

**WITH TERRORISM
FIGHT AND
Türkiye:
DAESH/KHORASAN
STRUCTURE**

17.05.2024

**DAY -
BY**



Milli İstihbarat Akademisi

**WITH TERRORISM
FIGHT AND
Türkiye:
DAESH/KHORASAN
STRUCTURE**

REPORT / 17.05.2024





Copyright

National Intelligence Academy © 2024

Ankara Turkey

Publication Date: 17.05.2024

The copyrights of the content of this work belong to the National Intelligence Academy and cannot be used or republished in any way without prior permission, except for reasonable quotations to be made partially by citing the source in accordance with the Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works No. 5846.

National Intelligence Academy

E-Mail : bilgi@mia.edu.tr

"It is not mandatory to carry a banderol within the framework of the 2nd paragraph of Article 5 of the Regulation on the Procedures and Principles Regarding the Application of Banderol."

REPORT / 17.05.2024

WITH TERRORISM FIGHT AND Türkiye: DAESH/KHORASAN STRUCTURE

YOUR WORD	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
ENTRANCE.....	11th
CHAPTER 1	
Push and Pull Factors in Radicalization Processes.....	18
CHAPTER 2	
DAESH/Khorasan Structure: Organizational Structure, Organizational Dynamics and Motivation Elements	24
CHAPTER 3	
Action Analysis of DAESH/Khorasan in Line with its Strategy, Tactics and Goals	38
CHAPTER 4	
Discourse Analysis of DAESH/Khorasan Structure	48
CHAPTER 5	
Activities of DAESH/Khorasan Structure towards Turkey	54
CONCLUSION.....	58
SOURCE.....	66

CONTENTS

INFOGRAPHIC

Infographic 1: DAESH/Khorasan Structure9

GRAPH

Graph 1: Distribution of DAESH Terrorist Organization's Attacks by Regions Between 2019-202411 **Graph 2:** Features That Make the Organizational Structure of DEAJ/Khorasan Effective..... 31 **Chart 3:** DAESH Attacks by Years39

TABLE

Table 1: Push and Pull Factors in Radicalization Processes.....19-20 **Table 2:** Pushers and Pullers of Participation in DAESH/Khorasan Terrorist Organization Factors58 -59

PHOTO Photo

1: Photograph of the Moment When Former TTP Member Hafez Said Khan, Founding Leader of DAESH/Khorasan, Pledged Allegiance to DAESH25

MAP Map

1: Afghanistan Map27

Map 2: Map of Central Asia, where DAESH/Khorasan Structure is Trying to Be Effective..... 28

Harita 3: Vahan Koridoru29

YOU WORD

Central Asia is a geography with which Turkey has strong historical and cultural ties. Great powers throughout history This region, which is an area of geopolitical competition, has become one of Turkey's strategic priorities in the context of its recently intensified relations with the member countries of the Organization of Turkic States. However, the activities of the Khorasan structure of the terrorist organization DEAÿ have brought a new agenda to the region. has caused controversy. Where different power dynamics intersect and geostrategic competition is an important Developments in this region are closely followed by Türkiye.

This report, prepared by the National Intelligence Academy, based on open source data, reveals that the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure's strategy of creating a new wave of radicalization and terrorism through Central Asia. deals with the dynamics. How the organization benefited from the historical and political conjuncture while structuring in the region, The methods of recruiting personnel, action tactics and strategy, and the discourse and narrative used in its propaganda are examined. At the same time, it is necessary to critically examine the effects of long-term destabilizing interventions. It causes such political, cultural and social vulnerabilities, which in turn leads to the establishment of radical ideologies and It is emphasized that it plays a role in the entrenchment of violence and perpetuates cycles of violence, making communities more vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation.

Establishing regional stability and security specifically in Central Asia, considering the organization's quest for revival and expansion in the Central Asian and African regions, having lost its effectiveness in Syria and Iraq. He makes some suggestions to strengthen cooperation. Comprehensive research and academic inquiry This study, based on ISIS, also tries to unravel the multifaceted dimensions of the phenomenon and examines ISIS terrorism. It discusses the measures that Turkey, which continues its determined struggle with the organization, can take specifically for the Khorasan structuring.

In summary, this report covers a lot of the DAESH/Khorasan structure and its effects in Central Asia and beyond. It aims to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive examination. Challenges facing the region It aims to contribute to an in-depth understanding of the ways to a safer and more resilient future.

The report you have in your hand is also the introduction of a series of studies that the National Intelligence Academy will focus on ISIS's mobility in Africa, as well as field research and data analysis addressing various dynamics related to the organization. We hope that this report will be an eye-opener for everyone who is interested in the subject and trying to understand the radicalization and terrorism activities in our nearby geography.

Prof. Dr. Talha Köse, President
of the National Intelligence Academy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The Central Asian region and the African continent have been in the global struggle of the dominant powers in recent years. area and these regions are Turkey's primary strategic interests. is located within the area. As a matter of fact, Türkiye's economic relations with the two regions in recent years It is gradually deepening its political and military relations.
- Groups trying to come to power through democratic methods after the Arab Spring removal from government through various interventions, destabilizing actions against these countries. implementation of policies; It is an important factor in the radicalization of some groups in the countries of the region. played a role. Some governments willingly support this process and radical terrorism It has been observed that they use their organizations to suppress reasonable opposition movements.
- Similarly, collapsed/collapsed areas in a wide geography from Libya to Afghanistan The existence of states is also a fertile ground for the strengthening of radicalism and terrorist organizations. creates an environment.
- After the DAESH terrorist organization lost its dominance in Iraq and Syria its focus on Afghanistan, which is geographically located between powers such as Russia, China and Iran. and efforts to recruit militants from this region; The sudden withdrawal of the USA from the country and When evaluated with the Taliban administration coming to power, it is obvious that the organization and its activities cannot be considered independent of the dynamics of the global power struggle.
- DAESH/Khorasan structure, whose name came to mind again with the terrorist attack carried out at the Crocus municipality building in Moscow, the capital of Russia, on March 22, 2024, It is one of the leading terrorist organizations that exploit religion and, as the name suggests, It has mainly targeted the historical Turkestan region.

DAY - BY

- The fact that the DAESH/Khorasan structure, which is nourished by the Salafi-Takfiri ideology, is more active especially in the regions of the former Soviet Union that have experienced disconnection from cultural and spiritual values, is due to the absence or weakening of established religious institutions and traditions.
- Turkey's democratic structure and the continued existence of traditional religious institutions and understandings pose a significant obstacle to the aforementioned organization and similar extremist groups gaining ground.
- Irregular migration resulting from unstable and fragile structures in the region and the sociological mobility that this migration creates, as reflected in official statistics, reveal the necessity of discussing the issue from different dimensions.
- As the multilingual propaganda efforts of the terrorist organization show, the fact that it targets a wide geography around Turkey rather than a specific country shows that it is important to carry out the fight against the organization with a collective approach. It would be beneficial to realize this cooperation in the socio-cultural field as well as in the field of security, as it will allow us to get to the roots of the issue.
- Turkey can convey its experience in the fight against terrorism to the relevant states and share its knowledge on disseminating cultural and spiritual education compatible with democratic values.
In this context, organizations such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs or the Islamic History, Art and Culture Research Center (IRCICA) affiliated with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation can play a more active role in creating a common cultural strategy and language.
- With cultural and ideological struggle methods aimed at preventing the terrorist organization from gaining ground, Turkey, which is already seriously fighting against the organization in the field of security and is one of the countries that pay the highest price in this regard, can be prevented from being targeted with different excuses.

DEAŞ/HORASAN YAPILANMASI

SOSYOEKONOMİK DEZAVANTAJ

Yabancılaşma, toplumsal dışlanma, düşük toplumsal statü

İTİCİ FAKTÖRLER

SİYASİ NEDENLER / DEVLET YAPILANMASI VE DIŞ FAKTÖRLER

Dış müdahale ve işgal, siyasi baskı ve dışlayıcı siyasi yapılar

KİŞİSEL KOŞULLAR

Yoksulluk, eğitimsizlik, dile içi sorunlar, travma, dışlanmışlık, gelecek kaygısı, aşağılanmışlık, kişisel arayış, macera arayışı

İDEOLOJİK ÇEKİCİLİK

İdeolojik anlatı ve ideolojik aidiyet hissi

ÇEKİCİ FAKTÖRLER

SOSYAL AĞLAR

Ulusötesi ağların ve söylemlerin yayılması, güvene dayalı sosyal ağların istismarı (kabile/dini grup gibi)

DİNİ FAKTÖRLER

Dini geleneklerden kopuş, dini istismar, muteber dini otorite olmayışı

STATÜ

Şiddet ve terörü anlamlı kılan çabası, daha büyük bir ülkünün parçası olma

FİNANSAL TEŞVİKLER

Mali imkânlar sunulması, mali fırsatların reklam edilmesi




ENTRANCE

DAESH TERRORIST ORGANIZATION is based on al-Qaeda in its origins.¹ It captured the city of Raqqa in Syria in 2013 and declared that it had established the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Damascus (DEAİ).² After capturing Iraqi cities such as Fallujah and Mosul in 2014 The terrorist organization has begun to make its statehood claim physically visible on a certain piece of land, transcending national borders. As of 2016, the strategy it built on claiming statehood by seizing certain areas gradually lost its effectiveness and the organization weakened in Syria and Iraq.

As a result of the disintegration of the organization of the ISIS terrorist organization in the Middle East as of 2018, it is observed that ISIS structures have shifted towards Afghanistan-Pakistan and African regions.³ Whether this disintegration has caused a change in the central structure of ISIS, and if it has caused a change, the nature of this change must be understood. It will be important in the fight and in creating predictions about the terrorist organization's course of action.

Chart 1: Distribution of DAESH Terrorist Organization's Attacks by Regions between 2019-2024



DAY - BY

The DEAÿ/Khorasan structure, which announced its establishment in Afghanistan in 2015, is a group that should be kept under observation in order to understand the current cyclical existence and strategy of DEAÿ.

Since the day it was founded, the ISIS/Khorasan organization has carried out attacks against civilians, security forces and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and has especially aimed to wear down the Taliban administration with both attacks and propaganda activities.⁵ The terrorist organization has also been involved in Pakistan with the participation of individuals and communities prone to radicalization in the region. It also frequently targets.

DAESH/Khorasan structure was able to maintain its ideological and operational capabilities; With the members of the organization coming from the Middle East, there has been an increase in the visibility of the organization both on the discursive level and on the operational level - mainly in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region.

The fact that the group defines its own name as "Khorasan" shows that it both concretizes its goals in terms of geographical dominance and focuses on Central Asia, especially in terms of recruiting personnel. The fact that he chose to use a region that is important for the Turkish world in many respects in his name is also noteworthy in terms of understanding how the terrorist organization makes sense of the area it wants to target, especially in Central Asia. In this report, the term "Khorasan" continued to be used because it clearly stated which region the terrorist organization was referring to. However, the so-called "province" designation of the organization was not included, instead "structure" was preferred as an expression used for terrorist organizations and the use of "DEAÿ/Khorasan structure" was adopted.

One of DEAÿ's target areas is Turkey. The civil wars and conflict environments that have recently affected Turkey's surrounding geography have led to the addition of new terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, to the terrorist organizations that Turkey is currently fighting against. In this context, it has been determined that individuals and groups affiliated with the DAESH/Khorasan structure are making organizational efforts within Turkey; Such structures were eliminated as a result of the operations of the relevant units in Turkey. In this context, DEAÿ/Ho-

Türkiye Does Not Allow Passage to DEAÿ's So-Called Khorasan and Türkiye Structures

- Kasÿm Güler, the so-called former "Turkey province responsible" of DAESH, was captured in an operation carried out in Syria in April 2021 and brought to Turkey.
- Activities of DAESH's so-called "Turkey province structure" and the "Faruk office" to which this structure is affiliated was foiled.
- As a result of the intelligence work carried out by MÿT, Muhanned Mehi Aldine, Mahmud Jabran and Husam al-Humeydi, who are known to be members of DAESH's so-called "Turkey province" and who mediated aid activities to members of the organization in Turkey, were captured.
- The so-called leader of DAESH, Abu Hussein al-Husayni al-Qurayshi, was neutralized as a result of the MÿT operation on April 29, 2023. has been made.
- In the operations carried out in 2024, the so-called Khorasan structure of DAESH; recruitment, finance and Logistics activities were dealt a serious blow.

Source: TRT News. Access Address: <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/mit-deasin-sozde-horasan-yapilanmasina-gecit-veriyor-834358.html>



**WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE**

It should be underlined that understanding the current organizational possibilities and capacity of the rasan structure is important in predicting the terrorist organization's course of action.

Turkey is one of the leading countries that seriously fight against the DAESH terrorist organization⁶, and in this respect, it is always in the target of the terrorist organization. Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations against Syria have been an indicator of the all-out fight not only against the DAESH terrorist organization, but also against the "terror corridor" that is intended to be created on Turkey's borders. In this context, the Turkish Armed Forces is the only army fighting hand-to-hand with the DAESH terrorist organization. In addition, ISIS attributes sanctity to itself by saying that there will be an apocalyptic war in Syria/Dabiq; It was expelled from Dabik by the Turkish Armed Forces and the organization was dealt a military, discursive and ideological blow.

The terrorist organization, which lost its effectiveness in Iraq and Syria in the process, attempted to make itself known again with the terrorist attacks in Iran, Turkey and Russia, as well as the terrorist attacks focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan, through the so-called Khorasan structure. Turkey's effective military struggle against the organization played an important role in the fact that the organization could not find a place around the Turkish border and had to be deployed in Central Asia and Africa.

While DAESH/Khorasan structure aims to establish control in certain areas in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region with its organized presence, it also takes advantage of Central Asia, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to recruit human resources. For this reason, the DAESH/Khorasan structure is trying to intensively exploit the political, sociocultural and economic problem areas in the Central Asian countries.

There are several main reasons why the ISIS/Khorasan structure has turned to Central Asian countries to recruit personnel and has made progress in this context. DAESH/Khorasan structure carries out an effective communication strategy in propaganda methods. In this context, it can also attract militants from other radical organizations by using violent discourse. While the land acquisition strategy it carried out between 2015 and 2019 following its establishment and its ability to maintain its administration on the land it took under control play a role in feeding this phenomenon, providing more financial opportunities to its employees comes into play as a supporting element at this point. In addition, it can accurately detect the vulnerabilities and areas of abuse of individuals and societies, and can especially manipulate young people in this sense.

All these issues also cause members of other terrorist organizations to join the DAESH/Khorasan structure.

Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations against Syria have been an indicator of the all-out fight not only against the DAESH terrorist organization, but also against the "terror corridor" that is intended to be created on Turkey's borders.

The DAESH/Khorasan structure, which continues to maintain the opportunity and ability to create terror in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, follows a strategy that goes beyond the region and targets other countries in its terrorist activities.

Another important feature of the ISIS/Khorasan structure is that it continues its existence without division, despite the decapitation operations and losses carried out against the leadership structure.

The DEAÿ/Khorasan structure, which continues to maintain the opportunity and ability to create terrorism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, follows a strategy that goes beyond the region in terrorist acts and targets other countries. The attacks on the commemoration ceremony of the anniversary of the death of Qassem Soleimani in Iran/Kerman on January 3, 2024, on a church in Turkey/Istanbul on January 28, 2024, and on the Crocus town hall in Russia/Moscow on March 22, 2024, are all examples of this strategy. can be mentioned among his recent reflections. In this context, it is seen that the DAESH/Khorasan structure has increased its threat level to a global scale, both through terrorist acts and through propaganda channels. In the *Voice of Khorasan* magazine, the terrorist organization frequently states that it targets Western countries and Turkey, as well as Central and South Asian countries.

From this point of view, in this report, the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure; It is examined within the framework of its organizational characteristics, human resource structure, action tactics and strategy, the universe of discourse it has built, and the content of the messages it gives through its propaganda.

The purpose of this report is to reveal the current organizational situation and course of action of the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure, as a result of the disintegration of the DEAÿ central structure, and to make sense of the threat level in this context.

At the same time, in this report, in the context of radicalization processes, the dynamics that pave the way for the ISIS/Ho-rasan structure to recruit personnel and reach the capacity to carry out terrorist acts are analyzed within the framework of the conceptualization of "push and pull factors" in the radicalization literature.

In the first part of the report, the literature on radicalization processes and the push and pull factors affecting this will be discussed. DEAÿ/Khorasan structure's efforts to recruit personnel, especially from the Central Asian region, which is of strategic importance for Turkey, are incompatible with what the organization claims in its propaganda.

Discussions in the literature on the role of decapitation operations in neutralizing terrorist organizations are generally negative. While Robert Pape argues that targeting terrorist organization leaders is "never effective" as a coercive tool in war, Jenna Jordan states that terrorist organizations rarely collapse after their senior leaders are captured or killed.

In this context, it is argued that not only decapitation operations but also a multi-dimensional approach should be adopted in order to fight effectively against terrorist organizations. For further discussion see. Patrick B. Johnston; Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns. *International Security* 2012; 36 (4): 47-79.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

It is not due to adherence to so-called Islamic beliefs and values, such as, but on the contrary, it is caused by foreign states in the region. It is related to the results of political, economic and sociocultural developments, including will be revealed.

In the second part, in order to provide an up-to-date analysis opportunity regarding the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure. From the organizational structure, organizational dynamics and motivational elements of DEAÿ/Horasan will be mentioned. Afterwards, he motivated the participation of the Central Asian region in the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure. Socioeconomic and cultural dynamics will be analyzed. The organization aims to influence Factors affecting radicalization processes in the Caucasus region will also be evaluated.

In the third part; Action strategy in line with the strategy, tactics and goals of the terrorist organization will be analyzed. In addition to the terrorist organization making itself visible through terrorist attacks, The kind of narrative he transforms it into and with what symbols he presents it is also important in understanding the anatomy of this structure. For this purpose, in the fourth chapter, the printed publications of DEAÿ/Khorasan Examining his publications and written and visual publications through social media channels Within the framework of the discourse analysis, the evaluation of the findings will be presented. Fifth In this section, the activities of the DAESH/Khorasan structure in Turkey will be examined. In the last part action that can be followed within the scope of the fight against DAESH in the light of the findings regarding the terrorist organization. Suggestions regarding the style will be included.

CHAPTER 1:

radicalization
In their processes
Pusher and Attractor
Factors

Generally speaking, he was victimized and humiliated; There is an academic literature that claims that those who think that they have been subjected to individual and group injustice and that their interests and values have been destroyed are more open to all these interactions and the effects of the wave of radicalization.

Push and Pull Factors in Radicalization Processes

In the radicalization literature, the importance of considering the issue as a social phenomenon and in a relational context rather than an individual deviation is generally emphasized.⁷ However, it is very difficult to talk about a standard radicalization experience and there are no specific examples of how individuals or small groups interact with social and global factors. There is no formula. Background elements, mental structures and environments that trigger these elements can be mentioned that cause radicalization. Recently, social activity environments, including online platforms, prisons and various cultural events, play an important role in the spread of new radicalization trends. In general, there is an academic literature arguing that people who have been victimized, humiliated, or exposed to individual and social injustices are more open to these interactions and radicalization tendencies.⁸

In the literature, the world and events are far from flexible; Another finding stands out as the fact that the tendency towards radicalization is higher in those who see sharp lines as black/white, right/wrong.⁹ Another issue that makes radicalization, and especially violence, possible is that those who go through the radicalization process have a wider audience and audience that goes beyond themselves for their actions. It is their belief that they do what they do for the community and that they sacrifice their personalities for the interests and values of this community.¹⁰ A kind of sense of altruism can facilitate the tendency towards radicalization and put it in a more acceptable pattern at the personal and social level.

Push factors can be summarized as negative social, cultural and political conditions in the social environment that make it easier for vulnerable individuals to be "pushed" towards the path of extreme violence. Push factors; Factors such as poverty, unemployment, ignorance, discrimination and political/economic isolation are put forward by the majority as the main reasons for radicalization.¹¹ **Pull factors** are the organizational features and benefits that "attract" vulnerable individuals to the extremist organization. The main ones are; group ideology (Especially emphasizes changing one's living conditions through violence rather than passive and insensitive democratic means), strong bonds of solidarity, sense of belonging, prestige building, expectation of fame, fame or victory and other socialization benefits.¹²

It would be wrong to approach radicalization processes from a holistic perspective because radicalization is a process, not a result, and this process has different stages. Different measures and struggles at each stage

mechanisms can be improved. In the study titled "*The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*", many factors are listed in the context of the causes of radicalization¹³, but this list is by no means comprehensive. The reasons and motivations of actors who play different roles in radical organizations may also differ.¹⁴ Some researchers express these differences as radicalization or different layers in radical organizations.¹⁵ Most of the models developed to understand the radicalization process suggest that different methods can be followed rather than a linear process.¹⁶ However, many studies in the literature foresee a one-way flow between processes and try to explain the transitions between stages in terms of certain mechanisms.¹⁷

Table 1: Push and Pull Factors in Radicalization Processes¹⁸

DRIVING FACTORS	
Socioeconomic Disadvantage	Research consistently shows that socioeconomic disadvantage is a significant driving factor in participation in terrorism. Individuals in economically deprived environments where unemployment and social inequality prevail are more susceptible to the influence of terrorist groups promising socioeconomic recovery.
Political Discontents	Political pressure, perceived lack of justice and humiliation by state or foreign actors; It can catalyze radical beliefs. Such conditions foster a sense of alienation and resentment towards perceived enemies, making extremist rhetoric more attractive.
Cultural and Religious Discrimination	Discrimination based on cultural and religious identity; individuals, their groups' rights and direct it to terrorist groups committed to defending its honor. . This is particularly striking in multicultural societies, where integration policies may be perceived as unsuccessful.
Personal Conditions	Experiences of personal conflict, such as trauma or loss of loved ones, can push individuals to radicalize in order to take revenge or gain control over their circumstances.

ATTRACTIVE FACTORS	
Ideological Appeal	<p>Terrorist organizations often attract attractive groups that offer a strong sense of purpose and identity. They produce narratives. These narratives are especially about people who are looking for meaning and a sense of belonging. can be attractive to individuals.</p>
Social networks	<p>Social networks play a critical role in organizational participation. Connections to family, friends or community leaders involved in terrorist activities; can significantly influence the participation of individuals through established relational networks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪
Financial Incentives	<p>In some cases, financial incentives provided by terrorist organizations can act as a pull factor, especially in regions experiencing severe economic deprivation.</p>
Adventure and Status Seeking	<p>The allure of adventure and the promise of status within a peer group can also attract individuals, especially young people, to terrorist organizations. Such organizations often portray their activities as heroic and noble.</p>

One of the questions that the political violence literature tries to answer is the context in which the phenomenon of violence occurs. As stated above, this issue is sometimes addressed in an individual-focused manner and sometimes in a group or broader context. Moreover, the effort to establish a causality between the phenomenon of violence and, for example, individuals' educational background, financial situation and cultural environment, and thus to present a model that can explain each condition, is another area where the literature focuses.

These patterns are often accompanied by facilitating factors, such as a deteriorating social or political environment, and accelerating events analyzed at the micro or macro level. However, there are studies showing that factors such as poverty and lack of education may not be the primary causes of suicide bombings.¹⁹ Likewise, some studies suggest that "any link between poverty and terrorism is indirect, complex, and probably quite weak."²⁰ In addition, existing data suggest that "poverty reduction is associated with international terrorism." It also draws attention among the findings underlined in the relevant literature that "it offers little reason to be optimistic that it will significantly reduce the On the other hand, there is widespread agreement that the inclusion of cultural considerations in discussions of radicalization should not be seen as a determining factor. However, judging by the rapid geographical spread of suicide acts²¹, this tactic soon became popular in Tamil Islam.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

It will be seen that it finds a response in regions, cultures and organizations with different welfare levels and educational backgrounds, such as the Liberation Tigers (TIKK).²²

A prominent approach among various explanatory models focuses on the relationship between international military interventions and suicide attacks: "Do foreign military interventions increase the risk of suicide attacks in the countries subject to intervention?"

The question continues to preoccupy those interested in security, radicalization and terrorism issues for a long time. In a study based on data from 138 countries between 1981 and 2005, it was found that suicide attacks increased only in countries that were exposed to foreign intervention involving a greater number of ground troops.²³

Although there is diversity in causes and patterns, most experts agree that third-party interventions to maintain order increase the risk of terrorism, especially suicide attacks.²⁴ Military actions by third-party countries justified as preventing terrorism or insurgency activities interventions; It is used effectively by organizations to maintain the ideological narrative and make it real, believable, persuasive and necessary.

In this context, the effects of transnational groups on the strategies of local groups can be mentioned. As foreign fighters join local groups, more sophisticated tactics appear to be adopted, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks and targeted assassinations. This shift in tactical orientation suggests that groups are changing their repertoire of actions in response to battlefield conditions.

According to Robert Pape's analysis, suicide acts can be seen as a calculated and tactical response to the intervention of foreign military forces in occupied territories. Pape also claimed that suicide attacks were effective in removing foreign invaders from different religions from the region. Therefore, the speed with which this tactic was imitated can be attributed to its success rate on behalf of the rebels in situations facing foreign military intervention.²⁵

The issue of radicalization, terrorism and foreign fighters; Long before the emergence of the DAESH terrorist organization, it was discussed through different examples and various theories and approaches were put forward on these issues. Each of the studies mentioned above looks at radicalization processes from different perspectives. In this context, discussing the activities of the DAESH terrorist organization, taking into account regional/local contexts and political, economic, cultural and ideological dynamics, will provide the opportunity and contribution to a more detailed understanding of the subject.

"Do foreign military interventions increase the risk of suicide attacks in countries subject to intervention?"

question is long

It continues to occupy those interested in security, radicalization and terrorism issues for a long time. In a study based on data from 138 countries between 1981 and 2005, it was found that suicide attacks increased only in countries that were exposed to external intervention involving a greater number of ground troops.

CHAPTER 2:

DAESH/Khorasan

Structuring:

Organizational

**Structure, Organization
Dynamics and**

**Motivation
elements**

DAESH/Khorasan Structure: Organizational Structure, Organization Dynamics and Motivation Elements

DAESH terrorist organization is the organization that has established the most centralized structure among the Salafi-Takfiri terrorist organizations to date. On the other hand, in terms of exclusionary religious discourse, the DAESH terrorist organization is expressed as the reflection of the Kharijites in the modern period.²⁶ At the top, the leader of the organization is positioned as a manager, assuming the title of so-called caliph, and under him there is a so-called council of ministers and an advisory board (yura board). Under the so-called council of ministers, there is a triple structure: delegations and committees, provinces and councils. According to the organization's declarations and schemes, the remote provinces office, where it manages the structures that declare allegiance to it from other countries, is under the unit called "delegations and committees", while the military wing, where it gives orders for terrorist attacks and provides the necessary support, is under the structure called "councils" (DEAÿ Propaganda Video, 6 July 2016).

DAESH terrorist organization is the organization that has established the most centralized structure among the Salafi-Takfiri terrorist organizations to date. On the other hand, in terms of exclusionary religious discourse, the DAESH terrorist organization is expressed as the reflection of the Kharijites in the modern period.

Another important feature of the DAESH terrorist organization is that it creates so-called provinces. The first form of province is the administrative structure of the terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq, which it directly controls. DEAÿ in Iraq after the declaration of the so-called caliphate; He established the provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Northern Baghdad, Southern Baghdad, Fallujah, Nineveh, Kirkuk, Diyala, Salahuddin and Euphrates (DEAÿ Propaganda Video, 6 July 2016). He appointed so-called administrators to these regions and then, based on the claim that they were states, he established so-called executive and judicial institutions in these provinces. The second province form of ISIS represents its administrative structure in Syria. Since ISIS declared itself as a so-called state, unlike its predecessors, it defined the other organizations that swore allegiance to this state from different parts of the world as provinces. In this context, he tried to depict the distant regions that the organizations that swore allegiance to him controlled/wanted to control, as administrative structures affiliated with him, by giving names such as Khorasan, Maghreb, and West Africa.²⁷

This centralist structure, which the terrorist organization established between 2014 and 2016, when it was at the peak of its power, first began to loosen, and then disintegrated, as the organization lost the territory it controlled. The name of the remote provinces administration mentioned above was changed and became the general administration of the provinces. In addition, the organization's inability to transfer shares of the revenues it obtained from the regions under its control to distant regions caused the loyalty to the central structure to decrease. Although it is a "brand value" for the provinces to be within the so-called caliphate state.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
 DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

However, the weakening of logistical support networks has weakened the authority of organization leaders over the structures that declare loyalty to them.

Despite the concrete data that DEAÿ/Khorasan is ideologically and discursively dependent on the central structure in its actions and movement style after the announcement of its establishment in 2015, the issue of whether this structure acts by taking instructions from the central structure in its operational planning and action style has been controversial since the year it was founded. offered. This issue makes understanding the context in which DEAÿ/Khorasan operates with the disintegration of DEAÿ in the Middle East structure important in terms of the fight against terrorism.

Photo 1: Founding Leader of DEAÿ/Khorasan Former Tehrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan

Photograph of the moment when (TTP) Member Hafez Said Khan Pledged Allegiance to ISIS



Source: Al Jazeera. Access
 Address: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/8/13/afghan-pakistan-isis-hafiz-saeed-khan-killed>

Despite concrete data regarding DAESH/ Khorasan's ideological and discursive dependence on the central structure in its actions and movement style after the declaration of its establishment in 2015, the issue of whether this structure acts by taking instructions from the central structure in its operational planning and movement style has been controversial since the year it was founded. has presented.

In January 2015, DEAÿ spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani announced the establishment of DEAÿ's so-called Khorasan province. "The Mujahideen have fulfilled the conditions of declaring the province of Khorasan and declared allegiance to the emir al-mu'mini," Al-Adnani said in a video statement released in January 2015. He used the expressions. Al-Adnani announced that Hafez Said was appointed as the governor of ISIS's so-called Khorasan province and Abdurrauf Hadim was his deputy.

DAY - BY

When evaluated within the framework of the developments in question, the organizational processes of the DAESH/Khorasan structure can be examined around two basic periods: (I) Establishment, rise and fall between 2015-2020; (II) The quest for reconstruction that started with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. The Khorasan organization, which started to be established in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014 with people who left TTP, al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, was officially declared in 2015 when ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi chose Pakistani citizen Hafez Said Khan as the first commander of the organization.²⁸

It is observed that Pashtuns are prominent in the leadership of the Khorasan structure. The most numerous part of the organization, which carries out most of its actions in Afghanistan, is basically a group from among the Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is larger in number but weaker in terms of training and weapons/equipment.

It is observed that Pashtuns are prominent in the leadership of the Khorasan structure. The most numerous part of the organization, which carries out most of its actions in Afghanistan, is basically a group from among the Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is larger in number but weaker in terms of training and weapons/equipment. The other layer of the organization consists of people who joined the organization from Central Asian countries and remote villages captured by ISIS/Khorasan in the eastern part of Afghanistan during its first expansion period. It is known that most of the prominent foreign militants are Uzbek and Tajik nationals, and although they came to Afghanistan from abroad, they can communicate more easily with the people of the region due to their linguistic and ethnic closeness.²⁹

DAESH/Khorasan, which has a part of its organized structure in the Nengerhar region of Afghanistan on the Pakistan border, also supports itself with drug and human trafficking activities carried out in this region.

In addition, it also generates income through illegal taxation and illegal precious stone and mineral mining.³⁰ The organization, which has also generated significant income through ways such as black market activities, has also experienced a loss of economic power due to the land losses it has experienced since 2020. . On the other hand, although this situation has made it difficult to recruit personnel, it appears that DEÄ/Khorasan has been able to keep its human resources at a certain level as of 2021.

Tehrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan (TTP): It is a structure formed by multiple armed groups that united against the Pakistani army in 2007. The leaders of the organization state that their aim is to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a so-called caliphate.

Source: National Counterterrorism Center. Access Address: <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html>

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

DEAÿ/Khorasan terrorist organization, in the conflicts it entered between 2015-2018 It lost approximately more than 500 senior militants and thousands of fighters. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) No. S/2021/655

According to the determination made for DEAÿ/Horasan in the report, "Kuner in 2020 and Nengerhar provinces, in terms of land, leadership, manpower and financial Other cases where fighters formed sleeper cells despite losses

to the provinces (Nuristan, Badÿis, Sar-i Pul, Baglan, Bedahÿan, Kunduz and

It is stated that "Moved to Kabul)".³¹ At the same time, this is the DAESH/Khorasan

It is an element that creates difficulty in directly determining organizational capacity.


Taliban against ISIS/Khorasan Afghanistan from 2022

It is waging a comprehensive struggle within. This situation caused ISIS/Ho-rasan to suffer heavy losses and to retreat from their important bases of Nengerhar and Ku-ner to the Tora Bora mountains. This is so called

that the DAESH/Khorasan terrorist organization, which claims the caliphate, has turned into a cellular structure;³² this situation has led to the terrorist organization's

It shows that it has established a sustainable structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Map 1: Afghanistan Map



ISIS/Khorasan structure, which took advantage of the collapse of the Afghan government, It has started to recruit militants from many groups in this country. The expansion of the organization towards regions in the north of Afghanistan, close to the Central Asian countries, has created an effect that makes it easier for ISIS/Khorasan to recruit militants from these regions in the medium term. Therefore, recently DAESH/Khorasan has invaded the Central Asian republics more than before.

organization
of Afghanistan
north, Central Asia
close to their country
towards the regions
If the expansion
DAESH/Khorasan
In the medium term this
militant from the regions
to collect
a facilitating effect
has created. This
why last
in the period
ISIS/Khorasan Central
Asia
to the republics
compared to the past
more access
has provided.

33 This makes the citizens of Central Asian countries, who have greater opportunities to travel or stay in many parts of the world than the citizens of Afghanistan, more attractive and useful in terms of recruiting militants. 34 ISIS/Khorasan, Unlike other distant organizations, its quest to show itself outside its region and the fact that it has succeeded in this to some extent makes it more than a local problem.

The DAESH terrorist organization constructs a discourse language that prioritizes the size, opportunities and capabilities of the organizational structure in the names it chooses when defining its own structure. In this context, his choice of the word "Khorasan", which is of Persian origin and means the place where the sun rises, as well as his use of the word "state", is related to the terrorist organization's effort to target a wide geographical area and to make these stimuli functional in the individual's world of perception by mystifying the group's possibilities, capabilities and power. .

DAESH/Khorasan's quest to show itself outside its region, unlike other distant organizations of DAESH, and the fact that it has succeeded in this to some extent, makes it more than a local problem.

The name Khorasan is used by ISIS for propaganda purposes, with the claim that it will enable the strong rebirth of Islam, with reference to the golden age of Islam. From the mid-7th century, the Khorasan region mostly encompassed present-day Northeastern Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and parts of Afghanistan. This is historical

Unlike the Khorasan region, the DAESH/Khorasan structure; It claims to represent a geographical region spanning Central Asia, Pakistan, most of India, and parts of Iran.³⁵

Map 2: Map of Central Asia, where ISIS/Khorasan Structure is Trying to Be Effective



The Khorasan region, which is targeted by DEAÿ, is a historical and cultural basin covering many countries in Central Asia.³⁶

DEAÿ/Khorasan states that it aims to establish a caliphate governed by global and supranational Islamic rules by targeting Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran, ideologically referring to the name Khorasan.³⁷ In this context, DEAÿ/Khorasan aims to establish a caliphate governed by global and supranational Islamic rules, from Kazakhstan to Sri Lanka. It aims to control the sovereignty of the region from the Maldives to China under the name of the so-called caliphate.³⁸ Accordingly, the so-called first governor of DEAÿ/Khorasan, Hafez Said Khan, stated the aims and objectives of the organization as "The great importance of the province of Khorasan for Islam and Muslims. there is. It was once under Muslim rule, along with the surrounding regions. The province is the gateway to the reconquest of all these regions, with the permission of Allah, until they are again governed by the Sharia of Allah and thus the lands of the holy Caliphate are expanded." He expressed it as follows:³⁹

Vakhan Corridor: In Northeastern Afghanistan; The Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of land on the border of Pakistan, China and Tajikistan, serves as a historical and strategic bridge connecting large regions of Asia. The Vahan Corridor has the potential to facilitate regional cooperation and economic integration.

Source: Amir, 2023. Access Address: <https://pakistan-horizon.piia.org.pk/index.php/pakistan-horizon/article/view/323/284>



Ideologically, ISIS/ Khorasan refers to the name Khorasan and states that it aims to establish a caliphate governed by global and supranational Islamic rules by targeting Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran.

Harita 3: Vahan Koridoru



DAY - BY

DAESH/Khorasan uses propaganda elements within the framework of its motto "to maintain its existence and expand" ($\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}$ $\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}$).

It declares takfir of all other Muslims and Muslim countries that act outside the rules they have framed in line with its own ideology, and in this context calls them infidels and apostates (apostates).

The DAESH terrorist organization bases its ideology on a Salafi-Takfiri understanding. Salafi thought basically means understanding the religion of Islam in its original form and returning to obtaining knowledge from its first sources. Starting from the second half of the 19th century, Islamic philosophers advocated returning to the Quran and the Sunnah and emphasizing the move away from imitation, paving the way for Salafism to be discussed more in this period.⁴⁰ However, it is difficult to relate the approach of the DAESH terrorist organization with a perspective within the scope of the Islamic religion and read the ideology of the organization from here. , will mean acceptance of the organization's propaganda. Because although the groups called Salafis have a common view on being subject to the first three generations of Islamic history, they have differences of opinion on the individual expression of this perspective or its application in the field of social activity. While one group is content with just preaching, the other group advocates legal activities to achieve social change.

Apart from these, an extremist group adopts violence and terror as a method and resorts to secret organization.⁴¹ Therefore, at this point, we can no longer talk about a religious approach, but a terrorist organization that exploits religion.

DEAÿ/Khorasan uses propaganda elements within the framework of its motto "to protect and expand its existence" ($\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}$ $\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}\ddot{y}$). It declares takfir of all other Muslims and Muslim countries that act outside the rules they have framed in line with its own ideology, and in this context calls them infidels and apostates.

With its so-called call for jihad, the DAESH/Khorasan terrorist organization motivates those who have given up hope on al-Qaeda and the Taliban to take action. In this context, examples such as DEAÿ/Khorasan's announcement that it took control of new geographical areas in Pakistan and India in 2019 lead individuals to perceive the organization as having more opportunities and capabilities than it actually does.

Within the scope of DEAÿ/Khorasan's global propaganda activities, there are images showing that members of the organization from different nationalities and many young people between the ages of 7-15 are given training. Additionally, DEAÿ/Khorasan calls on potential "fighters" to come to Afghanistan and support the Central Asian structure.⁴²

The DAESH/Khorasan structure, which consists of members of the organization who left the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban because they did not find the Taliban tough enough, also includes various elements from organizations such as the Uzbek Islamic Movement and the Uyghur East Turkestan Independence Movement. Also the Taliban

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
 DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE


It is known that militants from the Uzbekistan Cundullah group joined DEAÿ/Khorasan after the killing of their leaders.⁴³

Among the motivations for joining DEAÿ/Khorasan, which idealizes establishing a transnational structure in the context of the unlimited use of violence against anyone framed as an enemy; There are reasons such as individuals having identity problems, constantly being in conflict zones, being exposed to violence, having previously been involved in extremist movements, and economic and family problems.

In addition, DEAÿ/Khorasan's discourses exploiting religion may also affect people who feel the need to express themselves through their religious identity, but who perceive that they have been victimized in this sense or that the community they belong to is inadequate in this regard.

The effort of the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure to create an ideologically legitimate basis through the exploitation of religious concepts and terrorist elements are among the factors that can motivate participation in the said structure. In this context, socioeconomic inadequacies and other identity-based issues in Afghanistan-Pakistan and Central Asian states were used as areas of exploitation in the recruitment processes of DEAÿ/Khorasan. It is.

Graphic 2: Features That Make DEAÿ/Khorasan's Organizational Structure Effective



Although the number of people within the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure varies, the continuity in the organization's human resource supply in line with the information contained in different sources and the fact that the human resources do not fall below a certain number shows that DEAÿ/Horasan is an organization with a significant level of possibilities and capabilities in terms of manpower. ⁴⁴

It is seen that the organizational structure is structured on the basis of central hierarchy, although it operates as independent cells. The structure called Lajneh Assembly has an important function in decision-making processes. In this context, the people who were brought to power under the name of emirate are presented below, respectively.

DAY - BY

1

Hafiz Said Khan (Molla Orakzai):

He is a Pakistani and former TTP senior commander.
He served as DAESH/Khorasan emir between January 2015 and July 2016. of the USA
He was killed in a drone attack.

2

Abdulhasip Logari:

Logari, who was born in Kurram/Pakistan, worked for DAESH/ISIS between July 2016 and April 2017.
He served as the emir of Khorasan. USA and by the Afghanistan National Security Unit
He was killed in a joint raid.
He is responsible for 17 actions carried out in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the killing of 502 people in total. Mainly in attacks
When using the bomb suicide method, the most The fatal attacks took place in Pakistan.

3

Ebu Said Bacori:

Bacori, who was born in Bajaur/Pakistan, worked for DAESH/Khorasan between April and July 2017.
He served as its commander. USA's drone
He was killed in the attack.

4

Abdullah Orakzai:

He is from Pakistan. July 2017-August 2018
He served as DAESH/Khorasan commander during the period he did. US-backed Afghanistan National
He was killed during the Security Unit raid.

5

Ziya ul-Hak (Abu Omar Khorasani):

Between August 2018-April 2019
He served as DAESH/Khorasan commander.
He was dismissed by the DAESH central administration on the grounds that he showed "low performance". He was captured by the Afghanistan National Security Unit in 2020 and was killed after the Taliban came to power.

6

Mevlevi Abdullah Faruki (Orakzai):

He is a Pakistani and served as DAESH/Khorasan commander between April 2019 and April 2020. He was previously part of TTP.
Attack on a Shiite Hazara wedding in Kabul caused the killing of 92 people by organizing has happened. Also to the border post in Tajikistan
In the attack, one was a police officer and the other was a border guard.
Killing of 13 people, 13 people killed in the mosque attack in Quetta city of Balochistan
The killing of Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mezari
In the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of his death by the Taliban, an armed attack was carried out and 32 people were killed, and 25 people were killed in the attack on the Sikh temple in Kabul.
is responsible for the murder of the person. Afghanistan
He was captured by the National Security Unit.
Mevlevi, who was later released, was killed during a conflict.

7

Shabab/Shahab al-Muhajir (Gaffari):

He was born in Afghanistan. As of April 2020
He was appointed as emir.

When the leadership profile of the terrorist organization is examined, it is seen that the leadership of DEAÿ/Khorasan is generally Pashtuns of Pakistani origin. Among the emirs, Orakzai and Bacori take their names from two important Pashtun tribes in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Waziristan) province. In addition to the fact that the managers under the name of Emir are Pakistani nationals, for example, Kari Fatih, who is responsible for intelligence and operations in the ISIS/Khorasan Afghanistan region, is also Pakistani, and it is understood that people of Pakistani origin are appointed to such critical positions.⁴⁵

The fact that Pakistani nationals are and continue to be in the leadership team is one of the important distinguishing features of DAESH/Khorasan. In this context, it should be underlined once again that Pashtun organization leaders are trying to recruit personnel from the citizens of the countries in the region and are seeking to be active in Central Asia in this way.

DEAÿ/Khorasan's classification of its members according to their ethnic origin is another distinguishing feature of the terrorist organization. DEAÿ/Horasan names the members of the organization according to their ethnic origin; He describes the participants from central Afghanistan as Khorasani, the participants from Pakistani tribal groups (usually from the Pashtun region) as Bacori, the participants from Tajikistan as Tajik and the participants from Uzbekistan as Uzbeki.

2.1. Socioeconomic and Cultural Dynamics Motivating Participation in DAESH/Khorasan Structure from the Central Asian Region

During the Soviet Union Era, Islam in Central Asia became a suppressed identity due to the policy of defining the individual on the basis of collective identity within a common melting pot. The Muslim identity, which has been suppressed in the region within the framework of the definition of collective identity, has therefore become open to external influences. For this reason, it can be said that the Salafi-Takfiri thought, as opposed to the traditional Central Asian/Turkish Islamic thought, which is far from extremism, spread to the region as a result of the pressure created by the collective identity strategy.

In addition to the Soviet Union's practices on the Turkish states, the occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent arming of some groups in the region by the USA, their support to fight against Russia⁴⁶ and the subsequent foreign interventions; It has also prepared the infrastructure for structures that will have an impact in the region for many years.⁴⁷ Over the years, the emergence of extremist groups and terrorist organizations in the region and the

In addition to the Soviet Union's practices on the Turkish states, the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent arming of some groups in the region by the USA, their support to fight against Russia, and the subsequent foreign interventions; It has also prepared the infrastructure for structures that will have an impact in the region for many years.

DAY - BY

With the increase in opportunities and capabilities, countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as Afghanistan, have been affected by this situation.

Another issue that creates problems for the population in the region and causes the Salafi-Takfiri ideology to influence is related to border problems. Especially problematic sovereignty areas⁴⁸ and enclave lands created in the Fergana region shared between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan cause conflict areas in the region. For example, the Soh region, located within the territory of Kyrgyzstan, is under the sovereignty of Uzbekistan and the community living in this region is Tajik. These and other successive irregularities and border issues cause instability and areas of exploitation that will enable violent radicalization.

The violence and radicalization processes that started in Tajikistan as a result of the civil war and depression after the 1990s caused concern among the country's administrators. Since 2011, strict regulations have been made in this context to prevent the strengthening of radical movements that exploit religion in the country.⁴⁹ Tajikistan Islamic Renaissance Party (TIRP), a legal party in the country, was closed in 2015 on the grounds that it was associated with terrorist activities after winning the elections. As a result of political and economic instability, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have been able to recruit personnel through areas of exploitation in the country.⁵⁰ In addition, in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, which share Fergana, the population is higher than in other regions, natural resources inadequacies and border disputes; It causes society to be affected more quickly due to socioeconomic fragility. One of the most important economic inputs in this region is remittances to the countries of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks working in Russia. However, Russia's exposure to sanctions in the process that started with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 had a negative impact on the value of the ruble. This negative impact was directly reflected on the citizens of these three countries.

Uyghurs are also found among the communities that joined the DAESH terrorist organization. In the face of China's increasing pressure and strict practices, some individuals have been motivated to join extremist groups with their family members.

The gaps created within the framework of the above-mentioned issues are being tried to be exploited by DAESH/Khorasan. First of all, DEÄy/Khorasan heavily emphasizes that it offers high income opportunities in its propaganda aimed at recruiting personnel. These issues emerge as an important discourse pattern in the magazine published by the DEÄy/Horasan structure under the name of *Khorasan's Voice*. It is observed that the terrorist organization specifically targets Tajiks and Uyghurs, whom they see as the most marginalized and vulnerable. Additionally, DEÄy/Horasan terrorist organization; In its publications, through the propaganda that nationalism is a part of "ignorance", it expresses the claim of these individuals to get rid of their national and ethnic identities and start a new life within the framework of the identity proposed by the organization, and is able to persuade some individuals.

2.2. Affecting Violent Radicalization Processes in the Caucasus Region

Factors and Dynamics of Participation in DAESH/Khorasan Structuring

North Caucasus region; Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Circassian, Northern
 It is a region that includes Ossetia, Chechnya, Ingushia and Dagestan.

A region of different religious and ethnic groups where Europe and Asia are separated from each other
 Being an area where people live together makes the region an important geopolitical area.
 makes it geography.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, different ethnic and religious identities
 geographically in parallel with their re-definition process.

An isolated area becoming a part of the globalizing world,

It has increased the influence of different identities and thoughts in the region. The
 region's interaction with the outside world with globalization movements has caused the
 Salafi-Takfiri ideology to circulate more in the region.

51 In addition, the weak and fragile sociopolitical and economic

These conditions fostered the emergence of radical groups.

The sociopolitical effects of the Salafi-Takfiri ideology that emerged in the North Caucasus
 It appears to be fed by gaps arising from economic instability. The socioeconomic dream
 since the 1990s

Frustration and hopelessness make especially young people more susceptible to the influence of some movements.
 has made it clear.

When we look at the violent radicalization processes of young people in the region;

- Political leaders are inadequate to respond to the demands of their societies
to stay,
- Failure to distribute scarce economic resources equitably,
- The multitude of social problem areas,
- Social belief that legal processes operate slowly and inefficiently
blood,
- Weak belief among the young population that the problem areas in their societies will
be solved.

It can be said that factors such as play a major role.

In this context, structures that are violently radicalized and exploit religion, young people
 They were able to build an organizational capacity that could respond to the new identity
 searches that emerged within the society. These structures, especially for young people

of the Soviet Union
 dissolution
 different after
 ethnic and religious
 your identities again
 themselves
 describing
 parallel to the processes
 geographically
 an isolated one
 globalization of the field
 part of the world
 to become,
 different identities in the region
 and your thoughts
 increased its effect.

DAY - BY

They were able to turn their inadequacy in religious knowledge and their urge to rebel into an opportunity for themselves. In this context, especially the young population living in the region;

- They do not believe that they can change their economic situation,
- High unemployment levels among young people,
- They cannot find an interlocutor or solution to their problems,
- Local governments are not seen as legitimate for young people,
- Weakening of traditional religious understanding and institutions in the region

and as a result of all these, young people become alienated from the society and system they live in, It has made the region suitable for organizations to recruit personnel.

In the authority gap that emerged during the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the terrorist organization DAESH took control of Syria. It announced its establishment in April 2013 after capturing the city of Raqqa. It was announced by the DAESH terrorist organization on June 28, 2014 that the caliphate was restored and the so-called caliph was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It has been claimed.⁵² This situation motivated the participation in the so-called "Islamic caliphate" from the North Caucasus region. It has been a contributing factor. In this context, in 2014, from the North Caucasus to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi There were those who swore allegiance. Ending the existence of the DAESH terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria Then, it was carefully examined what kind of activities the participants of Caucasian origin carried out in which geographies. are among the issues that need to be followed.

CHAPTER 3:

**strategy,
tactics and
Goals**

**In line with
DAESH/Khorasan
Action Analysis**

The sensational nature of terrorist acts stands out as an important strategy preferred by DAESH/Khorasan. In this sense, it seems that it targets especially crowded events such as commemoration ceremonies and weddings in order to cause more casualties in terrorist acts.

In Line with its Strategy, Tactics and Goals Action Analysis of DAESH/Khorasan

DEAÿ/Khorasan determines its strategies and tactics in line with its ideology established within the framework of the enemy imagination on which it bases the concept of takfir. All people/communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, who do not comply with the dogmas and norms of ISIS, as a basis for terrorist acts and in providing operational motivation, create the image of the enemy.

DEAÿ/Khorasan's actions are especially concentrated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region; In this context, it appears that Afghan civilian life, the Taliban government, and groups such as the Afghanistan Hazara Shiite minority and the Sikh community are targeted. In this context, it is understood that the operational strategy of ISIS/Khorasan is aimed at disrupting the daily number of actions and the flow of life with sensational actions. The discursive framework DEAÿ used when targeting the Taliban; It was founded on the claim that the Taliban did not implement "universal Islamic jihad" but acted on an ethnic and nationalist basis. One of its other prominent targets is the Pakistani government and especially its intelligence structure.

In its operational tactics, DEAÿ/Khorasan employs its elements who have knowledge of the geographical structure of the region they are in.⁵³ They use hand-made explosives, remote-controlled explosives, suicide attacks, armed attacks, assassination, raids, kidnapping and beheading methods in their actions. In this respect, it is seen that DEAÿ follows an authoritarian and deadly agenda, just like the Khmer Rouge radical communist movement in Cambodia in the late 1970s.⁵⁴ The sensational nature of terrorist acts stands out as an important strategy especially preferred by DEAÿ/Khorasan. . In this sense, it seems that it targets especially crowded events such as commemoration ceremonies and weddings in order to cause more casualties in terrorist acts.

Significant actions of DEAÿ/Khorasan that reflect the logic of terrorist action; Examples include two suicide attacks against Hamid Karzai Airport in Afghanistan/Kabul on 26 August 2021 and a hospital and Shiite places of worship in Kabul on 2 November 2021.⁵⁵

According to the Global Terrorism Index, the people who carried out the most actions in 2022 were: The fact that DEAÿ/Khorasan carried out the actions that caused the most deaths in 2023, although the number of actions decreased, indicates that the scope of action of 56 terrorist organizations

**WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHORASAN STRUCTURE**

It is an important data to be used to evaluate the acidity. In this context, civilians are among the prominent targets of DEAŞ/Khorasan within the framework of its sensational action strategy. In this context, DEAŞ/Ho-rasan's actions include hospitals, universities, schools and airports; It seems that he was targeted based on the fact that they are crowded gathering areas.

When the conflicts between DEAŞ/Khorasan structure and the Taliban are examined, it is seen that DEAŞ/Khorasan and the Taliban declared war on each other in Afghanistan in January 2015.⁵⁷ DEAŞ/Khorasan made its first attack in Afghanistan in May 2015 against the Taliban in the Nengerhar/Kot region. He killed the militants and then targeted the tribes who claimed to be collaborating with the Taliban. In addition, the organization killed the Taliban's de facto leaders in the region by beheading them. In this context, special forces teams in groups of 1,000 people were formed by the Taliban and mutual conflicts took place in provinces such as Nengerhar, Farah, Helmand and Zabul, where ISIS/Khorasan structures are present.


With the cooperation of the US-Afghanistan national security units, ISIS/Khorasan suffered serious losses between 2017 and 2020. The Taliban announced in 2019 that ISIS/Khorasan was defeated, but sleeper cells could organize attacks. As a matter of fact, DEAŞ/Khorasan carried out an attack on the maternity hospital located in a Shiite-majority area in the capital Kabul in May 2020.

During the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, US soldiers were also killed.

It reached a serious level of visibility again with the Kabul Airport attack.

Chart 3: ISIS Attacks by Years

Another country where DEAŞ/Khorasan is active is Pakistan. of Pakistan



DAY - BY

It appears that critical periods and institutions, such as election processes and intelligence activities, are particularly targeted by the terrorist organization. Again, it is seen that targets such as schools, mosques and rallies, where civilians and civilian gatherings are concentrated, are specifically chosen by the organization for terrorist actions. For example, on July 30, 2023, a meeting held for elections in the Bajaur region of Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, was targeted by a suicide bomber and 54 people lost their lives. In 2020-2023, 119 terrorist acts were carried out by the DAESH/Khorasan structure, mainly in the Peşaver and Bajaur regions. Additionally, it is seen that DEAY/Khorasan has had an increasing action pattern in Pakistan since 2015 (except for 2019).⁵⁸

When the number of actions between January 2023 and January 2024 and the injury and death rates related to these actions are examined, it is seen that DEAY/Khorasan aims to carry out actions that will cause maximum injury/death rates. At the same time, it is understood that there is a trend from regional actions to international actions and the aim is to highlight the sensational quality. In this context, the action against the Crocus town hall in Russia/Moscow on March 22, 2024 shows that the aim is to create the unexpected state of terror and the elements of terror and fear for a long time. In this context, the use of knives, as well as armed attacks, to cause death and injury in the terrorist act in question also embodies DAESH's strategy of making the impact of terrorist acts effective on individuals and societies in a long-term manner.

It is seen that DEAY/Khorasan attaches particular importance to the sensational nature of its actions in its action methods. The terrorist organization plans its actions in a way that makes it possible to inflict the greatest number of casualties. It is seen that DEAY/Khorasan has created a pattern in which it directs the members of the organization in the areas where it carries out actions according to the countries they come from. In this context, it is understood that the DEAY/Khorasan structure mainly uses people from the North Caucasus and Central Asia in its actions in Turkey. In Afghanistan, people of Pakistani and Tajikistan origin; In Pakistan, it is observed that Afghanistan and Pakistanis are at the forefront of the protests.

It appears that DEAY/Khorasan has adopted a strategy of carrying out actions through Tajiks in Iran. In a news article published in *Voice of America* (VOA), based on information received from American officials, it was stated that the Tajiks in ISIS/Khorasan are more aggressive within the group and better educated than those from other regions, they constitute an important segment of the ISIS/Khorasan military wing, and they are more likely to commit terrorist acts. It is stated that they were successful.⁵⁹

Although the DAESH/Khorasan structure is organized through its cellular structures in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, it effectively uses social media for its organization and action activities with its structures and followers/sympathizers in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. At this point, it should be noted that Telegram is especially preferred among social media platforms and many accounts are managed on this platform. In this sense, the density of Telegram accounts is remarkable. It can also serve its messages to its audience at regular intervals through publications such as *Voice of Khorasan* and *en-Neba*.

Terror activities

Chronology 2014-2024

November 2014 – TTP leader Hafez Said Khan and 5 senior militants left TTP and swore allegiance to DEAÿ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

January 26, 2015 – In the statement made by DEAÿ, the so-called DEAÿ/Khorasan under the command of Hafiz Said it was stated that the province was established.

9 February 2015 – Abdurrauf, a former Taliban member and one of the senior leaders of DEAÿ/Khorasan Hadim (Abdurrauf Aliza) was killed in a drone attack.

April 18, 2015 – A bomb attack was carried out on a bank in Jalalabad by militants affiliated with ISIS/Khorasan. 33 people lost their lives and 100 people were injured. This attack was the first large-scale action carried out by ISIS/Khorasan.

May 13, 2015 – A bus was attacked in Karachi, Pakistan. 45 people lost their lives and 13 people were injured in the attack. DEAÿ/Horasan structure, Cundullah and TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 2015 – DEAÿ/Khorasan organization gained territorial control in some areas of Taliban-controlled Nengerhar.

March 2016 – The then President of Afghanistan Eÿref Gani announced that DEAÿ/Khorasan was in the east of the country. He announced that the areas he controlled were cleared.

July 23, 2016 – A double suicide bomb attack was carried out by ISIS/Khorasan in Kabul, targeting the Hazara ethnic group. 97 people lost their lives and 260 people were injured in the attack.

July 26, 2016 – DEAÿ/Khorasan emir Hafiz Said was killed in a US drone attack.

August 8, 2016 – An attack was carried out on a hospital in Quetta city of Pakistan's Baluchistan province. The attack targeted a group of lawyers and journalists who gathered at the hospital after the President of the Balochistan Bar Association was killed in a gun attack. Jamaat-ul Ahrar, along with DEAÿ/Khorasan, also claimed responsibility for the attack. 93 people lost their lives and 120 people were injured in the attack.

it happened.

October 24, 2016 – 3 militants affiliated with DEAÿ/Khorasan attacked students training at the police training center in Quetta, Pakistan. 62 people died and 165 people were injured in the attack. The Laÿkar Cavi (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) organization also claimed responsibility for the attack.

November 12, 2016 – DEAÿ/Khorasan carried out a suicide attack against civilians gathered at a Sufi shrine in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. 56 people lost their lives and 102 people were injured.

February 16, 2017 – DEAÿ/Khorasan carried out a suicide attack on a crowd gathered at a Sufi shrine in Sehvan, Pakistan. 100 people lost their lives in the attack, more than 250 people

DAY - BY

was injured.

March 8, 2017 – DEĀĵ/Khorasan militants disguised themselves as doctors and attacked the largest military hospital in Kabul. The militants detonated the explosives at the hospital gate and then opened fire on the staff and patients. In the attack in which 4 militants died, more than 50 people lost their lives and more than 90 people were injured.

April 13, 2017 – The US military attacked the DEĀĵ/Khorasan tunnel complex in Nengerhar, using the most powerful conventional bomb in its inventory (GBU-43/B MOAB) for the first time.

April 2017 – Abdulhasip Logari, who became the DEĀĵ/Khorasan emir after Hafez Said, was killed in an operation organized by the USA.

May 31, 2017 – A bomb-laden truck exploded at a crowded intersection near the German Embassy in Kabul. More than 150 people lost their lives and more than 400 people were injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. In the statement made by Afghan intelligence, it was claimed that the attack was planned by the Haqqani Network.

July 11, 2017 – Abu Said (Abdul Rahman Ghaleb), who became DEĀĵ/Khorasan emir after Abdulhasip Logari, was killed in a drone attack by the USA.

August 1, 2017 – A Shiite mosque in Herat, Afghanistan, was attacked by 2 suicide bombers. In the attack in which bombs and firearms were used, 33 people lost their lives and 66 people were injured. The Taliban said it had no responsibility for the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

December 28, 2017 – 50 people lost their lives and 80 people were injured in an attack on a Shiite cultural center in Kabul. DAESH claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 24, 2018 – The office of the UK-based “Save the Children” non-governmental organization in Jalalabad was attacked by DEĀĵ/Khorasan. 6 people died and 27 people were injured in the attack.

March 21, 2018 – A bomb attack was carried out near a Shiite shrine in Kabul during Nowruz celebrations. 33 people lost their lives and 65 people were injured. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 22, 2018 – 69 people lost their lives and 120 people were injured in a suicide attack on the voter registration center located in an area with a majority Hazara population in Kabul. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 30, 2018 – 29 people lost their lives and 50 people were injured as a result of the attack carried out by 2 suicide bombers near government buildings in Kabul. Various press organization employees were among those who lost their lives and were injured. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 1, 2018 – 20 people, mostly Sikhs and Hindus, died and 20 people were injured when a suicide bomber detonated himself in the city center of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.

**WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHORASAN STRUCTURE**

DEAÿ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

13 July 2018 – Election in Bannu and Mastung ahead of general elections in Pakistan

There were two bomb attacks at his rallies. 154 people lost their lives and 223 people were injured.

DEAÿ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 25, 2018 – Quetta, the center of Balochistan province, during the general elections in Pakistan

A bomb attack was carried out on a voting center in the city. 31 people lost their lives, 40 person was injured. DEAÿ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

25 August 2018 – Abu Saad Orakzai (Ebu Saad), who became the DEAÿ/Khorasan emir after Abu Said Erhabi) was killed in the attack carried out by the USA.

November 23, 2018 – Suicide in Orakzai district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan

33 people lost their lives and 56 people were injured in the attack. DEAÿ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 2019 – DEAÿ/Khorasan emir Abu Ömer al-Khorasani (Mevlevi Ziya ul-Hak) by DEAÿ

He was dismissed. Mevlevi Eslem Faruki (Abdullah Orakzai) became the new DEAÿ/Khorasan emir.

May 2019 – Indian and Pakistani provinces affiliated to the DEAÿ/Khorasan group were established by DEAÿ announced.

August 17, 2019 – A suicide attack took place during a wedding in Kabul. 92 people died in the attack

lost, 142 people were injured. DAESH/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it targeted Shiites. took over.

February 29, 2020 – The USA started the withdrawal process from Afghanistan with the agreement it made with the Taliban. announced.

March 6, 2020 – 32 people lost their lives and 81 people died as a result of fire opened by 2 armed attackers in Kabul.

was injured. The attack took place on the anniversary of the killing of Afghan Shiite leader Abdul Ali Mazari.

It happened during a ceremony. DEAÿ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

4 April 2020 – DEAÿ/Khorasan emir Mevlevi Eslem Faruki was killed by Afghan security forces. was arrested.

April 2020 – yahap al-Muhajir became the emir of DEAÿ/Khorasan.

May 2020 – Former ISIS/Khorasan emir Abu Omar al-Khorasani was killed by Afghan security forces was arrested.

2 August 2020 – DEAÿ/Khorasan in the center of Nengerhar province in eastern Afghanistan

targeted the Jalalabad Prison. 29 people died and 50 people were injured.

May 8, 2021 – Three police officers in front of a school in a predominantly Hazara area of Kabul

A bomb attack was carried out. 90 people, mostly female students, lost their lives.

DAY - BY

240 people were injured. The Taliban claimed that the attack was carried out by ISIS/Khorasan.

August 26, 2021 – A suicide attack was carried out at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.

In the attack claimed by ISIS/Khorasan, 182 people, including 13 US military personnel, lost their lives and more than 150 people were injured.

August 30, 2021 – The United States completed the withdrawal process from Afghanistan.

October 8, 2021 – A suicide attack was carried out on a Shiite mosque in Kunduz, Afghanistan.

More than 50 people lost their lives and more than 100 people were injured in the attack claimed by ISIS/Khorasan.

October 15, 2021 – A suicide attack was carried out on the Imam Bargah Mosque (Fatima Mosque), a Shiite mosque, during Friday prayers in Kandahar, Afghanistan. In the attack claimed by DAESH/Khorasan, 65 people lost their lives and more than 70 people were injured.

November 2, 2021 – Militants affiliated with ISIS/Khorasan attacked the Dawood Khan Military Hospital in Kabul.

25 people died and 50 people were injured in the attack.

March 4, 2022 – A suicide attack was carried out by a militant affiliated with DEĀĵ/Khorasan against a Shiite mosque in Peĵaver, Pakistan. At least 62 people died and 196 people were injured in the attack.

April 21, 2022 – A bomb attack was carried out by DEĀĵ/Khorasan on a Shiite mosque in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

31 people died and 87 people were injured in the attack.

September 30, 2022 – A suicide attack was carried out on an education center in a Hazara-majority area in Kabul. In the attack, 53 people, mostly female students, lost their lives and 110 people were injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

December 12, 2022 – A hotel where foreigners were staying in Kabul was attacked by militants affiliated with DEĀĵ/Khorasan. 5 people died in the attack and 18 people, including 5 Chinese citizens and foreigners, were injured.

January 1, 2023 – 20 people died in the bomb attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.

One person died and 30 people were injured. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 11, 2023 – 20 people died in a suicide attack in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 30, 2023 – A suicide attack was carried out at a Jamiat Ulema-e-Islamii rally in the city of Har in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. At least 63 people died and more than 200 people were injured in the attack. DEĀĵ/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

September 29, 2023 – A suicide attack was carried out during the Milad-un-Nabi ceremony in the Mastung region of Pakistan's Balochistan province. The explosion occurred near the Medina Mosque.

ii A political party in Pakistan.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

60 people lost their lives and 70 people were injured.

October 13, 2023 – Suicide attack on the Shiite Imam Zaman Mosque in the Baghlan region of Afghanistan

Edited. In the attack claimed by DAESH/Khorasan, 7 people lost their lives and 15 people were injured.

January 3, 2024 – Two bombs were used during the ceremony on the anniversary of the death of Qassem Soleimani in Kerman, Iran.

An attack was made. 94 people lost their lives and 284 people were injured in the attack. DAESH claimed responsibility for the attack.

Sources close to US intelligence say that the attack was organized by the DAESH/Khorasan group.

He claimed.

January 28, 2024 – Armed attack by 2 militants on the Santa Maria Church in Istanbul

Edited. 1 person died. DAESH claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack was carried out by ISIS/Khorasan.

It was claimed that it was arranged.

7 February 2024 – Political campaign ahead of general elections in Pakistan's Balochistan province

A double bomb attack was carried out targeting their offices. 30 people lost their lives in the attack, more than 40

Many people were injured. DEÄj/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

March 21, 2024 – Receiving salaries at the New Kabul Bank branch in Kandahar, Afghanistan

A suicide attack was carried out targeting Taliban workers. 21 people died in the attack

lost, at least 51 people were injured. DEÄj/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack.

March 22, 2024 – Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, west of Moscow

There was an armed attack on the concert hall by 4 militants. 139 people lost their lives,

DAESH/Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack, in which 182 people were injured.

CHAPTER 4:

**DAESH/Khorasan
structuring**

Discourse Analysis

Discourse Analysis of DAESH/Khorasan Structure

DEAÿ/Horasan group uses different languages to produce messages
 It operates in a professional manner in providing service through.
 It publishes *the Sesi of Khorasan* and *en-Neba* magazines at regular intervals ,
 It serves videos via YouTube and via Telegram channels.
 It can also interact with a wide audience. He also publishes in English,
 In different languages such as Persian, Uzbek, Russian, Bengali, Urdu, Tajik
 is doing. In this section, what kind of narrative DEAÿ/Khorasan constructed,
 It will be presented based on the content review made through its publications.

DEAÿ/Khorasan has built its narrative on the Salafi-Takfiri ideology.

In this context, enemy imagination is the clear depiction and marginalization of the other.
 It was shaped on it. In this context, group identity determines who the enemy is.
 It is interpreted on the basis of what it is and how it should be destroyed.

Accordingly, while definitions such as apostate, polytheist, and taghut are used to
 define the other, the way to destroy the enemy and establish an alternative order is
 defined through jihad.

The terrorist organization tries to legitimize its actions through the so-called concept of
 jihad, and while doing this, it uses the concepts and concepts of the Islamic religion.
 abuses symbols. In this direction, different ethnic identities

An attempt is made to lump the incoming people into a common pot based on the
 identity of a violence-based organization. For this reason, in DAESH/Khorasan propaganda
 Elements of national belonging such as nationalism and ethnic identity are devalued.

Although ethnic identity affiliations are used in the code names of the organization,
 they are seen only as diversity;

It is melted in the crucible of the organization's common identity.

DEAÿ/Khorasan's important attacks targeting the Taliban and Pakistani political life

It is seen that it produces propaganda material at a high level. Taliban dominated

The most important reason why they were targeted as DAESH/Khorasan structure was
 It is the motivation to dominate an area that can gain power by taking advantage of the
 gaps in the region. In this context

DEAÿ/Khorasan has a Central Asian theme in its discourse recently.

The increase in messages and visuals has achieved the targeted power in this region.

It is considered as providing the human resources needed to achieve success. In this
 context, propaganda activities were carried out in the Tajikistan region.

It also attracts attention, and it is seen that the DEAÿ/Ho-rasan structure produces
 specific content for Tajikistan. Cyrillic alphabet used in Tajikistan on DEAÿ/Ho-rasan's
 social media channels.

DAESH/Khorasan,
 Salafi-Takfiri
 ideology
 built on it.
 In this context the enemy
 imagination of the other
 net tasviri ve
 marginalization
 over
 shaped. This
 group in the frame
 identity, who is your enemy
 is and how is it not
 should be done
 on the basis
 is given meaning.

A large amount of content is produced in Persian, Pashto and Uzbek, including examples with subtitles. In these channels, it is emphasized that the Tajikistan administration led by Emomali Rahman is not Islamic, and Tajik youth are asked not to listen to the speeches of Tajik clerics who are under the control of the government of Emomali Rahman.⁶⁰

In the language of discourse produced by DEÄ/Khorasan towards the Taliban;

- The Taliban submitted to the USA with the Doha Agreement,
- The Islam represented by the Taliban is not the real Islam,
- Taliban members are apostates

issues come to the fore. DEÄ/Khorasan "Taliban is the servant of the infidels dressed in Islamic clothing." He defines the Taliban with his words.

Among the countries stated as enemies by ISIS/Khorasan structure; Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, Turkey, USA, European countries, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel are also included. It is especially emphasized that the Gulf countries are satellite states of the USA and Western countries.⁶¹ It is seen that there is a discrepancy between the enemy image that the terrorist organization targets discursively and the countries that are targeted by terrorist activities. Therefore, it can be said that the organization is trying to reach and persuade a wider audience by positioning itself in the propaganda medium through discursive construction rather than action.

Due to the restrictions on mainstream social media platforms such as Twitter (now X), Facebook and YouTube, DEÄ/Khorasan, like many terrorist organizations, is more active on Telegram, which offers more unrestricted activity compared to the mentioned platforms. Telegram channels managed by DEÄ/Khorasan and its supporters are divided into two groups. The first group is the channels that are managed mostly by the supporters of the organization and contain video and audio sermons of religious figures who can be considered as the ideologists of the organization. The contents on these channels consist of statements on religious issues by well-known clerics whom ISIS/Khorasan finds close to itself. Most of these people are also known to directly/indirectly support ISIS/Khorasan or to propagate the organization.

It seems that there is a discrepancy between the enemy image that the terrorist organization targets discursively and the countries targeted by terrorist activities. Therefore, it can be said that the organization tries to reach and persuade a wider audience by positioning itself in the propaganda medium through a discursive construction rather than action.

DAY - BY

The second group consists of the official statements of the organization, as well as the religious materials, books, audio lectures, videos or images of the killed ISIS/Khorasan members taken before and during the attack. It is possible to divide the materials shared on these channels into two groups in terms of content: anti-Taliban and others.

It seems that anti-Taliban content is generally shaped along two main lines.

- *The Taliban made an agreement with the USA and Western countries and served their interests.*

The Doha Agreement is at the center of the discourse that the Taliban serves the USA. The dominant theme in the contents on this subject is that the Taliban submitted to the USA with the Doha Agreement and that they gave up jihad within the framework of the Agreement and committed to protecting the interests of the USA and Western countries in Afghanistan. In this context, the Taliban administration is accused of "obstructing the jihad against kuffar", especially by referring to the Taliban's commitment within the framework of the Doha Agreement to "not allow jihadist groups to use the country against third parties". Again in this context, the Taliban's cooperation with countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkey, UAE and Saudi Arabia is presented as a great betrayal to Islam and the Ummah. China and Russia are described by ISIS/Khorasan as countries that oppress Muslims; Others are described as tyrant regimes collaborating with the enemies of Islam.

- *The Islam practiced by the Taliban in Afghanistan is not the real Islam.*

Within the scope of this narrative, some examples from Afghanistan under Taliban rule are given, and it is claimed that the current administration does not implement true Islam in Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban does not prohibit interest; He is criticized for disregarding practices such as retaliation, amputation and stoning.

In addition to these mentioned issues, there are also Telegram channels where learning military tactics, lessons on increasing computer skills, hymns, sharing the memories of ISIS/Khorasan members killed in Afghanistan, and topics on how women can contribute to ISIS/Khorasan's activities are discussed, especially targeting women. . These channels also include various online libraries containing hundreds of titles in Arabic, Persian, Pashto and Uzbek. Most of these books are written in Persian and Dari by the so-called DAESH administrators and militants.

The prominent themes in the propaganda content aimed at other countries, specifically in the *Sesi of Khorasan* magazine, can be stated as follows:

- Besides the Taliban, another country targeted on the basis of rhetoric is Pakistan. Among the reasons for targeting Pakistan, the issue of support for the Taliban by Pakistani intelligence is frequently mentioned.
- Saudi Arabia is targeted based on its transformation and normalization process with Israel.
- India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Tunisia, China, Iran and Russia are also among the countries that are specifically targeted and repeatedly identified specifically as to how and why they are hostile.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

- In the black propaganda content produced against Turkey, it is stated that Turkey is secular and democratic system, as well as Türkiye, especially Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The leaders of the Republic and the founding values of the Republic of Turkey are directly targeted.

Also in *Horasan's Sesi* magazine;

- Contents are presented on topics such as spying, reconnaissance, and target deviation.
- For the Uyghurs, who are a minority, and the Muslims of India and Myanmar to "migrate" propaganda is being made.
- Organizations and structures such as Al-Qaeda, Heyetu Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Hamas, Free Syrian Army (FSA) is being targeted.

When the publications of the DAESH/Khorasan structure are examined, it is seen that this structure attaches great importance to propaganda. and it is understood that he sees building a universe of discourse as equivalent to taking action. Own The aim of building a universe of discourse based on the narrative is seen as equally important as the aim of taking action. For this reason, they describe their members working in propaganda channels as "media warriors, media warriors". mujahideen". DAESH/Khorasan makes the individual think that he/she is being marginalized, It also uses a populist propaganda language that exploits the individual's search for identity and meaning. can be seen.

CHAPTER 5:

**DAESH/Khorasan
structuring
To Turkey
aimed at
Activities**

DAESH/Khorasan Structure Activities for Turkey

The network formed by people who went to this country from different parts of the world with the idea of "jihad" after the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan and participated in armed movements can be traced back to the mid-1980s. It is understood that a relationship was established between Turkish citizens and those who joined al-Qaeda in Central Asia, especially from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, during the 1990s.

Within the scope of Turkey's fight against DAESH, the organization's operational area has narrowed considerably as of 2023. The terrorist organization suffered a major blow with the Euphrates Shield Operation carried out in northern Syria between August 2016 and March 2017. Within the scope of the operation, approximately 3 thousand DAESH members were neutralized and an area of 2 thousand kilometers was completely cleared of DAESH.

Some of the Turkish citizens who went to Afghanistan married local people there, and after the US invasion of Afghanistan, some senior al-Qaeda officials in this country left the country with their families and went to Iraq, which also developed this relationship network.⁶²

The biggest terrorist attack carried out by ISIS militants of Central Asian origin in Turkey is the attack known to the public as the Reina attack. Abdulkadir Masharipov, who carried out the attack in which 39 people lost their lives, is a citizen of Uzbekistan. The terrorist, who joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (ÖIH) in the early 2010s and swore allegiance to ISIS in 2014, is a typical example of the militants who joined this terrorist organization from Central Asia.

As a result of the operations carried out against ISIS after this terrorist act, another attack cell consisting of Uzbek nationals was discovered in Istanbul in March 2017.⁶³ In the operation held in Istanbul Küçükçekmece on 21 September 2017, an Afghan national of Uzbek origin named Otobek R. The person was caught while preparing for action.⁶⁴

From the series of events above, it is understood that militants of Central Asian origin belonging to the DAESH terrorist organization have been included in the central structure of the organization for a long time. In addition, the DAESH/Khorasan structure occasionally requests personnel from those waiting for transition or those who will be sent to other countries after receiving military training.

Within the scope of Turkey's fight against DAESH, the organization's operational area has narrowed considerably as of 2023. The terrorist organization suffered a major blow with the Euphrates Shield Operation carried out in northern Syria between August 2016 and March 2017. Within the scope of the operation, approximately 3 thousand DAESH members were neutralized and an area of 2 thousand kilometers was completely cleared of DAESH. Türkiye has created a safe zone in northern Syria with the operations carried out within the scope of the fight against ter

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

It is turmus. The fight against terrorism was not limited to Operation Euphrates Shield; The activities of DAESH's so-called offices targeting Russia, the Caucasus and Europe have also been prevented. Considering Turkey's operations against ISIS, 122 operations were carried out in 2023 alone and a total of 426 terrorists were captured.⁶⁵ The ISIS terrorist organization could not create an effective structure due to Turkey's strong and determined struggle and had difficulty in recruiting militants. Turkey's effective steps in the fight against terrorism have also caused the organization to be organized more underground and in narrow cells. These cells mainly consist of individuals with weak social networks and who come to the country either illegally or with a tourist visa. These individuals concentrated their efforts to recruit militants among foreigners who came to the country through different means. It can be said that the marginal groups in Turkey who sympathize with the organization have limited contact with these cells and networks.

CONCLUSION

DAY - BY

CONCLUSION

It is known that after DEAÿ lost its power and dominance in Syria and Iraq, some of its human resources went to African countries, and some of it went to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region after 2018.

The DEAÿ/Khorasan structure especially targets human resources in the Central Asia and North Caucasus regions. DAESH/Khorasan constructs its propaganda language in a way that can penetrate psychological and sociological abuse areas through identity representation by instrumentalizing and abusing religious concepts.

The fact that ISIS/Khorasan has been able to create the perception among its militants that it has the opportunity and ability to become a state stands out as one of the most important factors in its gaining a dimension that allows it to recruit members from other terrorist organizations.

As ISIS/Khorasan becomes stronger, it makes its power more visible by both using the characteristics of terrorism and presenting the violence it creates within the framework of a symbolic and mystical narrative. It is observed that the DAESH/Khorasan structure is trying to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the countries that are in its area of interest for its activities, especially the Central Asian region, to recruit personnel from these countries, to engage in organizational activities in these countries, and thus to reach the capacity to engage in terrorist acts. Considering the push and pull factors of radicalization processes, it is seen that the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure is fed by the dynamics in Table 2.

Table 2: Push and Pull Factors for Participation in DEAÿ/Khorasan Terrorist Organization

Driving Factors for Participation in DAESH/Khorasan Terrorist Organization	
Socio-economic Disadvantage	In the countries within the scope of activity of the organization, segments of the population who feel excluded due to political and economic reasons may become alienated from their societies. Terrorist organizations can more easily target these excluded (ethnic, sectarian, tribal) vulnerable actors.
Political Reasons / State Structuring and Exterior Factors	Political pressure, perceived injustice, and humiliation by state or foreign actors can catalyze radical thoughts. Various conditions, such as foreign interventions and occupation, make extremist discourses more attractive by fostering a sense of alienation and resentment against perceived enemies.
Religious Factors	Not providing religious education under state control, religious education getting out of control, not having religious institutions or leaving the management of these institutions to external actors opens up space for structures that exploit religion.
Personal Conditions	In some countries, there appears to be serious mockery, exclusion and alienation against various ethno-religious groups. This situation initiates processes that lead to separation of people from the society they live in.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

Attractive Factors for Joining the DAESH/Khorasan Terrorist Organization	
Ideological Appeal	DEAÿ/Khorasan structure, as an organization that exploits religion, uses religious concepts and symbols and offers an attractive world imagination for individuals who are inclined in this direction. The so-called call for jihad can be perceived as an attractive ideology for marginalized individuals who cannot find a space in which to take action in terms of their life experiences.
Social networks	Social networks play a critical role in organizational participation. Connections to family, friends, or community leaders involved in terrorist activities can significantly influence individuals' participation through established relational networks. Therefore, when individuals do not have an environment in which they can gain belonging in their own land and are dysfunctional, they can become tools of terrorist organizations or other external actors who approach them for different purposes.
Financial Incentives	The financial opportunities provided by terrorist organizations serve as a pull factor, especially in regions where serious economic deprivations are experienced, and the ISIS/Khorasan structure also makes high payments for its militants.
Status	Exclusion and humiliation cause the people of the region to become aware of their common identity and act towards a common goal. At this point, the organization again exploits religious concepts and promises status to its militants in this world and after death.

The dynamics in the recruitment and radicalization processes of the DAESH/Khorasan structure show that social, political and economic vulnerabilities in the relevant countries emerge as an area that can be exploited by terrorist organizations. However, all these dynamics cannot be considered independently of the historical and international developments that create the regional conjuncture. The existence of collapsed states in a wide geography from Libya to Afghanistan creates fertile ground for the strengthening of radicalism and terrorist organizations, as well as the removal of groups trying to come to power through democratic methods after the Arab Spring from the government through various interventions, and the bloody suppression of civilian democratic demands. The implementation of destabilizing policies against these countries played an important role in the radicalization of some groups in the countries of the region. The activities of the DEAÿ/Khorasan structure should also be evaluated in this context.

One of the distinguishing features of ISIS/Khorasan is that people of Pakistani origin are in critical positions with their leadership and command levels. Its basic strategy is based on creating territorial dominance under its own control in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where difficult geographical conditions do not allow it to fully establish state authority. For this reason, Central Asia and Northern

DAY - BY

It also focuses on participation from the Caucasus region and recruits staff from the Tajikistan region. attaches great importance to its activities.

Euphrates Shield carried out by Turkey within the scope of the fight against ISIS as of August 2016

It is observed that the organization has entered the disintegration phase with the operation. DAESH/Khorasan structure In particular, while the number of actions in Afghanistan decreases after 2022, the number of actions in other parts of the world increases. Action attempts have increased. DAESH/Khorasan is experiencing the blockage in Afghanistan in different parts of the world. He tries to overcome it by taking action.

In the context of these discussions, the DAESH/Khorasan structure in particular and the DAESH terrorist organization in general are The relevant findings and suggestions are listed below:

- The central structure of DAESH lost power in the Syria and Iraq regions, some of its groups moved to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and the organizational processes of the DAESH/Khorasan structure increased. and caused some transformations in the style of movement. In this sense, the so-called remote province This organization, which can be described as a peripheral structure, is the power of the center. It seems that he came to the fore with his loss.
- DAESH/Khorasan structure, which follows a strategy of regional territorial control, On the other hand, it is effective outside its region with sensational actions in the international arena. It is understood that it is carrying out a strategy to become
- DAESH/Khorasan is trying to strengthen its organizational structure in terms of human resources. In this context, the terrorist organization's Afghanistan-Pakistan region is used for recruitment activities. It is observed that it is especially concentrated in the Central Asian region.
- The terrorist organization's religious attacks on citizens of the region with political and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. developed areas of exploitation for their search for identity representation, and in this context, Tajikistan and It seems that Uzbekistan citizens are especially targeted by the organization.
- The DAESH/Khorasan structuring has been subjected to both rhetorical threat elements and action. basically has a motivation to stand out with sensational terrorist attacks is observed.
- The DAESH terrorist organization is trying to build a tradition on its own narrative by exploiting religion. In this respect, it is rootless. Exploiting the accumulation of traditional religious movements and instrumentalizes it. We surrendered this valuable savings to the abuse of the terrorist organization. and devaluing these symbols, serving the interests of the terrorist organization It also means. On the other hand, based on the deep-rooted history of traditional religious movements, to protect its codes, symbols and meanings against abuse and exploitation by the terrorist organization is required.

**WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE**

- Producing a strong discourse to counter perception operations aimed at linking Turkey with DAESH and supporting this discourse with information and data; The role Turkey plays in the international arena against the DAESH terrorist organization needs to be reminded through various means and on various platforms.
- Türkiye primarily fights against terrorist organizations in the context of security. Secondly, Türkiye is one of the rare actors that can demonstrate soft power and produce influence by going beyond the security perspective. Türkiye is a religious and cultural center of gravity in the Islamic geography. In this respect, Türkiye; It is an actor with the necessary experience and capacity to produce culture, use it as a soft power tool, produce positive effects on societies, and thus prevent the spread of radical movements in the Islamic geography. On the other hand, Turkey's experience with democracy and the internalization of this experience by the society are among the arguments that Turkey can use discursively.
- The silence of the countries in the Islamic geography against the Israeli attacks after the events of October 7 is one of the issues that the DAESH terrorist organization heavily focuses on in its propaganda activities. By using this approach discursively, DAESH tries to legitimize terrorist attacks against countries in the Islamic geography.
- Countries that are subject to the DAESH terrorist organization propaganda should carry out studies to increase their state structure capabilities in order to eliminate their vulnerabilities, and at the same time, they should implement inclusive social policies. In this context, it is important to focus on vocational training activities, to diversify and strengthen cultural and social life opportunities, and to develop strategies that will prevent the alienation of individuals in society.

In the light of all these findings, other suggestions that are considered to be useful in the future fight against ISIS/Khorasan structure are presented below.

DAY - BY

- Ø Clarifying the stages of the process through which the terrorist organization enables violent radicalization, If DAESH/Khorasan has different methods for violent radicalization processes among the regions it targets, these methods should be specifically revealed and awareness increased,
- Ø Conducting studies that will enable the measurement of the impact value of the strategy carried out by the organization through its propaganda channels at the macro and meso level in the societies it targets, and at the micro level among individuals,
- Ø In this way, we can contribute to intelligence and security efforts by creating a common profile of people who have the potential to develop the initiative to take action, especially as a lone actor.
ma,
- Ø Making sense of how the system established by the organization through communication channels and the methods established through media communication channels, how the communication power works in terms of recruiting personnel, identifying gaps in the system, developing methods that can be applied to disrupt group dynamics in communication channels,
- Ø Developing counter-discourses that will show that the perception of alternative reality that the organization is trying to build on the discourses it produces is illusory, and ensuring that these discourses are transmitted through channels appropriate to the normal daily life of societies,
- Ø Determining the main element(s) that ensure continuity by revealing the nutrition channels and motivations of the human resources of the structure that can continue to exist despite the systematic decapitation operations carried out against the leadership of the organization,
- Ø Clarifying the roles and functions of the social networks that feed the DAESH/Khorasan structure among people of Central Asian and Caucasian origin in Turkey, determining the stage at which violent radicalization takes place, revealing how they construct their daily lives, identifying the means of penetration into these structures and establishing multiple controls on these groups. development of the method,
- Ø Planning studies through social and cultural networks to create a certain level of awareness among societies about the propaganda and action methods of the terrorist organization, and at the same time making an early notification network possible at the social level by raising awareness,
- Ø Increasing the awareness of non-governmental organizations regarding the structure and activities of the terrorist organization, creating training and rehabilitation programs for groups that may be prone to the radicalization process, with the coordination of all relevant institutions,
- Ø Establishing current quality intelligence sharing channels with source and target countries is seen as important.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

Suggestions regarding cooperation with Central Asian countries;

- ∅ Within the scope of the policies of "creating a network for cooperation and information sharing among member states to combat radicalization, violent extremism, Islamophobia, xenophobia and terrorism threats and to ensure border security" stated in the security cooperation subheading of the 2040 vision of the Organization of Turkish States establishing institutional structures, in this context, developing a common discursive language on the basis of the fight against terrorism,
- ∅ Establishing an intelligence pool regarding the activities of DAESH, and in this context, the relevant state
Increasing the coordination of institutions with each other,
- ∅ The Turkish anti-terrorism mechanism to be established specifically for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Linking it with the Organization of States,
- ∅ Establishing an infrastructure that will enable the establishment of preventive mechanisms and carrying out studies against elements that may arise due to issues such as migration and climate crisis and that can be exploited by terrorist organizations,
- ∅ Determining a comprehensive road map for de-radicalization efforts and defining specific responsibilities and tasks for relevant actors in line with this map; Initiating capacity building work to fulfill these duties and responsibilities,
- ∅ Planning joint studies on the field with universities in Central Asian countries, correctly reading and interpreting the change processes within the framework of the current pursuit of the terrorist organization, and developing the necessary mechanisms for the fight against terrorism in accordance with the nature and timing of the developments,
- ∅ Ensuring that religious education is provided by institutionalized structures.

DAESH/HORASAN STRUCTURE		
DRIVING FACTORS		SUGGESTIONS
Socio-economic Disadvantage	In the countries within the scope of activity of the organization, segments of the population who feel excluded due to political and economic reasons may become alienated from their societies. Terrorist organizations can more easily target these marginalized (ethnic, sectarian, tribal) vulnerable actors.	Increasing educational opportunities in poor areas, providing employment through economic development programs, providing social support and awareness programs by establishing community centers, promoting harmony among ethnic and religious groups through social integration projects, expanding health and psychological support services for victims of war and conflict, and working with local leaders. Addressing socioeconomic disadvantages in the fight against DAESH by working together. With these and similar methods, fragile societies can be made safer and more resilient.
Political Reasons / State Structuring and Exterior Factors	Political pressure, perceived injustice and humiliation by state or foreign actors; It can catalyze radical thoughts. Various conditions such as external interventions and occupation; It makes extremist rhetoric more attractive by fostering a sense of alienation and resentment towards perceived enemies.	Political reasons, state structure and external factors are very important to fight against terrorist organizations such as DAESH. In this context, political stability at regional and national levels, democratic processes, international cooperation, prevention of radicalization through media and education, a fair and inclusive management approach, the fight against corruption and increased transparency in state functioning are required. These measures will reduce the power of terrorist organizations and create a stronger basis for a large-scale fight.
Religious Factors	Not providing religious education under state control, religious education falling under the radar, not having religious institutions or leaving the management of these institutions to external actors; It creates space for structures that exploit religion.	Addressing religious factors to combat terrorist organizations such as ISIS is an important part of countering organizations' strategies to misuse religious discourse. In this case, it is important to raise public awareness against radicalization by official institutions, to provide religious education under state control, and to carry out comprehensive public information campaigns about the manipulation of religious discourses by terrorist organizations. Such an approach will preserve the unity of society and prevent terrorist organizations from exploiting religious motivations.
Personal Conditions	In some countries, there appears to be serious mockery, exclusion and alienation towards various ethno-religious groups. This situation initiates processes that lead to separation of people from the society they live in.	When fighting against terrorist organizations such as DAESH, it is very important to take individual circumstances into account, especially when intervening in the radicalization processes of individuals. Psychological support and counseling services specifically designed to improve people's emotional and mental health, mentoring programs and social integration projects especially for at-risk youth, increasing their economic independence and intervening in adverse living conditions such as domestic violence or discrimination are important. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the impact of factors that encourage participation in terrorist organizations and create healthier societies.

WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE

DAESH/HORASAN STRUCTURE	
ATTRACTIVE FACTORS	SUGGESTIONS
<p>Ideological Appeal</p> <p>DAESH/Khorasan structure, as an organization that exploits religion, uses religious concepts and symbols to achieve this goal.</p> <p>It offers an attractive world imagination for individuals who are inclined in this direction.</p> <p>The so-called call for jihad can be perceived as an attractive ideology for marginalized individuals who cannot find a space to take action in terms of their life experiences.</p>	<p>Terrorist organizations such as DAESH use ideological appeal to ensure that people become radicalized and join the organization. Educational programs are important to counter such ideological appeal and improve people's critical thinking skills. In addition, by collaborating with religious leaders and academics, it is possible to eliminate radical ideologies and ensure understanding of true religious teachings.</p> <p>Publishing content that clarifies the facts against the propaganda materials of terrorist organizations in the media and social media platforms will help raise society's awareness against such misleading messages. Additionally, offering social and individual opportunities as an alternative to the lies promised by organizations may cause individuals to show less interest in organizations. Reducing ideological attraction and encouraging solid social structures is possible with these methods.</p>
<p>Social networks</p> <p>Social networks play a critical role in organizational participation. Connections to family, friends or community leaders involved in terrorist activities; It can significantly affect the participation of individuals through established relational networks. Therefore, in cases where there is no environment in which they can gain belonging in their own territory and they remain dysfunctional, they can become tools of terrorist organizations or other external actors approaching them for different purposes.</p>	<p>Terrorist organizations conduct recruitment processes through social networks and spread radicalization actions. When creating social network strategies, it is necessary to first understand how these platforms are manipulated and prevent such manipulations. Therefore, it is necessary to develop and use advanced monitoring and moderation tools in cooperation with social media networks to detect and eliminate terrorist content. Digital literacy training should be provided and disseminated so that people can evaluate the information they encounter on social networks from a critical perspective.</p> <p>In order to create safe social networking environments and reduce the influence of terrorist organizations, social media campaigns should be organized with community leaders, educators and individuals who can make an impact to spread positive messages and real information.</p>
<p>Financial Incentives</p> <p>The financial opportunities provided by terrorist organizations are especially serious economic losses.</p> <p>It serves as a pull factor in areas experiencing deprivation. In this context, DAESH/Khorasan structure makes high payments for its militants.</p>	<p>Terrorist organizations, especially DAESH, give money to attract their members. To combat these incentives, strict financial regulations and cooperation should be increased at national and international levels. Again, strong control mechanisms on banking systems should be established to quickly detect suspicious transactions and operations against illegal fund sources of terrorist organizations should be increased. Additionally, economic incentives such as entrepreneurship support programs, job creation projects and microfinance should be provided to meet the financial needs that encourage individuals to join terrorist organizations. These programs can improve the overall well-being of society and reduce poverty and social exclusion fueled by terrorism.</p>
<p>Status</p> <p>Exclusion and humiliation cause the people of the region to become aware of their common identity and act towards a common goal. This</p> <p>At this point, the organization again resorts to concepts that exploit religion and promises status to its militants in this world and after death.</p>	<p>Terrorist organizations such as DAESH can attract individuals by giving them status and a sense of belonging. To counter these elements, it is crucial to offer alternatives within society that will enable individuals to feel accepted and valued. Community engagement projects, such as sports and arts, should provide youth with leadership and responsibility opportunities. In addition, individuals; They should be enabled to experience the feeling of making a difference in their communities through activities such as community service projects, volunteer work and participation in non-governmental organizations. Such programs can increase individuals' self-confidence and social cohesion, creating a shield against false status promises that terrorist organizations may offer.</p>

DAY - BY

REFERENCES

- ¹ Al-Tamimi, A. (2015). The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 9(4), 117–129.
- ² Göksun, Y. and Salihi, E. (2018). *Media Strategy of DAESH*, Istanbul: SETA Publications.
- ³ Siegle, J. (2017). ISIS in Africa: Implications from Syria and Iraq, *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*.
- ⁴ Zelin, Y. A. ve Winter I. (2024). One Year of the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map, *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/one-year-islamic-state-worldwide-acti-vity-map>, (Access Date: April 29, 2024).
- ⁵ Duran, B. (2021.10.16). Taliban's Ankara Visit and the DAESH Threat in Afghanistan. <https://www.setav.org/talibanin-ankara-ziyareti-ve-afganistandaki-deas-tehdidi/>. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- ⁶ AA Kitap, (2019), *Turkey's Fight against DAESH*.
- ⁷ McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20(3), 415–433.; McCauley, C. ve Moskalenko, S. (2011). *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*. Oxford University Press.; Porta, D. D. (2006). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Alimi, E. Y., De-metriou, C. ve Bosi, L. (2015). *The dynamics of radicalization : a relational and comparative perspective*. New York, NY; Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Hegghammer, T. (2010). *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*, Cambridge University Press.
- ⁸ Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*, New York: Princeton University Press.; Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(9), 797–814.; Vic-toroff, J., Adelman, J. R. ve Matthews, M. (2012). Psychological Factors Associated with Support for Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora, *Political Psychology*, 33(6), 791-809.
- ⁹ Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*, New York: Princeton University Press.; Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010). Violent radicalization in Europe: What we know and what we do not know. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33(9), 797–814.
- ¹⁰ Schmid, A.P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review", The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, *The Hague*.
- ¹¹ Schmid, A.P. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review", *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague*.
- ¹² Nasser-Eddine , M. , Garnham , B. , Agostino , K. and Caluya , G. (2011). Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review, *Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre*.; Holmer, G. (2013). Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective, *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 336.; Mirahmadi, H. (2016). Building Resilience against Violent Extremism: A Community-Based Approach, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Say: 1, (Ekim 2016), s. 129-144.
- ¹³ Schmid, A. P. (2015). Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State". *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, 67-80.
- ¹⁴ Nesser, P. (2010). Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe, in *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*. Magnus Ranstorp (ed.). Routledge. 81-114.
- ¹⁵ Kortweg, R., Gohel, Sajjan., Heisbourg, Francois., Ranstorp, Magnus., ve Wijk, R. D. (2010). "Background Contributing Factors to Terrorism", in *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, Magnus Ranstorp (ed.). Routledge. 23-24.
- ¹⁶ McCauley, C. ve Moskalenko, S. (2010). Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization, in *Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory, Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-WMD, Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement*, 82-91.
- ¹⁷ Madriaza, P. ve Ponsot, A. S. (2015). *Preventing Radicalization: A Systematic Review*, Montreal; Quebec: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC).

**WITH TERRORISM
STRUGGLE AND Türkiye:
DAESH/KHRASAN STRUCTURE**

- ¹⁸ Köse, Talha and Coşkun, İpek. (2010). *Universities and Radicalization in Turkey*, Istanbul: SETA Publications.
- ¹⁹ Elster, J. (2015). *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ²⁰ Krueger, A. B. ve Jitka, M. (2003). Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4), 119-144.
- ²¹ Bosi, L., Demetriou, C. ve Malthaner, S. (2014). *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*. Routledge Press.
- ²² Overton, I. (2020). A Short History of Suicide Bombing. *AOAV*, 23 Aug. 2020, <https://aoav.org.uk/2020/a-short-history-of-suicide-bombings/>, (Erişim Tarihi: 7 Mayıs 2024).
- ²³ Choi, S. ve Piazza, J. A. (2017). Foreign Military Interventions and Suicide Attacks. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 61(2), 271-97.
- ²⁴ Collard-Wexler, S., Pischedda, C. ve Smith, M. (2014). Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks?. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 58(4). 625-657.
- ²⁵ Pape, R. A. (2005). *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.
- ²⁶ Presidency of Religious Affairs. (2016). *Religious Exploitation and Terrorism Movement DAESH*. https://yayin.diyaret.gov.tr/File/Download?path=331_1.pdf&id=331. (Access Date: 3 May 2024).
- ²⁷ TRT News. (2021.04.12). *The Presence of the Terrorist Organization DAESH in Africa*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/terror-organization-deasin-afrikadaki-presence-572146.html>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- ²⁸ CSIS. (2018). *Islamic State Khorasan*. <https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/transnational-threats-project-archive/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic>. (Erişim Tarihi: 30 Nisan 2024).
- ²⁹ Ahmadzai, A. (2022). IS-Khorasan: Organizational Structure, Ideological Convergence with Taliban, and Future Prospects. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 16(5). 2-19.
- ³⁰ Global W. (2018). *At Any Price We Will Take The Mines*. https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/19366/AfghanistanTalInvestigation_May2018.pdf. (Date of access: April 29, 2024).
- Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights No. 31 A/HRC/49/24-16/05/2022.
- ³² IRAM. (2024). *The Rise of ISIS Khorasan and Tajik Militants*. <https://www.iramcenter.org/deas-horasanin-yukselisi-ve-tacik-militanlar-2476>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- ³³ Ahmadzai, A. (2022). IS-Khorasan: Organizational Structure, Ideological Convergence with Taliban, and Future Prospects. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 16(5). 2-19.
- ³⁴ Jadoon, A.ve Mines, A. (2019). Taking Aim: Islamic State Khorasan's Leadership Losses. *CTC Sentinel*. 12(8). 14-22.
- ³⁵ Tarzi, A. (2018). Islamic State–Khorasan Province, in *The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications*. F. al-Istrabadi & S. Ganguly (Eds.). Brookings Institution Press, 119–148.
- ³⁶ Britannica. (2024.04.03). *Khorasan*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Khorasan-historical-region-Asia>. (Access Date: May 7, 2024).
- ³⁷ CSIS. (2018). *Islamic State Khorasan*. <https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/transnational-threats-project-archive/terrorism-backgrounders/islamic>. (Erişim Tarihi: 30 Nisan 2024).
- ³⁸ Maan, A. (2021.12.13). *ISIS-K and the Fight Between the Ears*. Homeland Security Today. <https://www.hstoday.us/featured/column-isis-k-and-the-fight-between-the-ears/>. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- ³⁹ Zelin, A. Y. (2015.07.13). *Audio message from The Islamic State's Hafiz Sa'id Khan: "Message To Our People In Khorasan (Afghanistan)*. Lawfare. <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/audio-message-islamic-states-hafiz-said-khan-message-our-people-khorasan-afghanistan>. (Erişim Tarihi 7 Mayıs 2024).
- ⁴⁰ Özervarlıy, MS Selefiyye, *TDV Islamic Encyclopedia*, <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/selefiyye>. (29.04.2024).

DAY - BY

- ⁴¹ Yıldırym, R. (2020). Neo-Salafis Who Lost Their Way in the Footsteps of Their Ancestors, *Kriter*, October 2020 / Year 5, Issue 50, <https://kriter-dergi.com/siyaset/atalarinin-izinde-yolunu-sasiran-neo-selefler/>, (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- ⁴² Brooks, N., Honnavalli, V. Ve Jacobson-Lang, B. (2022). Children of ISIS: considerations regarding trauma, treatment and risk. *Psychiatry, Psychology and Law*. 29(1). 107-133.
- ⁴³ Raine, S. (2022. 08.05). "The Shifting Fortunes of IS-Khorasan. *Engelsberg Ideas*. <https://engelsbergideas.com/re-views/the-shifting-fortunes-of-is-khorasan/>. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- ⁴⁴ Maan, A. (2021.12.13). ISIS-K and the Fight Between the Ears. *Homeland Security Today*. <https://www.hstoday.us/featured/column-isis-k-and-the-fight-between-the-ears/>. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- 45 IRAM. (2024). *The Rise of ISIS Khorasan and Tajik Militants*. <https://www.iramcenter.org/deas-horasanin-yukselisi-ve-tacik-militanlar-2476>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- ⁴⁶ Gandomi, J. (2008). Lessons from the Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan for the United States and NATO. <https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf1661/files/2008-3.pdf>.
- ⁴⁷ Karakoç, D.Z. (2021). "The US-led "War on Terror" in Afghanistan: 2001-2021", *MANAS Journal of Social Research*, 10(Special Issue), 172-185.
- 48 İrdem, İ. and Baýak, S. (2023). Governance Weakness as a Security Problem: The Example of Uzbekistan. *Ankara Hacý Bayram Veli University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Journal*, 25(2), 589-616.
- ⁴⁹ Sharifzoda, K. (2020). How Serious is the ISIS Threat to Tajikistan?, *OSCE Academy in Bishkek*, No. 54.
- 50 Sharifzoda, K. (2020). How Serious is the ISIS Threat to Tajikistan?, *OSCE Academy in Bishkek*, No. 54.
- ⁵¹ Souleimanov, Emil A. (2014). Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War. *Middle East Policy*. 21(3).
- ⁵² Republic of Turkey Ministry of Internal Affairs. (2017). *Turkey's Fight Against DAESH*. <https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurum-lar/icisleri.gov.tr/lcSite/strateji/deneme/YAYINLAR/yÇERyK/deas%20fransyzca.pdf>. (Access Date: April 29 2024).
- 53 IRAM. (2024). *The Rise of ISIS Khorasan and Tajik Militants*. <https://www.iramcenter.org/deas-horasanin-yukselisi-ve-tacik-militanlar-2476>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- ⁵⁴ Schmid, A. P. (2015). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. New York and London: Routledge.
- UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Report No. 55 A/HRC/49/24-16/05/2022, 2022.
- 56 Institute for Economics and Peace. 2023. <https://www.economicsandpeace.org/global-terrorism-index/> (Erişim Date: April 29, 2024).
- 57 UN Security Council resolution S/2021/655, 2021.
- 58 CSIS. 2023. *ISKP*. https://www.csis.org/search?keyword=ISKP&archive=0&sort_by=relevance.
- ⁵⁹ Ahmadi, R. N. M. (2024.01.31). While Small in Number, Tajik Fighters an Asses for Islamic State-Khorasan. *Voice of America*. <https://www.voanews.com/a/while-small-in-number-tajik-fighters-an-asset-for-islamic-state-kho-rasan/7465311.html>. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- 60 Voice of Khorasan. (2024.)
- 61 Voices of Khorasan. (2022.06.02). Issue 7; Voice of Khorasan. (2023.08.01). Issue 27.
- ⁶² Gürlü, RT and Özdemir, Ö. B. (2014). Transformation from Al-Qaeda to Post-Qaeda: ISIS. *Türkiye Middle East Studies Journal*. 1(1). 113-154.
- ⁶³ Yeşiltaş, M. and Onel, R. (2017). DAESH After Defeat: Its Rise, Fall and Future. *SETA*, https://setav.org/as-sets/uploads/2017/12/Analiz_226.pdf. (Access Date: 7 May 2024).
- 64 TRT News. (2018.01.02). *Istanbul Police Did Not Give Passage to DAESH*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/istanbul-polisi-deasa-gecivermedi-345194.html>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).
- 65 TRT News. (2024.01.23). *MıT Coup on DAESH: 426 terrorists were caught in 2023*. <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gun-dem/deasa-mit-darbesi-2023te-426-terorist-yakalandi-831299.html>. (Access Date: 29 April 2024).

DAY -
BY

**WITH TERRORISM
FIGHT AND
Türkiye:
DAESH/KHORASAN
STRUCTURE**

17.05.2024