News Egypt, Ethiopia & Sudan Conflict

[Test7]

Before talking about this Non-Traditional security warfare. Let us talk about the root of this conflict which started after the announcement of dam building by Ethiopia on River Blue Nile when Egypt was busy in the Arab Spring in 2011. The Nile is flowing northward through the tropical climate of Eastern Africa and into the Mediterranean Sea, the Nile River is the longest in the world at 4,135 miles (6,650 kilometres). Egypt relies on the Nile River for 90% of its freshwater for farming. After the survey of August, November 2010, Ethiopian Govt. decided to build this dam on river Blue Nile near the Sudan border (15 Miles) in USD 4.8 billion. The Project was initiated by the Ethiopian Premier on April 2, 2011.

This dam will produce 6000 megawatts electricity which will be a major boost to Ethiopian National Grid as this electricity is enough both for domestic use and export. The dam will also help Ethiopia to defeat poverty. Ethiopia considers this a vital project for economic prosperity. After its completion, it will be the largest hydro Electric Power dam in Africa (Covering surface area, 1700 km) and 7th largest in the world. On the other hand, Egypt fears a short-term reduction of water availability due to the filling of the dam and a permanent reduction because of evaporation from the reservoir. The GERD flows into Egypt might be temporarily reduced, which may affect the income of two million farmers during the age of filling the reservoir. It will also “affect Egypt’s electricity supply by 25% to 40%.

However, the increased storage in Ethiopia can provide a bigger buffer to scarcities in Sudan and Egypt during years of future drought. Egypt considers this as a national security issue that is why wants Ethiopia to sign a solid agreement before filling the reservoir. Without any proper settlement with Egypt, the building of the massive upstream Nile dam could threaten both Egypt’s Agronomic economy and chronological heritage built over the Nile River. Ethiopia wants to fill the reservoir as soon as possible by starting from July 2020 and it is an alarming situation for Egypt. The step of Ethiopia can make Egypt a drought land. If Ethiopia will fill the reservoir in 5 years, Egypt will lose its 50% farming land (Al-Jazeera).

A series of dialogues and meetings were held between the three stakeholders. Sudanese President announced support for the dam after the meeting of 2012, between the water ministers of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Ethiopian officials pledged to export electricity to Sudan at a low cost. It was obvious as the building of this dam will not affect Sudan as much as Egypt because apart from low-cost electricity, it would help Sudan to control the floods as the GERD would reduce seasonal flooding.

The legal issue which is the main problem behind the failure of talks is that In 2010 upper riparian states signed a Nile treaty (Cooperative Framework Agreement) which deals with the share of water and other issues related to the Nile, which has not been signed up by either Egypt or Sudan. Both claim it encroach upon the 1959 treaty, in which Sudan and Egypt give themselves superior rights to all of the Nile’s waters. But Ethiopia and other considerations that as imperial treaty imposed by Britain as they needed both Sudan and Egypt during the colonization.

To deal with this Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan established an International Panel of Experts to review and assess the study reports of the dam. But all sides have different versions regarding the reports submitted by that panel. Many meetings have followed, but a settlement has not been reached because the Nile Water Agreements have shown a particularly intractable sticking point.

Egypt launched a diplomatic campaign to deal with the crisis. Egypt called on the US for mediation, which started in February 2019, but Ethiopia backed off from the talks. Accusing the US and World Bank of siding with Egypt contrary to the co-observer role initially assured by them. Ethiopian government soon after this issued statement that “it will not be pressured on Nile River”.

As of October 2019, the work stood at around 70% completion. The GERD-reservoir, once it has filled, has a total water volume of 74 km3. Filling it takes 5–15 years with water, depending on hydrologic conditions during the filling period and deal reached between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, and even by using all generating units at supreme capacity will not drain it within a few months. But many analyst fears that these countries could be drawn into clash if the agreement does not reach before the dam is being operational.

Egypt, Ethiopia & Sudan Conflict - Pakistan Strategic Forum

Before talking about this Non-Traditional security warfare. Let us talk about the root of this conflict which started after the announcement of dam building by Ethiopia on River Blue Nile when Egypt was busy in the Arab Spring in 2011. The Nile is flowing northward through the tropical climate...

pakstrategic.com

 

[Saithan]

I think the dispute isn't going to be solved easily because Egypt is corrupt and incapable of solving their own problems, so they "require" unhindered full use of the Nile. Doesn't fix the corruption or economy.

Ethiopia needs it to improve their nations current economy, so that's understandable. It's also a landlocked country, which is pretty bad considering it has 100 mio ppl.

 

[Bogeyman]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1327875641040113664

 

[Bogeyman]

Sudan Will Decide the Outcome of the Ethiopian Civil War​

While the world girded for the U.S. election in early November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a war against the northern region of Tigray. The region is home to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front—the party that dominated Ethiopian politics for decades and has since been displaced and sidelined as Abiy has sought to consolidate power and made peace with the TPLF’s archenemy, Eritrea.

But the TPLF has not gone quietly; in September, the regional government it leads held local elections that the central government refused to recognize in October. Then, on Nov. 3, following provocations by Abiy, it took control of personnel, military hardware, and equipment from the federal army’s Northern Command, prompting Addis Ababa to declare war against a region that remains home to a sizable portion of the Ethiopian federal army’s arsenal and forces, given its position along the long-contested and still undemarcated border with Eritrea.

Abiy has long accused the TPLF old guard of seeking to sabotage his government and his purported reforms. But now, facing all-out war against a formidable foe, the outcome will turn on the choices of Ethiopia’s neighbors—Sudan and Eritrea.

Members of the Tigray region special police force parade during celebrations marking the 45th anniversary of the launching of the “Armed Struggle of the Peoples of Tigray” in Mekelle, Ethiopia, on Feb. 19. MICHAEL TEWELDE/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Although Tigray is small, it is well armed, and its forces are battle-hardened. Tigray’s regional special forces, which a senior Ethiopian diplomat estimates have grown to at least 20,000 commandos—led by senior Tigrayan officers forced into retirement by Abiy, plus a standing body of reserve special forces made up of military-trained militia and armed farmers—together have an estimated total of up to 250,000 armed fighters. Until recently, however, it lacked the heavy weaponry required to directly confront a fully-equipped division.
Since last week, the TPLF has taken control of half the soldiers from the five divisions of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) Northern Command that remain in Tigray—meaning it has gained 15,000 soldiers, according to three sources: a senior Ethiopian diplomat briefed on the latest developments, a senior retired intelligence officer in Tigray who continues to work for the TPLF, and a source in Tigray monitoring the situation. But the seizure of Ethiopian military hardware and equipment has heightened the importance of logistical supplies for the TPLF, which will inevitably depend on Sudan’s stance.

Sudan has a number of strategic reasons to back—or at least to be perceived as supporting—the TPLF in the civil war against Ethiopia’s government

While Sudan has officially closed the borders between Tigray and Sudan’s frontier states of Kassala and Gadaref—which are landlocked Tigray’s only logistical links to the outside world in terms of fuel, ammunition, and food—it could use the threat of support to the TPLF to extract concessions from Addis Ababa on the contested Fashqa triangle.

Fashqa is an approximately 100-square-mile territory of prime agricultural land along its border with Ethiopia’s Amhara state, which Sudan claims by virtue of an agreement signed in 1902 between the United Kingdom and Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik II and subsequently reinforced by various Ethiopian leaders, including the TPLF.

The dispute over Fashqa remains a major grievance for Ethiopia’s ethnic Amhara farmers near the border, who seek to till the land, and is an obstacle in negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Like Egypt, Sudan has rejected Ethiopia’s proposal for guidelines that would enshrine Ethiopia’s future ability to manage annual flow of the Blue Nile on a discretionary basis and Khartoum is already using the issue as leverage to pressure Abiy on Fashqa, where Ethiopia and Sudan continue to maintain a military presence.

But if Sudan supports Tigray, which also borders Eritrea, the civil war will certainly become a protracted affair, and the strategic fallout in Khartoum’s relations with Addis Ababa and Asmara could be too high. Indeed, the region could quickly revert to the state of proxy conflict that preceded the rise of Abiy and the collapse of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s regime—or precipitate a wider regional conflagration.

Since last week, Sudan has already seen thousands of people flee from Ethiopia, including officers from the ENDF, according to a source who has spoken with Sudan’s civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, about the matter. While Bashir allied himself with Ethiopia’s former TPLF-led regime, the TPLF’s influence in Khartoum has become limited since Bashir fell from power, and because it no longer controls the Ethiopian state.

Sudan’s condition is already fragile, and it wants to ensure that it has at least minimal relations with its neighbors.

Sudan’s condition is already fragile, and it wants to ensure that it has at least minimal relations with its neighbors.

For now, instructions from Khartoum have focused on not alienating either Addis Ababa or Asmara—a message that has trickled down in the Sudan Armed Forces, which has deployed to its borders with Ethiopia, said a senior Sudanese military officer.


Sudan is not the only neighboring country with a strong interest in the outcome of the civil war. Envoys of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki traveled to Khartoum on Nov. 11 to see the chairman of Sudan’s transitional Sovereign Council, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—presumably to ask Sudan’s military, which holds the real power, to cut off any potential logistical support to the TPLF.

From the beginning, it was clear that Abiy was intent on provocation, but he did not anticipate the TPLF could supplant an entire military command. In late October, a week before the TPLF took control of the remaining Northern Command in Tigray, Abiy created a new regional command in Ethiopia’s Amhara state, with the two divisions of the Northern Command already stationed in Amhara slated to be transferred into its ranks.
The Northern Command comprises eight of the ENDF’s 32 divisions. Three of them have been stationed outside of Tigray for two years, since Abiy expanded the operational area of the Northern Command: a tank division in the north of Ethiopia’s Afar state and two divisions in Amhara. Military maneuvers against Tigray are now underway on three fronts: from Eritrea, Afar, and Amhara, with Eritrea and Amhara being used in an attempt to cut the TPLF off from Sudan.

On Nov. 1, a few days after Abiy created the new command, Burhan flew to see him in Addis Ababa with the director-general of Sudan’s intelligence service and the head of military intelligence. It was announced that they would strengthen control of the Ethiopia-Sudan border, suggesting that Abiy was trying to completely encircle Tigray before a premeditated confrontation with the TPLF.

Sudan Will Decide the Outcome of the Ethiopian Civil War

As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed goes to war against Ethiopia’s former rulers—the Tigray People’s Liberation Front—Khartoum’s moves will determine whether the conflict remains a local…

foreignpolicy.com

 

[Bogeyman]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1327813410910859264

Sudan recently gave the Russians a new naval base. It seems they didn't just give the Russians a naval base. They transferred the air defense of their base to the Russians.
It is also among the demands that the Russian special forces increase their visibility in the region. In these days, when a regional war is spoken in the Sudan-Ethiopia-Egypt triangle, Sudan's approach to the Russians seems quite meaningful.

 

[Bogeyman]

It is also among the demands that the Russian special forces increase their visibility in the region. In these days, when a regional war is spoken in the Sudan-Ethiopia-Egypt triangle, Sudan's approach to the Russians seems quite meaningful.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1328748955363135489

It is said that Russia can deploy electronic warfare and air defense systems at the naval base to be established in Sudan.

 

[ANGMAR]

Ethiopia entitled to use 86 per cent share of Nile, says foreign minister​

Demeke Mekonnen's comments represent a doubling down on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

A satellite image taken on June 26, 2020 shows a close-up view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Maxar Technologies via Reuters

Ethiopia is entitled to use its large share of the Nile’s waters and will not allow other nations to dictate how the river is used, the country’s foreign minister said on Wednesday.
Addressing a seminar marking 10 years since construction began on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project, Demeke Mekonnen said it “is the natural resource of all Ethiopians. No one can deprive Ethiopia of its 86 per cent share of the Nile [waters]”.
The statement signalled Addis Ababa’s continued unwillingness to compromise in its long-running dispute with Egypt and Sudan over the dam.
The Blue Nile is the river’s main tributary and its source is in the Ethiopian highlands. It thunders down into eastern Sudan and travels to Khartoum, the Sudanese capital to the north, where it meets the White Nile. Together they flow into northern Sudan, Egypt and all the way to the Mediterranean. It contributes more than 85 per cent of the Nile’s water.

The comments by Mr Mekonnen seemingly confirm suspicions in Egypt and Sudan that the dam was partially meant to help realise Ethiopia’s ambition to become the paramount power in east Africa and among Nile-basin countries.
Egyptian experts have long argued that the large capacity of the water reservoir behind the dam – about 75 billion cubic metres of water – was well beyond what it needed to achieve its goal of generating 6,000 megawatts of electricity and plucking millions of Ethiopians out of poverty.
Ethiopia has said it planned to go ahead with a second and much larger filling of the dam next summer regardless of whether a deal was reached with Egypt and Sudan. It carried out the first filling last summer without giving the two downstream countries prior notice. That filling disrupted work in water treatment facilities in Sudan but made no impact on Egypt because 2020 saw a bumper flood that filled its own reservoir behind the Aswan Dam to capacity.
Under a treaty reached with Sudan in 1959, Egypt’s annual share of the Nile is 55.5 billion cubic metres, while Sudan has 18.5 billion. Egypt, where 90 per cent of its fresh water needs are met by the Nile, is alarmed that Ethiopia’s dam would deeply cut its share of the Nile water.
Sudan, for its part, is worried that Ethiopia’s refusal to enter a legally-binding deal on the filling and operation of the dam and mechanisms to deal with drought years or future disputes would leave it vulnerable to deadly flooding and disruption to its own power-generating dams on the Blue Nile.
The latest Ethiopian comments came one day after the country renewed its rejection of a proposal by Sudan and supported by Egypt to ask the UN, the US and the EU to join the African Union as mediators in the deadlocked negotiations over the dam.
The involvement of outside mediators must be agreed to by the three nations, according to a declaration on the dispute they signed in 2015. That leaves Sudan and Egypt with few options to reach a deal as the time of the second filling draws nearer.
Sudan has said that the second filling would put at risk the lives of 20 million people, about half its population. Egypt, for its part, said it remained committed to finding a diplomatic resolution to the dispute but made clear it had no intention of negotiating “indefinitely.”
Updated: March 17, 2021 08:26 PM
https://www.thenationalnews.com/men...share-of-nile-says-foreign-minister-1.1186312

 

[ANGMAR]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1372524502383534082

 

[ANGMAR]

No one can take a drop of water from Egypt,' Sisi says on GERD dispute​

'All our demands [in the dispute over the Ethiopian dam] fall within international laws that deal with the issues of waters that cross borders,' he stressed​

"No one can take a drop of water from Egypt," President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi said on Tuesday in remarks on the continued deadlock in the negotiations with Ethiopia over the disputed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).


"We hope to reach a binding and legal agreement on the filling and operation of the dam," El-Sisi stressed.

"Our battle is a battle of negotiations," the president added.

"All our demands fall within international laws that deal with the issues of waters that cross borders," he stressed.

The president's remarks came during a question-and-answer sesision with reportes during a visit to the Maritime Training and Simulation Centre of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) in Ismailia.

The visit to the SCA comes less than one day after Egypt succeeded in refloating the mega container ship that blocked the canal for six days thus allowing navigation in the strategic waterway to resume

'No one can take a drop of water from Egypt,' Sisi says on GERD dispute - Politics - Egypt

'All our demands [in the dispute over the Ethiopian dam] fall within international laws that deal with the issues of cross-border waters,' he stressed

english.ahram.org.eg

 

[ANGMAR]

tension rises

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1376875804307623939

 

[TR_123456]

tension rises

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1376875804307623939

You think there will be some military action soon?

 

[ANGMAR]

You think there will be some military action soon?

if Ethiopia resumed filling the dam without agreement with the downstream countries ( Egypt & Sudan )
it will be a military action 100%

 

[ANGMAR]