The report is pretty long, but the above quote pretty much depicts the missing sense of impending danger. This unfortunately includes some Turks who're born in Denmark as well.An entire generation of Danes grew up without fear of war in Europe and in a world that opened up. They could travel freely around the globe and experience how democracy and human rights progressed. They experienced a historic boom in prosperity in Denmark and the rest of the world. The children and young people of today are faced with a more bleak future.
I'll just quote small bits from the report.
1.1 The international system – from a unipolar, liberal world order towards a more fluid order with competing economic systems
The United States has lost its position as the all-dominant superpower due to a spread of economic, technological and military power, which has given (primarily) China and a number of other great powers more influence and room for manoeuvre. Global institutions such as the UN and WTO have weakened, and most of the elements of the complex European and global network of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures no longer function or only do so very weakly. The already shaky rules-based international system received a severe shock when Russia, in violation of the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter and its special responsibility to maintain international peace and security as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, attacked a peaceful neighbouring country on 24th of February 2022. The weakening of the rules-based international system is primarily due to the lack of Chinese and Russian respect for the rules of the game, but the USA has also contributed to this with the termination of agreements such as Open Skies1 , the Iran nuclear deal and blocking the WTO dispute settlement system. We are on the threshold of a new era in which the rules-based international system based on the United States as the only remaining post-Cold War superpower will be replaced by a new system. It is still too early to assess how far this development will go in the direction of a more fragmented world order, where power means more than law and principles, but the direction is unfortunately clear
1.2 The economy has once again become security policy
Since the earliest state formations, trade, economics and security have all been closely linked, and many wars have been fought control over resources and trade routes. During the Era of globalisation, this connection became less clear; private actors took over much of the influence of the states as world trade and the economies of most countries with centrally planned economies opened up. This trend was further reinforced by the extensive privatisation of critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications, energy, ports, airports and railways in many countries. The largest global companies that made the best use of the new technologies and value chains achieved an economic strength and influence that exceeds that of many states. There was widespread confidence that market forces, with a minimum of regulation, would ensure the delivery of the necessary services to businesses and citizens. At the same time, an unprecedented boom in prosperity was felt around the world as a result of the extensive and sophisticated global division of labour organised in complicated value chains.
1.3 Military and civilian competition for technology and innovation
The increased great power competition is particularly manifest as long-term competition for the development of new technologies for both civilian and military purposes. The major players – including the USA, China and the EU – focus especially on the development of so-called disruptive technologies, which have the potential to change the future military battlefield and civilian industries fundamentally. The ability to translate innovation into military means is a key competitive parameter in the great power competition
1.4 Nuclear weapons attain greater importance
The global balance of power consists of economic, political and military factors, including not least nuclear weapons. Global strategic stability is expressed through the distribution of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as the associated authorities and organisations that handle them. The increasing great power competition implies an increased role for nuclear weapons in global security policy, which is expressed, inter alia, through the great powers’ renewal of their nuclear arsenals. The traditional great power status of the USA and Russia in this area is now supplemented by China, which in recent years has significantly expanded its nuclear strike force and its ability to withstand strategic attacks, which has strengthened the mutual deterrence with the USA. Despite this, China does not want to contribute to a new trilateral model of nuclear arms control between the nuclear powers, which has previously been a bilateral affair between Russia and the United States.
1.5 European Security after the Russo‒Ukrainian War
The outcome of the Russo‒Ukrainian War will have a major impact on the future security of Europe. The extreme scenarios are a complete Russian conquest of Ukraine and replacement of the elected government with a puppet government or a complete Russian defeat, with Russian forces withdrawn completely out of Ukraine, including Crimea. A complete Russian occupation will trigger even greater refugee flows and presumably a protracted guerrilla insurgency, supported by Western countries, with consequent risks of new conflicts. A complete Russian defeat, on the other hand, could trigger a fundamental regime change in Moscow, which might open up for better relations with the West, but would also likely lead to chaotic internal developments with significant risks for Russia’s neighbours and the rest of Europe.
1.6 Security in the Arctic and North Atlantic: Intensified great power competition
The growing global great power competition is also increasingly being felt in the Arctic and North Atlantic. The region is subject to new security policy dynamics and an increased military presence, especially from Russia. The Arctic and North Atlantic have thus far been characterised by a conflict‒ cooperation paradox, where cooperation between Arctic states has existed in parallel with an increasing potential for conflict. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the balance between the two dimensions has shifted. A united West has frozen cooperation with Russia – also in the Arctic
And on and on it goes.
3.1 NATO: A strengthened alliance in a more complex security landscape
NATO will remain the foundation for Danish security and the world’s strongest military alliance throughout the period covered by this analysis. After some turbulent years under the Trump administration, the Ukraine war has created unprecedented unity in NATO. In a crisis rife with risk that has developed surprisingly and quickly, the alliance members have quickly managed to make the necessary far-reaching decisions jointly and at the national level. Not least Poland has shown initiative and a remarkable willingness to bear costs. Denmark and other allies quickly sent reinforcements to NATO’s standing forces and the most vulnerable countries close to Russia and Ukraine. NATO has also decided to supplement the Enhanced Forward Presence in the three Baltic countries and Poland with corresponding NATO battle groups in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as to strengthen air patrolling over the Baltic countries and the presence of the standing naval forces
I've also attached the pdf. I doubt anyone is going to bother mentioning the important role of Turkey. But it could be beneficial to have DefenceHub give a qualified insight to the importance of the allied countries often forgotten.
