Meaningless without engine production to match. 96 TF35000 per year is not trivial
The statements are sure to please every Turkish defense and aerospace enthusiast; however, producing 48 KAANs annually is a highly aggressive target requiring a significant increase in existing infrastructure.
While TEI competes with global giants in precision component production, producing 100-120 TF35000s annually is a completely different level. This scale necessitates the construction of numerous new robotic production lines and at least a dozen new Brems (test cells) in addition to existing facilities. TEI's establishment target of this serial production discipline and 'complete engine package' management through its TF6000 and TF10000 projects is critically important.
Looking at the world, Lockheed Martin produces 120-150 F-35s annually, their engine partner, P&W, delivers 150-200 F135 engines per year, and it took them over a decade to reach that level, and a massive global supply chain behind it. Dassault is struggling to increase Rafale production from 15 to 36 units per year. A single country producing 48 fifth-generation jets per year is a level of production that even the US and China may struggle to achieve today.
The supply of strategic materials (titanium, superalloys), the flawless continuity of thousands of subsystems, and the certification process for each engine will make this pace challenging. While TEI's parts manufacturing capabilities have this potential, it will need to increase its complete assembly and testing capacity by 3-4 times and establish a massive subcontractor ecosystem.
In this context, a partner like Spain can be critically important for achieving a goal of this scale.
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Another question that comes to mind is how to manage the "Modular Production" and "Customer-Specific Configuration" strategies. Because the Kaan project offers potential buyers with an unorthodox market strategy both maximum ITAR-free and fifth-generation solutions, and also enables their participation in production. Certification will be in line with international aerospace quality standards; for example, subcontractors without ISO 9001 and AS/EN/JISQ 9100 qualifications will not be accepted, even if an offset is given to countries like Saudi Arabia in the future.
However, perhaps supply chain fragmentation will also occur. If a customer (e.g., Spain) does not want to source parts from a particular country (e.g., Pakistan) for political or technical reasons, the production line will need to be flexible to source these parts from TUSAŞ's main facilities or other approved subcontractors. This would necessitate TUSAŞ remaining the authority in the final assembly of all parts as the main integrator. Or, while some countries participate in the project's development phase with their engineering capabilities, discussions with countries like Spain will focus more on technology transfer and integration into the European aerospace ecosystem?
In short, Tusaş is ambitious not only because of the enormous supply ecosystem needs that its speculated production target of 32-48 units/year will create, but also because it aims to be a program that brings together different actors in an unprecedented way.
