I have decided to update my assessment of the matter in light of new information that has emerged.
First of all, it is necessary to look at the profile of the ballistic missiles used by Iran. It seems that the missile that hit Israel's Nevatim air base turned out to be a Ghadr BF missile.
The warheads used in the missile are designed to disperse in the air in a cone to make it difficult to be hit by missile defense systems.
As you can see, the only warheads from the 50 kg artillery rocket actually hit the target like this. Therefore, the number of ballistic missiles that hit Israel was probably 1-2, not 9-10.
The most distinguishable feature of the Ghadr compared to the older Shahab-3 is its conic nosecone with a ‘baby bottle’ cylindrical shape.
This adjustment likely reduced the volume of the payload the missile could carry by about 20 percent and the Ghadr likely carries a 750 kg warhead compared to the 1,000 kg warhead designed for the Shahab-3. This denser warhead also increases the speed of its reentry vehicle, making missile defense intercepts more difficult.
A December 2008 report estimated a CEP of 300 m for the Ghadr-1, which has been echoed by more recent analysis. More recent reports suggest Iran achieved this accuracy by equipping the Ghadr with a strap-down guidance package. If reports regarding the Ghadr-1 accuracy are correct, then it would be a significant improvement of the Shahab-3 (2,500 m CEP).
Reports also indicate the possibility that Ghadr could be designed to carry a nuclear payload. This possibility is raised with uncertainty as the Ghadr appears to be comparable to the Shahab system, whose apparent goal is to obtain such a payload.
Emad and Ghadr are Iranian variants of its Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
missilethreat.csis.org
Here, CSIS defines the Ghadr ballistic missile as a missile with a 750 kg warhead, a range of 300 m, and most importantly, the potential to carry a nuclear warhead. Work on the missile started 16 years ago.
Now let's talk about the dilemma of Israel and its allies here. Iran attempted to fire around 120 missiles that night. However, Israel and its allies were able to intervene in half of this. In other words, a single Ghadr missile escaped from around 60-65 missiles and aimed those mini warheads at the target.
The US and its allies should have destroyed the Ghadr missile in the launch or intermediate phase before it reached the terminal phase. Once the missile enters the terminal phase, it begins to "scatter" its warheads while diving.
For missile defense, the US used warships with this capability off the coast of Israel and Yemen, and missile defense systems stationed in Erbil and the Gulf countries. (Of course, we are making general assumptions here. However, in Saudi Arabia, they probably only used radars, etc. Otherwise, it does not appear that there was an active intervention.)
However, there are a few fine details here. First of all, this entire missile defense ecosystem (missile defense batteries and early warning radars and sensors stationed in Qatar-Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries) was used in "peacetime".
Fighterjet taking off from Gulf countries, Iraq and US aircraft carriers also took off in "peacetime". This is where the importance of war diplomacy and the involvement of countries in war comes into play.
The propaganda of Israel and its allies is that Arab countries are fully mobilized to defend them. However, such a thing is not the case.
Jordan had not opened its airspace to anyone. And fihterjets were patrolling the air not only for Iranian kamikaze but also for Israeli fighterjets.
Likewise, the United Arab Emirates did not cooperate with the USA and its allies against Iran's attack. There is no confirmed news that even the Saudis are cooperating with the coalition countries.
Therefore, if a state of war really occurs, Iran will ask its neighbors who have US military bases in their country to pacify the US military presence if they do not want to be a party to the war.
This also means that the data flow from the Kürecik Radar base to the USA should be actively cut off, and the radars in the Gulf countries should not lock Iran's air and missile assets.
Likewise, US fighterjets cannot take off from these countries, otherwise these countries will become parties to the war. It seems unlikely that Iran will go to war with the Gulf countries as long as they do not pose a threat to its existence.
As soon as the sensor-radar and missile defense batteries (Thaad-Patriot missile defense systems, etc.) that are a part of the missile defense systems in all countries in the region are pacified, the USA and its allies will be like birds with broken wings.
Even if they don't turn into birds, the US missile defense system assets that are so close to Iran are within artillery range in Erbil, for example. To protect all these systems, you need to assign a special Iron Dome to each of them.
Even if you achieve such a thing, all these beings will still be the subject of a small war of their own and will face a dilemma of whether to protect Israel or themselves.
I think it is now known to everyone that Israel and its allies, who cannot prevent a potential nuclear attack with ballistic missiles even in peace, will not even come close to being successful in war.
If we look at the different potential consequences of the issue based on a single event, if the Nevatim airbase that was hit was actually hit by a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead; (Unless Israel had a different air base-fleet structure that could carry out a nuclear attack, unlike F-35 warplanes) the air force leg of the nuclear trilogy would be history.
@Kartal1 @Zafer @Gary @Afif @NEKO
