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“This is an opinion piece by the author for forum members discussion only and not to be reproduced in any way on any other media.”
Acquiring new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces is a drawn-out and complicated process that typically can take up to 15 years or longer. When it comes to Canada’s four boat Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines, a decision on new replacements must occur over the next few years to ensure the capability survives. The recent standup of the Submarine Replacement Program by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is the first step towards a decision process by the government. Currently, neither the government’s official defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged or the RCNs own strategic guidance, Leadmark 2050 Strategy, earmarks any replacements for the Victoria-class.
In my opinion (IMO) the case for retention of an RCN submarine capability is not only desirable, but necessary. Beneath the negative headlines is the story of a force multiplier that can shape the strategic behaviour of an adversary, gather critical intelligence information, insert special operations units, and strengthen Canada’s alliances. Submarines require a “disproportionate response from an adversary.” Unlike its destroyers, frigates and supply ships, none of the submarines used by the RCN were built in Canada.
The price tag associated with a modern submarine fleet along with the fleets’ checkered history raises the question of whether replacing the Victoria class is a viable option. Modern submarines, whether powered by nuclear, air independent propulsion (AIP) or diesel-electric systems, are some of the most complex machines to build. Only a handful of allied countries have the where-with-all to construct them including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, France, Sweden and Japan. The Australian experience with their Collins-class has demonstrated that creating a domestic submarine manufacturing industry from scratch is fraught with challenges, from securing local sources of steel, recruiting management and building expertise, and sorting out intellectual property negotiations. Even buying new submarines from a foreign supplier is not necessarily a cheap option. A 2003 DND audit noted that if Canada had bought four new submarines in 1998, as opposed to buying the second-hand British-made Victoria class for $897 million, the price tag would have ranged from $3 billion to $5 billion CAD.
In 1958, senior naval officials made the push for nuclear subs but costs and opposition from the USN, particularly over nuclear technology transfers, in conjunction with a contentious domestic nuclear debate, killed the idea; even though the government identified a two to three nuclear sub buy in the 1964 Defence White Paper.
Efforts at identifying a replacement for the Oberons began in the 1980s. Maritime Command initially proposed a new fleet of diesel-electric submarines but the government of the day, sensing domestic concern over US and Soviet submarine movements through Canadian-claimed Arctic waters, pushed for 10-12 nuclear-attack submarines. Announced in the 1987 White Paper, the nuclear plan met opposition from Canada’s allies. The US was still opposed to sharing nuclear technology. The French were willing to share their Rubis-class design but only if the first four or five subs were built in France. The lost promise of Canadian offsets coupled with the project’s price tag of $10 billion CAD in 1989 dollars, a deficit crisis, unfavourable public opinion, and a changed global security environment, put an end to the nuclear submarine project in 1989. Canada then faced the possibility of losing its submarine capability altogether. It was under these unique circumstances that the Victoria class was acquired. In 1994, the UK decided to turn to a nuclear-only submarine force thereby freeing up their four recently built Upholder diesel-electric submarines for sale.
The four Victoria-class submarines had an unenviable start – a fatal fire aboard HMCS Chicoutimi in 2004, flooding on HMCS Corner Brook in 2002, six years in dry-dock for HMCS Victoria due to electrical problems, a five-year refit for HMCS Windsor in 2007-12, and the running aground of HMCS Corner Brook in 2011 not to mention the HMCS Corner Brook ballast tank testing fiasco in April 2021. Canada’s submarine fleet only achieved full operational status in 2015, 17 years after the government approved the purchase. The long time spent on ‘Canadianizing’ the subs and dealing with problems associated from their prolonged docking in saltwater in the UK have been well documented. Canada is now the only user of the Victoria class, effectively making the British-made subs an “orphan” class and generating difficulties in sourcing spare parts. It is tempting to view these challenges as vindication of criticism that submarines are not worth the expenditure of scarce resources. Missing from this narrative however, is a discussion of the capabilities and value that submarines bring to Canadian decision-makers.
First, at a strategic level, submarines are the ‘ultimate warfighting’ tool in a navy’s arsenal. Submarines give decision-makers the ability to both control an area of water and deter others from using it. This uniqueness derives from submarines’ physical and technological characteristics, chiefly the ability to remain underwater for long periods and to do so without detection. The Victoria class, for example, can operate in any weather conditions for periods of up to 45 days. The offensive power of a torpedo in combination with such endurance and stealth abilities often means that the mere presence of a submarine, whether “actual or inferred,” can change an adversary’s strategic calculus.
Second, a modern submarine gives a government unique intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The ISR component is arguably a more significant capability than sinking ships. The advantages of using submarines in this role is that they are extremely difficult to detect when submerged, and can go where planes and surface ships cannot. One modern diesel-electric submarine, with good sonar/towed array capabilities can cover more surveillance areas than five to six ships would be needed to cover the same areas. In the post-Cold War era, navies have increasingly found themselves operating in the world’s littoral zones. Here the dual effect of shallower waters and close proximity to shoreline makes surface naval vessels more vulnerable to anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons like cruise missiles and attack aircraft; factors recognized in Leadmark 2050. Maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters are likely to encounter air defences in such environments. Today, countries big and small, from China and Russia to Iran and North Korea, have turned to A2/AD weapons to counter the advanced and numerical capabilities of not only the US Navy, and specifically its aircraft carrier battlegroups, but also US allies. Even non-state actors have relied on A2/AD weapons to devastating effect. In this international security environment, the submarine remains a proven and invaluable tool in collecting ISR data. Modern submarines can detect high frequency, very high frequency and ultra -high frequency signals and cellphone transmissions. Because they are difficult to locate, they can remain in position for extended periods to gather both signal intercepts and monitor military and commercial maritime activity. Canada’s Oberon and Victoria class submarines have performed ISR activities in the past. The former monitored Soviet nuclear ballistic-missile submarines during the latter years of the Cold War and gathered intelligence on numerous fishing and drug enforcement missions in the early 1990s. In recent years, the Victoria class has participated in anti-drug smuggling missions in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, the secretive nature of ISR missions prohibits the sharing of much operational information; however, it is noteworthy that in May 2019 DND announced that the Victoria class might be deployed to help enforce UN sanctions against North Korea.
Third, owning a credible submarine capability brings prestige and intelligence access. As a member of the “sub club”, Canada is a participant in a global Water Space Management (WSM) regime that grants decision-makers access to information on allied submarine operations necessary to avoid mutual interference. When not on missions, Canada’s submarines have proven a valuable tool in strengthening alliances. The US Navy, which lacks the diesel-electric submarines commonly used by its adversaries, has regularly sought opportunities to train against Canadian submarines, including in 2017-18 in the western Pacific.
Finally, the submarine remains the most effective means to counter the threat of another submarine. IMO Canada needs a new fleet of between 10 to 12 modern, effective submarines with a sustained propulsion system, infrastructure and manpower required to deal with any future missions assigned to the RCN.
Acquiring new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces is a drawn-out and complicated process that typically can take up to 15 years or longer. When it comes to Canada’s four boat Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines, a decision on new replacements must occur over the next few years to ensure the capability survives. The recent standup of the Submarine Replacement Program by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is the first step towards a decision process by the government. Currently, neither the government’s official defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged or the RCNs own strategic guidance, Leadmark 2050 Strategy, earmarks any replacements for the Victoria-class.
In my opinion (IMO) the case for retention of an RCN submarine capability is not only desirable, but necessary. Beneath the negative headlines is the story of a force multiplier that can shape the strategic behaviour of an adversary, gather critical intelligence information, insert special operations units, and strengthen Canada’s alliances. Submarines require a “disproportionate response from an adversary.” Unlike its destroyers, frigates and supply ships, none of the submarines used by the RCN were built in Canada.
The price tag associated with a modern submarine fleet along with the fleets’ checkered history raises the question of whether replacing the Victoria class is a viable option. Modern submarines, whether powered by nuclear, air independent propulsion (AIP) or diesel-electric systems, are some of the most complex machines to build. Only a handful of allied countries have the where-with-all to construct them including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, France, Sweden and Japan. The Australian experience with their Collins-class has demonstrated that creating a domestic submarine manufacturing industry from scratch is fraught with challenges, from securing local sources of steel, recruiting management and building expertise, and sorting out intellectual property negotiations. Even buying new submarines from a foreign supplier is not necessarily a cheap option. A 2003 DND audit noted that if Canada had bought four new submarines in 1998, as opposed to buying the second-hand British-made Victoria class for $897 million, the price tag would have ranged from $3 billion to $5 billion CAD.
In 1958, senior naval officials made the push for nuclear subs but costs and opposition from the USN, particularly over nuclear technology transfers, in conjunction with a contentious domestic nuclear debate, killed the idea; even though the government identified a two to three nuclear sub buy in the 1964 Defence White Paper.
Efforts at identifying a replacement for the Oberons began in the 1980s. Maritime Command initially proposed a new fleet of diesel-electric submarines but the government of the day, sensing domestic concern over US and Soviet submarine movements through Canadian-claimed Arctic waters, pushed for 10-12 nuclear-attack submarines. Announced in the 1987 White Paper, the nuclear plan met opposition from Canada’s allies. The US was still opposed to sharing nuclear technology. The French were willing to share their Rubis-class design but only if the first four or five subs were built in France. The lost promise of Canadian offsets coupled with the project’s price tag of $10 billion CAD in 1989 dollars, a deficit crisis, unfavourable public opinion, and a changed global security environment, put an end to the nuclear submarine project in 1989. Canada then faced the possibility of losing its submarine capability altogether. It was under these unique circumstances that the Victoria class was acquired. In 1994, the UK decided to turn to a nuclear-only submarine force thereby freeing up their four recently built Upholder diesel-electric submarines for sale.
The four Victoria-class submarines had an unenviable start – a fatal fire aboard HMCS Chicoutimi in 2004, flooding on HMCS Corner Brook in 2002, six years in dry-dock for HMCS Victoria due to electrical problems, a five-year refit for HMCS Windsor in 2007-12, and the running aground of HMCS Corner Brook in 2011 not to mention the HMCS Corner Brook ballast tank testing fiasco in April 2021. Canada’s submarine fleet only achieved full operational status in 2015, 17 years after the government approved the purchase. The long time spent on ‘Canadianizing’ the subs and dealing with problems associated from their prolonged docking in saltwater in the UK have been well documented. Canada is now the only user of the Victoria class, effectively making the British-made subs an “orphan” class and generating difficulties in sourcing spare parts. It is tempting to view these challenges as vindication of criticism that submarines are not worth the expenditure of scarce resources. Missing from this narrative however, is a discussion of the capabilities and value that submarines bring to Canadian decision-makers.
First, at a strategic level, submarines are the ‘ultimate warfighting’ tool in a navy’s arsenal. Submarines give decision-makers the ability to both control an area of water and deter others from using it. This uniqueness derives from submarines’ physical and technological characteristics, chiefly the ability to remain underwater for long periods and to do so without detection. The Victoria class, for example, can operate in any weather conditions for periods of up to 45 days. The offensive power of a torpedo in combination with such endurance and stealth abilities often means that the mere presence of a submarine, whether “actual or inferred,” can change an adversary’s strategic calculus.
Second, a modern submarine gives a government unique intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The ISR component is arguably a more significant capability than sinking ships. The advantages of using submarines in this role is that they are extremely difficult to detect when submerged, and can go where planes and surface ships cannot. One modern diesel-electric submarine, with good sonar/towed array capabilities can cover more surveillance areas than five to six ships would be needed to cover the same areas. In the post-Cold War era, navies have increasingly found themselves operating in the world’s littoral zones. Here the dual effect of shallower waters and close proximity to shoreline makes surface naval vessels more vulnerable to anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons like cruise missiles and attack aircraft; factors recognized in Leadmark 2050. Maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters are likely to encounter air defences in such environments. Today, countries big and small, from China and Russia to Iran and North Korea, have turned to A2/AD weapons to counter the advanced and numerical capabilities of not only the US Navy, and specifically its aircraft carrier battlegroups, but also US allies. Even non-state actors have relied on A2/AD weapons to devastating effect. In this international security environment, the submarine remains a proven and invaluable tool in collecting ISR data. Modern submarines can detect high frequency, very high frequency and ultra -high frequency signals and cellphone transmissions. Because they are difficult to locate, they can remain in position for extended periods to gather both signal intercepts and monitor military and commercial maritime activity. Canada’s Oberon and Victoria class submarines have performed ISR activities in the past. The former monitored Soviet nuclear ballistic-missile submarines during the latter years of the Cold War and gathered intelligence on numerous fishing and drug enforcement missions in the early 1990s. In recent years, the Victoria class has participated in anti-drug smuggling missions in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, the secretive nature of ISR missions prohibits the sharing of much operational information; however, it is noteworthy that in May 2019 DND announced that the Victoria class might be deployed to help enforce UN sanctions against North Korea.
Third, owning a credible submarine capability brings prestige and intelligence access. As a member of the “sub club”, Canada is a participant in a global Water Space Management (WSM) regime that grants decision-makers access to information on allied submarine operations necessary to avoid mutual interference. When not on missions, Canada’s submarines have proven a valuable tool in strengthening alliances. The US Navy, which lacks the diesel-electric submarines commonly used by its adversaries, has regularly sought opportunities to train against Canadian submarines, including in 2017-18 in the western Pacific.
Finally, the submarine remains the most effective means to counter the threat of another submarine. IMO Canada needs a new fleet of between 10 to 12 modern, effective submarines with a sustained propulsion system, infrastructure and manpower required to deal with any future missions assigned to the RCN.
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