

FOR ARMY COMMANDERS

Intelligence, Ops & Force Protection

For Jammu & Kashmir

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Management
Security
Protection
Operations
Personal
Enforcement
Executive
Investigation
Physical
Close
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Counterterrorism
Surveillance
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PREFACE

MILITARY DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE. A MISTAKE

The very definition of intelligence precluded further understanding of its inner truth, it's ramifications and manifestations. All military definitions point to one thing. To decipher intent of enemy. Given certain indicators.

It has been categorized as a support discipline. Its offshoot Counterintelligence has been stripped of intelligence attributes although CI tactics are very much like int.

When writing the definition military theorists and thinkers did not focus on the tactics repository of intelligence. They focused on the end product of the intelligence cycle, viz Enemy intent. That intelligence can be tactically employed, configured very much like battle, this was ignored. The absolute focus on " Source" curtailed all understanding of maneuver of its all other tactics.

Tactical employment on human, terrain and enemy domain was only limited to surveillance and reconnaissance. HUMINT tactics employment was never seen as integrated ops with combat ops and was based primarily on "source". As it was not understood as a combat system, no effort was made to use all its tactics in aggressive mode and maneuver the locals and enemy. Doctrine was written keeping this passive definition in perspective so there was no room in doctrine to expand intelligence as a form of warfare.

Military definition made intelligence a passive system. Eclipsed it's weaponization.

**Changing the Mindset of Army Commanders: Solution to problem of Ambush.
To be noted specially by Indian and African Force Commanders.**

Very important.

I have thought of a FP strategy. I invented a term "combat dispersion coefficient". CDC. Very simply put a convoy has very low CDC as in an ambush it can't disperse. On the other hand FP Combat Reconnaissance teams (I won't detail here the disposition and movement formation between adjacent teams) which I plan to induce at sectors along the route, these teams have high CDC. They can break contact and disperse and counter in several ways. The Enemy who plans to ambush, am forcing him to tackle recon elements [first. Am](#) denying him the freedom of access to route and also denying him freedom of movement in the 2 km vicinity of the route. Targets with high CDC are not favourable for the enemy and propensity to engage the recon teams will be very low. Ill plan the disposition and movement of all sector recon teams in such a manner so as to create a full deterrence for the enemy in terms of offensive actions and movement. Ill deny the enemy access to the route.

The enemy offensive decision plan is one of three:

Deliberate

Combat

Quick

High CDC of our teams coupled with pervasive deterrent presence invalidates all three profiles.

The core is the mobile C2 design and disposition of the teams

The situation in J&K forces high density troop deployment. Apart from its deterrent effect it also acts as an enabler for cautious careful planning of the Asymmetric enemy.

The enemy has 3 planning profiles.

Deliberate

Combat

Quick

Due to troops concentration the enemy is forced to go for deliberate profile of attack. He will avoid the combat planning or trigger specific quick mode of attack.

We must create a strategy so that he opts for quick offense profile without security planning and room for counter and destruction...at same time strategy must keep us prepared for his quick assault.

Due to large deployment he is in effect put on guard and provokes a deliberate planning cycle where he will wisely commit to planned attack and even combat mode.

COMBAT REVISITED. AN ANALYSIS.

The recent terrorist situation in Anantnag as per traditional military thinking boils down to:

Immediate identification of an Operating Environment OE which will determine application of offensive actions..tactics leading to a Tactical situation.Regimental experience guides the joint forces commanders action thinking.Supported primarily by spot situation awareness of Targets: Identification,disposition,strength,estimated firepower and movement.

So far so good.

The term Tactical forces the Cdrs to focus on tactics as allowed by OE given the requirements of cover from enemy fires,terrain mobility,maneuver and fires.

On close inspection there are 3 dimensions to this combat situation.

1.Tactical: Tactics against Tactics

2.Opposing Situation Awareness.This is different from Tactical approach.Enemy tactics do depend on Situational awareness of Enemy but his tactics do not reveal HOW HE PERCEIVES THE SITUATION WHICH MADE HIM EXECUTE THE [TACTIC.In](#) other words say he executes suppressive fire,we don't know if it's for opportunity to escape or advance.

Having a situation awareness is one thing and how to do multiple perceptions and execute a hidden intent is another thing.The overriding effort of the enemy would be NOT TO TELEGRAPH his final product of the tactic or combination of tactics he employs..that is the INTENT.

The battle operating systems of disposition,movement,fires,...perception of these form our situational awareness.Thats phase 1.Employed tactic by the Enemy is phase 2 of our SA.The employed tactic/s may or may not reveal the 3 battle operating systems of the [enemy.It](#) is these 3 BOS of disposition,movement and fires THAT IS OUR TARGETING OBJECTIVES as a summation of all our tactics and OUR BOS.Enemy BOS of Command Control,logistics will not be applicable to the terrorist side as these are not militarily defined..they do not have specific coherent C2.

3.From the above dimension 2 follows the 3 rd dimension of Combat.BOS IDENTIFICATION.These are also the ultimate targeting [objectives.In](#) case of asymmetric enemy like terrorist these are Disposition,Movement and Fires.

INFERENCES AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Combat Dynamics:

[1.Do](#) we attack the Situation Awareness of Enemy?

[2.Do](#) we attack the Enemy's BOS?

[3.Do](#) we attack the Enemy's Tactics?

Attacking the SA of the Enemy:

We achieve this by

a)Using deception,decoys, misinformation we corrupt the Enemy's SA and force him to execute offensive or defensive moves meeting our objectives.

b)We modify to a new BOS ,movement fires disposition.This opens up new avenues of tactics and maneuver.

Attacking the Enemy's BOS:

Reconnaissance and surveillance coupled with our BOS we target Enemy's BOS.Tactics come into play.

Attacking the Enemy's Tactics:

This is essentially the typical military maneuver warfare.

Out of the three Attacking the Enemy's BOS is the most crippling and decisive approach to Ops.The other two should eventually lead to this type of Attack.

Force Protection Strategy Template

Phase1.FP Situation Awareness.

a.What are the enablers of commanders Situational awareness.

b.Situational Awareness depends on intelligence preparation of the battlefield.Intelligence factors two [ways.One](#), to enhance commanders Situational awareness.Two to guide via Intelligence requirements preparation for courses of action.

The second facet comes later after situational understanding is complete and Commander feels the initial requirement to assess a perceived threat or threats course of action.

First,Situational awareness and understanding is Priority.If the Battalion or unit has organic int assets,they are deployed to assess the battlespace environment with the objective of discerning any threat.If it's a new unit getting deployed,the outgoing unit int officer will submit a threat assessment report to the incoming unit int [officer.So](#) as to enhance the new commanders Situational awareness.

During the first phase of situational awareness and understanding a multidimensional intelligence exploitation of the battlespace is necessary. We need HUMINT teams to exploit the villagers, the prominent personalities of the civil population, using tactics such as tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation. We can task organize HUMINT and Counterintelligence personnel to form tactical HUMINT teams for specialized exploitation. We need reconnaissance and surveillance teams for terrain exploitation including route area and zone reconnaissance. We need to create tactical covert OPs for observation and surveillance. We need to embed Intelligence personnel in road blocks, checkpoints and all points and areas of ingress and egress so as to detect threat elements during screening ops. We need to embed HUMINT and CI personnel in Cordon and Search teams.

All these are also prevalent in second phase, i.e. intelligence operations after formulating intelligence requirements of perceived threat which is the outcome of phase 1.

Force Protection is a domain to be addressed, be it phase 1 or phase 2. Any viable threat can harm troops in base or transit or during ops. THE STANDARD FOCUS IS "INWARD" i.e. "ON SITE" PROTECTION OR "ENROUTE" [PROTECTION.SO](#) ITS MORE PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND VERY VERY LESS INTELLIGENCE ENABLED PROTECTION.

We need to think and act both inwards and outwards for a full 360 degrees force protection. We need to project Intelligence out of camp base area or convoy vicinity into local habitats and terrain so as to perceive threats "that are enablers of force protection specific attacks on convoys or base installations".

A INTELLIGENCE SOLUTION FOR ALL ARMIES.CAN BE APPLIED TO POLICING.

THE 5Ds.

Operationalizing Ops?? To give a Direction to division and correct alignment of ops to 5 fundamental "direction facilitators of operations". Detect, Deny, Deter, Deliver, Destroy. I will call them Ops Channel as they guide the employment of the particular type of Ops reqd.

Beginning from the very first vague perception of threat to the final point of threat spectrum, these 5 Ops Channel points dictate ALL POSSIBLE OPS.

Detect: The very first pt on threat spectrum. We apply HUMINT, Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Cordon and Search to detect the Enemy.

Deny: We employ Counterintelligence and OPSEC to frustrate enemy info collection, insider threat, security test and CI activities. We also employ armed R&S to deny avenues of approach and create a threat environment to deny enemy movement freedom.

Deter: Cordon and Search Ops. Harassment Ops. Hardening measures. FP Int ops. Tactical HUMINT Ops

Deliver: To deliver the local population from Enemy influence. We employ PsyOps, faith building activities, civil assistance programs. Tactical Human Exploitation to separate pro Govt from Enemy facilitators and sympathizers followed by Prosecution Ops.

Destroy: Encirclement, Harassment, Seek and Destroy, Search and Destroy (these two [diff. Seek](#) is when you have info about [threat. Search](#) is you go and look for threat) and other Combat Ops

So we have the basic template on which to correctly and coherently plan Ops.

PS.

With effort, trial and error and iterations Kashmir can be Operationalized using this template of identifying Areas of Ops Channel and suitably applying needed Ops.

The 5Ds enable the full and total treatment of any threat.

I assume I have appropriately defined the battlespace in terms of 5 threat avenues of collection of int and application of ops

From this we can design for example CRPF Cobra Multidimensional Operational Teams

I have hit the common denominator of ops. Just now conceived it. Operationalizing Ops?? To give a Direction to division and correct alignment of ops to 5 fundamental "direction facilitators of operations". Detect, Deny, Deter, Deliver, Destroy. I will call them Ops Channel as they guide the employment of the particular type of Ops reqd.

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It clearly highlights the problem areas in our int collection and ops planning and execution.The 5Ds bring to fore how we lack organized guidance of int collection and ops application.

FORCE PROTECTION

THE MOST ESSENTIAL PRIORITY OF ALL ARMED FORCES BUT UNFORTUNATELY MISUNDERSTOOD.

Force protection (FP) refers to the concept of protecting military personnel, family members, civilians, facilities, equipment and operations from threats or hazards in order to preserve operational effectiveness and contribute to mission success.

In the definition above "operations" is relegated to the last [position.In](#) Indian context FP is essentially static measures to protect camps and personnel and in transit.I don't find FP embedded in ops.Whereas the primary problem is to reduce casualties in ops.

Out of the 5 ops variables Decide Detect Deliver Track Assess,FP accounts for Detect and Track

phases. For this is needed a parallel embedded FP specific command and control with a FP Captain in the lead.

Every ops should have a FP element. And that should be essentially ISR enabled. R&S Teams can apprise the ops leader on threats in forward areas, on the front line and adjoining areas. We must have FP teams dispersed in AO. These teams will be task organized with Humint and CI personnel. They can feed current threat information to ongoing ops G2. For that matter every ops team should have a G2 int officer. A Fire support officer who will be supplied targeting information by the roving FP teams. The FP teams will conduct terrain profiling to determine likely areas of ambush, cover and concealment, avenues of approach and fields of fire. These teams will aggressively exploit physical terrain and all locals who happen to be in AO. It's important for the ops element to have a counterambush team in direct touch with embedded FP Command and Control.

FP is NOT as per the definition. The mentality should be FP is driven by int and CI and ops require FP, not only forces in transit or housed in bases.

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FOR ALL ARMY COMMANDERS

INTELLIGENCE AS COMBAT

Treat intelligence operations like combat ops. There is C2, comm, maneuver, tactics, combat support services (CI, Force protection int), Rear, base and Forward area. I'll detail this combat flavour [later. Now](#) as int is like a conventional formation, there is a forward line of own troops and beyond that enemy areas. This FLOT can be drawn across the Valley as Counterintelligence Control Line and HUMINT Control line, with nodes in all possible access, ingress and egress points like roadblocks, checkpoints, access points created by demarcation of cities and districts in a planned way to control and guide human terrain movement and more examples.

The two control lines if planned and drawn carefully with best communication with int base, int operators and teams in the field and human and jungle terrain, will act as the int battle envelopes FLOT and a variety of on the spot int extraction tactics can be conducted on suspects, detainees refugees at the nodes.

Now we use Intelligence Projection much like Force Projection where you have capability to project int assets stationed far away from base to even further enemy areas. From these control line nodes we can push int assets deeper into terrain and villages right upto terrorists bases and rear on "ISR missions"..but bear in mind to support them we must have (my creation of Int Bn) multidisciplinary int teams in the AOR.

The control lines can prove to be a very powerful interdiction throughout the State..but as I said three mindset commanders must have:

1. Don't harp only on Actionable int centric immediate and imminent enemy action resolution
2. Treat intelligence as a full combat arm with its own battlespace
3. Treat asymmetric enemy as conventional.

ABANDON LOGIC.THINK ABSURD.TOOL FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Think illogically and [absurdly.to](#) generate virgin ideas.

Take two totally dissimilar objects.a knife and a saucer plate.suspend logic and try finding a [relation.how](#) about making saucer edge very thin to slice through bread?

Take a chair and curtain.Flow with them.let mind swirl.chair a support to sit.Any ideas? Support..hmmm...support..well curtain is supported by metal rod in brackets.Go further...flow along.Curtain takes support to stand.STAND!!! Roger..chair will support me to stand and fix curtain.A relationship established between the two.A bridge..myself.Between the two.

Take two dissimilar activities of enemy not connected with our security.FLOW..KEEP FLOWING.SOMETHING WILL COME OUT

Think of the mind/brain as a river delta.And all your experiences flowing as lines of tributaries on the delta.Your thinking and intelligence analyses flow along your lines of experience.The [tributaries.You](#) are trapped in your experience." Fine,i solved this problem last time this way.Ill solve it again same way".Am [trapped.Am](#) trapped by training and experience.I won't think of all the alternative solutions.Indoctrination comes in.

Infantry soldiers are trained and trained in a system of defence and attack tactics and techniques.An enemy adapts to these tactics and evolves a new one.The soldiers are trapped in their training and experience.They become the prey.

We need to break across this lines of experience..the tributaries.Criss cross.Laterally.BREAK OUT!!!

You need to provoke yourself to break out of experience.The knife,the saucer,the chair,the

curtain are systems to help break out. Illogical thinking leading to logical thinking. Break out, if necessary think not along lines of logic. Military intelligence is a mind game. Don't be trapped in the Delta and tributaries.

A party was going on. A drunk guest comes out in the dark of the night and goes near a lit lamppost and searches for something on the ground. The guard gets curious. "Sir what are you searching?". The guest says "My car keys". The guard says "Why not you search near the car"? The man retorts "Stupid, there is light here, no light near my car!".

His logic is correct. But premise wrong. Leading to wrong result. Don't be trapped by your experience in Military Intelligence. Or any domain of army.

Insurgents use bikes. A bus going to the final bus stop and then makes return journey. **RELATION BETWEEN BIKE AND BUS???** THINK...FLOW....THINK.
Bus stops at every bus stop. Return journey same thing. Flow forward from this [concept](#). Is there any bike stopping at all the gates of the army camp on the pretext of losing its way? You can lose your way once at one gate but not thrice at all 3 gates. Testing gate security???

THE ENEMY IS
OUT [THERE.NO INDICATORS.NOTHING.NO](#) ACTIVITY. THINK. ABANDON LOGIC IF NECESSARY. INSERT A HUMINT NET AND EXPLORE BUT EXPLORE UNCONVENTIONALLY. THE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN TERRAIN. LOOK FOR DISSIMILARITIES AND FIND A RELATION.

A brief for Army Commanders.

Operations and relationships arising due to Intelligence.

Intelligence factors in four ways in an operation:

1. Prior to the operation intelligence requirements are satisfied and targeting setup. Operation commences.
2. During operations intelligence requirements can change necessitating change in ops.
3. Intelligence exploited after ops.
4. Intelligence determines content and direction of operations.

Assuming number and position of targets to be fixed, targets may be fixed or mobile

[2.As](#) operations proceed (Op 1) some targeting may be executed with the initial intelligence

T1. Due to uncertainty and dynamic fluid nature of battlespace certain intelligence requirements are yet to be satisfied and new intelligence requirements surface leading to a divergence from planned ops into yet newer ops and new targeting parameters T2.

If i think of the operation consisting of two states, one at point of commencement and the other on neutralization of target, then initially we have one straight line from beginning of planned operation O1 to T1. Due to change in Intelligence requirements the operation diverges into one or multiple operations so from T1 we go to states T2, T3. The planned operation successfully as per initial intelligence travels to T1 successfully neutralizing it but change in conditions due to this operations interaction with battlespace makes it necessary to pursue a different set of intelligence requirements to effectively target T2 and T3. Assuming the changes in intelligence requirements and the unsatisfied initial intelligence requirements made it necessary for two more different operations followup to neutralize T2 and T3.

We note that changes in initial intelligence requirements results in a divergence of ops from the initial ops line. The more these changes the more the arc of divergence. This will entail more time and resources to accomplish the mission.

So a change in Intelligence requirements causes a divergence in operations. This change can be measured in terms of total Time required to satisfy the changed IRs Delta IR. Similarly the operations divergence can be measured by total time taken for the last targeting minus the time taken for the first targeting Delta T.

Intelligence efficiency of Ops = $k \times (1 \div \text{Delta IR})$ where k is intel ops coefficient.

Ops Efficiency = $r \times (1 \div \text{Delta T})$ where r is ops coefficient.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INTELLIGENCE

WE CAN HAVE PERFECT INTELLIGENCE BUT WRONG SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

I will outline the steps so that no mistake is made.

Very first let me write down three equations.

1. Prevalent Army Thinking:

Intent + Capability = Enemy Action.

I discount this with the next two equations:

2. (Intent + Capability) x Propensity = Enemy Action

3. Confirm/Denial of (Intelligence Requirements for Anticipated COA + Intelligence

Requirements for Unexpected Surprise) = Situational Awareness.

(Note: I have introduced the system of mathematical equations to define military operations in my paper)

There are 5 modes of Surprise Target Selection.

- 1.High Priority Target
- 2.High value Target
- 3.Mass Effect Target
- 4.Recognizability specific Target
- 5.Running Target

Apart from Direct line Target as is the case of successful anticipation of Enemy COA with no surprise.

Propensity is the precursor of Surprise.The urge to execute offensive action.I have given below an acronym i created MTTT.This MTTT provides the fodder which kindles propensity appetite.The MTTT variables hold an inherent attraction for the terrorist to think ,adapt,and execute leading to Surprise.

The 4 variables responsible for Surprise is MTTT.

Unexpected:-

MOVEMENT

TACTICS

TARGET

TIME

Unexpected change in enemy movement patterns thus making it possible to change all the other three variables,contrary to commanders intelligence reports.Change in expected tactic.Enemy with assault rifles was expected but suicide bomber carried out mission.Anticipated attack on a particular target,but enemy resorted to 'risk transfer', transferring attack to a more easily accessible target.Expected time of offensive action but Enemy attacked much later or very early.

A High Priority Target is one who has built up a reputation to be a thorn in the terrorist mind and must be neutralized at any cost even if very hardened target [security.In](#) addition Target spearheads operations.The terrorist is willing to die to do the act.And that is indeed a Surprise given solid hardening of Target area and high impenetrability.The attack in Kashmir unit killing the CO inside the camp officers mess is an example of [HPT.In](#) case of HPT propensity is very high.And this propensity is more enabled by complacency on part of Target due to very hardened security.

Next is High Value Target .A target responsible for most of the operations in AOR.

Next is Mass Effect Target.Pulwama Attack.Uri [attack.Here](#) objective is max casualties PLUS a ripple demoralizing effect down the ranks.

Next Running Target.Sporadic isolated attacks on troops.

Next Recognizability Target.Targets of high national or social value.

PROTECTION FOR SOLDIERS: ATTENTION ARMY COMMANDERS

The standard approach of Commanders Intelligence requirements does not take into account SURPRISE.Mind it Surprise has no observable indicators.There may be zero enemy activity.Surprise accounts for 99% of ops failures and casualties.

An incident will happen

An incident most likely to happen

An incident which can happen

An incident which might happen

An incident which will not happen.

War gaming(the process of planning ops with reqd intelligence available) lays out all these.The 3rd one and 4th one in above list is kept on the scanner and assigned "possible surprise so better keep this incident in our sights ".Fine.

The last one? Well incident will not happen as NO INDICATORS alluding to [it.it](#) is exactly these NO INDICATORS that account for total enemy surprise move.

I propose before any intell collection FIRST CATEGORIZE TARGETS AS PER ENEMY PROPENSITY TO ATTACK based on CARVER and MTTT.Thereafter to do all int collection based on normal IRs and surprise IRs and CREATE THE TWO situational awareness reports,one pertaining to existing situation and the other to uncertainty and surprise.Combined is the ACTUAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.Thereafter to execute MDMP ,war gaming and hunch..whatever.

¶¶¶Δ

Propensity is the key word.

Capability + intent is NOT = enemy [action.As](#) taught in all Armies.

Capability + intent x propensity = ENEMY ACTION

It is the propensity of enemy that makes it attack us.Capability and intent indeed makes it dangerous but degree of propensity is the key to Surprise attack.

What I proved in the paper is we require two sets of intelligence Requirements,one for expected attack and one for totally unexpected surprise attack.If we are prepared for both WE NEVER LOSE A BATTLE AND CASUALTIES ARE MINIMUM.

In my paper i used CARVER and MTTT to predict targets of [attack.In](#) case of Surprise by Enemy.Then i gave weightage to these targets and built up a list of targets most likely to be attacked in a surprise move by the [enemy.Now](#) keeping each target in perspective I deployed intelligence assets to search and discover indicators of enemy leading to that particular [target.It](#) can happen there are no indicators so i deploy persistent reconnaissance and surveillance and HUMINT assets to EXTRACT hidden intelligence from terrain and local human population.This way i treat each and every target and distilled all information,boiling down to those intelligence information found to tally with some targets.These are the targets likely to be attacked by [surprise.Now](#) commanders sit down and war game.What are the likely course of actions of the enemy wrt each target.

So now in addition to the standard army approach of finding out course of action on expected target (NO SURPRISE.INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IS THERE.) we now have course of actions for Surprise targets.

We add up both.And plan OUR COURSES OF ACTION against each enemy course of action for all targets.

WE ARE PREPARED

A FEW QUESTIONS FOR ARMIES.

In my post today ,I maneuver the discourse in such a manner so as to trigger insights in the audience.When someone gets an insight it is a feeling of fullness,completeness.They will then automatically gravitate towards my concepts.

This is possible IF i challenge and breakdown existing military int concepts,defs,tactics and strictures.And replace with my own.Insights will be created instantly

I'll break intel,command and control,staff ops,ops,the exclusive dominance of combat ops over int AND thus lead this post to new insights.

Few questions that if answered by any Int Corps officer from amongst you ,I'll be surprised.And happy.If these questions are studied insights will happen.

[1.How](#) can you redefine Intelligence in the context of Surprise?So far we know it's determining enemy intent.From indicators.What if there are no indicators?Define intelligence both in terms of perceived intent and surprise.

2.Why is counterintelligence treated as a support discipline and not intelligence despite the fact most of the tactics coincide with intelligence tactics and techniques? Where is the flaw in definition?

3. How do we err when we ignore the protective component of counterintelligence? Why do we relegate it to bank bench compared with Intelligence?

4.Why cannot int and CI be treated as a combat arm? Where is the flaw in treating them as disciplines to support ops?

5.If you envisage both of them as combat arm can you list out defence,attack and combat service support components? Can you list out int and CI weaponry systems?Can you portray Deep penetration attack capabilities of this new combat arm?

6. Why is Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition RSTA ops combat evasive?Why is it no-engage?Can you place forth an argument in favour of "fighting for information"?

7.Why does doctrine differentiate between intelligence applications in conventional and asymmetric battle domains? Why can't we adapt to non linear distributed warfare using conventional tactics? Can you break this doctrinal assumption and give two methods to bring linearity in an otherwise non linear battlespace?

8.Why not human-net centric battlespace in place of net centric battlespace?In the rapidly evolving military use of advanced technology to portray situational awareness where is the flaw in ignoring the soldier on the ground?Can automation replace battle hand driven field comm systems?

9.Where is the flaw in the term "intelligence requirements of the Cdr"?Unless not satisfied by intelligence inputs say from an intelligence preparation of the battlefield how can the commander visualise what he needs to know? Pre and Post he needs intelligence?Can you assume the fact that intelligence is a continuous activity and there can be no discrete values in its spectrum with ops?

10. Can you prepare a simple battle plan using intelligence as combat arm instead of normal combat op plan OPLAN?

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON OPERATIONS FOR INDIAN ARMY.

Dissecting "Operation" and thus attempt to create a Control System. For coherent coordination and control between Ops and HQ assets.

Operation- "Operate" 1) On 2) With.

The "On" is the external attribute of Operation.

The "With" is its internal attribute.

The "On" leads to the concept of Operating "on" local Human terrain, jungle terrain, routes, all other int and combat/ kinetic, civil military and Psyops operating "On" targets.

The "With" leads us to:

Operating "with":

- 1) intelligence
- 2) Combat Power and personnel
- 3) Inherent Command Control
- 4) Comm
- 5) Combat Service Support
- 6) Maneuver
- 7) Mobility/ Countermobility

The "On" is thinking "outward" whereas the "With" is Thinking "inwards".

Thus Operation = Targets and external environment + C2 INT Tactics Techniques and procedures & Performing Assets

Tactics Techniques and Procedures are "Enablers" of an Operation so focus is inward.

But doctrine treats them focussed on battle.. including maneuver.

I argue on this point. Yes they are components of battle but technical control of TTPs should lie with HQs and maneuver too. It's the "Control" part rather than the "Application" part that should be focussed on.

A CONCEPT THAT CAN CHANGE WAY OF WAR.

Intelligence States.Attention Indian Army and States like Africa fighting terrorism and insurgency.

1.State of Rest.Intelligence Potential Energy:

When we conduct intelligence and Counterintelligence activities in static mode.For example vulnerability assessment of [installation.Red](#) teaming to know critical assets of installation.Counterintelligence Review.Deception to protect information and base [operations.Here](#) intelligence is static.Due to this it has inherent potential [energy.It](#) is relating to masses of personnel and equipment to be [protected.It](#) is residing in these resources of unit as a protection pervading them.Invisible,static and embedded.The summation is it's Potential Energy at Rest.

Corollary: By virtue of having potential energy intelligence has a virtual Mass.

2.State of motion.Intelligence Kinetic Energy:

When targets for exploitation,elicitation,questioning, Interrogation and extraction are subjected to these tactics,the latter brings about a dynamic operator-target environment the intelligence derivation and interpretation of which will lead to further execution of tactics and a "flow" of information towards other targets,towards command control nodes and [maneuver.Here](#) intelligence is in [motion.So](#) is Counterintelligence.Intelligence activities can be thought of a flow lines.Attacking nodes.Skimming,extracting,penetrating,infiltrating,maneuvering.A bunch of flow lines renders a "shape" of intelligence moving forwards with a "velocity". Thus possessing Kinetic Energy.

Corollary: The kinetic energy is the volume flow of int tactics through the target to other targets or [environment.So](#) in int operations more importance should be given to resultant effect on target due to all tactics and "where these effects lead to" and not on the spot exploitation and neutralization of the target.

By virtue of having mass,potential energy and kinetic energy intelligence has the Force dimension going by the equation $F = \text{Mass} \times \text{Acceleration}$.If i drop acceleration due to change for the time being,a state of intelligence activity (the flow) from a state of rest is also acceleration and hence intelligence assumes the dimensions and attributes of a Force.

Next i adopt a different set of COAs to use all intelligence from first operations for decisive operations,that is military [targeting.So](#) the characteristics of earlier operation CHANGES to this operation ,the earlier flow changes direction from collection of intelligence to ops targeting..so

we have [Acceleration.So](#) an intelligence Force comes into play which if properly guided,enhanced by physical resources as part of facilitating ops will slowly engulf and neutralize the targets with battlefield operating systems of intelligence maneuver,mobility and counter mobility,C2,Counterintelligence and it's innate firepower of tactics and techniques.

Mind it ,be it collection or targeting,in both cases intelligence assumes the dimension of Force.

A short Intelligence Brief for Indian Army

How do we know enemy in advance?

Intelligence is not understood fully by any Army.Universally it's a support discipline.This concept is [flawed.As](#) per my thinking and strategies it is akin to a Combat Force.With its own inventory of weapons,weapon delivery platforms,combat operations and all features usually delegated to Infantry.

My previous LinkedIn posts prove all what I said [above.Now](#) the subject of this [post.How](#) do we know enemy in advance? His intent.

DETECT
DENY
DETER
DELIVER
DESTROY

The 5D system devised by me.Readers can look up my most recent posts for a fuller treatment.We can successfully anticipate enemy intent and action using this 5D system.Each of the "D"s open up all possibilities of viewing the Enemy and corresponding Army action to be taken.All the 5Ds totally and absolutely give a 360 degrees view of the Enemy.

The recent attack on a school in Uganda killing 26 children COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.PROVIDED THERE WAS AN ADVANCE WARN SYSTEM AND A CAPABLE INTELLIGENCE UNIT TO SUPPORT IT.

Why was not the enemy's movement detected beforehand?

Why was there no HUMINT report on locals information about possibility of an attack?

Why was there no reconnaissance and surveillance report?

Why was there no advance Force Protection report?

Why was there no Tactical Command and Control nodes covertly emplaced in points equidistant from vulnerable targets like schools?

Why was there no Terrorist Targeting Standards Report that will predict likely targets of terrorist attack?

Why did the Army fail to observe indicators?

Why did the Army fail to exploit human terrain for advance information?

Why was there no exploitation of Physical terrain?

Why was forward operating zones absent?

All these and more questions. The answer to all these questions is that intelligence is never seen as an aggressive system of attack. Counterintelligence is supposed to be thought of as aggressive due to penetration and [infiltration. Wrong. It](#) can really be very aggressive weapon if it's task organized with aggressive HUMINT.

The Army needs organic intelligence capability. For infantry units. And should wage an intelligence war. Should view intelligence as a combat force. Reconnaissance and Surveillance should be embedded with intelligence capability. I have devised simple mathematical battle equations so that intelligence like combat has maneuver. Intelligence operations must be on the same lines of combat operations.

WE MUST CHANGE THE WAY OF WAR.

HIGH TIME

Intelligence War Template:

Conventional battle against asymmetric enemy.

(Full plan and strategy and also Int SOP available on official request at mil.intelligence@gmail.com)

Fuse all available information from int database and IPB, historical data, police records, Source folders and prepare a list of high value targets HVT and high priority targets HPT. Further divide the Area of Operations into sectors and sub sectors and ensure each of them contributes to Target list. Also include targets for influencing ops, targets from coterie of these influence targets.

Demarcate village and related areas as forward areas, enemy terrain like jungles and hills as deep forward areas. Establish covert C2 nodes in forward areas and tactical C2 in deep forward areas (for Reconnaissance ops, armed recon ops). Establish covert command posts in areas near forward area. Demarcate rear ops area. Establish covert tactical operating bases. Both bases and C2 can be in areas where subjects are friendly. Other locations can also be determined depending upon threat existence and terrain.

To ensure battlefield operating system of Mobility, prepare a detailed list of pro-force civilians

and sources coupled with police to facilitate unhindered movement. Establish counterintelligence control lines through all check points and road blocks, with embedded CI agents in security at these nodes to ensure countermobility for enemy.

Now next phase in Planning. Inventorize int arsenal of HUMINT and TACHUMINT assets and using the delivery platforms of int personnel deploy these at every area and subarea against the respective targets. Employ the combat service support Counterintelligence to protect these assets, contribute to countermobility, and conduct offensive operations in each area and subarea. The weapons available like HUMINT ops, Human exploitation ops, Surveillance ops.. employ these to execute dispersed distributed battle ops. The deep forward area will see Reconnaissance ops and armed Reconnaissance ops.

Covert communications network is the key. And coordinated synchronised command control linkages between all the C2 nodes in the entire AO. All this can be achieved through a planned communications network.

This synchronised and coordinated comm and C2 will enable maneuver on each area and subarea using influence targeting ops.

Tactical objective should be compromising and influencing targets who will assist in other int operations directed at HVTs. and HPTs. Second tactical objective will be establishing linkages between targets of contiguous [areas](#). So that every tactical maneuver in each area can influence targeting in adjoining or distant areas.

Now coherently execute all maneuvers in such a way so that areas with HVTs and HPTs are targeted with the final phase of DECISIVE OPERATIONS to neutralize, prosecute or compromise these HVTs and HPTs.

This is just a template of int [battle](#). It can be populated with several modifications and insights/enhancements.

AM GIVING THIS AFTER RECENT ATTACK IN KASHMIR

STRATEGY

Enemy Intent depends on Targets:

1.Criticality:

If destroying this Target does Enemy renders critical assets useless so that our combat ability is reduced to a [minimum](#).In other words we are completely defeated.

2.Accessibility:

Is it far easier to access the target compared to other targets? For example target hardening is low or there are unguarded avenues of approach.

3.Recuperability:

Will attacking the chosen target make it impossible to regain combat efficiency that was prior to the attack?

4.Vulnerability:

How vulnerable to attack is the Target?

5.Effect:

What will be the effect of attack on this particular target in media and on population as well on military ? Can the Enemy gain significant publicity? Will the troops be severely demoralised after this attack? Will there be significant political gains after the attack? Will the casualty rating be very high?

6.Recognizability:

Is the target of national / state significance? Will destroying this Target have a cumulative effect on religious sentiments on a very large scale? Will the attack be considered an attack on National entity?

Our intel staff should sit down and take a stock of all the above for all likely targets in AOR.The likelihoods should be quantified on a scale of 0-10.For example for Target A

C= 8

A=6

R= 5

V= 9

E= 7

R= 6

Total Attractive Index = 41

Target B

C= 8

A=8

R= 7

V=5

E= 4

R= 6

Total Attractive Index= 38

So chances of Enemy attacking Target A is more than attacking Target B.

The infantry Bn should have its own organic intel unit as higher HQ limited intel assets cannot conduct the attractive index calculation for all targets of all units in AOR. The Bn must have Reconnaissance and Surveillance assets (R&S) and counter R&S assets who will persistently conduct ops to discover enemy movement near targets and enemy surveillance on targets. This will give a good idea on Enemy intent with respect to the target. The Bn should have a Counterintelligence capability to conduct vulnerability assessments of the camp installation and camp security as well as troops and movement security. Further there should be capability to calculate the Criticality of the camp installation..those assets, human and physical, which if destroyed will stop all installation operations. For example the unit CO is a critical asset. Again the primary C2 node is a critical asset. The Bn will require HUMINT and Tactical Human Exploitation assets to gauge from the local population and from interrogation and tactical questioning of suspects, detainees, refugees and persons on white and grey lists (kept in the Counterintelligence target folders) reports and inferences about terrorist likely actions like procurement of information on targets and security of targets.

I can give a long list of reasons why organic intelligence capability is required so as to decipher enemy intent. Please note if we know enemy intent then NOTHING LIKE IT. PERIOD

Military concepts and terms can be broken down to reveal hidden important aspects of the term, not otherwise apparent.

Communication+And+Order= Commander

It's [communication.How](#) the officer in command interprets higher HQ, lateral units and subordinate units [comm.How](#) he ensures all these level staff understands his

comm [perfectly.How](#) he integrates comm inflow into his planning and decision making [process.How](#) he portrays his authority,integrity and leadership through his [comm.How](#) he effectively delegates authority and transfers control through properly formatted comm.His battlefield operating efficiency depends on correct communication with regards to control,maneuver and intelligence.

[Order.One](#) is the official order he [executes.One](#) is the order he [pronounces.One](#) is the correct leverage of his authority to interact with the heirarchy in its current order and how to displace this heirarchy,centralise it or decentralise it,to support his units mission appropriately.

Proper communications results in proper understanding and execution of Higher HQs orders.Same goes for formulating orders pertaining to the units mission.Understanding the transmission and flow of ground tactical troops communication is very important for the Officer in command.His military planning and decision making is a direct function of comm feeds ,correct management of which results in his issued orders.

We must break concepts and terms ...must make it a habit.This will reveal all the innate but otherwise hidden characteristics/attributes that if known fully will better help in the functioning of the concept.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INTELLIGENCE

WE CAN HAVE PERFECT INTELLIGENCE BUT WRONG SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

I will outline the steps so that no mistake is made.

Very first let me write down three equations.

1.Prevalent Army Thinking:

Intent + Capability= Enemy Action.

I discount this with the next two equations:

2.(Intent + Capability) x Propensity= Enemy Action

3.Confirm/Denial of (Intelligence Requirements for Anticipated COA+ Intelligence Requirements for Unexpected Surprise) = Situational Awareness.

There are 5 modes of Surprise Target Selection.

1.High Priority Target

2.High value Target

3.Mass Effect Target

4. Recognizability specific Target

5. Running Target

Apart from Direct line Target as is the case of successful anticipation of Enemy COA with no surprise.

Propensity is the precursor of Surprise. The urge to execute offensive action. I have given below an acronym I created. MTTT. This MTTT provides the fodder which kindles propensity appetite. The MTTT variables hold an inherent attraction for the terrorist to think, adapt, and execute leading to Surprise.

The 4 variables responsible for Surprise is MTTT.

Unexpected:-

MOVEMENT

TACTICS

TARGET

TIME

Unexpected change in enemy movement patterns thus making it possible to change all the other three variables, contrary to commanders intelligence reports. Change in expected tactic. Enemy with assault rifles was expected but suicide bomber carried out mission. Anticipated attack on a particular target, but enemy resorted to 'risk transfer', transferring attack to a more easily accessible target. Expected time of offensive action but Enemy attacked much later or very early.

A High Priority Target is one who has built up a reputation to be a thorn in the terrorist mind and must be neutralized at any cost even if very hardened target [security.In](#) addition Target spearheads operations. The terrorist is willing to die to do the act. And that is indeed a Surprise given solid hardening of Target area and high impenetrability. The attack in Kashmir unit killing the CO inside the camp officers mess is an example of [HPT.In](#) case of HPT propensity is very high. And this propensity is more enabled by complacency on part of Target due to very hardened security. HPT will entail concentrated group attack with automatic weapons. Sudden to overcome initial resistance and sufficient firepower to penetrate.

Next is High Value Target. A target responsible for most of the operations in AOR and as such to terrorist thinking Target is very knowledgeable about Terrorist support systems, tactics, intelligence, safe houses and all these factor on a frequent basis neutralization of [Enemy.Here](#) propensity is high. HVT will entail not on fortified installation but on mobile HVT, group and automatic weapons with ambush as launching pad.

Next is Mass Effect Target. Pulwama Attack. Uri [attack.Here](#) objective is max casualties PLUS a

ripple demoralizing effect down the ranks.Propensity High.This will entail huge IED delivery planted or mobile delivery,even if it means suicide.

Next is Mass Effect Target.Pulwama Attack.Uri [attack.Here](#) objective is max casualties PLUS a ripple demoralizing effect down the ranks.Propensity High.This will entail huge IED delivery planted or mobile delivery,even if it means suicide.

Next Running Target.Sporadic isolated attacks on troops,vehicles.Propensity Moderate to Medium High.Entails scattered attack from multiple directionsAutomatic weapons.

Next Recognizability Target.For example a place of worship whose destruction will have far reaching effect on a particular community.Selective killing of a senior leader.Targeting people congregated near a monument of high social significance.Propensity Medium.Preferred mode of attack Suicide Bomber.

MTTT offers an opportunity to determine in advance to predict changes in Terrorist plans.From anticipated Terrorist moves.A successful change and subsequent attack is the common denominator of Surprise.MTTT should be based on historical data not less than 6 months to include all possible Enemy changes in execution of offensive operations against anticipated operations that did not happen.

MTTT reduces room of error in military planning and COA [anticipation.By](#) incorporating surprise in planning.

War is how to deal with Surprise.The unexpected factors in unsuccessful operations and subsequent defeat.Your intelligence inputs from Intelligence staff officer may be 100% accurate ,specific and timely but your Situational Awareness may be wrong ,incomplete or totally ignored.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield gives the commander situation assessment.Other intelligence products like intelligence estimate,Counterintelligence estimate etc do give important details of Enemy but all these do not support derivation for Surprise.Commander gets all intelligence feeds,executed war gaming,decided on all possible courses of action,and prepares for the most likely course of action of the [Enemy.So](#) far so good.

What precedes all this planning? Intelligence Requirements.IRs are formulated after receipt of information of observed enemy activity.But despite all intelligence collection and approximate assumption of most likely course of action,the enemy may still spring a surprise.Situational Awareness takes this into account.

I am in no way reducing the significance of standard Commanders MDMP and war gaming in light of current intelligence feeds to deal with an expected [COA](#). It can very well be Enemy has no plans to Surprise. But then Commanders Situational Awareness is incomplete. He should take in account possible Surprise [moves](#). To this end I suggest a parallel MDMP after using CARVER to nominate other possible Targets apart from the one being considered, possible target types and associated propensity rating, all historical data and all other information in each Target folder, brainstorm hypothetical indicators specific to each Target environment, human and physical terrain, formulate SURPRISE INT REQUIREMENTS, look for associated indicators, confirm or deny them and through the process of Target Nomination- Target Development- Target Reduction Plan arrive at the highest possible alternate targets inviting terrorist surprise attack.

Algorithm/ Protocol

ASSUMING NORMAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS GOING ON FOR ANTICIPATED ENEMY COA, FOLLOWING STEPS NEED TO BE SIMULTANEOUSLY EXECUTED.

Target Nomination:

1. Use CARVER method to screen and nominate most possible targets.
2. Determine Risk profile. That is HPT is risk acceptance by Enemy. Your anticipated Target going by intelligence feeds may, say for hardening factors will initiate " Risk Transfer" on part of Terrorist to a more amenable target going by CARVER. HVT, Running Target Mass Effect Target and Recognizability Target Selection depends on persistent HUMINT and R&S ops and Tactical Human Exploitation ops together with Liaison and source network and for this is required a year long embedded and placement operation to develop AOR civil areas with covert observation and surveillance posts, covert C2, an embedded HUMINT and CI network with police affiliation and source network. Going outside the base and developing the civil AOR with all this is extremely important to avert surprise for the said 4 types of targets.

[2.Target](#) Development:

Here we take for granted all nominated targets will be attacked. From CARVER we determine which of the variables factor in the target. Corresponding to each CARVER variable we formulate indicators of enemy activity, even if no indicators present, guided by these indicators formulate intelligence requirements, send out int assets to conduct ISR ops, locate, confirm or deny the indicators. If no result continue this cycle everyday for 3 weeks. If no development it will be safe to assume Target not in [scanner](#). It is very important to task organize int assets with R&S and exploit human and physical terrain going outside Target point in concentric circles moving outwards, securing each circle, the outermost circle 25 km away from Target point. After 3 weeks

go to next step TARGET REDUCTION PLAN and eliminate this target from all targets list. In the event indicators are located use persistent ISR ops ,collect all possible intelligence,start the MDMF process and COA development ,plan the ops and using a mixture of kinetic,non kinetic and prosecution neutralize the Enemy before it acts.

ISR ops will include covert observation and surveillance, elicitation,tactical questioning,tactical exploitation,CI,embedded int assets in routine patrols - checkpoints- roadblocks,interrogation and R&S.Keep in mind every Target Folder must be continually updated.The three target lists in Target folder must be taken into account during ISR [ops.In](#) target folder there is historical data on all tactics of enemy,unexpected change in tactics corresponding to past targets.When brainstorming hypothetical enemy indicators these should be taken into account and screened to match current Target characteristics so that most possible tactics are ascertained.

[3.TARGET](#) REDUCTION PLAN.

Those targets whose ISR don't return results eliminate them from list.Those that are likely,plan and repeat the cycle.

4.DEVELOP THE SITUATION:

After few iterations of the above steps we boil down to anticipated Target plus extra most likely surprise [Targets.Now](#) commence a coordinated combined standard intelligence preparation of the total AOR and again once more study both the sets of intelligence requirements.Prepare the intelligence products Intelligence Summary,Intelligence Estimate and SITREP

ASSUMING NORMAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS GOING ON FOR ANTICIPATED ENEMY COA ,FOLLOWING STEPS NEED TO BE SIMULTANEOUSLY EXECUTED.

My entire writeup given from beginning above will facilitate determination and evaluation of MTTT variables. But it's exceedingly important to conduct persistent ISR ops and develop the AOR in one year with placed and embedded covert Intelligence network for ADVANCE WARN.

[STEP1.Study](#) all past enemy attack tactics techniques.For past 6 months.Find out which tactic was used sparingly.Find out which tactic were used often.Find out the success rates of both types.Remember Enemy will switch suddenly to diff new attack tactics depending on CARVER assessment of multiple targets.Determine target characteristics that prompted that particular type

of attack. Determine what situation was favourable for that type of attack. Based on these information draw up target profiles for every attacked target. The target profile should clearly bring out the amenability of the target to a chosen terrorist attack profile and WHY. Update all these information in target folders. See about target folders later in this writeup.

Point is we are attempting to avert a surprise. We must be able to fathom that despite all our Intelligence and preparations the four factors of MTTT are adaptable to enemy thinking and course of action. MTTT gives the enemy room to maneuver in order to spring a surprise. MTTT should be taken into consideration and integrated in military decision making process. MTTT calls for an entirely different set of intelligence requirements with respect to [Surprise.In](#) effect there will be two sets of Intelligence [requirements.One](#) the usual to deter or defend an expected course of action. The other set to prepare for a Surprise.

STEP2: How many time did enemy attack diff target than the one predicted by Intelligence. Conduct CARVER for both targets.

In your area of operations or responsibility list out all possible targets for enemy attack. Apart from the one you are expecting to be attacked going by intelligence feeds. This is to keep allowance for enemy tendency to shift to targets with high CARVER rating. Conduct CARVER for all targets. Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect of attack, Recognizability (the image of target in public eyes).

STEP3: Compare CARVER index of anticipated terrorist target with CARVER index of other possible targets. Layout defence plan for all targets.

A point to note here which will help to plan Surprise Intelligence Requirements adequately. Out of all the CARVER variables the terrorist target selection standard will be different from conventional enemy selection. The terrorist is of a loose group, not organized combat asset and will not look to destroy command control nodes, infrastructure or any critical part of target. But the conventional enemy will have this as [priority.So](#) he is more interested in the Criticality variable of CARVER. He will also be interested in the Vulnerability variable. The terrorist on the other hand will look for easy access, the Accessibility variable. Recuperability will be more attractive to the conventional foe. Effect.. that is amount of damage and its effect in media and Recognizability (importance of target) both of these are very attractive to the terrorist. Hence when doing CARVER for all targets keep these in mind.

STEP4:

Now formulate new Intelligence requirements. Don't look for enemy activity to prompt IRs as this is case of Surprise. Brainstorm all possible indicators for attack profiles matching each target. Take into consideration the most sparingly used tactics and most used tactics in last [6 months.Target](#) characteristics attract specific types of approach and tactics. Create target folders for each [target.In](#) each folder enter data on possible type of attack, CARVER index of the

target,Enemy groups and individuals active in the area where target located,white list containing names of local individuals willing to give information,grey list of suspected sympathizers and collaborators of enemy and black list of enemy agents leaders and operators.The target folder should contain all attack profiles in the region past 6 months.Will clearly outline tactics used and each tactic how often used and success rate.

STEP5:Taking every target folder into account and brainstormed indicators formulate Surprise Intelligence Requirements [SIR.One](#) point must be noted here.We are preparing for [Surprise.So](#) we expect no immediate enemy activity.We brainstorm indicators going by all data in target folder.Whether these indicators exist or not is not the point.These indicators initiate Commanders Intent and formulation of intelligence requirements.This is the "drive" to [explore.Now](#) we have an intent,objectives.This puts into motion intelligence collection and reconnaissance and surveillance.The white list,grey list and black list determine type of intelligence activity.Whether or not the indicators are confirmed ,now in effect the area around the target has a dynamic intelligence environment which will definitely detect any surprise activity.

FINAL PHASE:

4.DEVELOP THE SITUATION:

After few iterations of the above steps we boil down to anticipated Target plus extra most likely surprise [Targets.Now](#) commence a coordinated combined standard intelligence preparation of the total AOR and again once more study both the sets of intelligence requirements.Prepare the intelligence products Intelligence Summary,Intelligence Estimate and SITREP.Combine these and prepare the Intelligence Derivative Report.THAT IS THE COMMANDERS FINAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF BOTH CURRENT ANTICIPATED ENEMY COA AND SURPRISE COAs.The commander now formulates his INTENT.He and staff initiate MDMP ,WARGAMING AND COA DEVELOPMENT KEEPING ALL TARGETS,CURRENT AND SURPRISE IN SIGHTS.Theeafter Ops dept takes over.

Keshav Mazumdar

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIST AND THEORIST.

MISSION OBJECTIVE : Replace Combat ops mindset with Intelligence ops.Create a new system of Warfare.As depicted in his LinkedIn posts.

Currently involved in Project Army XXII under General V K Singh,.a experiment to revise Strategic,Operational and Tactical Command and to create safety for troops in base,transit and ops led by Intelligence.To create organic Intelligence capability so as to drive operations.Focus on Force Protection in transit and ops.Inverting the Intelligence pyramid with Mission Command approach.To redefine C4ISR in Tactical terms.Currently engaged in designing Corps MI Bde.

Has imparted training to 1500 US soldiers and personnel through ATAB.

Objective: To create dedicated Army Intelligence Bde Modular Units.

Focus on India and Africa battlespaces.

Keshav Mazumdar Dip Criminology,CPO,CRC,ASC,CMAS,ATO is engaged in revising Intelligence doctrine.He has challenged existing intelligence concepts and created new concepts tactics and techniques.The new system of Warfare he has created is predicated on Intelligence as Combat System.

He has singlehandedly set up intelligence unit for CRPF in Chattisgarh and currently involved in creating MI Brigade at Corps level.He has his Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) credential from S2 Institute of Safety & Intelligence, USA.He is at present the Sr Vice President ATAB , USA, Advisor (RIEAS) , Greece and also of European Intelligence Academy (EIA).He has written the First HUMINT, Counterintelligence and Force Protection Doctrines in India.He holds a Diploma in Criminology from Stonebridge Associated College UK and in Criminal Profiling(INDIA).He is certified as a Master Antiterrorism Specialist by ATAB , Anti Sabotage Certified (ASC) by the College of Forensics Examiners International (ACFEI-USA),Certified Protection Officer by IFPO-USA and is a Certified Crisis Response Coordinator (CRC).

Despite 17 years of selfless effort for the security forces , Indian Security Domain is yet to wake up to his endeavours. Be it Army , Paramil. But Karma goads him on. On his path to a new Warfare system. And protection of all soldiers, police personnel and agents, whichever country they may belong to. Every operator must leave his home certain he will come back safely. The death of even one soldier matters. To die in fair battle is fine, but to die in ambush, capture kidnapped, IED is unacceptable. Intelligence will show the way.