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Director Education

BANGLADESH ARMY JOURNAL
60TH ISSUE DECEMBER 2016

Contents

Editorial

It is always a pleasure to present the latest issue of Bangladesh Army Journal covering the contemporary trends and perspectives of military profession. The articles of 60th issue give insights into a wide panorama of military profession with vivid pictures on military operations, administrations, UN peacekeeping, professional military education, organizational and national interest, social media, etc. We do harbour an optimistic view that the thought provoking articles of this issue would provide our readers some enjoyable moments of reading.

The present world is progressing in multidimensional forms and ways. Knowledge on various disciplines has to be explored to keep pace with this ever advancing world. In this perspective, our valued writers of this journal continue to take us to the frontiers of new possibilities and promote farsighted concepts exploring the untrodden arena of professional life. As a result, this journal reflects as the mirror of the gradual professional development, progress and prosperity of Bangladesh Army by the continual zeal and enthusiasm of our inquisitive writers.

Finally, we are truly grateful to all the writers who contributed for this issue despite their busy schedule of professional commitments. We would feel amply rewarded if the readers find the issue worth reading and satisfying. Apart from this, we would like to thank all concerned for cooperating us in publishing the journal. We are optimistic that the writers would keep sharing their ever flowing fountains of ideas in the future issues to produce even better articles for our esteemed readers.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) - A CONCEPT NEEDS MORE ATTENTION IN MILITARY

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Introduction

The education, designed to ensure the mastery of a body of specialized knowledge in the multi-disciplinary fields in ensuring growth of professionalism in the military, can enable military officers, irrespective of levels, to undertake functions within and beyond the Armed Forces. The firm grasp of such education, also termed as Professional Military Education, is vital. The learning obtained through PME shapes the activities of a nation's military to interpret war and other conflicts, and enables in performing the roles as part of multi-disciplinary national and international efforts. The composition and attribution of such education play an important role in the formation of specialized military competencies that permit the military to perform its all functions under various odds and challenges.

Although Bangladesh is a small developing nation in South Asia, she has her huge strategic contexts and concerns not only as the largest contributor in peacekeeping throughout the world, but also for the changing security perceptions of 21st century with the balance tilting towards the non-traditional security concerns/threats. Non-traditional security concerns/threats, for Bangladesh to be more concerned in particular, are the climate change, environment, radicalization /extremism and water security. Thus, PME demands due priority for Bangladesh too. Besides, it is also an obligation of military authority from at least ethical point of view to provide required education to its members to develop their full potentials – even to be materialized after retirement from the service.

The term 'Professional Military Education (PME)' is not still in much use in Bangladesh Armed Forces, neither the concept is yet clear to many. But the concept of PME and its framework is prevalent and very much in use in the military in the name of Higher Education. Although Higher Education is yet to be institutionalized within the ambit of goals and objectives of the Armed Forces, its strategic ambits and paradigm needs an assessment. This paper aims to discuss the concept of PME and its significance, take a look at the PME structure of Bangladesh Armed Forces and suggest some ideas of looking ahead. This paper will mainly deal with the PME for the military officers only.

Understanding the Concept of PME and Its Significance

With whatever variations Professional Military Education (PME) may have been defined, fundamentally it entails the 'education and training' needed in military for obtaining optimal level of professional mastery by its personnel for performing their desired roles in military and services beyond the military. Unless the purpose of PME is well understood in its true meaning and implications, it will be difficult to a great extent to really understand the concept of PME. It will

be difficult to really differentiate between Military Training and Professional Military Education looking at the purpose in its simple meaning. In simple term, the purpose of any military training is also the same as stated above. But the concept of PME entails much deeper understanding of the optimal level of professional mastery needed for performing the desired roles; what the desired roles are; and what the education needs are in achieving the optimal level of professional mastery/professionalism. Ascertaining optimal level of professionalism/professional mastery, by any means, is extremely difficult.

In simple term, optimal level of professionalism in military widely and generally refers to having the best-trained officers and men with full vigour and values to be proficiently employed in military operations. But such a definition is no more complete in today's context. Study conducted on US military's performance indicates that, in the most important area of professional expertise - the connection of war to policy, of operations to achieve the objectives of the nation - the American military has been found wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, and battle has been manifested for a generation or more, but not so with strategy. That may have led the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Skelton Panel and the 2010 follow up study of USA to have clearly outlined the desired goal for PME that is the **intellectual agility** to develop leaders by conveying a broad body of professional knowledge and developing the habits of mind including intellectual curiosity, coupled with openness to new ideas. US Congress in its Goldwater-Nichols Act has defined "value" in terms of senior military leaders as **intellectually agility** from being operationally proficient to have the knowledge and education to be strategic, critical thinkers.

In the words of Carl von Clausewitz, "...war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." Clausewitz continued with the important notion that the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. These ideas reflect a rational connection between policy and military activities, which pertains to interpreting war and other types of conflict, as well as comprehending the linkages of these military activities to the state. That is why, optimal level of military professionalism mainly depends on the country's political, economic and strategic contexts, its national security perceptions, its political system, its role in the international arena and its looks towards future. As all these factors are subject to change depending on changing global environment and strategic context, optimal level of professionalism may thus vary depending on the country to country and time. Samuel P Huntington in his seminal book *State and the Soldier said* in 1957 that out of three military traditions technicism, *popularism* and *professionalism,* true propensity should be towards *technicism.* This may, however, make sense till today at the operational and tactical levels, but strategic leaders need different skills at this century.

There are two clearly defined major roles that the military officers are needed to perform in service: the primary role of war fighting and conflict management; and secondary role of contributing in the multi-disciplinary national and international efforts. Such secondary roles may include working as defence attaches/counsellors at the missions abroad, jobs on deputation to the

various government offices like ministries, corporations, socio-economic installations, intelligence organizations, para-military forces; duties in assistance to the civil administration; and any jobs under UN auspices and/or multi-national umbrella including peacekeeping, peace-making and peace building. Such are the roles/functions getting more importance in this 21st century, era of globalization, and facing more challenges to the military creating more demands of appropriate Professional Military Education (PME).

Military officers and men throughout the world with no exceptions retire from active service at relatively early age than that of their civilian counterparts. One of the major reasons of retiring military officers/men at the comparatively early age is to maintain optimum standard of physical fitness in active service. But the retired officers/men retain enough potentials - both mentally and physically – in rendering their knowledge, experiences, skills and wisdom at the service of the nation and at some selected areas of military. Their potentials, particularly potentials of officers, are rather more viable in the economy of scale for their knowledge and experiences, more-or-less in almost all the fields of work sphere like administration; human resource management; science and technology; command, leadership and management; and to some extent in business and economy beside the instilled values, discipline and rigour in them. If the nation wants to re-utilize their potentials as the trained and valued human resource of the nation, it is also of great significance to develop military officers and men while in the service for their post-retirement rehabilitations/employment. Even if speaking from moral/ethical obligations of a state to its citizens that is 'to develop full potentials of human beings for rendering service to the nation till the last', it becomes an obligation of the military to educate its officers/men for enabling them to render their service for the cause of the nation/national development till they retain their potentials. Such a requirement of developing military officers for post-retirement employment in any political and strategic field of work would require sound PME.

PME in Bangladesh Armed Forces

The term 'Professional Military Education (PME)' is not still in much use in Bangladesh Armed Forces, neither the concept is yet clear to many. But the concept is prevalent and very much in use in our existing training structure and higher education framework. Beside the higher education framework, some of the training courses and system have integrated matters of higher education, and national and international studies. But the vital questions are – is our PME designed to develop military officers to face the challenges of 21st century in performing all the roles as discussed above? Has the structure been designed in commensuration with goals and objectives of the Armed Forces, higher education paradigm, and strategic needs? Besides, it is also needed to be analysed: what is being taught, by whom is being taught and how effective are those. But without any in-depth research what can be said is that, with no exception to many countries of the world, military education in Bangladesh has always been viewed limited to its traditional domain of tactics, strategy, conflict and war; and purpose of its education has hardly been contemplated to develop its human skill for beyond the service. Some military leaders are still observed in their disdain for academics, and they exhibit sometimes open anti-intellectualism.

An overview of the military training structure in Bangladesh shows that military training is provided both at pre-commission and post-commission stages. Pre-commission training for officers, basically conducted in the academies of three services, is aimed to mould the young students of higher secondary level into military officers and to make them a graduate. Initially starting with 6 months' short courses, Pre-commission training continued with 2 years' courses for about four decades. It is just in year 2015, military has introduced 4 years' long courses and included academic programs on engineering degrees of various discipline, and subjects like IR, Economics and BBA.

Post-commission training is enlarged throughout the career at basic, mid and higher levels according to the professional requirements of those levels and the facets of military activities are mostly tactical, operational and strategic. Post-commission training has three important dimensions towards the development of professionalism: training on respective services, training on joint warfare/operations and training on national security and strategy. Basic trainings are purely on military conducted through basic courses and other fundamental/ utility courses within 5-6 years of service length, which aims to orient officers with respective arms/services and provide foundations on handling weapons/equipment, military science and technology and basic staffing, command and leadership functions. Mid-level trainings are conducted for the officers within 8-12 years of service length aiming to train on unit level command, tactical and technical courses applicable for both joint operations and service oriented professional development. For example, mid-career courses, staff course, unit command course etc. Although mid-level trainings are mostly military oriented, a few of the courses include very few lessons/lectures on the national and international affairs. Senior/higher level trainings are aimed to provide training on higher level commands, joint operations, national security and strategy for the officers above 14-15 years of service length. For example, war course, national defence course etc.

Training in military is a continuum, in that each level builds upon the previously gained knowledge and short cuts or voids in that continuum may prevent full growth of individuals as military commanders or staff. Training designed in our Military at tactical level may be enough for the officers functioning at tactical levels in discharging their duties effectively in fighting battles and engagements, but may not be enough for the same level officers in discharging their duties related to multi-disciplinary functions at national and international spectrum. Such a level of training, surely, would not be enough for the officers retiring at that level to be effectively re-employed at the service of nation (in the jobs beyond that level of military functions). Similarly, training designed in our Military at operational level may be enough for the officers functioning at that level in discharging their duties effectively, but they shall be handicapped in performing the roles beyond the armed forces at national and international spectrum both in service and as retired as well. But training imparted to senior officers functioning at strategic level may be of some use in performing the roles beyond the armed forces, while in service and as retired, due to their academic exposures in higher level courses and experiences. They may, however, still lack in the mastery of a body of specialized knowledge required for effectively functioning in those roles.

Here lies the importance of higher education or PME which can prepare all level military officers with the intellectual agility from being operationally proficient to have the knowledge and education to be strategic, critical thinkers. Because the learning obtained through PME shapes the activities of a nation's military to interpret war and other conflict, and enables in performing the roles as part of multi-disciplinary national and international efforts. The composition and attribution of such education plays an important role in the formation of specialized military competencies that permit the military to perform its all functions under various odds and challenges.

Although higher education and its paradigm in Bangladesh military is yet to be institutionalized within the ambit of goals and objectives of the Armed Forces, strategic needs and assessments, still its higher education and training structure gives an encouraging look in achieving the professional mastery in performing desired roles in both within and beyond the Armed Forces. Introduction of 4 years' academic programs in the pre-commission training is expected to provide strong foundations to the cadets for the development of professionalism with required vision and knowledge. Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP), Military Institutes of Science and Technology (MIST) and Armed Forces Medical College have been effectively contributing in the fields of pure and applied science, arts, business, economy, engineering and medical science for the selected military officers and civilians. Establishment of five more medical colleges, four engineering institutes and two business institutes in Army in 2014 has given it a tremendous boost. Officers in service and on retirement can avail the evening programs offered by BUP and Business Institutes in their pursuit of academic excellence including PhD. Command and Staff Course, beside the required military training, provides limited study on some key national and international issues including researches; and provides academic degree equivalent to masters. War course includes studies on joint operations and national security including key national and international issues and researches; and provides academic degree equivalent to masters. National Defence Course (NDC) provides comprehensive packages of security, strategy, economics, development and international system/relations to senior level military and civil services officers of home and abroad. National Defence Course also provides academic degree equivalent to masters and offer MPhil and PhD degrees. Of late, National Defence College has started with a two-weeks course named 'Capstone Course', for the very high officials, generals, politicians, businessmen, secretaries of the government including parliament members with a view to developing strategic thinking and deepening civil-military relations amongst them.

Overall analyses of the higher education/PME structure of Bangladesh, however, reflect a number of drawbacks and difficulties. Analyses on it can be summarised as under:

a. The Concept of PME has not yet got momentum in Bangladesh, mainly due to the inability on the part of its military to develop strategic culture and strategic thinking in all spheres. Same is true for the civilian counterparts who are mainly in the seat of policy making. Some of their mind-set on higher education for military is yet to be positive.

b.   Higher education structure for military has not been developed on any strategic needs and assessment of the government. Neither these have been synchronised with goals and objectives of military. Higher education in military has, by far, remained the concerns of military only, although universities/colleges of Armed Forces have the formal hierarchical control of civil authority. Similarly, training system and practices of Bangladesh Armed Forces and its training courses, particularly of higher levels, although integrate limited studies on national and international affairs, have not been linked with any national level specific strategic goals/needs.

c.   Higher/mid-level training courses in Bangladesh does not provide opportunity to all officers for educating on the subjects required to perform roles beyond the Armed Forces. Only few officers are selected to go through staff course, war course and national defence course. Similarly, a large body of military officers cannot undergo any higher educational programs. Selected military officers from engineers and signals corps of Army / similar branches of other services are allowed to undergo academic degrees from MIST. Some willing officers can, however, undertake degree programs from BUP and other business and academic universities/institutes at their own accord and expenses depending on their posting and facilities.

d.   PME in military lacks in sound approach that shapes strategic education from the lower to the higher level. A very few selected officers may only be lucky to have the continuum maintained in getting strategic education from the lower to the higher level by undergoing all three courses - staff course, war course and NDC.

e.   Although very senior military officers will play at strategic level and are likely to be involved in making strategic level decisions concerning national defence and security, they will have to be assisted by the staff officers of various levels. Staff officers trained at tactical and/or operational level may not have the adequate wisdom/knowledge on the national defence, security and geo-politics required for supporting the decision making at that level.

f.   Military officers, irrespective of any levels of seniority, will require higher education for contributing in the multi-disciplinary national and international efforts such as working as defence attaches/counsellors at the missions abroad, jobs on deputation to the various government offices like ministries, corporations, socio-economic installations etc; duties in aid to the civil administration; and any jobs under UN auspices and/or multi-national umbrella. But due to the voids in the continuum of training and education and for not getting due opportunities of higher education in military, military officers in general lack in the desired capabilities to perform such roles.

g.   There is no formal higher education/training structure/system in Bangladesh military to develop military officers to be effectively re-employed in the service of the nation on post-retirement and to maximise their full potentials.

h.   Even after serving the armed forces for decades and after undergoing specialized training related to art/science of warfare, members of the Armed forces find themselves without any

equivalence academic degree (except those who have undergone staff course or war course or national defence course).

j.   As war is no more alone the functions of military, civil-military relation is vital for undertaking any strategic level tasks related to war and conflicts and any other joint/combined tasks/missions related to state. Thus, it is necessary for the civilian counterparts to have the knowledge and shared vision on national security and strategy in contemplating war and conflicts. But in Bangladesh, higher education paradigm in public/private universities very seldom encompasses degree on Defence and Security Studies. As a result, not only our civilian counterparts are handicapped, but also it does not develop faculty in this field of study. Due to the scarcity of adequate faculty/academicians in the field of defence and security, Staff College and National Defence College run shortage of adequate resource personnel and depend mostly on a few available.

k.   It is seldom realized in Bangladesh that all policies –be it foreign policy, economic policy, defence policy etc. stem from national security policy. Thus, unless adequate knowledge on security related issues are imparted to the government officers and policy makers, nation will remain handicapped in full proof policy formulation. But only National Defence College provides opportunity to a very few civil services officers at additional/joint secretary level and police officers at Deputy Inspector General level, out of a large body of civil services and other government officers, to undergo training of similar kind.

l.   It is yet to become a culture in Bangladesh military to assign officers, particularly to the assignment beyond the Armed Forces, basing on the requisite professional education and qualification. Thus, awareness amongst the officers on the requirement of PME has not been developed.

What Can Bangladesh Do?

From the above analyses, it can be inferred that formal training/education structure of military in Bangladesh, other than the few courses like staff/war/defence courses, is not adequate to attain optimal level of professionalism for performing/undertaking roles beyond the Armed Forces –be it in service or on post retirement. This may, however, be sound for activities/functions within the Armed Forces. What can then Bangladesh do in educating and adequately preparing military officers to face the strategic security challenges holistically, to formulate policies basing on research and informed inputs as well as for undertaking roles beyond the Armed Forces, as and when assigned. Some of the measures that Bangladesh can undertake are, of course, not limited to:

a.   Develop strategic culture and strategic thinking at least from mid-level.

b.   Align all the services' joint training towards a common goal that considers the context which relates to the bigger picture of strategic environment and will connect the levels from the tactical to the strategic. c. Further facilitate the higher education of military officers – at both own and organizational accord.

c. In order to develop interests and insights on national and international system, international relation, geo-politics, strategy and economy etc, some compulsory course on security and strategic studies in the light of national defence course may be introduced for relatively shorter duration (10-12 weeks) for the mid-level military and civilian officers (major/lieutenant colonel and equivalent civilian counterparts). Such a course will not only fill the void of the strategic education from the lower to the higher level, but also greatly contribute in developing civil-military relation and strategic understanding.

d. Incorporate defence and security studies to the reputed universities for developing wider faculties and academicians in this field. Selected military officers from all levels also should formally be allowed at the organizational accord to undertake courses on defence and security studies from these universities.

e. Appropriate rehabilitation program(s), based on sound research, may be introduced in Armed Forces for the officers of all level for preparing them for post-retirement employment.

f. Bangladesh government may develop policy on the absorption of retired military officers in various government jobs basing on their background education and specialization. Such a policy will inspire military officers to undergo more educational programs at their own accord and thus promote PME and development of professionalism in military.

g. Bangladesh Armed Forces may actively consider arranging equivalent academic degrees for the training that the military personnel have to undertake in their service. Training and its grading system may be reviewed, if necessary, in order to accommodate the PME and necessary educational programs.

Conclusion

The term 'Professional Military Education (PME)' is not still in much use in Bangladesh Armed Forces, neither the concept is yet clear to many. However, the concept of PME and its framework is prevalent and very much in use in the military in the name of higher education. Higher education structure is, however, yet to be institutionalized within the ambit of goals and objectives of the Armed Forces, higher education paradigm and strategic needs and assessments of the state. In the higher education framework of Bangladesh military, some of the training courses and system have integrated matters of higher education, and national and international studies. But with no exception to many countries of the world, military education has always been viewed limited to its traditional domain of tactics, strategy, conflict and war; and purpose of its education has hardly been contemplated to develop its human skills for beyond the service. Although the purpose of PME is 'to obtain optimal level of professional mastery for performing the desired roles in military and service beyond the military', formal training/education structure of military in Bangladesh, other than the few courses like staff/war/defence courses, is not adequate to attain optimal level of professionalism for performing/undertaking roles beyond the armed forces –be it in service or on post retirement.

In contemplating the war and conflicts, as war is no more alone the functions of military, it is necessary for the civilian counterparts to have the knowledge and shared vision on national

security and strategy. But in Bangladesh, higher education paradigm in public/private universities very seldom encompasses degree on defence and security studies. As a result, not only our civilian counterparts are handicapped in this regard, but also it does not develop faculty in this field of study. It is seldom realized in Bangladesh that all policies –be it foreign policy, economic policy, defence policy etc. stem from national security policy. Thus, unless adequate knowledge on security related issues are imparted to the government officers and policy makers, nation will remain handicapped in full proof policy formulation.

Although very senior military officers will play at strategic level and are likely to be involved in making strategic level decisions concerning national defence and security, but they will have to be assisted by the staff officers of various levels. Staff officers trained at tactical and/or operational level may not have the adequate wisdom/knowledge on the national defence, security and geo-politics required for supporting the decision making at that level.

Some of the major steps that Bangladesh can undertake in educating and adequately preparing both military and civil officers to face the strategic security challenges holistically are: develop strategic culture and strategic thinking at least from mid-level; introduce a compulsory course on security and strategic studies, in light of national defence course, for relatively shorter duration (10-12 weeks) for mid-level military and civil service officers; align all the services' joint training towards a common goal that considers the context related to the bigger picture of strategic environment, and incorporate defence and security studies to the reputed universities.

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Professional Military Education...

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SWARNO DWEEP – A TREASURE ISLAND FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

Brigadier General Md Main Uddin, psc, G

Introduction

Swarno Dweep (SRD) is an island which is located towards the South of Subarno Char, Noakhali, in the estuary of Meghna river. It is towards 03 kilometers (km) South West of URIR Char, 4.5 km North West of Sandhip and 13.5 km North East of Hatiya island. It is an island which dominates the Hatiya – Sandhip channel and Caring Khal channel. In 1990's and 2000's, the island was used by pirates for various anti-social, smuggling, dacoity, kidnapping and collecting ransom etc. As a result, in early 2013, Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina entrusted the responsibility to Bangladesh Army for the socio-economic development of the island for the use of surrounding people restoring the law & order situation vis-a-vis fulfilling the training needs of the Army. On 14 November 2013, formal government order[1] was published by the Ministry of Land. In a bird's eye view, half of the island is open & flat and the rest of the land is thickly vegetated, the soil of the area is salty but fertile. Due to openness, the island offers huge opportunity for conducting almost all types of training for Brigade size force. It is easily possible to deploy a Brigade size force (with all its affiliated elements as per doctrinal layout and conduct maneuver without any hindrance. There is no other big area which offers similar facilities for conducting the training in Bangladesh. It allows driving of tanks for 18 kms (at a stretch) area at a speed of 30-35 kmh, which is impossible in other parts of the country. It allows conduct of all types of firing but at this moment it is not allowed due to the absence of master plan and many other factors. In addition to the training facilities, it offers cultivation of paddy, production of coconut, afforestation projects, fisheries project, development of farms (cow and buffalo fattening, milk extraction, cheese production, goose production etc) etc. The island has enormous potentials both for conducting training and socio-economic development projects for the area. In addition, the island opens doors for many research and development projects like solar power plant, bio-gas projects, wind mills etc.

SRD is a virgin island with hardly any habitations and few bathans[2] which can be used for any purpose (be it training, socio-economic development projects, afforestation, research & development projects etc). In the scope of conducting training, island can be converted for multipurpose training like FIBUA, counter terrorism, Riverine Operations, Special Forces Training, airborne operations, assault river crossings, bridgehead operations etc. In addition to the use of the island for training purpose, the presence of Army and implementation of socio-

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[1] Government Order was published in favour of Bangladesh Army for a permanent lease, with the clause of security of coastal char areas, maintaining law and order situation and afforestation on 14 November 2013 by Ministry of Land.

[2] Bathan is a place composed of 2-3 huts, constructed over a raised ground and has 2-3 ponds for collecting sweet water. Sheep, cows and buffalos are fattened here by the owners. The raised ground is used for protection of human and animals from water surge, cyclones, tide water etc and ponds are used for collecting sweet water harvesting to be used by humans and animals.

economic development projects is enhancing the overall development of the island and surrounding areas for future inhabitants. The festivity of the island also allows implementation of projects for island protection and environmental friendly projects which will add value to the economy of the country. The island can also be used for research and development of many new projects like solar power plants, wind mills, bio-gas projects etc. As such, the existing potentiality and future use of the island will make it a treasure island for Bangladesh Army.

In this paper an attempt has been made to familiarize SRD to the readers, and forecast the opportunities available for Bangladesh Army. It shall also include the wish list for conducting training, socio-economic development projects and concept of constructions in the island.

Location of Island

SRD is located at $22^°25^´7.10^″$ to $22^°37^´22.90^″$ latitude and $91^°11^´57.10^″$ to $91^°22^´13.40^″$ longitude. It is situated 3 km away from the south west of URIR CHAR, 4.5km North West of SWANDIP and 13.5 km North East of HATIYA.

Terrain Analysis of SRD

SRD (SRD) is an island which is located in the estuary of Meghna River in the Bay of Bengal. It is separated from mainland by a khal named Caring khal (Meghna Channel). The area is generally flat and open, and it is 28 km from North East to South West and 14 km from North to South. The area is distinctly divided into two halves; one half is thickly vegetated by Keora plantation of $5^´-8^´$ height which was planted by World Bank and the rest of the place is absolutely open and flat which can be compared to the surface of hockey fields. The island has distinctly three parts, northern tip which is north of Lamia's Khal is low lying and generally remains water logged due to tide water. It is soft and movement of foot & vehicle is difficult during rainy season. However, during dry season (November to mid-April), it remains little dry, yet movement of vehicle is completely restricted, but foot infantry movement is possible with caution. The southern most part, which is at the south of Baro Awolia Khal is divided into two types of lands. The southern tip is similar to the northern tip of the island but the area, close to Baro Awolia Khal, is absolutely like hockey field and during dry season movement of foot infantry and soft skinned light vehicle is possible. But during monsoon only foot infantry can move in that area. The area is criss-crossed with numerous canals originated from the Bay of Bengal. During high tide in monsoon, the island goes under water by almost 1-2 feet making all types of movement difficult. The island is usable for conducting maneuver training from mid-november to mid-march.

Opportunities for Training in SRD

General Description. In general, SRD offers opportunity for conducting all types of maneuvers for both foot and mechanized elements including supporting and services elements. Due to terrain and weather condition, SRD is now being utilized only for 3-4 months (dry season); but it can be utilized for the whole year. It should be used by all the elements of Army (including riverine assets, commandoes, and Special Forces etc.) throughout the year. Arms and

Service commando cadres can organize exercises in this island throughout the year. However, SRD uniquely offers the opportunity for conducting exercises to the formations; those are otherwise not possible to conduct in the formation training area(s) or area of responsibility. A stereo type defense or attack is not in focus, rather those practices which cannot be imparted to under commands like showing of whole battalion counter penetration position, passage of line of Brigade Reserve once launched, section clearing drill, staging forward of Brigade reserve, covering troops battle, layout of delay lines etc. should in focus.

Types of Training Can Be Conducted. SRD offers an area to employ a Brigade size force with all its supporting and service support elements as contemplated in Doctrinal Template. It is true for all types of operations including bridgehead operations. SRD can also be utilized for training throughout the year. Following table shows the season and types of exercises to be conducted in SRD:

November – March	April – October	Other Potentials
1. Attack (Brigade group attack with full components) 2. Advance to Contact 3. Extensive maneuver training for tank and APC (driving & negotiating obstacles) 4. Mechanized Infantry Training 5. Security Zone Battle 6. Joint Exercises	1. Special Forces Training (Survival exercise, tracking, fire and move in the jungle etc.) 2. Riverine Engineers Training	1. Defense (Battalion group defense focusing contingencies i.e. counter penetration, local counter attack, launching res). Classical defense may not be in focus. 2. Air borne operations, counter air borne operations, anti-heliborne operations 3. Large scale raid (on gun position, on landing strip etc.) 4. Engineers training (obstacle system, mine laying/breaching, explosives training etc.)

Facilities for Training in SRD.

a. Headquarters, Army Training and Doctrine Command (HQ ARTDOC) in coordination with Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate (AHQ, GS Br, MT Dte) has already prepared a comprehensive plan for making a maneuver area comprised of 164 cluster villages. The plan is in the implementation process and 35 cluster villages have already been prepared. The phase one of the project is supposed to be completed in 2018.

b. A Fighting in the Built-Up Area (FIBUA) village complex is also planned to be constructed in SRD. This will allow practicing all variants of FIBUA (like firing in various types of targets, actions with various battle field sounds, various enemy situations, various types of buildings (shops, huts, mosques, strong points, markets, open squares etc). In addition to FIBUA, it will also facilitate conducting training on Counter Terrorism.

c. **Field Firing of Various Weapons**. The scope of conducting all types of firing in SRD is very evident. Firing can vary from sub-caliber to small arms to heavy weapon firing. In all possibility, sub-caliber firing can be conducted in any part of the SRD, especially in the south-western part of the island. Although, the scope and necessity do not suggest conducting of isolated small arms firing but it may be conducted in the form of jungle lane shooting or reflex action shooting (as part of overall exercise plan). However, there are scopes and areas available for heavy weapon firing including artillery firing but the ground is not suitable to sustain the impact of heavy weapon firing. Due to the soil condition, heavy weapon firing, demolition and artillery firing may not be conducted in SRD now. However, live mine laying and training is possible and may be conducted in SRD.

d. **Special Training Areas**. The thickly vegetated area in SRD can be utilized for the training of Special Forces like commandoes. They can conduct exercises like tracking, fire and move, survival training etc. Arms and Services Commando cadres can also conduct their exercises in this area.

e. **Wish List to Conduct the Training in SRD**. In addition to the maneuver ground, field firing facilities, FIBUA complex, special training areas etc., there are other wish list to conduct the training in SRD. The probable wish lists area is as follows:

   (1) Drop zone for Special Forces and Para-units.

   (2) Riverine engineers training area.

   (3) Engineers training area including live mine training.

   (4) Two/Three jetty (Two in SRD and another in Chairman Ghat).

   (5) Cyclone shelters as accommodation.

   (6) A landing strip.

   (7) Adequate watercraft for the crossing of maneuver troops and troops stationed in the island.

   (8) Helipad capability of night landing (one in each camp).

   (9) Small arms firing range/reflex action shooting complex.

   (10) Air defense firing range.

   (11) Live firing area for infantry and artillery.

   (12) Area Pillar.

   (13) Main artery road.

   (14) Crossing point (bridge/culvert).

   (15) Training Store.

The wish list to conduct the training is attached as Annex C.

A Central Organization for SRD.

a. Presently AHQ, GS Br, MT Dte and Quarter Master General's (QMG's) Branch, Movement & Quartering Directorate (M&Q Dte) looks after the SRD through Area Headquarters (HQ), Comilla & Task Force HQ Comilla C/O: 33 Artillery Brigade. There are multifarious tasks including operations, training, construction, maintenance, movement & quartering etc. to conduct the training, ensure the maintenance of island & prepare SRD for future requirement.

b. In order to mitigate all the above actions, often all directorates, Task Force HQ and other stakeholders need to sit for coordination, yet there remain grey areas. On the other hand, maneuver brigades conduct exercise in SRD, also need to carry out a lot of coordination, as such, there is a vacuum & it becomes difficult for AHQ, GS Br, MT Dte to coordinate all aspects. Besides, over the years, the conduct of exercises has become monotonous. As such, if a central organization would have been present, the one ended contact & coordination could be enough for all (be it exercise planning, reconnaissance, coordination, future planning, implementation of all projects, etc). The group may be named as SRD Combined Planning Group (SRD CPG). As such, there is a requirement of a central organization, which may have following responsibilities:

(1)   Coordinate and conduct of exercises with maneuver Brigade Commander/ group.

(2)   Coordinate and assist maneuver Brigade Commander/group in planning and conducting of exercise in SRD.

(3)   Train and provide enemy for conducting the exercise.

(4)   Evaluate the exercise on behalf or in conjunction of HQ ARTDOC.

(5)   Coordinate with Area HQ Comilla, all committees related to SRD and concerned directorates of AHQ.

(6)   Oversee implementation of maneuver ground, FIBUA village and all other training facilities.

(7)   Coordinate move of troops to and from SRD.

(8)   Coordinate logistic support of the maneuver troops and troops stationed for maintenance of SRD.

(9)   Suggest modification/improvement of maneuver area in SRD, and any other tasks given by Army HQ etc.

(10). The proposed organogram of SRD CPG may be as follows:

```
                        ┌─────────────────┐
                        │     SRD CPG     │
                        └────────┬────────┘
                        ┌────────┴────────┐
                        │  Headquarters   │
                        └─────────────────┘
```

Commander   - 1x Brigadier General
Deputy Commander   - 1x Colonel
Staff Officer (Operations)   - 1x Major
Staff Officer (Administration)   - 1x Major
Staff Officer (Planning)   - 1x Major

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┌──────────────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────┐  ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ Operations Planning Group│  │  Enemy Control   │  │ Logistic Planning Group  │
└──────────────────────────┘  └──────────────────┘  └──────────────────────────┘
```

Commander - 1x Colonel	Commander - 1x Colonel	1x Lieutenant Colonel
Staff Officer - 1x Lieutenant Colonel	Control - 1x Lieutenant	1x Major
(Operations)	Colonel	1x Captain
Staff Officer - 1x Major		
(Future Operations)		

Location and Command & Control of SRD CPG. SRD CPG will be stationed in Comilla cantonment. The details of command and control and relationship with the various stake holders are attached as Annex A.

Modus Operandi. The modus operandi for the SRD CPG will be as follows:

  a.   **General**. SRD CPG will coordinate and assist in planning of exercise by the maneuver Brigade Commander. In this regard, SRD CPG will initially brief the maneuver commander and his staffs (including control and umpire organizations) in its HQ. They shall also discuss the draft plan to conduct exercise. Thereafter, maneuver Brigade commander will visit SRD and carry out detailed reconnaissance. On completion of reconnaissance, the maneuver group again shall fall back to SRD CPG, discuss and modify the exercise plan and finally on return to the respective HQ, brings out exercise paper at least 15 days prior to the commencement of the exercise.

  b.   **Time Plan for Planning the Exercise**. In general, a 2 months' forward planning is a requirement to conduct an exercise of a Brigade group in SRD. It shall be a continuous process for SRD CPG for all the Brigade groups conducting exercise in SRD. A model of forward planning for a maneuver Brigade group is attached as Annex B (note that the commencement date for the exercise is taken as 01 December).

  c.   **Leaders Training**. Maneuver Brigade Commander is to come and meet SRD CPG and discuss the requirement of Army and Formations at least 90-120 (minimum 60) days prior to the commencement of the exercise. Maneuver Brigade Commander should be accompanied by his all commanding officers, officer commanding, control and umpire organizations representatives, etc. On return from SRD CPG, these echelons will train it's under command and prepare for the exercise in SRD.

d. **Maneuver Brigade Group**.

(1) They will be responsible for preparing final exercise paper and circulate to all concerned by D-15.

(2) They will be also responsible for exercise planning, coordination for movement and execution of exercise.

e. **Enemy.** Enemy will be controlled by SRD CPG. Enemy will be provided by the formations not attending the exercise at that point of time. The strength, training and coordination, in accordance with the exercise, will be done by SRD CPG.

f. **Control of Exercise**. Exercise will be controlled either by Enemy Commander or by a group of officers from player formation, under the supervision of SRD CPG. However, a tentative organization is appended below:

(1) Chief Control   - 1 x Colonel

(2) Enemy Control   - 1 x Lieutenant Colonel/1 x Major

(3) Logistics Control - 1 x Major

(4) 1 x Member from SRD CPG.

g. **After Action Review (AAR)**. AAR will be done in two phases, first: by the ground commander in site, second: by the Maneuver group commander along with the presence of SRD CPG centrally. In all cases, MT Dte and HQ ARTDOC representatives may also form part of the team to evaluate the exercises.

h. **Additional Responsibility of SRD CPG**.

(1) To oversee implementation of maneuver area in SRD as per approved plan.

(2) Coordinate with Area HQ Comilla, all committees related to SRD and concerned directorates of AHQ.

(3) Assist and suggest improvement/modification of maneuver plan.

(4) Suggest DOs and Don'ts for exercise brigades.

(5) Suggest modification of Standing Order of Procedure, if necessary.

(6) Ensure implementation of Standing Order of Procedure in SRD strictly.

(7) Suggest modification of training map.

Logistic Support. Maneuver brigade and his formation (player formation) will be responsible for the complete logistic support of the Brigade group. AHQ will only approve the plan for logistics and details will be planned, coordinated and supported by SRD CPG. Comilla Area will provide both fresh and dry ration to the Brigade group. It shall also facilitate the maneuver brigade for movement, logistic, accommodation, medical etc. in its area of responsibility.

Opportunities for Socio-economic Development Projects

SRD also offers enormous opportunities for socio-economic development projects to be implemented in the island. The water in the ponds and canals can be utilized for fisheries projects, the island can be earmarked for cattle grazing area and military farm can function well. Already a military farm has been established in which milk is extracted, cheese is produced and cow/buffalo fattening is also possible. The area also offers potentiality for bio-gas plants and it will be easy to establish in number of places. There are number of Bathans which needs to be relocated for number of reasons, and it should be done in one place. One area is selected in south western part of 'Baro Awolia Khal' for making "Mujib Killa". 'Mujib Killa' will be the place for re-location of bathans from entire island. In this area (Mujib Killa) a number of bio-gas plant can be constructed. The area also offers opportunity for crab fattening project, paddy cultivation, plantation, forestation etc. The wish list for socio-economic development projects are as follows:

    a.   Fisheries projects.

    b.   Mujib Killa (relocation of Bathans).

    c.   Water purification plants.

    d.   Medical facilities.

    e.   Workshop facilities.

    f.   Paddy fields

    g.   Cattle grazing area (buffalo/cow fattening projects).

    h.   Solar power plant projects.

    j.   Forestation.

    k.   Bio-gas plants, etc.

The probable areas for socio-economic development projects are attached as Annex D to this paper.

Miscellaneous Aspects

Dual Use of Land. Many part of the SRD can be used for Dual or multipurpose role. These areas may be thickly vegetated area i.e. south of Baro Awolia Khal and far down south areas.

Earmarking of Areas. There are requirement of earmarking of areas either by pillars or by any other means to avoid duplication/confusion.

Master Plan. There is a requirement of preparing master plan for SRD. It should cover exact location for each element or each wish list. This master plan should be the baseline for all development projects.

Concept of Construction. According to the report submitted by MIST, island is increasing in its size but it is stable. As such, all types of construction must be done in accordance with the master plan. A coordinated effort (AHQ, QMG's Br, AHQ, GS Br, MT Dte & TF HQ) must be pursued to convert the island for a place for training, socio-economic development projects and research & development projects.

Conclusion

SRD will be the major exercise area in the coming days. As such, a comprehensive guideline is necessary for the balance of development of the island, as well as effective training for the maneuver brigades. All concerned stakeholders (player formation, AHQ, Area HQ Comilla, TF HQ etc.) need to play their role to convert the island into an ideal training ground and utilize its other potentials to the fullest. It is not only the stakeholders but also the exercising brigades who should also prepare for reaping maximum benefit from the potentials of the SRD.

The maneuver exercise, generally entails a huge move with resources from Army and at times from sister services which needs lot of high level coordination. The cost of training also increases due to the movement and many other factors, as such the effort to get benefit from the training must be greater than that of its area of responsibility.

The process of converting the island into a complete maneuver area is continuing and side by side the other potentials of the island [like socio-economic development projects, ecological balance, afforestation, infrastructural and projects (like solar power, water purification etc.) complementing improved living conditions] are also being implemented. There is a requirement of a master plan for the SRD and all efforts directed towards development of the island must be coordinated by an apex body. Only in such case, the island will be utilized fully and in a planned manner. Bangladesh Army will definitely be benefitted from the training and socio-economic development projects potentials of SRD.

Recommendations

The recommendations are as follows:

a. A central organization (namely SRD CPG) need to be formed immediately and they should be given the overall responsibility of SRD.

b. There is a requirement of preparing a comprehensive master plan for SRD, basing on which all plans will be executed.

Annexes:
A. Proposed Command and Control (C2) Relationship of SRD CPG.
B. Time Plan for Exercise Planning.
C. Wish List to Conduct the Training in SRD.
D. Wish List for Socio-Economic Development Projects in SRD.

Swarno Dweep – A Treasure Island...

PROPOSED COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) RELATIONSHIP OF SWARNO DWEEP (SRD) COMBINED PLANNING GROUP (CPG)

ARMY HEADQUARTER, GENERAL STAFF BRANCH MILITARY TRAINING DIRECTORATE

- **Directive**
- Exercise Conduct Schedule
- After Action Review
- Budgeting

Swarno Dweep Combined Planning Group

Coordination

Player
- Exercise Planning
- Movement & deployment
- Conduct of Exercise
- After Action Review

Coordination

Area Headquarters Comilla
- Logistic Coordination
- Establishment
- Implementation Committee

Coordination

Sponsor Headquarters
- Exercise Planning
- Control of Exercise
- Umpiring

Operation Control

Enemy
- Training
- Movement
- Deployment

**ANNEX B TO
PAPER ON
SWARNO DWEEP**

TIME PLAN FOR EXERCISE PLANNING IN SWARNO DWEEP

Reconnaissance by Maneuvre Brigade Commander

Training of Enemy Starts

Exercise Paper Issued

| September | October | November | December |

Finalize Exercise Plan

Exercise Period

Maneuvre Brigade Commander Meets
Swarno Dweep Combined Planning Group

After Action Review Submitted to
Military Training Directorate and
Army Training & Doctrine Command

Swarno Dweep – A Treasure Island…

WISH LIST FOR CONDUCT OF TRAINING IN SWARNO DWEEP

Riverine Engineers Docking Area

Jetty

Cyclone Shelters

Fighting in the Built up Area Village

Artillery and Tank Range

Live Mine and Demolition Training Area

Infantry Heavy Weapon Firing Area

Drop Zone

Landing Strip

**Air Defence Firing Range**

Small Arms Firing Range

United Nations Pre - Deployment Training Area

SWARNO DWEEP

Maneuver Area – Phase 2

Special Forces Training Area

Maneuver Area – Phase 1

Maneuver Area – Phase 2

BAY OF BENGAL

22

**ANNEX D TO
PAPER ON
SWARNO DWEEP**

WISH LIST FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SWARNO DWEEP

Fisheries Project

Mujib Killa

Water Purification Plant

Medical Facility

Military Farm

Workshop

Solar Plant

Plantation

Relocation of Bathans

Bio Gas Plant

Paddy Field

Cattle Grazing Area (Can be in Caring Char also)

SWARNO DWEEP

BAY OF BENGAL

Swarno Dweep – A Treasure Island. . .

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Brigadier General Md Main Uddin, psc, G *was commissioned in the Corps of Artillery in December 1990. In addition to the basic military qualifications, he has completed Masters in Defence Studies, Masters of Science (Technical), Masters in Business Administration (major in Marketing) and Bachelor of Laws. Moreover, he has also completed Post Graduate Diploma courses on Disaster Management from the University of Dhaka. He is certified as Radiation Control Officer by Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission. Apart from serving in the artillery units, he has also served as Grade 3 Staff Officer (Operations) in an Infantry Brigade, Platoon Commander in Bangladesh Military Academy, Specialists Instructor in School of Infantry and Tactics (Tactics Wing) and Grade 2 Staff Officer (Foreign Affairs) in Armed Forces Division. He has commanded a Field Regiment Artillery more than 2 years and served as Grade 1 Staff Officer (Joint Operations) in Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters. He served for 2 years as an embedded officer in US military as "Strategic Planner" in United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida. Later on, he has also served as Formation Training Evaluator in Army Training and Doctrine Command. Currently, he is the Commander, 33 Artillery Brigade and Task Force Commander for Swarno Dweep.*

TRENDS OF INFANTRY BRIGADES' OPERATIONS – IMPERATIVES FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

Colonel Husain Muhammad Masihur Rahman, SPP, afwc, psc

Introduction

Evolution in doctrine, organization, tactics and concept of operation for different armies occurred following different tracks. Great armies defeated adversaries by unique tactics, innovative procedures and superior maneuver. Muslim army of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) won battle of Ahzab using unique 'ditch' in the battle of ditch. Napoleonic Army's victory was unique, for they used maneuver. German Army almost defeated the allied forces during WWII by their 'Blitzkrieg'. Vietnam defeated two great powers[1] by its unique guerrilla warfare[2]. Bangladesh Army is no different; it continually seeks to develop its capability to defend the country and excel further in military operations other than war.

Ever since the emergence, Bangladesh Army's performance both home and abroad has always exceeded the expectations: Army is maintaining high standard of professionalism. Army's present preparedness is based on erstwhile British doctrine, augmented recently with US style of war fighting. It has been felt that, Army's readiness should be of own blend to bring uniqueness in all performances. There had been directives to formulate defence policy incorporating Bangladeshi style of fighting ('Juddho Khetre Deshoj Drishtibhongi')[3]. Army has also taken steps to reorganize units with 'quality over the quantity'[4] since 1999. The restructuring of units[5] was done focusing primarily the infantry units. Some more innovations like the concept of Unconventional Warfare, introduction of Kill House, Viper training, confidence training for new soldiers, etc. are incorporated in the Army, yet there need to be many more. Tactical employment of the units remains as it was in the past, albeit the operational method remains a vintage.

In order to bring efficacy in operations, formations need winning formula and commanders need winning mentality. Present operational pattern of infantry brigades appears static and predictable. There is lack of novelty in operational training. Even with the given flexibility, little innovation is practiced by commanders at different levels, demanding innovative discourse in operational domain. From this point, the paper first focuses on brigade defence operations of different countries. Then the weaknesses of brigade operations in Bangladesh are discussed. Finally imperatives are delineated for Bangladesh Army to be a force with cutting-edge in modern military operations. The study is focused to Infantry Brigade' Operations in Bangladesh Army.

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[1] Vietnam defeated in 1954 and USA in 1963-75.

[2] Vietnam Guerrilla War was unique, though Mao Tse Tung was the first practioner.

[3] Bangladesh Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Affairs has directed Armed Forces Division in 2010.

[4] General Mustafiz Bir Bikrom, former Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh Army expressed his vision in these words many a time for force structuring.

[5] Infantry units' strength has been reduced to 470 from 800.

Tactical Level Operations – Comparison with Few Armies

Core Competence of Future Land Forces. Operational pattern depends mainly on core competence. Considering the emergence of Information Warfare, operations in the Electromagnetic spectrum and development of different new military thoughts, different nations are revising the core competence of their militaries. Core competences of some of the armies[6] are as follows:

Serial	USA	Russia	Japan	China
TABLE I - CORE COMPETENCE OF DIFFERENT ARMIES				
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Immediately responsive	Maneuverability	Long range precision Strike	Situational awareness
2.	Quickly deployable	Long Range Operations	Ability to concentrate fires	Maneuverability
3.	Agile	Combined operations	Target detection	Command and control
4.	Multi-functional	Infantry operations ability	Strategic and operations maneuver	Three dimensional and all depth attack
5.	Lethality		Joint Operations	Information and fire strike
6.	Survivality			Air Defence and anti-missile capability
7.	Continued support			Special operations
Source: Authors study basing on Brigade Command Course 2016, Nanjing, China				

Redefined core competence and resultant restructuring of different armies suggest that, future battlefield would be operated mainly by lighter forces. Brigades would replace 'Divisions' and may even operate as the main formation at operational level. Besides, there is a clear preference of smaller outfits, modular units and flat command-control structures. Smaller force is better in dealing with threat in limited wars, their deployment is quicker and lesser expensive. Lighter force would improve flexibility in operational employment and increase efficiency in deployment. Modular force would perform diversified tasks. Flatter structure is to take the advantage of networks and command-control assets. Because of these factors, Russian army has transformed its motorized divisions to motorized brigades, reducing their strength to 50%. US army is in the process of reorganizing its army into 73 Brigade Combat Team and 226 modular brigades. Chinese Army has reduced its 5 command levels[7] to 3 levels[8].

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[6] Su Kai Hua, Professor (Senior Colonel), Armed Forces Development Studies Department at Nanjing Army Command College, China- Class presentation of Force construction for Joint Operations under Information Condition on July 08,2016.

[7] Previous 5 layered command levels in Chinese Army are: Central Military Commission, Service Headquarters, Military Theatre, Army Corps and Division (and below).

Defensive Operations – An Overview on Some of the Armies in the Asian Region. It is at times unwise to compare the organization, doctrine, weaponry, tactics, etc. amongst different armies of the world because the comparison risks to ignore the threat perception, terrain and geopolitical context. However, there are certain aspects like organization, defensive framework, maneuver elements, etc. which are common ignoring the dissimilarities of threat, terrain and defence expenditure. With this backdrop an overview of tactical operations, mostly defensive, and the organization of the maneuver elements of a Brigade/ Battalion are stated below:

a. **Chinese Army**. Chinese Army shares the typical defensive layout like Bangladesh except the framework of the defensive operation and organization. The bayonet strength of an Infantry Battalion is less than that of Bangladesh Army. More emphasis is given on tank-hunting than that of Bangladesh Army.

b. **Myanmar Army**. Similar to the Bangladesh, Myanmar follows the same layout of a Brigade Defence with two forward Battalions and a depth Battalion. However, at the Battalion level, Myanmar Army keeps the fourth company as committed reserve in the depth for launching the local counter attack. The defence is organized keeping three/ two companies at the front. There is a 'last man last bullet' defence in Myanmar.

c. **Pakistan Army**. Pakistan Army differs from Bangladesh as the number of mechanized battalions are more than the light infantry. However, the major difference can vividly be observed in the field of reconnaissance where even the UAVs are employed at Brigade level. Use of modern gadget is proportional to the defence expenditure, but the essence of reconnaissance/ battle field awareness at tactical level can be an aspect that Bangladesh Army may consider basing on the above discussion.

d. **Sri Lankan Army**. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are fairly different in terms of geography. However, the concept of an wide frontage at the Battalion level with 3 companies at the front and attrition of the enemy by fire fairly ahead of the main defence are the doctrinal differences. Those can be counted for Bangladesh Army.

e. **Nepalese Army**. Nepalese Army is similar in case of layout of a Brigade Defence, but seldom utilizes two companies as depth in the battalion defence. Usually three companies are deployed at the front. Further, uncommitted reserve at battalion level is also practiced in the recent years considering the difficulties of employing the Brigade reserve due to terrain configuration. Hilly terrain is the primary determinant in Nepal army defence.

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[8] New 3 layered command levels of PLA are; Central Military Commission, Joint Command, Army component.

Maneuver Elements of Different Armies. A tabulated summary of the maneuver elements of different armies within and beyond the Asian Region is stated below:

Serial	Nations	Maneuver Battalions	Brigade Maneuver Element/ Task Organization						
			Positional defence	Reserve	Combat outpost	Reconn aissance and Strike Element	Support from Mobile /Special Force	Anti-tank Elem ent	Reserve at Battalion level
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)
1.	Myanmar	3	Y	Y	Y	-	-		Y
2.	Pakistan	3-4	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-
3.	USA	3	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y
4.	China	4-5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-
5.	Mexico	5	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-	Y
6.	Nepal	3	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	Y
7.	Ethiopia	3	Y	Y	-	-	Y		Y
8.	Zimbabwe	4	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	
9.	Sri Lanka	3	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	-

Criticism on Brigades' Operations in Bangladesh Army

Battalion Commanders' Psyche.

a.   **General**. Light infantry battalions' total strength was around 800 in different armies in the past. This was reduced to about 470 persons in Chinese army and to 525 in US Army. Infantry battalions' strength in Bangladesh though reduced from 850 to 740, yet the commanders' mind-set remains passive. Battalion commanders are yet to believe that much more can be done with four companies with 740 persons. If an infantry battalion with 470 strength can defend an area taking the advantage of favourable terrain[9], infantry battalions in Bangladesh must be able to do even better; to hold and to recapture that land when needed. This calls for changing the overt defensive mentality.

b.   **Imperatives**. Battalion commanders may be stimulated to plan deploying three companies in ground defence and his fourth company or part thereof may be allowed by Brigade commanders to employ as reserve.

World War II (WW II) Vintage Tactics.

a.   **General**. Tactical training on conventional warfare in many countries remains as backdated as that of WWII. Operational doctrine of the British army still forms unalterable basis of our operations and training. Pattern of Defence and attack at both battalion and Brigade level are at status-quo since long. Battalion defence, which stands on four pillars

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[9] Bangladesh is known as defenders paradise.

(represented by four companies-two companies forward and two companies in depth), is static both at physical and cognitive levels: defence with two companies up and one company in the depth with the 4th company as battalion reserve seems not an acceptable option. Though there is no restriction on deploying three or four companies in battalion defence, there is no literature in support of such practice either. Similarly the attack organization of both the battalion and brigade level remains routine and obvious. There is no variation and innovation in the preparation and methods of attack.

b.   **Imperatives**. Boldness and innovation is the key to success in modern day's operations. Brigade and battalions may be given more intelligence and reconnaissance capability, more maneuver options and more flexibility for organizing their outfits. Commanders need to be trained to be more assertive and given more flexibility for employing their units, through detailed doctrinal leverages on such aspects. Organizational modification would be excellent, yet optimum utilization of present organization can do a lot better. With available resources, brigades may organize reconnaissance and strike group to provide situational awareness, organize annihilation fire to apply concentrated fire while enemy advances, develop and employ Anti-tank Group to kill tanks in Tank Killing Area and form Deep Strike Group to conduct deep operations. Thus, in defence, brigades' maneuver elements would include Reconnaissance and Strike Group, Advance Position, Anti-tank Group, Deep Strike Group, Main Defence and Reserve. These entire elements may be formed or task-organized within present strength. In the attack, Brigades may organize Reconnaissance and Strike Group to provide situational awareness, Deep Strike Group to penetrate deep in enemy defence. Through appropriate training and practices, Fire Base must focus on application of fire both from static and moving positions. Protection of own information domain and incapacitating the enemy's one should be focused by strengthening the capability.

Approach to Intelligence and Reconnaissance.

a.   **Intelligence at Brigade Level**. Intelligence is one of the most important battlefield operating systems. There is no intelligence outfit at the brigade level, though there are provisions for intelligence coverage from division resources. Present battlefield environment, especially the introduction of Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence (C4I) system in Bangladesh Army and digitization of the forces demand each battalion to have own intelligence collection capability, while infantry brigade must have dedicated intelligence processing assets. Possibility of inclusion of UAVs with brigade may also be studied.

b.   **Approach to Reconnaissance**. Mechanized Infantry Battalions, Division Support Battalions and Armoured Regiments have reconnaissance platoons. Their employment concept has not yet been formalized. While brigade commander is to ensure the whole brigade sector is kept under surveillance[10], there is no dedicated force for reconnaissance in the brigade[11]. Our practice of reconnaissance seems to have a narrow meaning i.e. moving to

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[10]GSTP 0040, Infantry Brigade in Battle, Section 28 paragraph 1.
[11] GSTP 0040, Infantry Brigade in Battle, Section 1 paragraph 2 and annex A.

the enemy locations and return to prepare for the operation plan. Static reconnaissance from Spotter, Anchor Observation Posts, etc. are also there in scattered practices. Continuous feeding of information by Reconnaissance Force at brigade level is very precious for any operations and is practiced by many armies. Reconnaissance in force and armour sweep is also conducted by modern armies, used latest by US army during the Iraq war. Hence, organization and employment of reconnaissance force for the brigades need to be practiced to gain situational awareness of the battlefield.

c.   **Probable Options**. Situational awareness capability is a prime requirement of a modern force. For the least, infantry brigades in Bangladesh must have dedicated intelligence and medium range reconnaissance (upto 15-30 km) capability. In an Infantry Brigade, there are about 33 dedicated intelligence personnel[12], who are not utilized for actual intelligence duties. These persons are employed either as map marking assistant or as operations room staff instead. Necessary organizational modification may be made for the infantry brigades to have situational awareness capability. Dedicated or task-organized intelligence outfit from own resources may also solve intelligence and reconnaissance issue.

Source: Author

Figure I- Possible Intelligence and Command, Control, Communication and Computer Structure for Infantry Brigades

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[12] There are 09 intelligence persons in each infantry battalion totaling 27 (including three officers) and more 06 intelligence persons are available at the Brigade HQs.

d.   **Imperatives.** Dedicated intelligence outfits or task-organizing intelligence sections of battalions, brigade headquarters and the designated intelligence assets from the division intelligence unit needs to be done for effective brigade reconnaissance. These intelligence sections/assets may not necessarily be grouped for unified intelligence actions; rather they may be employed through appropriate intelligence training and planning from brigade level. These persons may be given well-structured combat intelligence training (may be combined with the viper training[13]) as per their appointment. Clerks may be trained to assist officers in map marking in the command posts. Along with intelligence and reconnaissance tasks, brigades will be able to conduct strike and sabotage acts on selected targets with this force.

Planning and Execution of Anti-tank Efforts.

a.   **Present Approach to Anti-tank Battles**. Anti-tank warfare has been incorporated in the doctrines[14] since the inception of tanks. Purpose of anti-tank warfare is to countermand the shock effects of tanks on infantry; preventing tanks to destroy the ground defence. In offensive operations, tanks are the first element, followed by mechanized infantry to arrive at defended locality. Conventional tactical maneuver of some armies 'advance lead by armoured/mechanized force till main defence is met, suggests that, threat offensive forces move in speed and stop only when faced with the main defence. If enemy can reach the defended locality with full tank strength, battalion defence is sure to face more troubles. Hence, defenders must try to strike the enemy mechanized column well ahead of main defence and throw the first major blow to enemy plan. Keeping all the anti-tank weapons at the defended localities, including at the depth, would be a waste during battles as these weapon system may not be able to utilize their longer range remaining within the defended localities. Our doctrine suggests destroying enemy armour at the greatest possible range[15] but we have neither planned for it, nor have we that in our practices.

b.   **Imperatives**. Killing tanks should be a priority task for the defenders. In our terrain, there will be few tank-able spaces in the brigade defended area. Enemy tanks may be killed in Tank Killing Areas, which should be developed ahead of the defended localities, similar to the arrangement of killing zones.[16]Within the available assets, Brigade Tank Killing Group may be organized along the likely axis of tank advance. Sixty percent of the total long range Anti-tank weapons[17] of the brigade would make about 20 ATGW systems, with which one or two Brigade Tank Killing Areas may be organized along the likely axis of tank advance between advance position and battalion screens. Planning for employing anti-tank group may be done at the brigade level, while the execution may be decentralized to the battalions. The operations may be conducted in the form of ambush or as a separate phase of operations.

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[13] Viper training has been organized in 24 Infantry division from 2012 and in 403 Battle Group in 2015. Through this commando type training, individual soldiers' capacity has been built to very high level.

[14]Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-tank_warfare, accessed on 10 July 2016.

[15] Infantry Brigade in Battle Section 28 paragraph 49.

[16] Though this is within present doctrine, appropriate anti-tank group is not being organized at any level. Tank Hunting Parties are being employed, but the anti-tank group needs to be far stronger, well-planned and more coordinated, even be employed by the brigade.

[17] Three battalions' total 24 ATGW system and additional minimum 8 ATGW systems from the division resources are available in the brigade. Fifty percent of these would make 18 -20 ATGW system available for Anti-tank efforts.

Source: Author

Figure II- Anti-Tank Group from Own Resources for Infantry Brigades

Information Warfare.

a.   Enemy would invariably strike first on the command-control system in future conflicts, either through physical operations or by electronic means. As the information technology advances, armies are fielding newer tactics and weapon system. Invention of soft-kill weapons and their employment would make brigade operation more vulnerable. Most of the armies, for example Chinese Army, put a lot of importance on information warfare as they consider information attack to take place during the preparation time of any operation. Brigades must have appropriate training to protect from such attack and be able to disrupt enemy's information weapons as much as possible. Protection of information domain from enemy attack must be integrated with the brigades by providing appropriate training and by strengthening the brigade communication units.[18]Besides, group training on information warfare is necessary to succeed in future battlefields.

b.   **Imperatives**. Information warfare Training must be incorporated in our group/combined training system. Besides, Jamming/anti-jamming capability may be achieved at least upto infantry/Mechanized/Armoured brigade level.

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[18] Presently this is performed by Brigade signal companies.

Transforming Fire Support into Fire Strike.

Fire support of different outfits in Bangladesh Army has been methodical and procedural, but has not been used as effective fighting element- it has the status of support element. Commanders at all levels need to realize the efficacy of fires and optimize it during engagements.

a. **Status of Fire**. Application of firepower is the essence of fire units. Joint operation increases the fire power of a force. Modern armies plan to reduce enemy strength by at least forty-percent employing different forms of fire before committing ground troops[19]. US Army uses the technique of 'attack by fire'[20] while Chinese army uses 'fire assault'[21] and 'annihilation fire'[22] during attack and defence respectively. Modern armies are developing and applying fire power to augment maneuvering forces. While brigade areas are supposed to be 'covered by pre-arranged fire', only 'Defensive Fire[23]' is not enough in modern defence.

b. **Imperatives**. Concept of fire support may be reoriented to fire attack as done by many armies. Infantry brigades may integrate the concept of 'attack by fire' or 'fire strike' with maneuver which will add more aggressive mentality in planning and execution. In addition, 'annihilation fire' may also be organized, developed and applied with available indirect fire assets including fire from Navy, Air force and other strategic assets on the enemy avenue of approach, similar to the use of Killing Zone.

Source: Author
Figure III- Fire Support to Fire Attack/Strike

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[19] Chinese army uses this as doctrinal teaching for launching ground troops.

[20] In US Army attack by fire is the Fires employed to destroy the enemy from a distance, normally used when the mission does not dictate or support occupation of the objective.

[21] Fire assault is the planned application of indirect fires on the enemy. This is done by Chinese Army during the attack operations by utilizing the ground and technical reconnaissance to bring fires on enemy.

[22] Annihilation Fire is the fire organized on a particular area ahead of forward defended locality to bring coordinated fire. This is done by organizing and developing the area, deploying reconnaissance assets and concentrate guns on the enemy when he is in the area.

[23] GSTP 0040, Infantry Brigade in Battle, Section 27 paragraph 1.

Deep Strike Force.

a.   **Necessity of Having a Deep Strike Force**. Infantry units/formations fight in close, main, reserve, deep and rear area operations. When fighting along the frontline goes on, a strike deep at the enemy, both during attack and defence, would divert his attention inwards. When enemy is compelled to look back, his main efforts would get weaker and would offer opportunity for defeating him. Hence infantry brigades may organize a dedicated or task-organized deep strike group from own resources.

b.   **Probable Options**. Deep strike group may be organized by implementing and augmenting Army's plan of 2011. Divisions may have a commando company and infantry battalions may have a commando platoon. The three well-trained commando platoons in the brigade would enable the brigade commanders to task-organize a deep penetration force for conducting deep operations. During the attack, such a force would act like a sword in the stomach of enemy commanders. These outfits would be great assets in low intensity conflict too. These APC borne special platoon would enhance battalion commander's confidence greatly.

Source: Author
Figure IV- Deep Strike Force for Brigades within Own Resources

c.   **Imperatives**. Specially trained platoons in all battalions will add extra capability for the battalions and brigades in both conventional and low intensity conflicts. As the commando

training facility is meager, this may initially be implemented by training 9th[24] or 12th platoon of each infantry battalion as commandos in accordance with the plan. Till the commando training capability is enhanced, one platoon each form all infantry battalions may be given 'Viper Training'. Brigades may be allowed to group these platoons together when the situation demands or else battalions may employ them in both defensive and offensive operations.

Brigade Organization for Attack.

a. Attack organization of infantry brigades is probably the most obvious pattern an enemy can expect. Occupation of FUP, Fire Base square to the objective, Two-Up attack, Follow-Up and Reorganization is the least an enemy commander would appreciate and remain prepared to counter. If the enemy commander may only determine the direction of attack, it is easier for any defender to repulse our attack. Hence, brigade attack need to be more offensive and challenging; novelty is the key in our attack.

b. For brigade attack, adequate intelligence must be gathered and situational awareness must be obtained by employing reconnaissance assets. As dedicated resources are available, this element may be task-organized from available assets as described in paragraph 10. Alongside this element, plan for deep strike by brigade element can do wonder for brigade attack. While the fighting at Start Line to objective is ongoing, a deep strike at the depth of enemy defence would work like a knife in the stomach. It would create dilemma and challenge in the minds of the enemy to face/tackle the situation. This will help divide enemy's efforts and thus will facilitate to capture the objective. Deep strike element can be organized as discussed.

c. **Fire Support and Fire Base for Attack**.

(1) **Fire Supports Attack by Fire**. Our fire support and fire base needs more focus. Reorientation of our thought process on fire attack or attack/assault by fire may be done as discussed.

(2) **Fire Base**. Effective application of fire on the enemy is the main objective of forces. But our concept of fire base square to the objective seems to be considered by many as a dictum than a guideline. In the open terrain, firebase square to the objective is an ideal arrangement but due to the presence of foliage along the line of fire, there is hardly any ideal terrain for that. Again the establishment and functioning static fire base right in front of the nose of the enemy main defence may not be easy at all. A Battalion may suitably position fire base, either static or moving, from where it can apply fires, not necessarily fire base is square to the objective only.

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[24] Providing special training to 9th platoon would be preferred to 12th platoon, as 4th companies are sometimes employed as brigade reserve or advance position.

Necessities for Future Operations - Bangladesh Army

Forces Development Trend. In accordance with the revolution in military affairs and the trend of world armies, it is obvious that brigades would be the main tactical outfits sooner or later. For better maneuverability and more effective operations, Bangladesh Army may study reorganizing its forces into brigade size modular force to function independently. All maneuver Brigades may be made Leaner, Modular and Self-Operating (independent operation ability) basing on detailed study. Till the restructuring is done, modifications and rearrangements of Battlefield Operating System at brigade level may be done for making brigade operations more effective as outlined in subsequent paragraphs.

Change of Psyche. Commanders need to function with novelty. Through doctrinal leverages, training and exercises, commanders may be encouraged to be bold and innovative. Army Training and Doctrine Command (ARTDOC) may gather and study new ideas as they may come from any sources. Battalion commanders may be allowed to plan for deploying three companies and may be allowed by Brigade commanders to employ his fourth company or part thereof as reserve.

Information Warfare. Appropriate attention must be paid to the revolution in military affairs, especially on the information domain. Information War Training must be incorporated in our group/combined training system. Besides, Jamming/anti-jamming capability may be achieved at least up to infantry/Mechanized/ Armoured brigade level.

Brigade Defence. Brigade defence should be organized by deploying appropriate resources. Within present strength, infantry brigade defence pattern can be two battalions in the forward, one battalion in depth and a brigade reserve. Besides, intelligence and reconnaissance group, deep operations group and anti-tank group may be organized for effective brigade operations. For that, battalions' defence layout may be reviewed. Fires from arty and other services may be more coordinated and should be used more actively.

Use of Fire. Concept of 'Attack by Fire' or 'Fire Strike' may be ordained in operations at Brigade Level. Brigade attack need to be made more offensive and challenging; novelty needs to be a key in attack. Brigade must acquire adequate intelligence and situational awareness capability for attack. More so, tactical teachings may be studied further so that Battalions may suitably position its fire base, either static or moving, from where it can apply fires, not necessarily the fire base is square to the objective only.

Provision for Deep Strike Force. Brigades may achieve deep operation capability by organizing the 9[th] or 12[th] platoon of each infantry battalion as commandos or Vipers.

Conclusion

Bangladesh Army has been advancing remarkably since the Liberation War. It has been a beacon both home and abroad. Performance of Bangladesh Army in operations, non-operations

and Peacekeeping Operations is attributed to its professionalism. In the time of technological advancement, it needs to adjust itself to the challenges the Information Technology offers. Hence, professional discourse should be encouraged and attended appropriately.

Tactical innovation and refined methods of operation are the foundation of successful force preparedness for a force to maintain the cutting-edge. Study of the modern force-development trend and operational pattern of some armies suggests innovation and modification of tactics, techniques and procedure. It's always better to have a lighter but optimum force. Again innovative maneuver and doctrinal novelty coupled with professionalism can bring success in all situations. There are scopes to do that.

Brigades in Bangladesh Army can perform even better with little modification of tactics, techniques, procedures and maneuver. Organization of dedicated intelligence assets for brigades, provision of anti-tank group and deep operations group would be very effective in brigade operations. Attention to the proper application of fire and arrangement of reserve at brigade and battalion level is a necessity of time and need to be attended from appropriate command level. Among the imperatives, there are certain things that can easily be applied while certain measures need further study. It is expected that the ideas formulated in this paper will be studied by appropriate mechanism and then a decision will be taken on those. This may go a long way in enhancing attention to the professional discourse in Bangladesh Army.

Recommendations

Following recommendations are made basing on the above discussions:

a. Formation Commanders may encourage the Battalion Commanders to organize defence keeping in mind the future challenges of the battle field incorporating innovative tactics and deployment pattern.

b. Military Operations / Training Directorate and ARTDOC may study the feasibility of organizing an effective intelligence functioning group at brigade level within the existing structure of Bangladesh Army with a view to efficiently employing the intelligence outfits of the infantry battalions.

c. ARTDOC may conduct research on the existing defensive layout of the infantry brigades and suggest the ways forward to employ anti-tank weapons more effectively, and engage the enemy fairly ahead of the main defence.

d. ARTDOC may study the feasibility of incorporating the concept of 'Attack by Fire' or 'Fire Strike' within Bangladesh Army's doctrine in order to employ the fire assets as a manoeuvre element for both defensive and offensive operations.

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BANGLADESH ARMY: A COMPLEMENTARY ORGAN OF THE GOVERNMENT IN PURSUANCE OF NATIONAL INTEREST

Colonel A F M Atiqur Rahman, afwc, psc, G

"UN Peacekeeping has evolved as a central pillar of Bangladesh's value-driven foreign policy"
-Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

Background

National interest often referred to the French expression ***raison d'état*** ("reason of state"), is a country's goals and ambitions in regard to economic, military, or cultural. The concept is an important one in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school of thought. A country achieves its national interest by its national power.[1] Usually, Army of a nation is considered as hard power, which is an important organ to attain national power vis-a-vis the national interest. Bangladesh Army is not an exception to that. Bangladesh Army, since its inception, has always been proved as a great complementary entity to the government. Our Army is one of the important elements of Bangladesh's national power. This Army has taken its birth through a great liberation war which is also amongst the rare examples in the global history.

Since long, Bangladesh Army has always been contributing to the nation in its socio-economic (one of the strong elements of our national power) development. Apart from participating in nation building activities, Bangladesh Army is also assisting the government as a complementary wing in crisis moment to maintain good governance. Bangladesh Army has also been contributing to nation's remittance (economic element of national power) earning contributing the highest number of troops to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. Members of Bangladesh Army can be a great instrument for the civil government for conducting diplomacy through interaction/engagement around the globe through their foreign employment. Being deployed abroad, Bangladesh, Army can create space and opportunity for our government to invest in different socio-economic sectors of the host countries. By utilizing Army's previously established good reputation, the government can use it as a bridge and negotiator in establishing rapport with different counterparts in remote places including Africa and South America.

National Power vis-a-vis National Interests

National power is defined as the sum of all resources available to a nation in pursuit of national objectives.[2] The major attributes or instruments of national power can be diplomacy, information, military, economy (DIME)[3] and so on. National power is always utilized to achieve

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[1] 'National Interest', https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest *, accessed on 10 February, 2017.*

[2] 'National Power', <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_power> **accessed on 12 February, 2017.**

[3] (DIME) is reference essentials for the instruments of national Power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic. This is recognized as a "whole of government" doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals around the world.

national interest. National power can also be categorized into two parts; hard and soft. Military wing falls within the category of hard power of a country. Hard power projection has taken a different shape in today's world. **Hard power** is the use of military and economic means to influence the behaviour or interests of other political bodies. Hard power contrasts with soft power, which comes from diplomacy, culture and history.[4]

On the other hand the **National interest** is one country's goals and ambitions may it be diplomatic or economic, or informational. We know that the major foreign policy objectives of Bangladesh are self-preservation, economic development, safeguarding and augmenting national power, ideology and national prestige.[5] Various attributes of national power are shown diagrammatically:

Figure: Major Elements of National Power

The key national interests of Bangladesh may be summed up as follows:

- Maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bangladesh.

- Ensure economic prosperity and development of Bangladesh in order to meet the aspirations of people.

- Ensure political and social stability in order to enhance national development.

- Project Bangladesh as a moderate, tolerant and secular democratic country.

Bangladesh Army and Elements of National Power

Diplomacy is one of the prime elements of national power. It is a tool for maintaining congenial atmosphere and /or international relations with other countries. Diplomacy often

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[4] 'Hard Power', <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_power> accessed on 12 February 2017.
[5] **'Foreign Policy of Bangladesh', <http://assignmentpoint.com/business/economics> accessed on 02 February, 2017.**

termed as international diplomacy or political diplomacy.[6] The key actor of political diplomacy is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All the organs of the government implement international diplomacy with other nations connecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there are many more informal actors playing diplomatic role, e.g. many non-residents Bangladeshi or Bangladeshi Non- Governments Organization (NGO). They are also playing important pars by participating in different sectors of the host countries or the countries they are working. The diplomatic relation with many nations are also revolved through Bangladesh Army in the international peacekeeping arena. Apart from this, many senior officials of Bangladesh Army are also working in the embassies, and headquarters of various world bodies. As such, since decades, our military could also shape up our nation's diplomacy to a great extent in the following ways:

- **Image Building**. Bangladesh Army could gain the confidence of multi-nation including United Nations through their successful participation in peace keeping mission. Around the globe, especially in the remote areas, people know the name of our country. Bangladesh Army could stand out clearly amongst other participating countries for its good deeds and reputation.

- **Military Diplomacy**. Our military diplomacy is very much complementary to political diplomacy in order to comply with the country's political and economic needs. Now, the military diplomacy gives Bangladesh a tremendous scope in developing international relations. It also helps to improve the country's image. At most, it allows Bangladesh to place its nationals in key positions in international organisations.[7] Since decade, Bangladesh Army has been carrying its flags in remote areas of the world through its UN employment where even the other elements of the government did not have any scope to go.

- **Military-Military Contact**. Bangladesh is participating in multi-national operations whose members include many non-traditional allies, as we saw in the Gulf War and in Haiti. Our Army is also taking part in joint exercises with other countries which give us a scope to establish good rapport with the friendly countries. These programmes are platforms for imparting influence and democratic values to militaries in reforming or newly democratic nations. Conduct of combined exercises with developed militaries provides scope of military-to- military contacts too.

- **Humanitarian Operations.** Our Army participated in humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations abroad as part of national diplomacy. Bangladesh Army participated in these types of operations in Haiti, Somalia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal etc. Through humanitarian aid or disaster relief operations, Army can built up a friendly relation with government , non-government and other international organizations involved in that country. Hence, this relation will definitely help our government in future.

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[6] Ronald Peter Barston, *Modern diplomacy*, Pearson Education, 2006, p. 1
[7] http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/05.html

Economy is considered as the hub of all the elements of national power. To have a credible national power, a nation has to have the credible economy. Bangladesh Army is contributing continuously in socio-economic up gradation in the following ways:

- **Infrastructure Development**. Our Army is performing tremendously in social development activities. Bangladesh Army has been given with the responsibility of advisory role for major jobs in Padma bridge construction. This will save a lot of money of the government as it was proved in other national projects (Hatirjhil, Flyovers around the country, embankment construction, strategic bridge maintenance etc). This is how our military is complementing to the national economic growth. Apart from these, Army is also working jointly with many development projects of our country. Local people are also developing their socio-economic condition through employment opportunity in the projects of Army.

- **Remittance Earning**. Bangladesh government gets the benefits from deploying its troops abroad. Usually the foreign remittances are in the range of $1 billion, as a result of peacekeeping operations overseas. As such, through participation in UN mission Bangladesh is earning a good amount of foreign currency. This is contributing to the national economy. Through military to military engagement we can also do the marketing of our domestically produced military hardware (Bangladesh Ordnance Factory produces ammunition and armaments) to the developing countries.

Information is considered by United States of America's (USA) new National Security Council Structure as a bona fide element of National Power.[8] Military always contribute in influencing information interest of a country as it is termed as soft power. Failing to achieve this will create a political defeat in the international arena. USA's drone attack effect in Afghanistan created dissention due to the failure of proper informational influence. Army officers, working in different capacities in embassies of overseas countries and UN Headquarters, get different information which is of valuable use by the government. As such, our Army is contributing in informational sector of our country. In the following table we get the usual state of our high ranking officers working abroad. They are in a capacity to influence their counterpart which is ultimately helping our government as a platform for establishing rapport.

Table: Usual State of Defence Attaché (DA) and/or Assistant Defence Attaché (ADA) Working in Bangladesh Missions Abroad

Name of Existing Defence Wing	Defence Attaché (DA) and/or Assistant Defence Attaché(ADA)	Additional Country's Responsibilities
Asia		
Kuwait	01	Qatar and Bahrain
China	03	South Korea and Mongolia

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[8] < www.jfsc.ndu.edu/library/.../Elements_of_National_Power.pdf> *accessed on 24 January, 2017.*

Name of Existing Defence Wing	Defence Attaché (DA) and/or Assistant Defence Attaché(ADA)	Additional Country's Responsibilities
KSA	01	Jordan, Syria and Egypt
Sri Lanka	01	Maldives
Pakistan	01	Iran
Malaysia	01	Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines
India	02	Nepal
Myanmar	01	Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand
Europe		
United Kingdom	02	Germany and France
Russia	01	Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania
Turkey	01	Italy and Greece
North America		
United States (Washington DC)	01	-

Note: Officers working in other capacity (consulate) are not included in the above table.

Capitalizing the Existing Role in Persuasion of National Interest

Prologue

Our honourable Prime minister univocally said "Bangladesh has become a brand name in peace support operations. UN was given with the assurance by Bangladesh to strengthen his hands by providing rapid support at all times. The Prime Minister also reiterated Bangladesh's pledges to build partnerships with countries that need critical enablers, personnel, force and mission. The Prime Minister said **"UN Peacekeeping has evolved as a central pillar of Bangladesh's value-driven foreign policy"**. The Prime Minister also said Bangladesh remains ready for triangular co-operation. "We will provide training and skills to emerging Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) with support from partners. "Bangladesh is also keen on providing senior leadership both at UN Headquarters and in field missions," she said. She mentioned that Bangladesh looks forward to entering into logistics and services supply partnerships for field support to missions, including the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (A-PREP).[9] Bangladesh has a state-of-the-art Institute named Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations and Training (BIPSOT). "We have planned to turn BIPSOT into a global centre of excellence for training peacekeepers, especially women peacekeepers from all countries," she said. "We pledge to share our expertise through customized training, joint exercises and necessary technical support to other TCC and police contributing countries," she said.

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[9] A-PREP is declared on 06 August, 2014 by Obama government. Its goal is to "address short-falls in Africa-based peace keeping forces." Noting that a number of recent crises (Central African Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia, Kenya, even Algeria to name a few) have exposed the weaknesses of emergency-ready African forces. A-PREP will focus uniquely on military training and assistance to six African countries: Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda to try to improve "rapid peace keeping."

Diplomatic Interest. Bangladesh Army can contribute a lot by assisting the government in fulfilling its diplomatic interest. This initial approach must be capitalized by the government in pursuing its national interest. Following can be the major tools:

- **UN Peace Mission**. UN peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It brings together the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, troops and police contributors and the host governments in a combined effort to maintain international peace and security.[10] However, the relationship earned through participation in peacekeeping missions could not be capitalised for issues of mutual benefit. A policy guideline and political persuasion are necessary to achieve national interest capitalizing the military entity.

- **Assisting in Good Governance**. Bangladesh military has played a tremendous role through assisting the government in implementing various national projects like National Voter Identity Card and Machine Readable Passport' projects. These may be continued.

- **Trade and Commerce**. Bangladesh Army is deployed in some countries where there is no Bangladesh embassy. Connection with business community of those countries and, finding new market for trading garments, pharmaceuticals, and jute products can be done through military.

Economic Interest. Capitalizing good connection with UN and other countries through peacekeeping, Bangladesh can pursue the following:

- Few African and Middle East countries can be targeted for establishing trade, commerce and work force export.

- Building defence cooperation with developed countries through military expertise /training exchange programmes and purchasing military hardware with low interest.

- Increasing scope and opportunity for UN peacekeeping employment. These include more Bangladeshi contingents in field missions, placing individuals as military observers, staffs and on secondments in UN HQ.

Informational Interest. Bangladesh Armed Forces has a unique body who deals with media (Inter Service Press Release) or other bodies (e.g. operations, intelligence or overseas operations directorate etc. in Army Headquarters). On behalf of the government, Army can be used very effectively sharing required information with media, press or other information recipient bodies. These would clarify many speculation and wrong perception on defence contract or other matters. By doing this, it would help the government in eliminating the so called wrong perception amongst general mass on military issues. However, our military's role would be 'mutually reinforcement contribution' in persuasion of informational interest. These include:

- Building partnership and sharing information with information agencies.

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[10] http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/success.shtml.

- Building trust with media and attach value of the role of media in a multi partner world.[11]

- Appreciating public trust on media and capitalizing on it.

Way Forward in Pursuing National Interest

Foreign Policy Must Integrate Army's Role Around the Globe

Every country, basing on its political system, national objectives, management system, decision making at national level, threats to security, evolves its own system for the evolution of national strategy.[12] The foreign policy of Bangladesh is derived from a close enquiry and examination of her vital national interests and stands largely on two pillars; security and development.[13] So, our foreign policy must take the Bangladesh Army's global role into cognizance. These are not two separate entities. There is a necessity to formulate a comprehensive policy on military diplomacy. While formulating this policy, national interest, objectives, plan and engagement strategy need to be sorted out. However, the formulation of this policy needs adequate staff structures at the government level and other organizational structures need to support this system under the existing manner of political control. We must pursue and employ our lobbies to have more vacancies at top ranking post at UN Headquarters and multi-national command appointment in peace support missions.

Engagement Strategy

Bangladesh is jointly engaging itself with different actors on the issues of peace and security, economic emancipation, climatic effect, women heath, women empowerment, gender based violence, education and so on. Our Honourable Prime Minister always urges upon to build partnership with other troops contributing countries of the world. It gives us a clear and concise guideline. Bangladesh Army is in advantageous position to implement joint military cooperation as they are deployed in different remote areas around the globe. All other concerned ministries may also take help from our deployed forces through Army Headquarters and Armed Forces Division for seeking partnership with foreign countries. Our Army can act as a bridge between that ministry and partner country. For example, the ministry of agriculture may take help of our Army if they seek to build joint farming partnership with any African nation. But this all should be routed through Army Headquarters and Armed Forces Division. More so, any Bangladeshi ministry's delegation may take help from Army for mediation with any foreign government/counter body. Bangladesh Army can also continue to contribute in other nation building activities within the country. These will also help in developing country's socio-economic image which is one of the major elements of national power. Ministry of Foreign Affairs must delineate various short term, mid-term and long term plan for engaging with different countries/ partners.

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[11] Lecture to AFWC in NDC by Mr Humayun Kabir, Former ambassador of Bangladesh to USA, on 17 April 2013.

[12] Nanda, Colonel Ravi, National Security, Perspective Policy and Planning, Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1991. p 205.

[13] Ambassador Ahmed, S.M. Rashed, November 2012, "*Bangladesh foreign policy Achievements, challenge and way forward*", <http://mygoldenbengal.wordpress.com>.

Engagement Tires

In Bangladesh, at national level, Ministry of Foreign Affairs has several desks (basing on several zones of the world) to deal with treaties and protocol. On the other hand, we see at Armed Forces Division, there is only a wing (including a few staffs) under operations and plans directorate who deals with protocol and treaty. If we go further down the tier, at Army Headquarters, usually Staff Duties Directorate and Military Training Directorate only implement the instructions of Armed Forces Division. These are mainly confined to "incoming and outgoing visits" and "training exchange programs" by Army Headquarters.

Ideally, military to military engagement should move parallel to political diplomacy during any initial approach to other nations. This is true in case of our neighbouring countries as we always focus towards building amicable working relationship with them. Possible tiers/levels for pursuing our military engagement to achieve our national objective could be:

- **Global**. The objective of global engagement should focus on creating long lasting image and maintaining good relation with all working partners and different troops contributing countries in accordance with foreign policy/directives. This can primarily be achieved through exploitation of success achieved by completed or current peacekeeping/peace building missions, military training exchange programmes, goodwill visit etc. Our senior Army officers working in UN secondment, embassies in Europe and America can be utilized as media also in the diplomatic engagement process.

- **Regional and Bilateral**. The objective of regional and bilateral military engagement should focus on maintaining harmonious relation with both neighbours and Middle East countries. Various types of military training and cultural exchange programs, joint defence talks, goodwill visits to neighbouring countries can assist to attain those objectives. Our on-going missions in Kuwait, Lebanon can be capitalized to get more migrants acceptance by them. As part of training exchange programme, huge number of Army officers from our region and Middle East countries is coming to our different Army institution each year.

- **National**. The objective of conducting the military diplomacy within the country is to develop and maintain civil-military relation. This can be achieved by assisting the civil administration as complementary wing; participating in nation building activities and managing the natural and man-made disasters. These types of local activities have correlation with the military diplomacy.

Role of Armed Forces Division

Within the military sphere, Armed Forces Division should be the lead actor. Being guided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it should be able to work in a coordinated framework with the Army/Navy/Air Headquarters to develop strategy for military's role/engagement with other countries in pursuing our national interest. Armed Forces Division should be the focal point on these issues. As per the policy guideline, it will delineate objectives including proposed action plan for various military engagement at global level. Armed Forces Division should have the

direct access to the Honourable Prime Minister (who is also the defence minister) on global military engagement matters. Programmes, need to be undertaken by Army/Navy/Air Headquarters, should be chalked out for local, regional and international level. These programmes should be implemented through unified approach by all elements including paramilitary forces deployed abroad. An action plan encompassing country/ organization-wise objectives and time frame needs to be set. Armed Forces Division should also set the priority and decide on training and skill building for emerging troops contributing countries, propose senior leadership structure at UN Headquarters and different field missions. They must supervise the overall functioning and capacity building of BIPSOT.

Role of Army Headquarters

Army Headquarters should be the prime mover for implementing global engagement of our Army on ground. To play a pivotal role in matters related to military diplomacy, a dedicated directorate may be earmarked for centralized policy implementation and control. It can take charge of global Army interaction/employment/engagement related jobs of Military Training Directorate (Training/course/visits etc.), Overseas Operations Directorate (Peacekeeping and other employment) and Staff Duties Directorate (Protocol and goodwill visits). Alternatively a separate wing or section with dedicated staffing for dealing with concerned matters can be opened at Overseas Operations Directorate. Army Training and Doctrine Command may conduct an in-depth research and analysis of regional and global military events and its possible impact on Bangladesh in pursuance of its national interest. It should provide the Army Headquarters with short-term and long-term military strategic environment within which Bangladesh Army may likely to operate or interact with foreign countries and deploy in the mission areas. On receipt of guidelines/ objectives from the Armed Forces Division, Army Headquarters should identify objectives/ goals need to be attained at their end. It should be able to develop a complete plan considering the likely expenditure and impediments for conducting the global military interaction focussing our national interest. Overseas Operations Directorate must have a list of technical expertise on UN peace support operation. This directorate should also chalk out detail plan on the mechanism if we want to provide logistic and service support to any field mission. Considering the increased challenge in UN operation, Overseas Operations Directorate must re-design the training curriculum if needed along with the capacity building of BIPSOT.[14]

Capacity Building of Potential Army Officers

Our military officers are usually not exposed to any organized training on the specific role they need to play when they are employed abroad in different influential appointments. Thus officers may be trained on the basis of diplomacy, national interest, and instruments of national power and details of military diplomacy. These will help them in acquiring the minimum essential working knowledge. Few exposures can be given in Defence Services Command and Staff College too as it is done in National Defence College through lectures, expertise's

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[14](OO Directorate Staff Hand Note) Currently Bangladesh is the leading TCC with more than Seven thousand peacekeepers. Out of 19 current UN sponsored mission, Bangladesh peacekeepers are deployed in 10 peace mission in 10 different countries and stand-by arrangement for responding to any further call from UN anywhere on the globe.

presentation. Intelligence training for the defence attaché or military intelligentsia deployed in different Bangladeshi embassies abroad can be conducted prior to joining. The syllabus should include strategic culture, use of modern technical intelligence gazettes, strategic intelligence, social media etc. These would help the defence attaches to act as confident Diasporas.[15] Qualified individuals may be recruited and sent overseas for higher specialized education and training. On return, they would be able to provide advice on issues that are vital for Bangladeshi foreign policy. They should have a career path that attracts them.

Influence of Social Media

Print and electronic media including the social media can always play a greater role to deliver adequate publicity on the role of Bangladesh Army abroad. Front line reporters should always be available with the deployed Bangladeshi UN peacekeeping forces to project our role in international media.

Training and Education programmes

We must take maximum gain from these programmes for furthering our military diplomacy. Usually, under this type of programmes, professional and non-political issues, interaction between the military students on professional military organizations, procedures and manner in which military organizations function under civilian control can be learnt. This will also expose students to military justice systems and procedures and promote the development of strong civil-military relations. Military cooperation is strengthened when participants improve their knowledge on developed Armies' military doctrine, strategic planning processes and operational procedures. This cooperation leads to opportunities for military-to-military interaction, information sharing, joint planning and combined force exercises that facilitate global or regional interoperability.[16]

Conclusion

With maturity of the existing stable democratic institutions, it is now incumbent to use maximum possible instruments of national power to promote Bangladesh's interests. Not doing so will be detrimental to our growth as global military engagement with other countries is being extensively pursued by our neighbours.[17] 'Military entails huge monetary expenditure' is the common perception of the people of Bangladesh. Now all need to watch it in different angle where military is complementary to the development of the economic infrastructure of

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[15]Term Diaspora is mentioned to refer any individual or group working away from local soil and contributing for the country. Examples are, our employees working in different parts of the world, individual or group working in secondment and deputation in foreign soil or foreign countries.

[16]International Military Education and Training (IMET), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington DC, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/65533.htm> accessed on 28 September 2015.

[17]Note: C. Raja Mohan writing in the Indian Express avers "While the civilian bureaucracy and the political leadership in our Ministry of Defence continue to constrain the Indian military's engagement with the world, China is consciously promoting it". In Pakistan's case, the military has exploited its position to secure every perceived advantage for their nation and today greatly influences their foreign policy.

Bangladesh. In a developing nation like Bangladesh, all the elements of national power have the complementary interest with military in persuasion of national interest. Our military has to continue to complement the other elements of national power to achieve desired national interest.

The new purpose to which Western states have put defence diplomacy since 1990's is supporting partner countries in developing peacekeeping capability. There has also been a shift away from traditional peacekeeping – which is peace enforcement involving peace building tasks including supporting social and economic reconstruction. Taking this opportunity, Bangladesh can also benefit its economy if it also employs its unemployed migrated civil manpower for such reconstruction development activities. This will create a new sector for us. For this matter, it is not only the hard power of Army, but also the utilization of its soft power i.e., projection of 'Military Diplomacy'. In a country like Bangladesh, all elements of national power are closely related to each other. Considering its geo-political and geo-economic importance, there is no alternative to enhance our military diplomatic activities. Bangladesh is at more advantageous position due to its highest deployment under UN umbrella than any other countries of the world. We need to have proper structure, smooth functioning hierarchy for conducting military diplomacy. It must therefore be appreciated that if Bangladesh is to grow to a great nation status, it has to increasingly use military diplomacy as an element of confidence-building within the region as well as internationally.

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EXPECTATIONS FROM THE PEACEKEEPERS VERSUS REALITY ON GROUND: WAYS AHEAD FOR BANGLADESH

Colonel Md Aftab Hossain, afwc, psc

"Overstretched, underfunded and overburdened peacekeeping operations create 'Yawning Gap' between expectations and performance." [1]

4th Committee Close of Debate, 66th General Assembly

Introduction

UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) have been proved to be the most effective tools for maintaining peace and security of the world for last six decades. Therefore, peacekeepers have become the most important element in UN systems who are sacrificing even their lives for the peace and stability of the world. These sheer sacrifices of the peacekeepers to promote peace and stability of the world needs to be recognized, honoured and highlighted to world bodies in different occasions. Side by side it demands periodical study to evaluate the performance/ result of the peacekeepers deployed on ground as they operate in places where physical, social, economic and political environment are changing frequently. The peacekeepers perform their responsibilities amidst evolving challenges like shortage of manpower, non-cooperation of host country, logistics challenges etc. Therefore, it is evident that there are likely to be gap between expectations and results due to many ground realities as UN missions normally takes place in the most physically and politically difficult environments where political situation remains volatile and security situation remains unpredictable. At this back drop as a leading Troops/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), it is imperative for Bangladesh to identify those gaps and find out ways ahead to overcome those. [2]

In this paper, an endeavour has been made to highlight expectations of UN Secretariat, other stakeholders, host country and even home country from a peacekeeper deployed in the UN missions vis-a-vis the expectations of peacekeepers from counterparts around the world. The paper has also discussed the challenges of peacekeepers in meeting the expectations and ways ahead to overcome those impediments. Finally, the paper has concluded with few recommendations relevant to Bangladesh. The paper has been written basing on the personal experience of serving as Planning Officer in DPKO (New York), contingent member of field mission and serving as Colonel Staff of Overseas Operations Directorate.[3] However, personal experiences were validated through interviews, sharing experiences and discussions.

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[1] Website: https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/gaspd465.doc.htm, accessed on 22 February 2017.

[2] Provider of military and police personnel are known as troops contributing countries (TCCs) and police contributing countries (PCCs). Commonly they are known as T/PCCs.

[3] Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), New York is the responsible department in UN Secretariat that deals with all UN Peacekeeping Operations.

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE PEACEKEEPERS VIS-A-VIS EXPECTATIONS OF THE PEACEKEEPERS FROM DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS

Expectations from the Peacekeepers

As a guardian of the word, UN takes care of all the issues around the world, especially for the suppressed people under difficult conditions. UN Security Council (UNSC) takes all necessary steps to protect humanity and tries to ensure a peaceful, secured and stable world. To materialize those, the peacekeepers deployed in the field face multi-pronged pressure from different corners. Those are as follows:

a.   **Expectations of UN**. UN expects peacekeepers will create a secured environment that will enable all the organs of UN, non-government organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders to work for the successful implementation of the mandated tasks that has been set in the UNSC resolutions. Nowadays, implementation of the challenging mandates demand psychological change in the mind-set for the robust, multi-dimensional and sometimes traditional peacekeeping as situation demands.

b.   **Expectations of General Mass of the World**. General mass of the world expect that peacekeepers will insure human rights and people should live peacefully due to their presence.

c.   **Expectations of Host Country**. The victims and host nation expect peacekeepers will protect them from all odds at all costs. Peacekeepers will ensure not only the absence of conflict and hostilities but also the human rights for them.

d.   **Expectations of Warring Factions**. The warring factions of the mission area always expect UN peacekeepers to remain impartial and avoid involving them in the internal clash between/among factions. They minutely observe whether the peacekeepers are inclined to the ruling party or not.

e.   **Expectations of Home Country**. T/PCCs expect that their peacekeepers will uphold the name and fame of their country in international environment in implementing mandated tasks. They will remain highly professional, disciplined, and keep them away from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).


Source: Conceptualized and prepared by the author.
Figure 1: Expectations and other Factors that Creates Pressure for Peacekeepers

Expectations of the Peacekeepers from Different Stakeholders

Deployed peacekeepers are basically soldiers of different nations habituated to work silently for the peace but still preserve a strong desire in their hearts to be supported and cooperated by all stakeholders. These expectations vary but generally speaking those are as follows:

a. **Expectations to UN.** The peacekeepers desire that UN will ensure their capacity building while working for the implementation of mission mandates. The capacity building includes passing the resolutions, ensuring legal rights to work on the land of other nations, developing policy for the use of force, delineating rules of engagement (ROE) etc. It also assists in having Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA).

b. **Expectations to General Mass**. The peacekeepers keenly observe the reaction of general mass of the world to any incident/accident that takes place in mission areas. Peacekeepers always expect a justified and logical yet friendly opinion from them.

c. **Expectations to Host Country and Warrior Factions**. The peacekeepers probably expect lion's share of the support and cooperation from the host nation for the implementation of mandate. The peacekeepers also expect that the parties to the conflict will support them to perform their responsibilities with freedom.

d. **Expectations of Home Country and Families**. Deployed peacekeepers remain away from their own country. So, they expect timely combat support and logistic supply to keep them operationally fit. They also expect mental and morale support from their families in the home country.

Source: Conceptualized and prepared by the author.
Figure 2: Expectations of Peacekeepers from Different Stakeholders

Summary. By and large, in last six decades, UNPKOs has many successes of providing the essential security and support to millions of people except the failure of mid-90s in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. However, success of UNPKOs is never guaranteed, because it takes place in the most physically and politically difficult environments, thus invite new challenges. In response, the trend of peacekeeping has been shifted from 'traditional peacekeeping (under chapter VI) to peace enforcement with complex 'multidimensional' peacekeeping (under chapter VII) which necessitates a paradigm shift to the mind-set of the peacekeepers. In the present context, POC is one of the major mandated tasks as the civilians have increasingly become the victims of armed conflict. Therefore, everyone expects that the peacekeepers will do everything to establish peace and security of the world even risking their own lives. Besides, the deployed peacekeepers have also expectations to get support and wholehearted cooperation from different stakeholders including host nation.

CHALLENGES FACED BY THE PEACEKEEPERS IN THE FIELD MISSIONS TO MEET THE EXPECTATIONS

Few of the important challenges faced by the peacekeepers in the field are as follows:

Challenges Related to the Protection of Civilian (POC). The UNSC has mandated most of the current PKOs with the mandate of POC from physical violence under Chapter VII.[4] At present 95% of total globally deployed peacekeepers work for POC.[5] The performance of peacekeepers is viewed very seriously by UN and other stakeholders. Effective POC faces numerous challenges as described below.

a. **Conceptual Challenges of POC**. Though the concept of POC has developed before 15 years in UNAMSIL but took long time to have an operational definition about POC.[6] Multiple actors involve in POC activities, tend to have differing perception and understanding about POC, especially in distinction between humanitarian protection and military coercive use of force to protect civilians. Moreover, there are difficulties of distinguishing 'Civilian' from 'Combatant' because the simple possession of a weapon does not necessarily give a person the status of combatant. Civilians who are in possession of arms for protection of property but are not currently engaged in hostilities are not 'combatant' rather entitled to be protected. Once the civilians exploit these opportunities, the uncertainty and insecurity of civilian as well as peacekeepers remain a point of concern.

b. **Inadequate Peacekeepers to Provide POC**. The state below in Table 1 shows the number of the civilians need to be protected by one peacekeeper.

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[4] Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
[5] Statement by USG, DPKO to the Special Committee on PKO, at New York, on 24 February 2014.
[6] The 1st UNPKO to have POC mandate was UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999.

Table 1: Comparative State among Area, Population and Deployed Peacekeepers

UN Mission& Country	Peacekeepers Deployed	Area (in sq km)	Population (in million)	**Ratio:** Civilian/ Per Peacekeepers
MINUSMA (Mali)	11,880	12,40,192	14.50	**1221/1**
MINUSCA (Central African Republic, CAR)	12,104	6,22,984	4.70	**388/1**
MONUSCO (DR Congo)	18,692	23,45,409	81.60	**4366/1**
UNMISS (South Sudan)	12,923	6,19,745	12.34	**955/1**
UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan)	17,256	4,93,180	7.50	**435/1**

Source: Information collected from different websites and compiled by author. [7]

From the ratio of above mentioned statistics, it is observed that the number of peacekeepers is inadequate to protect the civilians against any attack by the armed group. It should be a matter of concern whether such less number of peacekeepers can protect a civilian?[8] Studies show that it is not possible to **'protect everyone from everything'** with usual population versus the peacekeepers ratio deployed in UN mission. Often civilians are protected from harsh conditions with limited or insufficient resources but once the peacekeepers cannot protect everybody, the civilians lose confidence on peacekeepers and start showing non-cooperation.

Complex Command and Control (C2) Arrangement of UN. In UN mission the contingents and individuals are placed under operational control of the Force Commander (FC) but not under the full command. As the FC and Sector Commanders are not from the same nation, in a crisis situation the contingents do not react the way they would do in their national environment. This C2 arrangement of UN is resulting the unexpected performance by the deployed peacekeepers. Research shows that due to the complexity of operations and the limitations imposed by the national governments, a centralized command and a form of decentralized mission type/ style are generally used in the frame of UN operations at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical.[9] Therefore, UNPKOs sometimes suffer from confusion caused by poor C2 arrangements.

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[7] Information collected from different websites especially from Wikipedia on different dates from 01-28 February 2017.

[8] Lieutenant Daniel Blocqis an assistant professor in international law at Netherlands Defence Academy.

[9] Goran Stojanovski, Lieutenant Colonel, National Defence College Academy of Latvia. *Command and Control issues in UN Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations, 2013.*

Frequent Changes in Key Personnel. As per policy all the staffs/ peacekeepers rotate yearly/half yearly which cause difficulties in pursuing and maintaining the continuity of operations. For example, since its inception in 2003, MONUSCO had minimum 14 different set of staffs/peacekeepers in last 14 years. Therefore, due to frequent changes in staffs, the accountability and continuity of the operations are hampered. It also slows down implementation of mandate and sometime misses the track. Moreover, every staff takes some time to get him acquainted with the business and start checking out before one month. Therefore, excluding the leave period a staff can serve for 8 to 9 months in one year tenure.

Difficulties in Realizing the Real Challenge. Table 2 below shows the top 10 contributors in finance and troops contribution for UN.

Table 2: A Comparative State of Top 10 Voluntary Finance Contributor and T/PCCs for UN

| Finance Contributors (Average Contribution from 2013-2015)			Troops /Police Contributors (Average Contribution from 2013-2015)		
Country	In USD	Position	Country	Peacekeepers	Position
USA	9,330,352,554	1	Bangladesh	8,644	1
UK	3,291,835,507	2	Pakistan	8,062	2
Japan	2,932,649,203	3	India	7,886	3
Germany	2,151,496,024	4	Ethiopia	7,266	4
Canada	1,445,692,215	5	Rwanda	5,115	5
Sweden	1,341,839,442	6	Nepal	4,872	6
Norway	1,247,877,736	7	Nigeria	3,918	7
France	1,119,371,745	8	Ghana	2,985	8
Netherlands	1,101,040,689	9	Senegal	2,953	9
Brazil	898,521,310	10	Egypt	2,626	10

Source: Secretary-General's note, Annex I and Annex II, dated on 24 October 2016.

From the statistics it is evident that the developed countries are leading in financial contribution for UN while the developing countries are contributing troops for peacekeeping missions. So, the actual difficulties faced in the field missions by the peacekeepers or troops contributors may not be realised to that extend by the financial contributors as they do not have sufficient deployed peacekeepers. Therefore, the real difficulties faced by the deployed troops may not get due attention in planning process of the mission which later on generates impediments for the peacekeepers. The finance contributors focus on result at any costs but the T/PCCs have to think for security, logistic supply and other issues along with the result.

Disproportionate Task. Beside the POC, there are many important mandated tasks to be completed in missions which require huge amount of force to be deployed. Therefore, the

contingents are occupying more number of MOBs and TOBs than mentioned number in SUR to perform the required operational tasks.[1011]

Therefore, the peacekeepers are putting themselves in a risk and sacrificing their lives. In recent years, increased number of casualties of the peacekeepers is shown in graph below.

Source: Information collected from different websites and analysed by author.[12]
Figure 3: Increased Number of Casualties in Terrorist Activities

Terrorist Activities by Different Factions/Armed Groups. Recent trend shows that terrorist attack, improvised explosive device (IED), suicidal vehicle borne IED (SVBIED), remotely controlled IED is a common phenomenon of terrorists activities in the mission areas. Most of the countries' military are not basically meant for counterterrorism activities which is basically the job of police. Therefore, the fear and uncertainty of threat are hampering the mandated tasks. The recent attack on Mechanism Operation de Coordination (MOC), Mali and attack on civilian in Juba, South Sudan in July 2016 brought two things in forefront i.e. how devastating the armed group may be and how helpless the peacekeepers are!

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[10]MOB -Main Operating Base, TOB - Temporary Operating Base, SUR-Statement of the Unit Requirements.
[11]Discussion with Sector Commanders, Country Seniors and Contingent Commands who are presently deployed in different missions.
[12]Monthly report on security situation from deployed contingent.

Lack of Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV). The terrorist attacks have made the road movements and operations unsafe. Shortages of MPVs and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) are hindering implementation of mandated tasks by the full utilization of deployed peacekeepers.

Heterogeneous Forces Composition and Lack of Cohesion in the Contingent. Deployed peacekeepers in UN mission came from 123 different T/PCCs. In a single mission like MONUSCO, there are 54 T/PCCs. Due to difference in background, training standard and other factors' understanding on the same issues vary from TCC to TCC. Therefore, it sometime becomes difficult for a heterogeneous force to work together with similar understanding of issues for a common goal that is implementation of UN mandate. Moreover, there are different elements like logistic, maintenance, medical etc. within a contingent to make it self-sustained which also require time to build-up cohesion among the members of the contingent.

Language Barrier and use of Civilian Interpreters. Six large UN peacekeeping missions are hosted in Francophone countries (in CAR, Mali, Haiti, Lebanon, West Sahara, and DR Congo) where Bangladesh is a major contributor.[13] Bangladesh also contributes to UNAMID and UNMISS in Sudan and South Sudan respectively where the local language is Arabic. Though officers' skill in English is good but troops yet to attain minimum required level skill. The levels of communication of both officers and troops lack tremendously in the requisite skill in French and Arabic.[14] Bangladesh employ military/civilian interpreters to overcome this language barrier. Therefore, understanding and visualization of the interpreters (who is at time non-military person) and his capability of communicating the commander efficiently has a direct impact in planning and success of operations.

Difficulties in Logistics Support. Logistic supply is the lifeline for keeping any deployed forces battle worthy. Maintaining several contingents with thousands of troops far away from Bangladesh in Africa is posing huge logistic challenges. Besides, there are hurdles in getting custom clearance and transporting them to few land locked countries like Mali and CAR. Therefore, the shipment of spare parts and other equipment do not reach in time in most cases. There are instances when resupply took more than nine months and the demanded equipment/materials of existing contingent were being used by subsequent contingent. Uncertainty in logistics support sometime hampers the operational efficiency of the contingents.

WAYS AHEAD TO OVERCOME THE IMPEDIMENTS TO MEET THE EXPECTATIONS

Steps Suggested for Bangladesh

Study and Evaluation of On-going Trend of Peacekeeping. There is no magical solution by which peacekeepers can meet the expectations of all stakeholders. The paradigm shift of the

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[13]Websites of all the missions on 1 February 2017.
[14]Rasul, Brigadier General Ilyas Iftekhar, ndc, psc (retired), '*Bangladesh's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa*' - *a paper for the National Seminar on "Look Africa: An Emerging Foreign Policy Option for Bangladesh'* on 2 December 2010 at BIISS Auditorium. p. 5-6.

pattern of terrorist activities towards peacekeepers in recent days should be carefully studied to understand the intention and capability of the armed groups. In the coming days, there is a strong likelihood that UN peacekeepers had to operate in environments characterized by the presence of transnational terrorist networks. Think tanks comprised of former and present leadership with peacekeeping experience should study the contemporary issues and devise strategies for Bangladesh. This careful study will determine the requirement of training, equipment, mind-set and above all requirement of determination to achieve the objectives leaving aside many odds.

Language Proficiency. Enhancing language proficiency in English, French and Arabic should be the major concern of Bangladesh Armed Forces. To fulfil the requirement, number of dedicated Language Centre may be established for potential peacekeepers for their continuous practice as it takes time to build up the proficiency and skill on languages.[15] Troops should focus on efficiency in English and selected troops may also undergo training on French and Arabic languages. Skill on French and Arabic language will also help candidates of Bangladesh to get selected for posts in UN secretariat and field missions.

Modernizing the Peacekeepers. Contingents are now undertaking complex and multidimensional tasks that include POC and robust peacekeeping. For the ensuing tasks, the Armed Forces need to be modernized to meet the challenges of the UNPKOs. The TCCs with better equipment is likely to have edge over other TCC's and Bangladesh should try to make the contingent fully equipped before deployment. Considering the IED attacks the modern equipment should include Explosive Ordnance Disposal Suit, MPV, UAV etc. to modernize the contingents.

Focused Training with due Attention. Commanders at all level should conduct scenario based training on mandate and ROE. Pre-deployment training (PDT) should also include the directives on use of force. As POC is the prime focus of all the missions, the deployed contingent should be thoroughly trained on POC. Beside the basic training, all junior leaders should be trained to improve leadership qualities.

Training of Interpreter. Due to the shortage of military interpreter at present, Bangladesh is employing civilian interpreter who may not be able to interpret correctly due to the lack of knowledge on military matters. It has to be borne in mind that interpretation is not just translation rather understanding the whole issue and interpret it in correct way. Otherwise there are possibilities of misinterpretation. Therefore, the civilian interpreters must undergo orientation training in formations/training institutions.

Acquire Sufficient Knowledge of Terrain and Demography. Though training on demography and other aspects are included in three weeks' PDT but a peacekeeper deployed only for one year or less is insufficient to know in details about territory and demography of a new country. But a local terrorist who is born and brought up in that land is likely to be in an advantageous position to fight against Peacekeepers. Therefore, duration of PDT should be increased with more focus on territory and demography.

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[15] Rasul, Brigadier General IlyasIftekhar, ndc, psc (retired). '*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trends and Challenges*', Op. Cit. p.38.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). Bangladesh should take all necessary measures through motivation and administrative action to avoid SEA cases. It should be born in mind that one single incident can diminish all hard earned positive image of Bangladesh. Background history of the individuals should be taken into consideration before selecting them for missions or any foreign assignments.

Gender Mainstreaming. There are many tasks related to women and children those can be better performed by female peacekeepers. Besides, UN pursues the agenda of employing 50% female peacekeepers. Though Bangladesh Army is yet to provide female troops but Bangladesh has already established her credibility by providing all-female Formed Police Contingent (FPU) to Haiti (MINUSTAH) and DR Congo (MONUSCO). The tempo should be continued and inclusion of female soldiers in Army is likely to bring dividend in future. In case of nominating candidate for higher posts at UN Secretariat and field missions, female candidate should get priority as they have better scope to be selected.

Logistic Support. At present most of the Bangladeshi contingents are deployed in Mali, CAR, South Sudan, Sudan and DR Congo. To ease up the logistic supply at least two Advance Logistic Base should be established; one in Mali and other one in Sudan to support missions in CAR, South Sudan, Sudan and DR Congo as shown in Figure:4. The suppliers should be allowed to deliver directly to those bases or in the missions instead of bringing those equipment/spares in Bangladesh and again sending them to missions following a long and hazardous procedure.


Figure 4: Proposed Advanced Logistic Base

Steps Suggested for UN to Implement

Designated Sectors for TCCs. Presence of heterogeneous and diversified forces from different countries in same mission area reduces the combat efficiency of the peacekeepers. To overcome this weakness, one particular sector's area of responsibility (AOR) may be assigned to a particular leading TCC (like Bangladesh) who will provide sector commander along with majority of the forces of that sector. The said force is likely to perform better in crisis like POC as the cohesion among units and understanding of the commanders at all level will be similar. Moreover, peacekeepers of the responsible TCC will be more concerned about the name and fame of their country.

Avoiding Relocation of Contingents. After deployment, a contingent works and establishes a positive (or negative) repute and it continues by the follow up contingents of same nation. Basing on the establish repute, the locals and other organizations extend their support towards the contingent. A considerable time is needed to establish positive repute which assists in the implementation of the mission mandate. Sometimes the contingents are relocated to adjust with the requirement of Force Headquarters (FHQ). These changes disrupt the continuity of implementation of mission mandate as expected.

Conclusion

UN does not have its own forces for immediate deployment and conducting peacekeeping missions. Therefore, UN depends on different member states whose quality of force varies widely in terms of training, professionalism, mind-set, moral aspects and logistic support. Heterogeneous force, poor C2 arrangement, disproportionate tasks, linguistic barrier in communication etc. make the peacekeeping force less effective than expected. Moreover, peacekeepers operate in physically and politically difficult environment that generates new challenges in implementing mission mandate. Therefore, the peacekeepers deployed on ground cannot meet the expectations of the different stakeholders including UN. Wholehearted support of UN in capacity building of the peacekeepers, unconditional cooperation of the host country including warrior factions and required support of other stakeholders can make a mission successful meeting the desired expectations of all the stakeholders. The sheer sacrifice of thousands of peacekeepers deployed around the world away from their families for establishing peace and security is the key element for successful peacekeeping operations but they need the support of other stakeholders. A collaborative approach of UN, T/PCCs, host countries and the deployed peacekeepers can help to meet each others' expectations. On the "International Day for the UN Peacekeepers" everybody should show tribute and honour for the peacekeepers and should evaluate the peacekeepers so that they can take better preparation to ensure peace and stability. Because, they sacrifice their lives for others and ensure peace of the world as said by former SG Dag Hammarskjöld "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."[16]

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[16]Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, who died in a plane crash in what is now Zambia in September 1961.

Recommendations

Following are recommended to overcome the challenges and meet the expectations of UN by the peacekeepers:

a. **Training on Languages**. Training on English (for troops), French and Arabic (for officers) should get top priority for conducting effective operations and to avoid misunderstanding.

b. **Training the Civilian Interpreter**. Civilian interpreter should be trained to acquire workable knowledge on conducting the military operations before employing in UN missions.

c. **Duration of PDT**. Duration of PDT may be increased from three weeks to eight weeks incorporating all the latest requirements from UN like knowledge on ROE, POC, use of force and robust peacekeeping etc.

d. **Joining the Contingents in Time**. Bangladesh Armed Forces should ensure the joining of all peacekeepers in the contingents well ahead and prepare them for mission.

e. **Establishing Think Tank**. Group of experts on UN peacekeeping may be formed as 'Think Tank' for required study, strategic planning and modus operandi for future employment in UN missions.

f. **Coordination with UN Headquarters**. Bangladesh should raise the issues like designated sectors for TCCs and reducing relocation for deployed contingents to UN secretariat.

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TIME IN MILITARY UNDERTAKINGS

Lieutenant Colonel M M Moazzem Hossain, SUP, afwc, psc, Engrs

Force and time in this kind of operation amount to almost the same thing, and each can to a large extent be expressed in terms of each other. A week lost was about the same as a division. Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have captured it after March 18. Seven were insignificant at the end of April, but nine just might have done it. Eleven might have sufficed at the beginning of July. Fourteen were to prove insufficient on August 7.

Sir Winston S. Churchill
on the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915

Ask me for anything but time
Napoleon I

Introduction

Time as a fourth dimension provides a distinct perspective in military affairs during peace and war. For any military leader, the operating principle must be clear: making the right decision of what to do and preparing a good plan to carry it out are not enough; the plan must be properly implemented in time. Even the best plan may fail unless the timing is right. Time is a fixed phenomenon, it is neither elastic nor changeable, and it is dynamic in nature and can only be exploited or manipulated. Time lost can never be recovered, while space lost may be regained. Space and time when combined with the movement of one's forces and the speed of executing actions, time can considerably increase the freedom of action for the operational commander.

The higher the level one goes, the more important it is to consider the timing of what one does. And one of the most important aspects of timing is to evaluate how it will affect others. Time lost or wasted in conducting daily routine activities can sometimes indirectly influence, to a greater degree, the outcome of a combat action. Therefore, timing either in routine matters or in combat operations, from a section to a theatre of operation, is vital to success. One of the basic principles of war is surprise which is another way of saying that timing your operations is an important element of success.

Any military action needs a certain amount of time to plan, prepare, conduct and sustain. But over the period of time, the relative value of time has gradually changed. In the era of two dimensional wars, the military undertakings have taken place over a much smaller space and at a relatively slower pace, allowing the commanders more time to prepare for the combat or to react to unforeseen situations. But the technological advancements of the modern era have considerably reduced the time - taken for intelligence gathering, prepare for mobilization, conduct and maintain the war effort till the time operational or strategic objective is achieved.

The size of the battlefield has steadily expanded while the time ever remains constant. Such a conflict of space and time is gradually minimized by the innovative thinking and readings of the battlefield scenario by the ground commanders or by the proper management of time available at hand. The meaning and implications of time in war usually brings about different considerations for political leaders and military decision makers. Although there is wide agreement with **Clausewitz's** statement that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means[1], there still remain differences between the political and military imperatives in war, which affect the time considerations in military affairs. The paper will mainly focus on **TIME,** which is one of the central elements of military undertakings. It will also discuss few definitions, factor and characteristic of time, military and political imperatives of time with examples from the military history.

Definitions[2]

It is appropriate to define few of the important terms related to the factor of time:

a.   **Time** is the "non-spatial continuum in which events occur in apparently irreversible succession from the past through the present to the future[3]." Time, in this sense, is an objective phenomenon that has both physical and psychological aspects. Other assumptions about time are that it can be observed, measured, manipulated, and exploited[4]."

b.   **War** is defined as organized social conflict between defined actors that involves direct violent action. This overlapping of conflict and war is consistent with the idea that conflict is a precondition for war, that there can be conflict without war but no war without conflict. The primacy of violence in the conflict as a condition for war is consistent with Clausewitz's idea that "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will[5]."

c.   **Political imperatives** are distinguished from military imperatives by defining them as those imperatives that stem from governmental interaction with citizens, organizations, and other governments which does not include the application of force in the pursuit of objectives[6]."

d.   **Military imperatives**, on the other hand, relate directly to the application of force, the management of violence, and the accomplishment of specific tasks in the execution of military strategy sanctioned by political authority[7].

Factor of Time in the 'Theory of War'

Great military thinkers and leaders paid much importance to the factor of time. **Carl von Clausewitz** himself in his book **'On War'** dedicated a chapter solely on **'Unification of Forces in Time.'** He argues that "the simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war[8]." In viewing the use of force from the time perspective and proposing time as the unifying element, Clausewitz seems also to appreciate the fact that such simultaneous use will have an effect beyond the mere cumulative addition of individual strengths[9]." Clausewitz's emphasis on the inherent superiority of the defense suggests that habitual aggressors over the time are likely to end up as failures[10]. This view leads him to

characterize a defensive war as a "**Waiting War**," in which one counts on time to improve one's prospects. Having outlined the problems caused by the passage of time, Clausewitz offers advice about overcoming them. He emphasizes the necessity of **speed** to the point of enunciating it as a principle. "The second principle is the **rapid use of our forces**," writes the theorist, "Any unnecessary expenditure of time, every unnecessary detour, is a waste of strength and thus abhorrent to strategic thought[11]." Also important in his thought was **surprise**, which he viewed in temporal terms as a question of timing whose advantage was increased by the speed of such an attack[12].

Article XXXI of **Jomini's** "The Art of War" covers what he calls the orders of battle. Jomini says, "the great difficulty of the tactics of battles is and always will be the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous fractions whose efforts must combine to make an attack successful[13]." Here **Jomini** emphasized on the time sequenced actions upon which success or failure of one act is dependent on the other and it would, at any cost, affect the overall chain of operations.

John Boyd, the military strategist from United States Air Force is credited for largely developing the strategy for the invasion of Iraq in the first Gulf War. Boyd's key concept was that of the "Decision Cycle or **OODA Loop** (observing, orienting, deciding and acting)", the process by which an entity (either an individual or an organization) reacts to an event.

Source: Basing on John Boyd Theory Developed by Author
Figure 1: OODA Loop

According to the idea, the key to victory is to be able to create situations wherein one can make appropriate decisions more quickly and timely than one's opponent. By doing this, one can cause psychological dislocation to one's opponent and achieve surprise and maintain initiative[14].

Mao Tse-tung brings in a creative strategy that uses not the speed but the passage of time (protraction) as a weapon against the opponent. The basic premise of Mao's theory is concerned with prolonging the war- to such an extent that "Time" becomes the equating factor in an

otherwise unequal confrontation. Fundamental to all else, according to Mao, is the fact that countries with legislative systems cannot survive a war of attrition-either financially or psychologically. Over the time, the country with legislative power fighting with regular forces and organized resources find the accumulating financial burden increasingly intolerable. This weakens the morale of the people and the ability of the troops in the field to continue the fight. Even the strongest government, if based on a multi-party structure, will find the commitment to a long and indecisive war politically suicidal[15]. A weaker force would always play with the time seeking to extend, expand and elongate the fighting hours against her strong opponent with utmost economy of forces while maximizing her profit and ensure, if not early but a long delayed, success or victory.

Characteristics of Time in War

During war, we actually fight with the time. The party, in war, which has more time for planning, preparing, mobilizing and executing the art and science of war, is sure to have an upper hand in the battle. Therefore, it is imperative to learn the characteristics of time which have profound effects on the overall outcome of an operation. The five characteristics of time in war are duration, tempo, timing, sequence, and synchronization[16].

a. **Duration** involves the passage of time and the theorists have concentrated on the effects of this passage. Both Clausewitz's idea of a waiting war and Mao's concept of protracted war center on this characteristic.

b. **Tempo** describes the frequency or pace of events in the time continuum. One can relate the concepts of speed and initiative to tempo as well as the principle of the offensive since it embraces the necessity of initiative.

c. **Timing** has to do with opportunity and the choice of a particular moment in time for action or inaction. Timing is at the heart of the principle of surprise which bids one to "strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared."

d. **Sequence** involves the order of events in time. The ability to understand this order and perhaps predict how it will unfold in future is the key to any military undertaking.

e. **Synchronization** implies the ability to orchestrate events so that they occur at appropriate points in time. To remain true to the principle of mass, which call for the concentration of forces at the proper time and place, one must synchronize forces.

Time in the Military- Historical Examples. In previous military undertakings, history records many examples upon which there was a profound influence of the characteristics of time:

a. The Japanese attack at **Pearl Harbour**, early Sunday morning, 07 December, 1941, was devastatingly successful because of its timing: complete surprise. But their follow-up at Midway Island in June, 1942, ended in disaster, largely because it came too late and the US intelligence correctly forecast its place and timing.

b. Adlof Hitler failed to have his plans for invading England ready in time, so the opportunity passed. On the other hand, his unexpected attack toward Antwerp was timed perfectly to catch the Allies by surprise, and produced the "**Battle of Bulge**." This dislocated massive allied preparations for crossing the Rhine into Germany and prolonged the war[17].

Military and Political Perspective of Time- Its Conflict and Value in Decision Making Process (DMP)

The very method and processes of conducting wars, for instance, have now become a primary concern of statesmen and politicians because it is they and not the professionals who hold the power to use the biggest weapons of war-the nuclear bombs. Thus, military strategy, traditionally the business of the professionals, has spilled over into the policy files of the politicians. At the same time, policy-making at governmental levels has become so dependent on military assessments and advice that the professionals are today required, as never before, to extend their expertise to questions and problems far beyond the strictly strategic[18]. It is because of the reason that through the ages of history, the politicians and the military leaders are largely interdependent on each other for making the war time policies, sustenance and its conduct.

Time Induced Tension between Political and Military Imperatives. Misunderstandings often take place between the political and military imperatives due to differing time considerations in war. In a situation when political imperatives may need a quick military decision or response against an opponent; military imperatives may suggest postponement of such an action considering the time and space, preparation and force build-up requirements, logistical and other military factors. On the contrary, there might be a situation when prudent military action against the opponent is immediately required to accomplish the military objectives, but the political views may suggest postponement of such military move due to the lack of domestic and international support or due to humanitarian reasons. Thus the differences between the consideration of time amongst the military and political decision makers revolve around concerns that ranges from military to diplomatic to the humanitarian needs including the time based specific situations. The result of these differences is often, though not always; produces time-induced tensions which must be resolved before undertaking any kind of military operations for success.

The Gulf War-1991

a. The events of the **Gulf War** were set in motion by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 02 August 1990. In that war, there were disagreements in setting out the date for an offensive operation against the Iraqi regime between the political and military leadership. **General H. Norman Schwarzkopf** in a statement said, "Washington was signaling us to be ready to attack sooner rather than later. I was over at the White House yesterday talking about possible D-day dates, Powell told me on December 11. When I mentioned February 10 to February 20 as a possible window, everybody gulped. He told me that if the crisis weren't resolved before January 15, there was going to be real pressure for immediate military action. I replied that, if

that were the case, we might have to launch the air attack and just keep bombing until the ground offensive was ready[19]."

b.   At a point when **General Schwarzkopf** felt he still had a couple of months work to do in shoring up his defenses, he was told again to begin offensive planning for an operation he had told Bush in August, would not be possible for 8 to 12 months. He later complained, " I don't recall any time in military history when a theater commander has been asked to put together offensive plans for a force of three hundred thousand or four hundred thousand, been told to do it in a matter of a few days with no strategic guidance, and then been asked to defend that plan in detail[20]."

The Arab-Israeli War 1967.

a.   The proximate events leading upto the Six-Day War began in April 1967, when Israelis responded to Syrian artillery attacks with an air strike. In the time leading upto the commencement of hostilities, political imperatives generated by international considerations put off going to war while military imperatives argued that Israel had to act sooner rather than later in order not to lose the initiative or allow the forces aligned against the operation on Syrian sovereign territory. Once the war began, however, the situation reversed itself. The political situation of Israel demanded that the war be short, decisive, and relatively cheap in terms of lives and material, and lead to peace (perhaps by trading land)[21].

b.   Because there was a good chance the superpowers might intervene early to stop the war, the Israelis needed to accomplish their political objectives quickly. **Moshe Dayan**, the Israeli Minister of Defense, was particularly concerned about such intervention and told his generals the duration of any campaign would be limited. Israel's commanders had a difficult military problem which seemed to require more time than the political circumstances might allow.

Value of Time in DMP. "We learn from history that we do not learn from history", says Georg Hegel. History is the testimony of all successful and failed engagements, battles or major operations where time played a key role in the overall outcome. Time is a resource, a power house to the commanders who are either engaged in planning or fighting in the field.

a.   When space is in abundance, commanders tend to trade space for time and when space is limited, commanders tend to buy time either by delaying tactics or by deliberate attrition warfare or by compressing time for early victory. But in any case, it is the time consideration that commanders at all level must never ignore for victory. In recent conflicts in Syria, Crimea and Yemen; the value and importance of time is well understood and displayed by both sides to gain the highest possible strategic advantages within the shortest possible time and means.

b.   In **Syria**, President Baser Al Asad had played with time just to prolong the war and to invite Russia's, Iran's and Hezbollah's support and military assistance in her favour against the terrorists/rebels. The **'Strategy of Time Denial'** to the opponent forces proved to be beneficial which had given the Syrian Government an upper hand in negotiations with the oppositions.

c. In **Crimea**, the Russians smartly played the **'Time Card'** and out-manoeuvred all the major powers so intelligently that they had no time to react in favour of the Ukrainian Government. The Russians employed the time based hybrid warfare tactics recognizing Crimea as part of her own territory and winning a gorgeous victory without fighting, a modern day example of San Tzu's teaching on **'Victory without Fighting'**.

d. In **Yemen**, the Saudis had conducted swift lightening air strikes against the Huthi rebels and delayed the rebel advance towards the port city of Aden. The rebels on the other hand, continued their fighting delaying the achievements of Saudi end state of reinstating the exile Hadi Government in power.

Fight for time in achieving the end state would be the ultimate theme in all future joint military operations that would certainly influence the decision making cycle of the political and military leadership.

### *Time in Military Undertakings*

Time in Military Operations. The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong but the **time and chance** happen to them all (Bible, Ecclesiastes)[22]. Time is essentially a dynamic force in all military undertakings.

a. In case of a **defensive operation**, time is of vital   importance for reconnaissance; for preparing preliminary and supplementary positions; for fire and manoeuvre planning, terrain reinforcement and terrain development, logistic support and many other requirements like the overall operational planning and its play including the reserves. On the other hand, the fight between time and space remains as the main focus in all the **offensive operations**. The main and secondary effort of any offensive need to act faster than the enemy, entailing smarter moves and time dependent initiative to seize opportunities and act decisively.

b. Normally, the operational commander and staff cannot influence the factor of time which is primarily the responsibility of the national-strategic command echelon (e.g. mobilization, warning time, preparing country's armed forces etc). However, the factor of time dealing with operational decisions, operational planning, planning and conduct of a campaign or major operations are directly influenced by the operational commander, staff or by subordinate commanders[23].

Time-Space-Force. In any military undertaking, a true combination of Time-Space-Force ratio can bring enormous benefits to commanders in the field with greater leverage and success against the enemy. On the morning of November 19, 1942 the Soviet forces had encircled the entire German Sixth Army in the **'Battle of Stalingrad'**[24]. Hitler ordered and promised General Paulus to supply his troops with food and ammunition by aircraft. But Hermann Goring, the Luftwaffe chief failed to provide **timely supply** of the much needed 300 tons of food and war materials. In late December, the Sixth Army began to run out of ammunition, fuel and food. The result of German offensive was obvious - a humiliating, inevitable surrender and defeat.

Time and the Concept of Culmination. The art of leadership in the field is to correctly anticipate or foresee the arrival of 'a culmination point' or culmination. **Culmination is solely a time oriented phenomenon**. There is probably no aspect of operational art as complex as the concept of culmination. It is the point of time and space when either the defender or the attacker has come to a point beyond which he cannot match his combat power, will and efficiency with his opponent[25].

Source: Adapted by Milan N. Vego
Figure 2: Theory of Culminating Point

Besides the concept of culmination, the **'Principles of War'** like concentration and economy of force (timely massing of troops at a decisive battle front), morale (timely success i.g General Slim's Burma Campaign), surprise (sudden and timely action), synchronization (timely meshing in all battlefield activities) etc. are also time dependent.

Time and Deception. Deception is a traditional component of political and military conflict. Deception is conceived and executed to help multiplying the combat power through surprise and security. In any military undertaking, one of the fundamental questions to deceive or not to deceive the enemy is based on the availability of resources including the time[26]. The timing of actual operation and deception are well knitted to the overall strategic plans and success of one would accelerate the other. During '**Normandy Landing'** in WW II, the actual timing of landing operation was a great success because the allied could timely misguide and deceive the Germans into believing that the true landing would take place either in Norway or at the Pas de Calais (Straits of Dover).

Time in Rear Area Operations. The Air-Land battles cannot solely be won by neglecting its 'Rear Area Operations' but it could well be lost in the rear. Timely operational focus on rear area defenses is also important. A clever and cunning enemy would always seek to cut the tail of a marching column separating the fighting echelon from the supporting elements at the rear. Therefore, a timely and well harmonized planning and response mechanism during DMP can

limit, if not in full, the enemy interference at the rear. During **World War II** in 1944, some 370,000 men and women from the Soviet **BYELORUSSIA** kept thirteen German divisions involved in the rear area[27]. It was later identified that the Germans did not **timely anticipate** that the Soviets might carry out such a precise, well-timed rearward action against the rear causing havocs to her survival.

Good Timing and Bad Timing. The **'Timing Principle'** is all-pervasive in the military service. The training and administrative events are duly programmed to take place in time and the leaders should focus on good timings rather than bad timings. In the context of our country, normally physical training (PT) of a unit can best be performed during the morning hours while games and gym in the afternoon and evening. The troops of a unit doing PT at noon would be an example of bad timing. In case of visit or inspection, more positive beneficial results stem from announced and regularly scheduled programmes than from the negative approach of being caught unaware. But in special cases like alarm scheme, stand to drills, firefighting drill, duty alertness checking; no advance warning might be given. In military, it is said that the best plan may even fail unless the timing is correct.

Time - a Scarce Commodity in the Military. A senior leader's most important commodity is time[28]. Time is only the commodity due to limits on other aspects of life and on life itself. Time only makes sense as a commodity because our lifespan is small and limited[29]. Resource and time in military are always scarce and effective management of these two is vital for a good leader. A smart, bold and thoughtful commander may economize his time and resources by prioritizing and at the same time risking any military activity/moves. The commander, by doing so maximizes his concentration and effort towards the urgent operational requirements which ensures greater flexibility, greater output and success.

Selection of Timing. Selection of timing is normally the responsibility of the higher authority. Most frequently encountered errors in selecting the timing are - the visits to another officer or in unit headquarters. Usually, the first thing in the morning or the last thing in the afternoon is not a good time to visit a busy person or unit- although, again there are exceptions[30]. Military is a 7/24 hours job which includes both operational and non-operational timings. As the official hours are important, so is the importance of leisure hours also. Leisure hour recharges one's brain and heart to organize or to synchronize the thoughts and planning parameters that support the future military undertakings.

Time versus High Expectations.

    a. The very attitude of military leaders must not be **'One-upmanship'**. The intention, wishes and desires must meet with the time, environment and situation; the ways, means and ends. Too many expectations within a limited time frame may beget mistakes and misunderstandings, allowing loss of time, energy and resources. Zero error syndromes should never be the criteria for any military job/tasks. Even at times, the time sensitive mistakes, faults and failures may be overlooked with positive attitude for future rectifications.

b.   Timely planning with elaborate and intelligent details matching with the capabilities, means and dreams of a leader can bring him the glory and success in the field of military undertakings which might qualify him a '**Heaven Born Captain**'.

A Snapshot on the 'Need of Time' in Military Undertakings. Time is a special resource for any military leader to undertake any military jobs/tasks. Thus the art of management of time is a precondition for any success during war/conflict. Milan N. Vego, in the figure below, pictorially describes the time requirements for various military dealings.

Source: Adapted by Milan N. Vego's Presentation on Operational Art
Figure 3: The Factor of Time [31]

Conclusion

The most valuable thing in the military world is **TIME.** As psychologist Dr. Denis Waitley points out, "Each human being has exactly the same number of hours and minutes every day. Rich people can't buy more hours. Scientists can't invent more hours[32]." Time in all sorts of military undertakings is considered to be the most precious gift, not because it is abundant, handy

and can be utilized in dire needs but because it is scarce and can't be recalled back or because it can be of enemy's help if not effectively or efficiently managed or utilized. Great military thinkers and leaders like Carl von Clausewitz, Jomini paid much importance to the factor of time. Quick and timely decision making helps commanders in the field to overpower the enemy on every aspect of military engagements, battles or major operations. On the other hand, prolonging the time of conflict/war can best be pronounced as an effective weapon against the strong oppositions, Mao Tse-tung reiterates.

To reap the maximum output from time, military commanders should properly value and understand the five characteristics of time. In this connection, historical examples and lessons from military history can be the best guide to comprehend the time value. The differences in the considerations of time for the military, political or humanitarian issues may sometimes generate time induced tension between the political and military imperatives; because the ends might be the same but the means and ways of doing things might differ considerably from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level. Time induced tension may be resolved through careful and diligent use of time or through the use of modern equipment and technology that can bring decisive victory against the opposition within the shortest possible time and minimum possible collateral damage.

Time is essentially a dynamic force in all military undertakings. Time is of vital importance in the defensive or in the offensive operations; for reconnaissance, for fire and manoeuvre planning, logistic support and many other requirements like the overall operational planning including the reserves. Culmination of own and enemy forces is solely a time dependent phenomenon. Timely action and force - coupled with deception and surprise can effectively attrite the enemy to culminate in time and space. The 'Timing Principle' is all-pervasive in the military service. Military leaders should focus on good timing rather than bad timing. Again the proper selection and maintenance of timing is the leader's responsibility and towards him only - the led are always looking at. Efficient and effective utilization including the correct management of time may make a military leader a **'Heaven Born Captain'**.

End Notes :

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5. Clausewitz, 75.

6. Walter d. Givhan, 3.

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8. Clausewitz, 205.

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29. Prakyat Prasad, Is time a commodity, https://www.quora.com/Is-time-a-commodity, accessed on 17 February 2017.

30. Major General Aubrey S. "Red" Newman, What are Generals made of, Chapter 13, 55.

31. Presentation on Operational Art, Milan N. Vego, 19.

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EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION – A COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY OF BANGLADESH ARMY

Lieutenant Colonel Md Masud Rana, psc, AEC

Introduction

Education, ***of the right kind***, is the most powerful factor that can be employed for the elevation of the people in every respect[1]. From the philosophical thought, education enlarges the conception of what is possible, enriches our intellectual imagination and terminates the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation. In the largest sense, education is an act or experience that has determining effect on the character of an individual. It is a continuous process with which a society transmits its knowledge, skills and values from one generation to another. Without education it becomes very difficult to sustain with the technologically advanced society. Education planning adopts a comprehensive approach to education that spans all the avenues from kids to career. Education planning monitors the evaluation and change in educational activities and its effect check. It also highlights the contemporary issues of planning analyzing them with a view to disseminating methodologies which can be more pertinent for the community. A better education planning can be done if there is a tested common policy guideline for the stakeholders such as students, teachers and guardians implemented under a set organizational body.

Military is a component of the society. Viewing wider, the master plan of each cantonment includes the establishment of educational institutions as a part of better and effective educational planning from pre-primary level to graduation level. There are two perspectives of an educational planning that is ***operational***; deals with academic and other activities and ***organizational*** perspective that deals with administration. From the organizational perspective Brigade/Station Commanders, Centre Commandant and Directors of few Directorate at Army Headquarters (for Dhaka Cantonment) are given responsibility of Governing Body (GB) keeping the General Officer Commanding (GOC) as the Chief Patron. Besides, military officers are being posted as Principal to some of the educational institutions. Now, the functioning of these institutions has become a command responsibility at all level. Under the guidelines of commanders, institutions are running well and gaining applauding success in the country. But, there are academic matters such as lack of teachers training for quality and effective teaching, lack of competitive attitudes among these institutions in case of co-curricular activities, absence of teachers posting provision among these institutions, lack of keeping accountability in case of students' migration. Besides, there is no common policy guideline for these institutions, maintenance of history of subsequent successes of the students, timely preparation of academic syllabus, calendar and maintenance of budget. These are some of the major lacunas identified from the operation point of view. At present, only a Central Coordination Committee (CCC) is working at General Staff Branch, Army

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[1]. *'Educational System from Lord Curzon to World War –I'*, 1914 by B M Sankhidher, Deep Publications private limited, 159, Rajour Garden, New Delhi -110 027, Page- 90.

Headquarters (AHQ) to coordinate the academic matters of Cantonment Public School and College (CPSC) and English Medium School and College (EMSC). To look after the matters of Cadet College and Proyash School (for Neuro Developmental Disordered Children) and Military Collegiate School Khulna (MCSK), a separate administrative body works. Besides, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been signed with Bangladesh Open University (BOU)[2] to expedite soldiers' Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) programme (named Niche-1)[3]. Now HSC is a departmental requirement for soldiers' subsequent promotion to the higher rank[4]. Each year, almost 6000 trainee soldiers from army appear at HSC examination under BOU. The activities of Niche-1 are also looked after by the AHQ, General Staff (GS) Branch, Education Directorate. There is also a planning of diploma (HSC equivalent) education for the soldiers of some of the technical Arms/Services under Bangladesh Technical Board (BTB). Under this circumstances, how comprehensively these academic matters can be looked after through a viable *education planning* and *administration* sharing the command responsibility of Bangladesh Army is the main focus of this article.

This article has been developed for more general understanding of education planning for CPSC, EMSC and soldiers' education only. It attempts firstly in discussing overview of the existing system of administration of educational institution of Bangladesh Army its achievement and major difficulties faced by these institutions in present perspective. Secondly, it deliberately explains the necessity of an effective education planning and administration for the educational institution under army control. While evaluating the existing education system a probable outline of a centralized body with appropriate action plan is suggested with a view to sharing the command responsibility more effectively and efficiently. Finally, some recommendations are made related to effective education planning and administration in Bangladesh Army. The paper has been designed following the methodology of objective assessment with primary information, data, interviews of Army officers, and secondary from different article written by eminent people belonging to diverse profession in newspapers and relevant web site. Before setting any policy or establishing any institutions, there should have some brain storming among staff level. This article is simply to be considered as author's original thought which left the option of further thoughts for others.

Overview of the Existing System of Administration

At present, there are 32 Cantonment Public Schools and Colleges (CPSC), 22 English Medium Schools and Colleges (EMSC), 12 cadet colleges and 10 Proyash (For Neuro Developmental Disordered Child) schools under Bangladesh Army control. Besides, there are 39 Cantonment Board Schools and Colleges (CBSC) located within the cantonment which are administered by Director Military Lands and Cantonment (DMLC). The local Governing Body (GB) is most likely headed by Station Commanders to look after the academic and co-curricular activities. No military officers are posted in CBSC. There are about more than two lakhs of

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[2] . MOU between Bangladesh Army and BOU dated 17 November 2013

[3] . Ministry of Defence (MOD) letter number Sha-1/2013/D-1/JCO Upgrade/129 dated 01 April 2014

[4]. Manual of qualification 2016 (Revised) dated Nov 2016.

students study at different levels in CPSC, EMSC and CBSC. These institutions are academically under the Ministry of Education (MOE), National University (where applicable), Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards and Upazila Education office of different location of the country but administratively under military control. These institutions facilitate pre-primary education to higher secondary level education. The academic activities of CPSC and EMSC are looked after by a Central Coordination Committee (CCC).

Each institution has separate Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) or Rules of Business (ROB) for running the institution effectively. An overview of administration of CPSC, EMSC and CBSC are as shown by the diagram below:


Figure 1: Structure of Present Administrative Body

Achievements of the Institutions Administered by Bangladesh Army

All these institutions are striding ahead because of the involvement of the military leaders in regards to the planning and administration with CPSC, EMSC even in CBSC. Some of the achievements of the institutions are narrated below:

a. Academic Result of CPSC, EMSC and CBSC. Education is the major component of the human capital which plays an important role in fostering economic growth and enriching the overall quality of life. Army controlled institutions provide a strong foundation through various initiatives from pre-primary learning to higher secondary level education. Institutions follow same syllabus of national text books in same academic calendar. In each institution, teachers use modern, digital, contemporary and sophisticated training aids while conducting the classes. Under the able command, guidelines, continuous supervision and leadership of commanders at all level, institutions are obtaining applauding success in every public examination of the country. A comparison of academic result of last five years of CPSC, EMSC and CBSC in public examinations is shown by the matrix below:

Figure: 2 A Matrix on Academic Result in Public Examination

b.   *Students' Success in Army Controlled Institutions*. Any student can be declared success if he or she can establish himself in the renowned organizations of the country. From the historical point of view, it is known that many students of CPSC, EMSC or even CBSC obtained success in their life. Some students became Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh Army, many ambassadors and high commissioners were the students of the institutions under army control. It acts as the testimony of success of these institutions. Presently, the non military counterparts are found very interested to admit their children in these institutions for better service, good academic result and subsequent success trend of the students.

c.   *Co-curricular Programs - a Value Adding Factor for the Institutions.* The aim of the educational institutions under army control is not only to achieve good academic result but also to instill moral values and ethos to the children. Here, the children are being nurtured with good ethical and social values so that they excel in the society. There are some segments pursued for the students to materialize the students' knowledge, intelligence and talent in the army controlled institutions. In every year there are debate competitions; mathematics Olympiad, general knowledge competition, etc. are held at local and formation level. Following the process, students are evaluated and recognized as best student and institutions are also declared as best institutions. This is a unique methodology of practice of co-curricular activities among the students. *The* rate of number of students' participations in co-curricular activities is increasing day by day. It helps to make the students mentally robust in confidence building and reshaping them as good human being of the country. On the other hand, it also adds values in the success of the institutions.

d.   *Effective Teaching Brings Success for Institutions.* The chain of teaching in CPSC, EMSC and CBSC brings the community together to share education in different avenues. In the school community, this starts at the top in working with others to develop their standard in every position. By focusing on the individual's strengths, teachers explore their expertise first, before looking for helping them to develop in other areas. It focuses to build a

relationship with each individual, pushing them to be better every day. The more experience teachers have, the more effective teachers and leaders they are and have strength-based united approach to their students. Strong effective teaching in all areas, consequently, is bringing success for the institutions as per the vision set.

e. ***Success Obtained by Sharing Responsibility of Principal and Counterparts*** Present reality is not only the wisdom but also the knowledge, social values and ethics that they inculcate within the student for our present and future. Military principals are being posted to the institutions to put due importance on academic and administrative control on the institutions. The successes of students are not the sole responsibility of the principal only but the other counterparts such as the parents, teaching staffs and students should collectively be involved in this regard. Principal being the institutional head is sharing responsibilities with the guardians, students and teaching staffs to bring optimum output for the institution.

f. ***Community Service Patronized by Bangladesh Army***. At present, beside the CPSC, EMSC, Cadet College and Proyash Schools, Bangladesh University of Professionals (BUP) - a public university emerged out in conducting higher studies programme where the members of Armed Forces and non- military students of the country are the main stakeholders. Under BUP, there are some affiliated institutions like Military Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA), National Defence College (NDC), Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Armed Forces Medical Colleges and so on. These institutions patronize both the military and non-military education to the students of the country. The present percentage of students in the university, schools and colleges are approximately **70%** non-military and **30%** military wards. People are now relying more on military administered institution for its effectiveness, higher standard and discipline.

Major Difficulties faced by the Institutions

Despite many successes there are some problems identified as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

a. ***Structural and Operational Constrains of the Institutions***. The educational planning needs to identify structural and operational constraints for education and skills development and indicate what should be done to overcome these obstacles. The structural weaknesses will require a sustainable and long term effort to be pursued with a sense of urgency. More immediate steps need to be taken on operational issues within a designed framework of structural reforms. In case of CPSC and EMSC major structural constraints are formation of common policy, education quality, interest of the stakeholders and realistic common budgetary platform of the institutions.

b. ***Students' Migration for Parents Posting.*** In Military, families and children are the most transient of populations in the society. Students who understand the reality and potential dangers associated with their parents' ***absence***, exhibit signs of fear of adjustment, engagement, disengagement etc. Educational planning in Bangladesh Army has been primarily formulated to meet the requirement of the pupils of the cantonment. Army personnel serving in remote area and their nature of employment usually hamper their

children's education. Despite the potentialities their children are falling behind the privileged group. To the parents, children's education gets top priority with a view to obtaining success in their subsequent life. No comprehensive plan is set to address the students' migration on posting of the military personnel.

c.   *Positional   Disadvantages – Socio-economical   Circumstances   of   Guardians*. Educational institutions of Bangladesh Army are co-located with cantonment area including Chittagong Hill Tracts. The socio-economic conditions of family members are not similar everywhere in the country. The students' tuition fees are therefore varies from place to place. This creates a problem in fixing the teacher's salary and other amenities in a common shape of the schools and colleges.

d.   *Absence of Common Policy for Institutions.* Policy is as ***'an explicit or implicit'*** single decision or group of decisions which may set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action or guide implementation of previous decisions. Policy making is the first step in any planning cycle and planners must appreciate the dynamics of policy formulation before they design implementation and evaluation procedure effectively[5]. At present, there is no common policy guidelines to run the school and colleges under army control.

e.   *Winning the Mind-set of Non Military Counterpart*.   Generally Army controlled educational institutions follow the rules and regulations of the government; but in regards to the pattern and method of administration, teaching quality and other activities, it follows own command style which are most likely different from other institutions of the country. For example; to make sure the quality teaching, these institutions offer reasonable salary to the teachers as such the students' tuition fees are different from other institutions. Thereby, institutions cannot fully abide by the rules and regulations set by education board and others. This, sometimes, creates panic in the authority of the institutions. Besides, for some pertinent issues like coordinating for public examinations centre, obtaining students' scholarship etc. for which the school authority needs to win the provincial mindset of the non- military administration.

f.   *Students' Varieties*. The thoughts of the students of each area of the country are not similar. They are academically, socially, culturally and economically different from each other. It creates discrete academic result in public examination (PECE, JSC, SSC and HSC) vis- a -vis in qualifying them in competitive admission test in public universities of the country.

g.   *Traffic Problem within the Cantonments, Especially in Dhaka Cantonment.* There is a guideline about the number of students to be admitted in each school and college. Because of the coordinated service provided by the institutions and its consecutive successes have increased the interest of the guardians for admitting their children day by day. As a result, the density of transport within cantonment is increasing day by day. As such, the traffic problem has become now a concern of the cantonment authority, especially in Dhaka cantonment.

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[5]. ***'Education Policy-Planning Process: an Applied Framework'*** Wadi D. Haddad., with the assistance of Terri Demsky, Paris 1995.

Necessity of an Effective Education Planning and Administration

The term education planning refers to both ongoing process and the associated documentation that informs the education of a student with special needs through describing, documenting, monitoring and evaluating the students' education program. It is an instrument for providing the needed coordination and direction of the different components of an educational system. Educational planning must consider the full context of the educational community. Education planning is a 'road map' that plots the progress to re-look the development and revise as needed[6]. The notion of educational planning – making the education sector of Bangladesh Army grow and functional more effectively suggest a well structured administrative body with clearly defined aim and objectives, undisputed causal relationship and decision makers. The education planning is required to provide direction, to reduce uncertainty and to minimize waste and redundancy[7]. The necessity of education planning has been clearly described in the subsequent paragraphs:

a. **Teachers Training for Capacity Building.** To train all teachers of CPSC and EMSC on present creative system of education, each year *'quality workshop'* is arranged under the guidelines of CCC but some of the teachers cannot join as the academic classes are run at that time. A comprehensive approach is needed to raise the standard of education by making an arrangement of teachers training for every institution. Army administrated educational institutions are drawing the attention of parents of both military and non military wards of the country in comparison with the civil institutions. Expectations of the guardians are increasing day by day with the continuous socio-economic and technological advancements. Most of the teachers feel uncomfortable in adopting innovative educational approaches including teaching aids because of the lack of appropriate training. They also fear that use of other approaches may result in poor performance in examinations. As a result, the pass rate in public examination is getting higher but a number of students are failing to qualify them in competitive examinations. Present teachers training system need to be improved to meet the increasing demands of the parents. Teachers' quality is the strength in education. Increasing demands for best quality teaching will only be materialized through proper training of the teachers. This requires continuous and progressive training throughout the service. A well-organized institution can plan the training of the teachers as per the expectations of parents. The curriculum, pedagogy, leadership and regulation of teachers' education must be revamped and revitalized with due emphasis.

b. **Maintenance of Database of Successful Students.** Academic institutions are place with which the students' senses of belongings, interaction, socialization and participation rejuvenate. The provision of maintaining a success register would help in making an updated database of success of all students of institutions under Army control. At present, there is no record of the students' success state. All institutions should have success register where the students would endorse their updated state while they come to the institutions for collecting documents like certificates, testimonials, mark sheets etc. It will also help the institutions to

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[6]. *'Education Planning and Administration'* by Mrs. M. Brindhamani and Mr T. Manichander, A. P. H Publishing corporation, 4435-36/7, Ansari Road, Darya Gan, New Delhi-110002.

[7]. Ibid

measure their contribution and accountability of success and teaching standard with the sense of deep satisfaction.

c. ***Transfer and Promotion of Teaching and Non- teaching Faculty.*** The point of transfer of teachers was raised by the stakeholders of the institutions[8].At present, the economic condition of every institutions is not same. As such, the equal opportunity cannot be offered by all institutions. But, to make equal standard of teaching the quality of teachers should be same. The quality of a teacher at Dhaka may not be same in comparison with the teachers outside Dhaka, but the teachers of Dhaka can be transferred to other institutions outside Dhaka if equal amenity or facilities can be ensured. ***Teachers posting is required to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of education services.*** Besides, it should be within the policy applicable for all enrolled teachers of the institutions under Army control. Education planning and administration is required to coordinate the qualitative expansion necessitated by demographic factors and community /social demand with quantitative improvement in terms of content, structure, quality and method. Creation of the provision of teachers posting in case of army educational institutions would support the development plan of the institutions in the long term and open up an avenue in new practices in education management and career development[9].

d. ***Teaching and Non- teaching faculty members' employment***. Educational planning brings good dividends in the form of fulfillment of manpower needs, the overall development of individual and organizational economic, social and cultural development. In every institution there are number of teaching and non - teaching faculty members employed separately. A comprehensive plan in this regard can plot its judicious need and employment of manpower in the institutions.

e. ***Accountability of Students' Migration.*** It is a common phenomenon for the military wards to study in 6 to 10 different schools at the end of their high school. A better education planning and administration can address the students' quantum jump in maintaining their performance to make sure the choice of parents who are looking for quality education at affordable cost for their wards. A separate organizational body is envisaged who will have jurisdiction over all institutions in solving the migration related problems of the student.

f. ***Creation of Job Opportunities for Retired Military Members.*** The age limit of a teacher or other staffs at public university is up to 65 years where a military officer of the rank of General to Major and below is ranging from 61 to 50 years (age limit). So there remains the scope and strength of military members of serving more 10 to 12 years. A suitable educational administration plan for military personnel can give a scope to be re-employed in the institution under Army control like CPSC, EMSC and others like BUP, MIST, AFMC, BMA and so on. An organizational body would be appropriate to forecast and prepare a comprehensive plan in this regard. If it is planned, it would be welfare to the retired officers that will undoubtedly boost the morale of serving military members as well and the institutions will be benefitted by the service of experienced teaching faculty.

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[8]. ***Minutes of Formation Commander Conference 2/2016,*** Item number-16 c dated 04 May 2016.

[9]. ***'Teachers day*'** by Mr Qazi Faruque Ahmed, Professor , Daily Sun dated 05 October 2015.

g. **Feeder Institution for Army.** At present, the officers' intake in Army is enrolled from Cadet College and others. Army arranges advertisement, lecture in public colleges to inspire students to join Army. A database basing on the interest of the students of CPSC, EMSC even in CBSC who want to join Army can be prepared from the institutions under Army control. An incentive as source of inspiration may be declared in case of students study in the institutions under army control.

h. **Monitoring Academic and Co- Curricular Activities on Ground.** A strong central administrative body for effective planning and administration to ensure good academic and co-curricular activities in all the military administered schools and colleges is a contemporary necessity. At present, there is only Central Coordination Committee (CCC) formed at AHQ level to monitor or assess the academic and other activities of the institutions. Concerned staffs can only limitedly check the function of institutions located at Dhaka on ground. Institutions located outside Dhaka are not closely monitored by CCC. Due to the lack of proper monitoring and control systems, there might have some scope created in these institutions where teachers could engage them in shadow teaching (coaching business) rather spreading quality education[10]. Therefore it is envisaged that a central monitoring and information system to be developed to reinforce the existing mechanism. It will modify the present system to fit the requirements at a more unified and synchronized way. The monitoring system may have following components:

- *Indicators to measure the progress and impact*

- *Specific areas to be monitored*

- *The network to link horizontally and vertically with existing system*

- *Common terms of reference for comparable and meaningful interpretation of results of each event.*

- *Evaluate the best practices of the institutions*

j. **Leadership Aspirations on the Education System in Army Controlled Institutions.** In recent past the leadership has expressed specific directives on the educational and its administrative development in the army controlled institutions mentioning education as a 'command responsibility' in Army. Commanders at different tiers of military are closely associated with different schools and colleges. Commanders at all level are responsible for imparting quality education to the children of the schools and colleges governed by them. The good schooling and well grooming up of the children will satisfy their parents in staying in the respective cantonments. If schools are not good, officers or military members will keep their family away for the better education of their children which will affect their professional life as well. Hence, the formation of a central administrative body is a requirement of the time in discharging the command responsibility of imparting quality education to military wards by effective planning and administration.

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[10]. **'Ensuring Quality Education**', editorial in daily sun dated 31 March 2015.

k. *Security of the Institutions*. Ensuring security is a mammoth responsibility. In this regard a central security measures may ensure better security for all the educational Institutions in Army. The periodical security check-up and identifying security status in all the schools and colleges of Army may be vested on a Central Administrative body with a view to ensuring effective planning and administration.

l. *Fulfilling Government's Aspiration- 'Education in the 7th Plan'.* A concept note prepared by the General Economics Division (GED) of the planning commission indicates that a strategy for strengthening education and training during the 7th plan and emphasizes ways to ensure quality education at all levels[11]. In the plan government recognizes the need to patronize and guide educational development aspiration, the planning function has to be strengthened in appropriate ways. A panel of education experts with insight and interest in the interface of education and national development should be brought into the process of crafting the plan. The 7th plan comes at a critical juncture for shaping development priorities and strategies to move Bangladesh into the rank of middle income countries. Education planning and skills part of the plan has a key role in this effort.

Establishment of a Central Administrative Body

A better education planning can be done if there is a tested policy guideline for all. The efficient delivery of education service and its follow up needs constant monitoring. In Army institutions are located discretely at different places of the country. A separate coordinated central mechanism solely is needed to look after the policy making, resource allocation and efficient management of all institutions. The central body can set up a policy and find out ways to implement it with the help of local Governing Body. The central administrative body would permit joint decisions to be taken on overall policies and priorities, while retaining flexibility in the implementation of central objectives at local levels. For an example, Pakistan has *'Army Public School and College Secretariat' (APSACS)* which serves as the central unifying body which ensures uniformity amongst branches of Army Public Schools and Colleges and schedules training workshops for teachers, school management and regional coordinators[12].

Probable Structure of the Administrative Body. Administrative body is a statutory apex in the field of controlling and ruling the institutions placed under it. The capacity and accreditation of this institution would be under Army Headquarters (AHQ). For better and effective handling of the army controlled institutions an administrative body named **'Directorate General of Army Education Services' (DGAES)** may be established as outlined below. DGAES as nodal point would manage and ensure proper education facilities in the institutions under army control in coordination with CCC. All CPSC, EMSC, CBSC, Proyash Schools and recruit HSC (Niche-1) programme may be planned under **DGAES**. On the other hand, this body would help teachers to involve in participatory and wide ranging approach through a regular process. It can look after teachers' development plan and programs as a package, as an attractive career, promotion and

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[11] . *'Education in the 7th Plan'*, Manzoor Ahmed Professor Emeritus at BRAC University, Daily Star, Dated 12 January 2015.

[12] **www.apsacssectt.edu.pk**

posting, teachers' and staffs recruitment, in-service training, sickness, accident and emergency benefits, recreational facilities and on retirement/pension benefits[13].


Figure 3: Proposed Administrative Body for Institutions under Army Control

The Aim and Objective of DGAES. The aim and objective of DGAES may be as follows:

- *To enable the critical examination of trends and directions in educational administration, planning and management of all educational institution under army control*

- *To facilitate the critical appraisal of a range of theories relevant to the study and practice of administration, planning, policy and management in education*

- *To relate theoretical considerations to current substantive problems and issues rose in those institutions.*

- *To focus on quality improvement and service delivery of education at all level.*

Segment - wise Charter of Duties in Broad Terms Following may be the charter of duties of the wings of DGAES:

a. ***DGAES Headquarters (HQ).*** It will be established for the institutions, regulation, supervision, control and development of DGAES. HQ may be headed by a Director General (DG) of the rank of ***Major General*** of Bangladesh Army. He will be the chief of both academic and administrative officers.

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[13]. '***UNSECO Guideline and Teacher Development Policy***' Quazi Faruqe Ahmed, Professor, Daily Sun, Dated 13 Feb 2016.

b. ***Director of School (Primary & Secondary) and College Section.*** The responsibility of the directors of school and college section would be the maintenance of the standard of teaching and examination of the institutions. They would constantly visit and supervise the academic activities of the institutions. They would also advise the DG on the development of academic and co-curricular **Planning & Development** activities of the institutions. They would also make a ***Performance Appraisal Report (PAR)*** of the institution at the end of the year. The rank of the directors of school and college may be a ***Brigadier General*** of Bangladesh Army.

c. ***Director of Training Branch.*** The responsibility of this section will be generally the maintenance of discipline of the staff of DGAES and that of institutions under it. It would maintain a constant liaison with all other training institutions of the country and forecast a training schedule for the institutions under army control in every year. The head of this branch may be a ***Brigadier General*** of Bangladesh Army. He will be the ***secretary*** of DGAES subject to the control of DG and shall carry out the orders and decision of DGAES. He shall be the custodian of all funds of DGAES.

d. ***Record of Posting and Promotion and Students' Migration.*** An effective career planning will be maintained by this section. They will be completely responsible for posting, promotion and enrolment of the institutions. They would keep a record of success of students of all institutions by maintaining a liaison with all institutions. This branch will also look after the migration problems of students. The branch head may be a ***Colonel*** of Bangladesh Army.

e. ***Budget Section.*** This section will be responsible for making annual budget for the institutions. The command and control of this section will be under the Secretary of DGAES but it shall have a budget officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of Bangladesh Army.

f. ***Transport Section.*** This section would work under the policy guideline applicable for the transport available in DGAES. The section will be under the control of HQ with an officer of the rank of Major of Bangladesh Army as transport officer.

g. ***Line of Functioning of CCC in Relation with DGAES***. At present, CCC looks after the academic activities such as preparation of academic syllabus and calendar, books selection, family security scheme maintenance and some other problems raised by the institutions. In present system all academic activities are accomplished by forming number of committees among the members of the institution where CCC only approves it through two meetings in an academic year. Now all jobs will be performed under DGAES office and present in the meeting arranged by CCC. It will be more comprehensive, thought provoking and closer participation of the institutions will be ensured. Thereby the job of CCC will be reduced and it would be able to supervise the activities of all institutions under army control through a regular and more comprehensive presentation of the command of DGAES.

Recommendations

In view of above discussions, this paper makes following recommendations:

a. ***Establishment of Directorate General of Army Education Services (DGAES)***. To look after all academic, co-curricular and administrative activities more closely and comprehensively proposed DGAES may be established. The establishment of DGAES will address the issues like making of a common policy applicable for institutions, student migration/admission problem, provision of teaching and non- teaching staffs' transfer, teachers' training for quality and effective teaching and most suitable academic and co-curricular development plan of the institutions. DGAES may also run recruit HSC (Niche-1) and soldiers' diploma program in coordination with BOU and BTB respectively. Under such circumstances, a board of officers may be convened to find out possible ways of establishing and formulating the detail charter of duties of each section and Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The suggested structure of Board of Officers is as under:

Director of Education	- President
One officer (Lt Col) from Military Training Directorate	- Member
One Officer (Lt Col) from Education Directorate	- Member
Two Principal (One from CPSC and one from EMSC)	- Member

b. ***Posting of Principal in CBSC***. All CBSC are located within the cantonment but these institutions are administered under the non -military principals where the chairman of GB is from military (station commanders). Besides, there are some reputed school and colleges (like Rajuk Uttara, Residential Model and so on) where army officers are posted as principal on deputation. Similarly, in all CBSC army officers may be posted as principal. This would facilitate the institution in the same line of operations located within cantonment under the common rules and regulations set by DGAES office.

Conclusion

In the present context, in educational institution under army control there are some academic matters such as lack of teachers training for quality and effective teaching, maintenance of competitive attitudes among these institutions in case of co-curricular activities, no teachers posting provision among these institutions, lack of keeping accountability in case of students migration due to parents' posting, no common policy guidelines for these institutions, timely preparation of academic syllabus and calendar and so on are some of the major difficulties identified from the academic point of view. As such, an overview of the existing system of administration of educational institutions under army control in regards to achievement and difficulties has been studied to find out a comprehensive approach for more effective and successful achievement of the institutions.

Better education planning ensures widely accepted long - term goals and brings a realistic appraisal of the institution's resources which is an important factor in the successful implementation of the plan. Educational planning must consider the full context of the

educational community. Education planning is a road map that plots the progress to re-look the development and revise as needed. The leadership's noble aspirations have also been presented as guidelines on better education and administrative planning for all institutions under army control as a need. As such, the need of better education planning with formation of an organizational body (DGAES) has been outlined in the write-up. Finally, some recommendations have been made by analysing all factors for further necessary study on the better educational and administrative planning through more close and deep command participation.

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MILITARY PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY

Lieutenant Colonel Md Khalid Saifullah, psc, Sigs

Introduction

Social media has taken a deep-seated role in today's society. It is a technology with the highest penetration level, as billions of people are connected through this principal global platforms by sharing their experiences, documents etc. Social media is defined by a number of tools, which includes blogs, wikis, discussion forums, blogs (Twitter etc) and social networking sites (Facebook etc).[1] Since the number of internet users in the world is growing, no doubt, the numbers of social media users are also on the increase. It is revealed that there are almost 2.1 billion active social media accounts worldwide. The number of worldwide users is expected to reach 2.5 billion by 2018. Global internet users averagely spend 101.4 minutes/day surfing social networks. In every minute, YouTube users upload 10 minutes of video and watch hundreds of millions of videos. On any given day, internet users can Google the word Army and get over 228,000,000 website hits.[2] The statistics delineates the understanding of social media platforms so that an effective social media perspective can be formulated.

It is as easy as a click of a mouse or a tap on a smart phone, and in a few seconds sensitive military information might be shared that could reduce the military operational effectiveness. With the ease of social media, in any part of the globe at any time, a military person can post pictures from a deployment or talk about a military mission. But these seemingly innocent posts could actually contain sensitive information that endangers military mission by revealing locations, security measures, mission operations, or troop movements. The role of social media in shaping national and global political landscapes came to the fore in the aftermath of the Iranian elections in 2009, and then in the popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011.

Social media provides a rich pool of overt data for intelligence agencies to measure and evaluate the information float in the open web environment. Hence, this data can assist in analyzing and identifying threats to national security as social media is used by the activist group for internal communication due to availability of convenience way and low cost. The threats pose by social media on national security are an unavoidable reality in today's global technological environment. As a consequence, rather than being paranoid by the threat social media can pose, it is much better to perceive it as an opportunity, since there are so many avenues to use social media as an important tool of information's source in military perspective.

Social media has revolutionized our means of communication intercepting every facet on an internal scale. The military domain is no exception to this reality. The question becomes, can the

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[1] http://www.dictionary.com/, accessed on 07 January 2017.
[2] http://www.infinitdatum.com/social-media-statistics/, accessed on 12 January 2017.

military, the Bangladesh Army in particular, obtain the benefits sought from social media use without seriously compromising individual and operational security? Answering this question requires an initial assessment of Army goals and objectives to determine risk and use of social media. We have already entered into a new age whereby the security is not only determined by physical warfare but increasingly dependent on our digital capabilities as well. At this backdrop, this article discusses the threat and opportunity of social media in military perspective. It will highlight the potential roles of social media in information warfare as well. Furthermore, it will also present the social milieu of the soldiers in social media environment.

Case Studies

Use of social media tools in the Lebanon War involving Israeli forces and Hizbullah in 2006 is well notable.[3] In contrast, the roles of social media in Operation *Cast Lead*, when Israeli forces attacked the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009 are also well discussed in world literature. The differing approaches taken by Israeli forces in the two operations highlight how an effective social media strategy can impact the strategic outcomes. In the summer of 2006, Hizbullah effectively integrated information operations, including social media, into their tactical operations to fight the Israelis. Hizbullah embedded photos and videos into blogs and YouTube to promote a positive self-image and to highlight negative perceptions of Israeli operations. Hizbullah used information effectively to limit Israel's strategic options. After 33 days of fighting, a ceasefire was declared and Hizbullah claimed victory. The organization was able to create a "perception of failure" for Israel, which ignored the realities of the social media and relied instead of traditional information policies. It was less agile than Hizbullah and was unable to match in the information war. In contrast, in Operation *Cast Lead*, Israeli forces devised a more effective strategy for the use of social media. They developed a proactive information strategy, incorporating social media tools, along with enlisting the support of the Israeli online communities, to set the agenda in the media and controlled perceptions of the fighting. The result was that the Israelis used information effectively to preserve strategic options enabling them to achieve their objectives.[4]

In one example cited by the US military, American soldiers took photographs of a new fleet of helicopters arriving at a base in Iraq in 2007. When the photos were uploaded to the internet, embedded with coordinates of where the photos had been taken, the enemy was able to determine the exact location of the US helicopters inside the compound and conduct a mortar attack, destroying four of the AH-64 Apaches.[5]

Another example, an unnamed soldier revealed the time and place of the raid and the name of his unit on the social networking site. "On Wednesday we clean up Qatanah, and on Thursday, God willing, we come home," the soldier wrote on his Facebook page. Qatanah is a village in the

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[3] William B. Caldwell, Denis M. Murphy, and Anton Menning, "Learning to Leverage New Media: The Israeli Defense Forces in Recent Conflicts," Military Review (May–June 2009), p 2–10.

[4] Ibid.

[5] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10948490/Troops-leaked-confidential-data-on-Twitter-and-Facebook.html), accessed on 22 January 2017.

West Bank near Ramallah. He said on his status update that his unit planned a "clean up" raid. The soldier was court-martialled and sentenced to 10 days in prison. He was also ousted from his battalion and relieved of combat duties. The decision to cancel the raid was made by commanders after it was feared the leak would put the unit in danger. The operation went ahead several days later.[6]

From the preceding case studies it is well implicit that social media is changing the ways as the information moves around the world. The roles of traditional and social media are changing, and social networking tools allow collaboration as never seen before. A key to successfully adapt to the changes will be the ability of military to develop strategies that take advantage of the changes and deny the same to the enemy. Using social media that incorporates the lessons already learned in the social media environment will allow the Armed Forces to improve their ability to understand the environment, communicate more effectively, and generate unity of effort throughout the organizational requirement.

Threat Perspective of Social Media in Military Domain

Security and Privacy Risks.

a. "Risk is a function of the likelihood of a given threat-source's exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization."[7] In social media perspective, security and privacy are issues that pertain to materials posted. Information posted on the internet is permanent and never completely disappears even if one deletes it. Therefore, caution is justified regarding information posted on the internet. The facts are that the majority of social media users post information online, without giving due diligence to privacy and security concerns. At the same time, cyber criminals are targeting social network sites with increasing amounts of malware and online scams, honing in on this growing user base. Privacy issues aside, the world's favourite social media sites have also seen more than their fair share of outright malicious activity, including the spread of viruses, phishing attempts, and other social engineering ploys aimed at exploiting users' information.

b. Information held by an organization is an asset. Even the personal information of an organization's member requires protection. Thus, online usage of social media by military personnel need to contain appropriate levels of security, and education about appropriate content for posting is constructive.

Risks of Leakage of Sensitive Information and Spread of Rumours. The risk of leakage of military sensitive information and the spread of rumours on social media is a major concern. Social media forums provide an online venue in which military personnel may share confidential information; such postings are likely intentional/unintentional breaches of security and pose risks to the military. This provides explicit scope of leaking operational security information (OPSEC). Besides, unmonitored communication on social media can spread of rumours, which can impart information quickly to a large number of users and cause considerable distress and confusion. Awareness of the risk of rapid dissemination of information and rumour control can be challenging but important.

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[6] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8549099.stm.
[7] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (New York, Water Book, 1995).

Exposure to Cyber Espionage.

a.   A global domain within the information environment consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded controllers. Since, users control the content of their own profile they can add malicious content to the pages. One of the most obvious attacks is to redirect the user to an external malicious site which is fully controlled by the attacker. We have seen the traditional spoofed emails claiming to be from the social network service offering some update or contest. In order to see the update, the user needs to follow a link and log in, thus handing over his credentials to the attacker. The user redirection can be achieved by social engineering tricks with sending malicious links or by embedding active content like tagging that redirect the user automatically. Successful compromise of targeted vulnerability allows malicious code to be run. Executed malicious code inserts malware, such as a Remote Access Trojan or opens a backdoor connection to the target system to acquire information. The social engineering attack is very hard to block for the social media provider, since it is hard to distinguish from regular posts. Each link has to be followed through to ensure that it points to harmless content.

b.   The table appended below is an example of social media functionalities which might expose to cyber espionage:

Table: Social Media Functions and Potential Threat Perspectives to Organization

Social Media Functionalities	Potential Security Problems	Impacts to Organization
Post information / update status	Accessibility of social media by anyone, anywhere at any time, using any devices, allows users to update their status several times a day, thus, sensitive information may be revealed.	Revealed information can be deduced by attackers to obtain confidential information about the organizations in order to do cyber espionage and sabotage.
Friends' requests	Carelessness in accepting friends' requests could result to adding enemies' instead of friends' who have more access to users' information.	These friends' are able to constantly monitor the users' activities to obtain credentials for accessing the organizational network.
Upload photos and videos	Unrestricted photo albums and videos allow everyone to view the photos and videos that are potentially sensitive to organizations.	Cause embarrassment to the organizations and those may be useful for cybercriminals to collect information.
Third party applications and links to external sites	While using the applications or clicking on the links, malware may infect official computing platforms.	Compromised and allow attackers to sabotage official networks and provide access to monitor and steal intellectual property.

Source: Writer's own analysis

Extremist and Cybercriminal Threats. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and a host of other social media applications are used by terrorist organizations to identify, radicalize, and recruit new warriors; provide training tools and resources for the radicalized; raise money; publicize successes; and shape public perception regarding ongoing hostilities. Almost all the terrorist groups have their own media apparatus that distributes video and graphic products online through forums, blogs, and dedicated file-hosting websites.[8] Some websites are said to carry a downloadable "e-application", through which a user can choose an internet target and launch a low-level denial of service cyber-attack. Social networking tools can also aid in providing material support for planned acts of terrorism, as well as for target acquisition through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Window of Opportunity - Social Media in Military Sector

Due to the ubiquitous nature of social media, it is inevitable that military operations will be affected by this technology. This section discusses the implications of social media in a military context. The large diffusion of social media makes ideal for many activities of interest in military domain. The potentialities of these platforms are enormous and their control, monitoring and use are a must. Modern social media networks are actively used by many governments all around the world. U.S., China and Russia are the countries that are most active in this field.[9] The U.S. Department of Defense for example has created a dedicated web portal to provide any kind of information related to the use of social media for militaries and, more in general, for any citizens who desire to better understand these platforms.[10]

Let's say, for example, a cyber-espionage campaign for the diffusion of specific crafted malware, but with powerful social platforms, could also be used to influence the sentiment of a population in the country feeding such dissent against the authority. Another alternative use of social network is for propaganda to spread a religion or an ideology widely and efficiently. Many governments are promoting the growth of internal cyber units composed by specialists who analyze in real time the principal source of interest to monitor a global situation from cyber space, like a cyber-eye on the real world. Military can purposefully use social media due to the possibility of being able to support military operations such as:

    a.   Psychological Operations (PsyOps)

    b.   Open-source Intelligence (OSInt).

    c.   Data mining in social media.

    d.   Cyber espionage.

    e.   Perception management.

    f.   Fit into information warfare.

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[8] Davis, J. D. (2012, April 30). 5 easy steps to measure social media campaigns. Retrieved from www.entrepreneur.com/article/223437.

[9] Kenneth Geers and Roelof Temmingh. 'Virtual Plots, Real Revolution,' The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, ed. Kenneth Geers and Christian Czosseck, p 294-302.

[10] Ibid.

Psychological Operations (PsyOps)

Social media networks are widely used channels to adopt for PsyOps. These are organized media operations to broadcast information to influence the "sentiment" (e.g. emotions, motives, objective reasoning) of large masses, such as a population or the politics of governments. PsyOps is defined by the U.S. military as, "planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."[11] Social media gives military a powerful instrument to reach critical masses instantly. PsyOps through social media can be considered an important part of diplomatic, military and economic activities.

Distinguished theorists like Sun Tzu have highlighted the importance of waging psychological warfare: "One need not destroy one's enemy. One only needs to destroy his willingness to engage". Different cyber technologies can be used to modify the sentiment on specific topics, such as web sites, virtual reality, blogs, video games, chat bots and of course social media platforms. The mission for PsyOps in military domain is to take advantage of these cyber technologies exactly like their adversaries do to influence individuals to support their cause and to create an atmosphere of fear. For example, propaganda operations can be used in social media to provide instruction on the operation to the followers. To influence common sentiment of specific topics, intelligence agencies might arrange political and geopolitical campaigns using impressive amounts of data to induce information, real or unreal, on masses. Social media networks are flooded with particularly crafted content and numerous discussions are opened to involve an increasing number of users. The discussions are structured with ad hoc comments and posts are used to sensitize and influence the user's perception towards the events.

In warfare scenarios, PsyOps are an essential component of information operations, possessing the specific goal of influencing adversarial human and decision process. Use of social networks allows the attacker to create anonymous or targeted profiles of real persons and publish material without any moderation and enables conducting PsyOps on targeted geographical regions or political parties. In summary, the principal advantages of using social media for PsyOps are:

a. Social media can reach to individuals with the availability of social media platforms.

b. Flexible and persuasive technologies of social media are interactive and make it possible for an attacker to tailor operations for highly dynamic situations.

c. Cyber and persuasive technologies can grant anonymity.

d. Automated PsyOps on social media are more persistent and efficient than humans.

e. The information being presented to influence can be easily modified and changed in the social media domain to address the target audience.

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[11] www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm.

OSInt

Social media is an open means for collecting, processing, analysis and finally dissemination of information. Presently, social media is widely considered as a powerful support to intelligence operations particularly because its analysis makes it possible to conduct OSInt operations to gather information. This available and easy means through web can be used as a significant tool for intelligence gathering. DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), USA mentioned that: "Understanding what affects such online behavior is needed for trend forecasting". Thus the use of social media platforms is also essential in composing complex analysis based on public data.

Blogs, social-network sites, Wikis and any other information aggregators are rich sources of information publicly available and intelligence agencies can constantly monitor them. These resources are very useful and allow the monitoring of billions of conversations generating text analytics based on predefined criteria. By those resource applications OSInt can be obtained and determine the sentiment of the participants to a discussion with respect to some topics and events.

It is a common fact that the terrorist groups increasingly use Facebook for propaganda purposes and as a platform for exchanging tactical information such as reconnaissance targeting. Terrorist groups also used Facebook to provide links to outside radical forums that give instructions on the use of false identity to mask true identities. Monitoring of social media for OSInt purposes is not so simple; we must consider that social media users are very dynamic and each individual usually has different profiles on various platforms making cross analysis much harder. However, by technological placement and ample monitoring system, social media can be an effective tool for OSInt.

Data Mining in Social Media

Data mining in social media is the process of representing, analyzing, and extracting actionable patterns from social media data. Social media mining bring in basic concepts and principal algorithms suitable for investigating massive social media data.[12] The data mining of social media activities are often conducted by intelligence circles.

Many free services can help military analysts to see trends in different specific events and news, like protests and social movements. Everything on the internet could be subject to data mining practices and social networks represent a relevant portion of data circulating on the web, making them sources of great interest for any kind of analysis. Social media in many cases not only provide raw data for investigation, but also draw relationships between subsets of information, simplifying mining activities.

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[12] Reza Zafarani, Mohammad Ali Abbasi, and Huan Liu. Social Media Mining: An Introduction. April 20, 2014. Complete Draft and Slides Available at: http://dmml.asu.edu/smm.

Cyber Espionage

Cyber espionage through social media (facts, statistics, and technologies) is essentially based on data mining through the linked networks of contacts. The use of social media can be useful for cyber espionage and cyber intelligence. It can help for PsyOps, cyber operations, intelligence reconnaissance and target identification (like a group of persons, or events etc). Adopting data mining techniques for contacts and connections analysis makes it possible to establish the relationship between different persons as a part of cyber intelligence operation. It also helps to gather private contacts of different persons who publish it only to a very close group of people.

One of the principal military uses of social media is cyber espionage. Most popular techniques include:[13]

a. Replacement of identity: the ability to impersonate another user to acquire information.

b. Identity spoofing: the creation of a fake profile that does not match any existing person.

c. Malware-based attacks: use of malicious code to compromise a victim's machine and steal sensitive information. Sharing a link on a compromised website could allow an attacker to exploit vulnerability in a user's browser to gain control of its information.

Perception Management

Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and other social networks are ever-present in our lives. The potentials of their uses by the military are nearly limitless. Perception management seeks to generate a profile of how a set of users feels about a particular topic. For example, a campaign that seeks to increase interest in a new event could use specific metrics to see whether users of social media had generally positive or generally negative feelings towards the event.

The military can use a form of perception analysis through social media when preparing to conduct a propaganda campaign, engage in diplomacy, or acquiring intelligence assets. All of these operations benefit from an understanding of how the public feels on a particular issue. The chances of success in psychological and intelligence operations can be affected by the general feelings of the population of interest, and sentiment analysis can provide a window into these feelings that's much more natural and wide-ranging than other methods, as well as being less intrusive.

Potential Roles of Social Media in Information Warfare

Information Warfare (IW) is also used to describe the "war" on the internet. Technically IW can be defined as: actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary

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[13] Ibid.

information, information based processes, and information systems, while defending one's own information, information based processes and information systems.[14] Information is data plus instruction. Transmission, storage, and acquiring are the characteristics of information while corrupt, deny, exploit, destroy, and protect are the four characteristics of IW. Six fundamental activities related to the conduct of IW are acquiring, using, protecting, exploiting, denying and managing information and information systems. Various types of IW aimed against military forces and state infrastructures are: [15]

a. **Command and Control Warfare (C2W)**. Attacks on the ability to generate commands and communication with the services and deployed forces.

b. **Electronic Warfare (EW)**. Techniques that enhance, degrade, or intercept flows of electrons or information.

c. **Intelligence-based Warfare**. Integration of sensors, emitters, and processors into reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battlefield damage assessment systems.

d. **Psychological Warfare**. It is designed to affect the perception, intentions, and orientations of decision-makers, commanders, and soldiers.

e. **Cyberwar**. It is the use of information systems against the virtual personas of individuals or groups.

f. **Hacker War**. It is the uses of the hacker techniques to destroy, degrade, exploit, or compromise information systems.

It is apparent that social media can be used to gain intelligence, propagate malicious code, and sway perceptions. This section examines the role of social media in these activities from an information warfare perspective. The objective is to further develop a descriptive model illustrating the role of social media in information warfare and conflict. Social media can be used in network warfare to exploit vulnerabilities to insert malicious code to gain intelligence. In psychological operations, it can be utilized to influence populations and individuals into behaving favourably towards the organizational objectives. It can be exploited to gain open-source intelligence for a convenient communications and collaboration platform for command and control.

Given its ubiquitous nature, it can be expected that social media will become more prevalent in information-based conflict, and its roles will become more significant. However, social media will, at least for the foreseeable future, remain as a tool to facilitate such activity rather than the primary instigating factor. Social media is one of many variables in a complex system, and it has the capability to impede IW domain within that system rather than acting as a catalyst only in the

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[14] Reto Haeni, An Introduction to Information Warfare, The Internet, http//tangle.seas.gwu.edu/~reto/infowar/info-war.

[15] Timothy L. Thomas, Deterring Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge, Parameters, Winter 1996-97, p 83.

IW. Arab Spring is one of the blatant examples of this. The figure below, illustrates the role of social media in information warfare and ultimate objectives.


Source: Writer's own judgment

Figure - 1: Role of Social Media in IW

Social Milieu of the Soldiers in Social Media Environment

Social media has unprecedented access to soldiers and unclassified networks. However, Army policies and procedures are in place to safeguard operational security. It is entirely possible that in the future, a person's 'status' in the social media can compromise the security of a whole unit. Soldiers and leaders need to know about the dangers, and need training to counter the risks that social media poses to the Armed Forces. Our adversaries are trolling social networks, blogs and forums, trying to find sensitive information they can use about our military goals and objectives. Therefore, it is imperative that all soldiers and family members understand the importance of practicing good operation security (OPSEC) measures.

We depend on social media, but it can be extremely dangerous if you are not careful. OPSEC and personal privacy concerns should be paramount when using social media. As the saying goes 'loose lips sink ships' or 'the enemy is listening…he wants to know what you know' are quite relevant under these circumstances. Safe social networking is a must and it should be supported by the OPSEC. A strong monitoring and controlling system and policy is a must to control content or information onto a site as it is a challenge and bears increased OPSEC risk.

The reality is that evolutionary information changes will continue without the military's consent. All military personnel require training on appropriate use of social media now. The Bangladesh Army can institute training that raises awareness of these dangers for all service members. Thereby, social media will become a manageable medium to communicate the right messages maintaining good order and discipline within the Armed Forces.

Source: Writer's own judgment
Figure - 2: Monitoring and Controlling the Social Media Environment

Conclusion

Social media platforms have assumed a fundamental role in our society. Social media sites have connected and impacted people globally in ways never anticipated since the inception of digital media and the World Wide Web. Military domain is also equally influenced by social media. Social media is based on information sharing, a potential exists for careless posting of information that could result in security risks. Despite the threats social media can pose on national security, it has also the potential opportunities to be used in today's global technological environment. Thus, rather than being paranoid by the threat social media can pose, it is much better to perceive it as an opportunity, since there are so many avenues to use social media as an important tool of information's source in military perspective.

In social media perspective, security and privacy are issues that pertain to materials posted. Therefore, caution is justified regarding the information posted on the internet. The risk of leakage of military sensitive information and the spread of rumours on social media is a major concern. Besides, unmonitored communication on social media can spread the rumours, which can impart information quickly to a large number of users and cause considerable distress and confusion. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and a host of other social media applications are used by terrorist organizations to identify, radicalize, and recruit new warriors; provide training tools and resources for the radicalized; raise money; publicize successes; and shape public perception regarding ongoing hostilities. The very nature of social media may result more vulnerabilities than traditional web pages.

Military must acknowledge the ubiquity of social media in the communications age and learn to harness its power for military purposes. Undoubtedly, social media has become a strategic importance for military sectors, as they offer information that could be analyzed using different axes of analysis providing efficient and reliable instruments for the study of realities of interest. PsyOps through social media can be considered an important part of military activities. Presently, social media is widely considered as a powerful support to intelligence operations particularly because its analysis makes it possible to conduct OSInt operations to gather information. Data mining in social media is the process of representing, analyzing, and extracting actionable patterns from social media data. Everything on the internet could be subject to data mining practices and social networks represent a relevant portion of data circulating on the web, making them sources of great interest for any kind of analysis. Cyber espionage through social media is essentially based on data mining through the linked networks of contacts. The use of social media can be useful for cyber espionage and cyber intelligence. The military can use a form of perception analysis when preparing to conduct an event or campaign. This perception management through social media can benefit from an understanding of how the public feels on a particular issue. Social media is used as a tool of IW in today's technological world. It can be used for psychological operations to influence populations and individuals into behaving favourably towards the organizational objectives. Social media can be exploited to gain open-source intelligence for a convenient communications and collaboration platform for command and control. With its ubiquitous nature, it can be expected that social media will become more prevalent in information-based conflict, and its roles will become more significant in IW. Social media is one of many variables in a complex system, and it has the capability to impede IW domain within that system rather than acting as a catalyst only in the IW.

The 21st century's information age has provided high end technology that has allowed to access and share information in very easy ways. The large diffusion of social media makes ideal for many activities of interest in military domain. Thus, online usage of social media by military personnel need to contain appropriate levels of security, and education about appropriate content for posting is constructive. The potentialities of these platforms are enormous and their control, monitoring and use are a must. The reality is that evolutionary information changes will continue without the military's consent. All military personnel require training on appropriate use of social media now. The Bangladesh Army can institute training that raises awareness of these dangers for all service members. Thereby, social media will become a manageable medium to communicate the right messages maintaining good order and discipline within the Armed Forces. It is the demand of time to formulate robust policy guidance for social media in order to balance the need to safeguard our operational and communications security whilst exploiting the opportunities social media presents.

Recommendations

From the above study on social media, following steps are recommended to develop effectual uses of social media for Bangladesh Army:

a. A strong monitoring and controlling system along with policy to be incorporated to control content or information onto social media to reduce OPSEC risk.

b.   Training on appropriate use of social media to be induced at all level to communicate with the right messages for maintaining good order and discipline within the Armed Forces.

c.   Bangladesh Army must acknowledge the ubiquity of social media in this age of communications harnessing its power for military purposes with appropriate steps.

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DEVELOPING THE SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN ALL RANKS & FILES OF BANGLADESH ARMY – A WAY FORWARD

Lieutenant Colonel Md Shafiqul Islam, psc, BIR

"You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today"- Abraham Lincoln

Introduction

Responsibility is the accountability for men, material, equipment and obligation for mission and action accomplishment for the organization. Soldiers are legally responsible for their actions to their section commanders, section commanders to platoon commanders, platoon commanders to company commanders and so on. Every single individual is accountable for what he does or fails to do to his respective superiors or to the organization. To define in layman's language, responsibility means to know someone's duty, understand and perform that duty appropriately in time without being dependent on others and a person who has the sense of doing that is a responsible man. Admiral Hyman G Rickover rightly said, "…**responsibility is rightly yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else**". An organization like army always looks for responsible men at all levels to accomplish the organizational goal.

Now question remains, are we all responsible as it is expected by the organization? Is the state of responsibility same at various level of chain of command or at all ranks? Dose it vary rank to rank? Is it diminishing day by day? If it is, what are the probable reasons? What are the lacunas? How can we develop the sense of responsibility among all the ranks? If the responsibility diminishes at any level, the organization affects in manifold.

At this backdrop, this paper will initially highlight the essence of responsibility. Then it will draw attention to the need for developing the sense of responsibility followed by probable barriers of the issue in question and finally it will mention some means and ways followed by a progressive flowchart to develop the sense of responsibility. To make a simplified approach, purview of the paper has been kept limited to Bangladesh (BD) Army only.

Knowing the Essence of Responsibility

Responsibility is a moral obligation of a soldier or a leader for his own actions, accomplishments and failures. Responsibility is something if conflicts with personal interest then organizational interest should come first. For example, company sergeant major (CSM) of 'A' Company, sergeant Halim requested for three days leave from Friday to Sunday for a family programme. But Sunday the company had inter-company firing competition, if such a conflict cannot be resolved, accomplishing the organizational mission must come first. In this case, company commander disapproved his leave and the sergeant accepted without raising any point as expected by the company commander/ organization. This is an example where both the officer

and the sergeant acted like a responsible man who gave priority to the activities of the organization. But, do we all act like this? There are many negative examples also where the interest of organization comes later than individual interest. However, an organization like army along with its men cannot run without knowing their responsibility and what they are accountable for. Let us see few general roles and responsibilities at various levels:

The General Roles and Responsibilities of Officers

- Understand and exercise the command, leadership and management.
- Establishing policies and any instruction given by the higher authority.
- Deals with unit's training, operation and administrative matters.
- Focus on unit's effectiveness and battle readiness.
- Integrate soldiers and leaders collective training to accomplish the mission.
- Execute any job given by the higher authority.

The General Roles and Responsibilities of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs)

- Provide quality advice, counseling and solutions to support the command.
- Assist in executing policy and instructions.
- Ensures the execution of proper training, operation and administrative matters.
- Work on ground to ensure the unit's effectiveness and battle readiness.
- Prepare the soldiers by various collective training to accomplish the mission.
- Ensure the execution of any job given by the higher authority/officers.

The General Roles and Responsibilities of Other Ranks (ORs)

- Obey the lawful command and orders of officers and JCOs.
- Complete each task to the best degree of their ability.
- Maintain individual physical fitness strictly.
- Maintain individual weapons and other equipment for battle readiness.
- Do all the works ordered by the officers and JCOs.

Need for Developing Responsibility

From the liberation war of our country, it was found that all ranks of our army were very committed, obligated for achieving the independence. They made it even at the cost of their lives. Immediately after the liberation war, our renowned organization started with a very small size of force which was like a newly born baby. At that time, there was no question of lack of

responsibility among the leaders and led, but over the period of time, it is found that a good number of members are not performing as they are expected to do which indicates the diminishing of sense of responsibility. With the passage of time force size increased and number of commitments also amplified in manifold and apparently it seems that taking responsibility among all the ranks is not that spontaneous. A limited research was carried out within the members of an infantry brigade where respondents were 150 of various ranks and the answer of the question "Do you think that with the passage of time taking responsibility is reducing among all the ranks of our army?" was as follows:


Figure-1: Pie Chart of Opinions of Officers, JCOs and ORs in Answer of the Question.

From the above study it is found that almost half of the officers, JCOs, and ORs consider that taking responsibility is either highly or moderately reducing. Though it is a limited research but the fact remains, taking responsibility by the individual is reducing. So, it has become imperative to address the issue immediately. In another question they were asked about the probable reasons to reduce the sense of taking responsibility. Following reasons were mentioned by the respondents that we need to address in order to develop it.

- Lack of self-motivation and initiative.
- Lack of knowing oneself and under commands (UC).
- Lack of knowledge on basic soldiering.
- Shortage of manpower vis-à-vis commitment.
- Reluctant tendency in maintaining the chain of command.
- Too much reliance on a particular individual.
- Lack of realization to the facilities provided by the organization.
- Singularism instead of pluralism/ materialistic attitude.

How to Develop Sense of Responsibility

Developing Self-Motivation and Initiative

Self-motivation is the bedrock for serving in an organization like army. If someone is wrongly motivated, he cannot take any responsibility for his men and organization rather he influences others to be de-motivated. Likewise, initiative is another important attribute without which someone cannot be responsible because a responsible man is never asked to do anything rather he takes initiative to do his job. However, regretfully it is noticed that self-motivation and taking initiative are reducing day by day. Lack of basic soldiering, lack of religious teaching, materialistic attitude, etc. are few of the probable reasons for lack of self-motivation and initiative.

How to Develop Motivation and Initiative? Following may be done to develop self-motivation and initiative:

- Training may be conducted at formation/ brigade/ unit level to create **"self-awareness"**. For officers a short training/ course may be arranged centrally under the AHQ/ any HQ of field formation and for JCOs/ NCOs, it may be arranged under brigade/ unit focusing their duty and responsibility, chain of command, values, ethos, unit administration etc.

- Creating a conducive environment where everyone will feel as the part of the organization, avoiding and discouraging **"I only attitude"**.

- Commanders/ leaders must motivate UCs regularly and set positive personal examples in front of UCs.

- Religious Teacher (**RT**) should be utilized to inculcate religious teaching and motivation. He may act as counselor for the soldiers and maintain a register covering following details:

serial	Rank/ Name	Address	Parents	Children	Problem faced in the unit	Family Problem if any	Advice	Remarks	Sign of CO/ 2IC
1.	Corporeal Hafiz	Garakhola, Madhukhali, Faridpur	Father- Dead Mother - Sick	Son Daughter- Autistic	Not able to get promotion related cadre (BMR) in time	Mother sick, daughter autistic Needs leave frequently	Do all the jobs properly given by the unit, so that you can get leave when it is asked	Individual is burdened with family & career problem. Needs immediate action to solve those	

Knowing Oneself and UCs

Knowing the UCs is very important to make someone to perform his duties and responsibilities. If someone does not know his and UC's strength/weakness, capability and basic information about soldiering, he is no way expected to do his duty properly. Generally it is found that leaders are reluctant to know the strength-weakness of his UCs, so does with the UCs. A leader (Section, Platoon, Company Commander and so on…) is expected to know the state of IPFT, firing, individual training, etc. of his UCs, and then he should identify the weak soldiers and arrange the proper training to overcome their weaknesses.

How to Develop It?

A simple format of knowing UCs containing 10 points may be followed as shown below. All ranks must practise as per the format to know these basic details which will make him obligated to know his UCs or superiors and thereby make him committed to perform his duty and responsibility.

Serial	Rank Name & Appointment	Length of Service	Course/ Cadres	Marital Status	Kids/ any Autism/ problematic	District	Special quality Strength/ weakness	State of		Present location
								IPFT	Firing	
1.	Sergeant xxxxxx	20 years	BMR, CLM	Married	2 x Sons 1x Autistic son	Farid Pur	Basket ball player, Battalion Team, weak in IPFT	Passed but weak in Beam	Weak Firer, failed in last RET	Unit/ Privilege leave/ ERE/ Casual leave etc.

Knowledge on Basic Soldiering

Knowledge on basic soldiering is the keystone of performing someone's responsibility. But, it is found that many of us don't have the adequate knowledge on basic soldiering. Even a sergeant does not know how to hold his weapon in an operational environment. On being asked by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), he replied that he is fresh from Extra Regimental Employment (ERE), whereas holding weapon is the bread and butter for any soldier. On the same visit, once GOC asked few soldiers to give some push-up and beam, expected result was missing rather some sergeant did better than young soldiers, even some soldiers do not know how to do beam and push-up properly (Camp visit of GOC, 24 Infantry Division). This surely speaks about the lack of knowledge on basic soldiering which hinders in developing the self-responsibility.

How to Develop It? Following may be done to acquire knowledge on basic soldiering:

- Commanders of all tiers (from section commanders to battalion commanders) should call his men and make some "**knowledge enriching sessions"** in the form of quiz test, extempore speech, etc. on related professional subjects.

- **"Intra and inter"** section/ platoon/ company competition may be arranged regularly on IPFT, weaponries, tactics, operational and adminitrative aspects, thereby making them knowledgeable on their professional matters.

- "**Knowing men**" (as per the above format, paragraph 11) is very important as basic knowledge cannot be transmitted from one to another if we don't know each-other.

Shortage of Manpower vis-à-vis Commitment

It is an un-denying fact that everywhere we have shortage of manpower and also we have emerging commitments which is affecting our performance and hindering to perform our responsibilities. But, we cannot saturate the manpower overnight. Then, how can we mitigate this problem? As we have acute shortage in terms of officers, we can shed out few responsibilities to the JCOs and NCOs which is possible by making them **"Thinking leaders".**

How to Develop Thinking Leadership?

- To develop thinking leadership, JCOs and NCOs should be brought under a development program where they will learn about situational training exercise (**STX)** on some given situations; ie; conducting a competition as referee, how to handle a chaotic situation etc. Once this solution of this practical oriented situation/ problem will be taught to them, later on they will be able to handle the situation. Likewise, STX, operation and admin aspects should also be taught to them.

- To make them independent, and to take decision at their own, they should be asked to conduct various unit programmes like raising day, Eid re-union, Darbar, firing, etc. independently.

- Understanding the army values and ethos in the form of **"Tutorial Discussion (TD)"** which will instill the spirit of values in them and make them confident to take any higher responsibility.

- They should carry out **"book review"** on professional subjects under the close supervision of respective units.

- "**Group discussion"** by the Platoon and Section commanders on knowing their Under Commands following the format mentioned at paragraph 11.

- "**Encouraging initiative"** to conduct competition within inter and intra Companies/ Platoons and Sections on any professional subjects.

Maintaining the Chain of Command

Australian author, speaker and leadership expert John C Maxwell said, *"A sense of responsibility is the clearest indication of mature leadership".* Maintaining chain of command is the indication of loyalty and following leadership which is not possible without performing the responsibility properly. It's the beauty of the organization that everything goes in accordance with the chain of command but that beauty gets blurred when someone does something at his own,

trying to show off and foster a cosmetic approach while performing his duty and responsibility.
How to Maintain the Chain of Command? Following may be considered to maintain the chain of command:

- "**Loving the organization** and **feeling as the part of the team"** mentality has to be developed. If required Religious teacher (RT) should be utilized for positive counseling.

- **"Cosmetic" "showing off"** and **"making up"** approach has to be avoided and violation of performing duties/ responsibilities should not go unpunished.

- All commanders in the chain should be responsible and accountable for their actions and UCs actions and it must be monitored by the all level commanders.

Reducing Reliance on a Particular Individual

It is found that many a time we employ one particular individual (who is known to be a so called active one) for multiple tasks leaving aside many others. As a result, other becomes workless, irresponsible and they remain inactive. On the other hand, the active soldier being over committed neither can complete his original responsibility nor the extra tasks which make him demoralized (a simple diagram is shown below). Again there is a **"Me or Him"** attitude among all the ranks (Figure is shown below) which we have to get rid of immediately.


Figure-2: Impact of Reliance on a Particular Individual

How to Overcome? Following may be considered:

- Distributing task to all individuals equally thus making them all responsible, if require, a special training may be arranged for the weak/ inactive soldiers.

- Focus on teamwork rather than on a particular individual. A team is always can give better output than a single individual.

- Ensure the avoiding of **"Me or Him"** attitude. Commanders of all level must give executive order for specific task to the specific individuals.


Figure-3: "Me or Him" Attitude

Realization of the Facilities Provided by the Organization

Responsibility sometimes appears from the realization of the amenities given by the organization but unfortunately it is found that many of us do not feel or realize it. As such, they don't feel obligated to perform their responsibility. Being the Army of a developing country, it is providing all primary needs (food, clothing, accommodation, medical and education) for free to the soldiers. Besides, it is also giving resale to officers/ JCOs/ soldiers, and many other tangible/ intangible facilities. But, do we realize it? Probably not all of us, those who do not realize are performing their responsibility callously or partially. A simple diagram given below may crystallize the contribution of organization to soldiers and the return of it by the soldiers. It should be a two way communication.

How to Overcome? Following may be considered.

- Proper introduction of all facilities to be mentioned regularly, especially to the JCOs and soldiers during roll call/ darbar.

- A regular accountability/ liability should be taken to prove the two way communication (what army is giving to us and in turn what we are giving to the organization).

- Commanders/ leaders of all tiers must motivate their UCs about the enormous facilities given by our organization and thus make them more obligated towards their classical job.

Figure-4: Lack of Two Way Communication

Singularism Instead of Pluralism/ Materialistic Attitude

Singularism (not feeling as the part of the team) is a great barrier to develop self-responsibility. An individual who does not own his men and organization is a kind of selfish (materialistic) and less likely to perform his duty as expected by the organization. A materialistic person is not only creating problem for himself but also acting as a negative catalyst for others for not working for the organization. This serious issue acts as a cancer to the organization and must be addressed as soon as possible.

How to Overcome? Following may be considered

- In order to build team work all should start using team words **"We", "Our" and "Us"** instead of the individual words **"I", "Me", and "My"** (Small Unit Leadership by Col Dandridge p.96).

- Keeping the accountability by fall-in (Roll call) and knowing each-other. Leaders should identify such individualistic character and motivate them to be part of the team.

- Fulfilling the maximum administrative requirements of army personnel so that they do not develop the materialistic attitude.

Progressive Flowchart to Develop the Sense of Responsibility

At last, taking everything into consideration, we can say that this is a process which must start from the beginning of the recruitment and continue till the last day of someone's career. For officers it must start from the selection ie; from ISSB. If the selection is good, it is likely that the

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end product will be a good one as it is desired by the organization. US Navy *Admiral Hyman G. Rickover rightly said, "Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished".* So, nurturing of an individual's responsibility should begin from his origin which can be shared, maintained or enhanced by the environment he grows with and this is a continuous process. But, someone cannot ignore it or avoid his portion to do it. As American social psychologist Stanley Milgram said, ***"The disappearance of a sense of responsibility is the most far-reaching consequence of submission to authority",*** *so* this is undoubtedly, a very important and time worthy issue, therefore a progressive flowchart may be suggested to develop the sense of responsibility.


Figure-5: Progressive Flow-chart to Develop the Sense of Responsibility

Conclusion

Taking responsibility or performing it in the army is very important. It is an obligation to keep accountability of men, material, and all available things of the organization. Every single individual is accountable, for what he does or fails to do, to his respective superiors or to the organization. It is to know someone's duty properly and understand and performs that duty in time without being dependent on others.

Essence of Responsibility is something if conflicts with personal interests, organizational interests must come first. Taking responsibility has got an immense importance in our army. Immediately after the independence, state of self-responsibility among all the ranks was very good but over the period of time it started diminishing for many reasons. Lack of self-motivation and initiative, not knowing UCs, lack of knowledge on basic soldiering, lack of higher education, lack of good social background, shortage of manpower, reluctant tendency in maintaining the chain of command, reliance on a particular individual, thinking singularism, lack of realization of the facilities provided by the organization are the probable reasons for the gradual diminishing of the sense of responsibility.

In order to develop the sense of responsibility we need to address those reasons of diminishing. However, while finding out the ways to develop the sense of responsibility, it was found that we need to create self-awareness to develop motivation and initiative; to know the basic soldiering; to develop thinking leadership by STX, TD, book review etc. We have to educate our all ranks, especially the professional education. They must be selected from good family background during recruitment. To develop the sense of responsibility, chain of command has to be maintained properly; need to reduce the reliance on a particular soldier; need to think pluralism instead of singularism; we should realize the amenities given by the organization. It is expected that if we follow the measures mentioned above, it will assist in developing the sense of responsibility. Last of all, we can bear in mind the saying of Swiss philosopher and writer Tariq Ramadan, "*Don't nurture a sense of guilt, nurture a sense of responsibility married with a sense of humility*."

Recommendations

The recommendations are as follows:

- A board of officers may be formed and send to each garrison to measure/ check the present state of taking responsibility and take any of the measures or all mentioned in the paper.

- The progressive flowchart may be followed to develop the sense of responsibility.

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