- Turkey to Host NATO Missile Defense Radar
- Ukraine Construction of a defense line by the Ukrainian army
- MBDA to double the range of Aster 15 surface-to-air missiles with Aster 15 EC upgrade
- Canada Breaking News CANADA'S NEW DEFENCE POLICY-OUR NORTH , STRONG AND FREE
- Danish company lands three-figure million contract with NATO
xizhimen
Experienced member
- Messages
- 7,391
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Good they love their host country , it's the right attitude.
- Messages
- 9,297
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
How Indian Army's secrecy & unorthodox deployment fooled the Chinese at Pangong Tso
The Mountain Strike Corps played a key role in shaping India’s counter-offensive strategy that led to the domination of the southern banks of the Pangong Tso.
theprint.in
New Delhi: Nearly a month’s planning in utter secrecy, unorthodox deployment of multiple units and false flag manoeuvering, is what led to Indian forces outflanking the Chinese in Eastern Ladakh in August, ThePrint has learnt.
The operation has enabled India to dominate the southern banks of the Pangong Tso and offer a determined counter deployment in the northern banks.
The development also took place even as the Navy deployed almost its entire Eastern and Western Fleets out at sea to counter any possible Chinese aggression at sea and to showcase capability to completely dominate the area of influence.
Top government sources had earlier ruled out any premature withdrawal from the southern banks, which have given India a bargaining chip in negotiations that until then in August, were one-sided.
They have now told ThePrint that when New Delhi realised that the Chinese had no intention of going back, the Army was asked to come up with options so that India could have some sort of a bargaining power.
According to the plan finalised, 6-7 places were identified along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) where Indian forces could gain an upper hand over China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Once the locations were identified, the only offensive formation against the Chinese — Panagarh (West Bengal)-based Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) – was put into action.
The offensive operation also saw the participation of the Army’s elite Para SF and the Chakrata (Uttarakhand)-based Special Frontier Force (SFF), largely made up of Tibetan Refugees.
24 hours notice and just one aircraft
In early August, on just 24 hours notice, a team from the MSC, sans any big equipment besides their own personal gear and led by its General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lt Gen Gen Savneet Singh, flew out to Ladakh.“It was important to ensure that the Chinese were not able to pick up any large movement of troops and equipment since their satellites and potential spotters on the ground would be active. Accordingly, the Army went in for unorthodox deployment,” a source in the defence and security establishment said.
Sources said that unlike earlier, when the full division would have moved, only a much smaller team left without any additional equipment while the life at MSC, also known as the 17 Corps, went on as usual to avoid raising any eyebrows.
Lt Gen Savneet Singh was the man in charge of the offensive operation and its planning.
Asked how two corps commanders, the other being the then GOC of 14 Corps Lt Gen Harinder Singh, were functioning in Ladakh, sources said that while the Leh-based 14 Corps was the holding or defensive corps, the 17 Corps was the offensive one.
“It is always understood that whenever an offensive action is needed, a strike corps will come in from outside. That is what the strike corps are all about,” a second source said.
Multiple teams and false flag maneuvering
The men who undertook the offensive operation belonged to the MSC, Para SF, the SFF and elements from the mechanised and armoured units.As part of the overall counter deployment against the Chinese aggression is Eastern Ladakh, India had deployed nearly 40,000 additional troops along with artillery and tanks.
Sources said that when the 29-30 August operation was put into action, various elements came together while equipment came from a different pool.
They added that India also did false flag maneuvering to make the Chinese believe that the Army was focusing on something else while the real action was at a different height.
Accordingly, specialised Indian elements managed to surprise the Chinese and dominate the southern banks of the Pangong Tso and capture heights on what is known as Kailash Range, which had been under dispute by both sides.
However, neither India or China occupied these heights, until August end. The heights include Rechin La and Rezang La. These along with some other peaks has allowed India to dominate Spanggur Gap under Chinese control and also the Moldo garrison on the Chinese side.
“This has proved to be highly beneficial because it gave India a lot of bargaining power,” the first source cited above said. “The fact that the Chinese are insisting on India moving back from the southern ranges is an indication of the strategic significance of the Indian ops.”
Adding to the bewilderment of the Chinese was that India had managed to bring their tanks to these heights along with armoured personnel carriers.
“A lot of planning and unorthodox movement took place to bring multiple units and equipment to these heights,” a third source said.
Operation on the northern banks
Even as the focus remained on the southern banks, a small team of one of the Para SF in operation, had managed to climb up to the dominating heights of the finger areas and click pictures of the Chinese posts on top of Finger 4.With a new route found, specialised elements managed to climb up by the end of August and set up camps facing the ridgelines of Finger 4 in the Northern Banks of Pangong Tso as reported by ThePrint first on September 2.
Sources said while this did now give as much tactical advantage as in the southern banks, it showed India’s determination to stand up.
Excellent analysis from The Print -
China will seek to clinch a disengagement agreement to achieve its political aim. India shouldn’t be in a hurry to agree to disengage or deescalate.
LT GEN H S PANAG (RETD)
On 18 December India and China resumed diplomatic talks to find a solution for the months-long crisis in eastern Ladakh. The Ministry of External Affairs said, “ Both sides agreed to maintain close consultations at the diplomatic and military level. They agreed that the next (9th) round of Senior Commanders meeting should be held at an early date so that both sides can work towards early and complete disengagement of troops along the LAC in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements and protocols, and fully restore peace and tranquility.”
Recall how the Indian media on 11 November, five days after the eighth round of Senior Commanders’ meeting, had reported that an ‘agreement’ for disengagement along the Kailash Range and north of Pangong Tso was on the cards. I highlighted the pitfalls of such an agreement in my column dated 12 November — “If India loses grip on Kailash Range, PLA will make sure we never get it back.”
The premature celebrations by our media to the extent of claiming victory had put the “agreement” in cold storage. It is my assessment that the next round of military talks will revive and refine this agreement before it gets the seal of both governments. Such an agreement enables China to achieve its political aim at India’s cost. On the contrary, a stalemate is a defeat for China. I analyse why.
The question that has intrigued strategic analysts the most is, why did China, in the middle of the Covid pandemic, alter the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and break five border agreements and 33 years of peace in vogue since the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis that lasted one year? On 8 December, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, without giving India’s assessment, said that China has given five different explanations for amassing troops on the borders.
Overtly, the confrontation is focussed on the 1959 Claim Line and “areas of differing perceptions” — hardly a reason to break long–standing peace. More so, after the two “one to one” summits between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which were hailed as a giant leap forward in India-China relations. Indeed, territory is the core of the Westphalian state system, but China had secured all the strategic territory that it needed to in the 1950s and had further safeguarded this asset by securing more in the 1962 war.
Since then, an unsettled border is merely a tool for China to assert its hegemony, embarrass/humiliate India and undermine its regional, international, and military reputation. The degree to which it precipitates the situation is dependent on the perceived military differential and India’s response. In 1962, it led to a war, while in 1967 at Nathu La and 1986-87 at Sumdorong Chu, it ended in a stalemate.
China wants India to be a cooperative junior partner and not a political, economic and military competitor in the international/regional arena. So long as it perceives this situation, peace prevails on the borders. In terms of territory, China wants the 1959 Claim Line to prevail, which militarily ensures security of the territory usurped by it. Any threat to this line, in form of development of border infrastructure, is considered crossing the red line.
That perception gradually changed from 2008 to 2020 for multiple reasons :
• India’s alliance with the US.
• India challenging China’s position in South China Sea (SCS) and Indo–Pacific.
• India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in general, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in particular, since it passes through Indian territory occupied by Pakistan.
• India’s aggressive strategy in Doklam.
• Change in status of Jammu and Kashmir, and an aggressive statement by Union Home Minister Amit Shah that Aksai Chin and PoK/Gilgit-Baltistan are part of J&K/Ladakh.
• PM Modi’s status as an international leader is seen as a challenge to President Xi Jinping.
• But the immediate trigger was India’s rapidly developing border infrastructure in Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Gogra-Hot Springs-Kugrang River, north of Pangong Tso and Chumar, which poses a threat to Aksai Chin and other territories usurped by China.
And so, China set a strategic aim for itself to reassert its hegemony by precipitating a situation on the LAC to embarrass India and undermine India’s international and regional status as an emerging power, cut Modi down to size, and ensure the status of the borders on its terms.
When it came to execution, China’s strategic military aims were to:
• Neutralise the developing threat to Aksai Chin and other territories due to India’s development of border infrastructure.
• Permanently secure territory up to 1959 Claim Line in areas left out in 1962 or not occupied later.
• Put the onus on India to escalate and in case it obliges, capture, through a limited war, Depsang Plains-DBO, area up to Galwan-Shyok river junction, all territory up to north bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and Indus Valley up to the Ladakh Range.
The shameful incident on the intervening night of 15-16 June, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed in action, rudely woke India up to face the strategic reality. The Indian armed forces mobilised with nearly twice the force level that the PLA had used to prevent further loss of territory, and also positioned reserves for offensive action. The Modi government wisely decided not to escalate the situation, which would have given China casus belli to exploit the military differential to make strategic gains due to the positional advantage the PLA had secured through pre–emption. The government took a firm stand on restoration of status quo ante during diplomatic and military engagements.
The Indian Army’s counter manoeuvre to seizethe Kailash Range on the night of 29–30 August to a great extent neutralised the advantages gained by the PLA. At this juncture, the situation is that of a stalemate.
Also read: The dangerous cat-and-mouse game before 1962 War has lesson for counter-attack in 2020
Moreover, the fear of a stalemate or a setback inhibits China. Unfavourable military differential and fear of a setback, the probability of which is high, prevents India from having any ambitious military aims beyond the current stalemate.
We should not be in a hurry to agree to disengage or deescalate. Any agreement, with or without buffer zones where no patrolling/deployment/infrastructure development will be carried out, should be all–encompassing, covering the entire LAC from Karakoram to Chumar and must include its demarcation.
The Sumdorong Chu standoff lasted over a year and the stalemate led to the 1993 border agreement. We have a similar opportunity now and we must persevere. With us sitting on the Kailash Range, even with limited loss of territory in the Depsang Plains and north of Pangong Tso, we have forced a stalemate on China. And a stalemate is defeat for a superior power!
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal
China will seek to clinch a disengagement agreement to achieve its political aim. India shouldn’t be in a hurry to agree to disengage or deescalate.
LT GEN H S PANAG (RETD)
On 18 December India and China resumed diplomatic talks to find a solution for the months-long crisis in eastern Ladakh. The Ministry of External Affairs said, “ Both sides agreed to maintain close consultations at the diplomatic and military level. They agreed that the next (9th) round of Senior Commanders meeting should be held at an early date so that both sides can work towards early and complete disengagement of troops along the LAC in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements and protocols, and fully restore peace and tranquility.”
Recall how the Indian media on 11 November, five days after the eighth round of Senior Commanders’ meeting, had reported that an ‘agreement’ for disengagement along the Kailash Range and north of Pangong Tso was on the cards. I highlighted the pitfalls of such an agreement in my column dated 12 November — “If India loses grip on Kailash Range, PLA will make sure we never get it back.”
The premature celebrations by our media to the extent of claiming victory had put the “agreement” in cold storage. It is my assessment that the next round of military talks will revive and refine this agreement before it gets the seal of both governments. Such an agreement enables China to achieve its political aim at India’s cost. On the contrary, a stalemate is a defeat for China. I analyse why.
China’s strategic aims
Towards the end of April and early May, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a surprise operational level manoeuvre by intruding at multiple points in Ladakh, deploying two mechanised divisions to secure its 1959 Claim Line. It sullied India’s international, regional and military reputation, prevented any further development of border infrastructure and by virtue of its deployment, made large tracts of our territory militarily untenable to defend in the event of an escalation to a limited war.The question that has intrigued strategic analysts the most is, why did China, in the middle of the Covid pandemic, alter the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and break five border agreements and 33 years of peace in vogue since the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis that lasted one year? On 8 December, Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, without giving India’s assessment, said that China has given five different explanations for amassing troops on the borders.
Overtly, the confrontation is focussed on the 1959 Claim Line and “areas of differing perceptions” — hardly a reason to break long–standing peace. More so, after the two “one to one” summits between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which were hailed as a giant leap forward in India-China relations. Indeed, territory is the core of the Westphalian state system, but China had secured all the strategic territory that it needed to in the 1950s and had further safeguarded this asset by securing more in the 1962 war.
Since then, an unsettled border is merely a tool for China to assert its hegemony, embarrass/humiliate India and undermine its regional, international, and military reputation. The degree to which it precipitates the situation is dependent on the perceived military differential and India’s response. In 1962, it led to a war, while in 1967 at Nathu La and 1986-87 at Sumdorong Chu, it ended in a stalemate.
China wants India to be a cooperative junior partner and not a political, economic and military competitor in the international/regional arena. So long as it perceives this situation, peace prevails on the borders. In terms of territory, China wants the 1959 Claim Line to prevail, which militarily ensures security of the territory usurped by it. Any threat to this line, in form of development of border infrastructure, is considered crossing the red line.
That perception gradually changed from 2008 to 2020 for multiple reasons :
• India’s alliance with the US.
• India challenging China’s position in South China Sea (SCS) and Indo–Pacific.
• India’s opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in general, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in particular, since it passes through Indian territory occupied by Pakistan.
• India’s aggressive strategy in Doklam.
• Change in status of Jammu and Kashmir, and an aggressive statement by Union Home Minister Amit Shah that Aksai Chin and PoK/Gilgit-Baltistan are part of J&K/Ladakh.
• PM Modi’s status as an international leader is seen as a challenge to President Xi Jinping.
• But the immediate trigger was India’s rapidly developing border infrastructure in Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Gogra-Hot Springs-Kugrang River, north of Pangong Tso and Chumar, which poses a threat to Aksai Chin and other territories usurped by China.
And so, China set a strategic aim for itself to reassert its hegemony by precipitating a situation on the LAC to embarrass India and undermine India’s international and regional status as an emerging power, cut Modi down to size, and ensure the status of the borders on its terms.
When it came to execution, China’s strategic military aims were to:
• Neutralise the developing threat to Aksai Chin and other territories due to India’s development of border infrastructure.
• Permanently secure territory up to 1959 Claim Line in areas left out in 1962 or not occupied later.
• Put the onus on India to escalate and in case it obliges, capture, through a limited war, Depsang Plains-DBO, area up to Galwan-Shyok river junction, all territory up to north bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and Indus Valley up to the Ladakh Range.
Did China achieve its aim?
The PLA achieved strategic surprise and pre-emptively secured all its military objectives without firing a shot. India was unable to pre-empt the PLA and relied on denial, obfuscation and appeasement to wish the problem away or at least hope that the PLA would agree to status quo ante as in the past. At this juncture, China seemed to have achieved its political and military aims.The shameful incident on the intervening night of 15-16 June, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed in action, rudely woke India up to face the strategic reality. The Indian armed forces mobilised with nearly twice the force level that the PLA had used to prevent further loss of territory, and also positioned reserves for offensive action. The Modi government wisely decided not to escalate the situation, which would have given China casus belli to exploit the military differential to make strategic gains due to the positional advantage the PLA had secured through pre–emption. The government took a firm stand on restoration of status quo ante during diplomatic and military engagements.
The Indian Army’s counter manoeuvre to seizethe Kailash Range on the night of 29–30 August to a great extent neutralised the advantages gained by the PLA. At this juncture, the situation is that of a stalemate.
Also read: The dangerous cat-and-mouse game before 1962 War has lesson for counter-attack in 2020
Stalemate is defeat for China
There should be no doubt that China has not been able to achieve the end state it desired — make India accept the 1959 Claim Line and stop further development of infrastructure. India has partially restored its international and military reputation. The onus is now on China to escalate the matter to a limited war and inflict a sharp defeat if it wants to impose its will in full. As a superior power, China does not want to be seen as an initiator of war and neither does India.Moreover, the fear of a stalemate or a setback inhibits China. Unfavourable military differential and fear of a setback, the probability of which is high, prevents India from having any ambitious military aims beyond the current stalemate.
We should not be in a hurry to agree to disengage or deescalate. Any agreement, with or without buffer zones where no patrolling/deployment/infrastructure development will be carried out, should be all–encompassing, covering the entire LAC from Karakoram to Chumar and must include its demarcation.
The Sumdorong Chu standoff lasted over a year and the stalemate led to the 1993 border agreement. We have a similar opportunity now and we must persevere. With us sitting on the Kailash Range, even with limited loss of territory in the Depsang Plains and north of Pangong Tso, we have forced a stalemate on China. And a stalemate is defeat for a superior power!
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal
He is quite objective. Unlike those two trolls Gaurav Arya and that Chinese stooge Sawhney
Raptor
Contributor
- Messages
- 534
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Well his critics say,he is political.
I don't like any political armyman,be it gaurav arya or anyone.
Lt. Ata hasnain seems to be finest of them all.
They recently let American aircraft refuel there.
theprint.in
US military aircraft refuels at Indian base for first time under defence pact
The aircraft landed over a week ago at an airstrip in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for refuelling under an agreement signed between India and US in 2016.
theprint.in
- Messages
- 9,297
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Earlier posts/replies on some of the related subject matter:
defencehub.live
India - China Relations
With Chinese Navy positioning itself for dominance in the Indian Ocean through strings of ports in Myanmar, Pakistan and Iran, India is planning rapid infrastructure upgrade in its Island territories to ensure that there is no restriction on navigation or a replay of the South China Sea in...
defencehub.live
Last edited:
Nope.
Paro
Well-known member
- Messages
- 368
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
That will turn Myanmar into new North Korea without nukes and a large standing army.
Gary
Experienced member
- Messages
- 7,684
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
I mean you should take this into consideration, Israel doesn't require permission to enter Lebanon and Jordanian airspace to bomb both Syria and Iraq.
Think about that.
The people who live on those islands outside of defence personnel are some of the last uncontacted people on the planet. Bombing has no strategic benefit. Killing uncontacted tribe would invite worldwide condemnation. The only thing that would help China is an actual capture of the islands. Considering China can't even take Taiwan which is literally next door, that's a bit of a stretch.
Paro
Well-known member
- Messages
- 368
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
China comes through Myanmar bombs Indian state and you think India will let go? For that you need to understand the border relationship between India and Myanmar. It’s a long story by itself. Short answer is no. It’s not possible in the near future.
Last edited:
