NATO Missile Defense Radar(Türkiye)

Saithan

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Tom Z. Collina

After an extended delay, the U.S. Department of State announced on Sept. 2 that Turkey had agreed to host an early-warning radar as a key part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the Obama administration’s plan for missile defense in Europe.

U.S. officials have said they expect the radar to be deployed at a military base in Kurecik, about 435 miles from Iran, by the end of the year. The radar, along with the March deployment to the Mediterranean Sea of the USS Monterey, armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IA missile interceptors, would complete the first phase of the administration’s missile defense plans.

Other elements of the administration’s missile defense plans for NATO also have recently fallen into place. On Sept. 13, Romania signed an agreement with the United States to deploy 24 SM-3 IB missile interceptors at Deveselu Air Base in 2015. The pact still has to be ratified by the Romanian parliament. In addition, a U.S.-Polish agreement that entered into force on Sept. 15 would place SM-3 Block IIA interceptors at a base near Redzikowo in 2018. Both agreements were expected and are consistent with previously announced plans.

The U.S. desire to put an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar in Turkey has been known for more than a year, but Ankara had delayed its decision in an apparent attempt to avoid a conflict with Iran, against whose missiles the NATO interceptor system would be aimed. Ankara had been seeking to position itself as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement regretting Turkey’s decision, saying it would “create tension” and cause “complicated consequences.”

Turkey also was seeking assurances from the United States that information from the radar would not be shared with Israel, a restriction opposed by many in the U.S. Congress. Israeli-Turkish relations have soured since Jerusalem’s raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla in 2010. U.S. officials said that no promise was made to Ankara regarding data sharing with Jerusalem. “It’s a U.S. radar,” a senior official told reporters on Sept. 15, adding, “Nothing in any of the agreements restricts our ability to defend the state of Israel.” A similar U.S. radar is already deployed in Israel.

Ankara appears to have a different interpretation. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said in an interview Sept. 18 that information gathered by the radar would be available only to NATO members. “We will provide support only for systems that belong to NATO and are used solely by members of NATO,” he said. Israel is not a NATO member.

The Russian Foreign Ministry responded to the U.S.-Turkish radar agreement Sept. 2 by noting the “continued lack of progress in the Russia-NATO dialogue” on missile defense cooperation “due to the stubborn reluctance” of the United States and NATO to consider Russia “as an equal partner.” Moscow reiterated its demand for the United States and NATO to provide “solid, legally binding assurances that their missile defenses in Europe would not be directed at Russian strategic nuclear forces.”

Moscow is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy hundreds of increasingly capable SM-3 missile interceptors by 2020 at sea and on land as part of the phased approach, which NATO approved last November to counter the missile threat that allies expect to emerge from Iran. Russia agreed to work with NATO to seek areas of cooperation, such as sharing information on third-party missile launches and conducting joint exercises. The Pentagon has been interested in gaining access to data from Russian radars located northwest of Iran, such as the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan, that could provide useful tracking information on Iranian missiles that could be launched toward Europe or the United States.

Moscow has made it clear that it would be unwilling to pursue additional nuclear arms reductions with Washington unless its concerns about NATO’s missile interceptor plans are addressed. The United States and Russia met in Brussels in June to seek a compromise, but the talks were not successful. (See ACT, July/August 2011.) The effort stalled, officials said, because the United States and NATO could not convince Moscow that NATO would not use the system to intercept Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Speaking at a conference in Copenhagen on Sept. 5, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder said Russia’s desire for a legally binding agreement was a “stumbling block we need to remove…. [The United States] can’t sign such an agreement.” Daalder said NATO was working on a compromise “in the form of a political statement” that makes it clear that the NATO system “is directed against a threat coming from outside Europe, not against Russia.”

Meanwhile, on Sept. 1, Raytheon’s new SM-3 IB missile, planned for deployment in Romania and at sea in 2015, failed to intercept a target during its first flight test, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced. The SM-3 IB is an upgrade of the SM-3 IA interceptor now deployed on the Monterey and other Aegis ships. Also last month, the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee zeroed out funding for the SM-3 IIB interceptor from its version of the fiscal year 2012 spending bill, in part because of problems with the SM-3 IB.

The SM-3 IB test missile was launched from the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie in the Pacific Ocean minutes after a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from Kauai, Hawaii, 574 miles away. “An intercept of the target was not achieved,” an MDA statement said. Agency officials are conducting a review of the test failure, the MDA said.

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I don't think this was shared earlier, though we all heard about it and know about it. But could forget these installations and their importance.

With the tensions in ME, it's important not to forget the data and intelligence sharing that is occuring especially not when double standards and amoral behavior is running rampant.
 

Kartal1

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Tom Z. Collina

After an extended delay, the U.S. Department of State announced on Sept. 2 that Turkey had agreed to host an early-warning radar as a key part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, the Obama administration’s plan for missile defense in Europe.

U.S. officials have said they expect the radar to be deployed at a military base in Kurecik, about 435 miles from Iran, by the end of the year. The radar, along with the March deployment to the Mediterranean Sea of the USS Monterey, armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IA missile interceptors, would complete the first phase of the administration’s missile defense plans.

Other elements of the administration’s missile defense plans for NATO also have recently fallen into place. On Sept. 13, Romania signed an agreement with the United States to deploy 24 SM-3 IB missile interceptors at Deveselu Air Base in 2015. The pact still has to be ratified by the Romanian parliament. In addition, a U.S.-Polish agreement that entered into force on Sept. 15 would place SM-3 Block IIA interceptors at a base near Redzikowo in 2018. Both agreements were expected and are consistent with previously announced plans.

The U.S. desire to put an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar in Turkey has been known for more than a year, but Ankara had delayed its decision in an apparent attempt to avoid a conflict with Iran, against whose missiles the NATO interceptor system would be aimed. Ankara had been seeking to position itself as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement regretting Turkey’s decision, saying it would “create tension” and cause “complicated consequences.”

Turkey also was seeking assurances from the United States that information from the radar would not be shared with Israel, a restriction opposed by many in the U.S. Congress. Israeli-Turkish relations have soured since Jerusalem’s raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla in 2010. U.S. officials said that no promise was made to Ankara regarding data sharing with Jerusalem. “It’s a U.S. radar,” a senior official told reporters on Sept. 15, adding, “Nothing in any of the agreements restricts our ability to defend the state of Israel.” A similar U.S. radar is already deployed in Israel.

Ankara appears to have a different interpretation. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said in an interview Sept. 18 that information gathered by the radar would be available only to NATO members. “We will provide support only for systems that belong to NATO and are used solely by members of NATO,” he said. Israel is not a NATO member.

The Russian Foreign Ministry responded to the U.S.-Turkish radar agreement Sept. 2 by noting the “continued lack of progress in the Russia-NATO dialogue” on missile defense cooperation “due to the stubborn reluctance” of the United States and NATO to consider Russia “as an equal partner.” Moscow reiterated its demand for the United States and NATO to provide “solid, legally binding assurances that their missile defenses in Europe would not be directed at Russian strategic nuclear forces.”

Moscow is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy hundreds of increasingly capable SM-3 missile interceptors by 2020 at sea and on land as part of the phased approach, which NATO approved last November to counter the missile threat that allies expect to emerge from Iran. Russia agreed to work with NATO to seek areas of cooperation, such as sharing information on third-party missile launches and conducting joint exercises. The Pentagon has been interested in gaining access to data from Russian radars located northwest of Iran, such as the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan, that could provide useful tracking information on Iranian missiles that could be launched toward Europe or the United States.

Moscow has made it clear that it would be unwilling to pursue additional nuclear arms reductions with Washington unless its concerns about NATO’s missile interceptor plans are addressed. The United States and Russia met in Brussels in June to seek a compromise, but the talks were not successful. (See ACT, July/August 2011.) The effort stalled, officials said, because the United States and NATO could not convince Moscow that NATO would not use the system to intercept Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Speaking at a conference in Copenhagen on Sept. 5, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder said Russia’s desire for a legally binding agreement was a “stumbling block we need to remove…. [The United States] can’t sign such an agreement.” Daalder said NATO was working on a compromise “in the form of a political statement” that makes it clear that the NATO system “is directed against a threat coming from outside Europe, not against Russia.”

Meanwhile, on Sept. 1, Raytheon’s new SM-3 IB missile, planned for deployment in Romania and at sea in 2015, failed to intercept a target during its first flight test, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced. The SM-3 IB is an upgrade of the SM-3 IA interceptor now deployed on the Monterey and other Aegis ships. Also last month, the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee zeroed out funding for the SM-3 IIB interceptor from its version of the fiscal year 2012 spending bill, in part because of problems with the SM-3 IB.

The SM-3 IB test missile was launched from the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie in the Pacific Ocean minutes after a short-range ballistic missile target was launched from Kauai, Hawaii, 574 miles away. “An intercept of the target was not achieved,” an MDA statement said. Agency officials are conducting a review of the test failure, the MDA said.

____________________________________________________

I don't think this was shared earlier, though we all heard about it and know about it. But could forget these installations and their importance.

With the tensions in ME, it's important not to forget the data and intelligence sharing that is occuring especially not when double standards and amoral behavior is running rampant.
The early warning radar in Kurecik was active during the Iran-Israel standoff. While the information is sent to a NATO HQ in Berlin first, there it is no 100% guarantee that information gathered by the radar was not shared with other parties too (there is a clause in the agreement prohibiting this).
 

Huelague

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The early warning radar in Kurecik was active during the Iran-Israel standoff. While the information is sent to a NATO HQ in Berlin first, there it is no 100% guarantee that information gathered by the radar was not shared with other parties too (there is a clause in the agreement prohibiting this).
Of course, US shared the information with Israel.
 

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Of course when us care for own and isreal they will act as fast as possible.
Question remain: Why Turkiye helping? :(
Both isreal and usa are acting as hostile as it is possible when topic is Turkiye.


Why Turkiye for once does not act accordingly thier behaviour!? Just delay deployment of usa radar. Make anything which suit only Turkiye
 

Saithan

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Of course when us care for own and isreal they will act as fast as possible.
Question remain: Why Turkiye helping? :(
Both isreal and usa are acting as hostile as it is possible when topic is Turkiye.


Why Turkiye for once does not act accordingly thier behaviour!? Just delay deployment of usa radar. Make anything which suit only Turkiye
The radar was deployed long ago. What we need to do is uncover the sharing of intel and take control of where the intel gets sent first.

mainly
 

Saithan

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No intelligence provided to Israel

In the meantime, Defense Ministry officials denied that the radar station based in Malatya, in eastern Anatolia, has shared the intelligence gathered on the night Iran attacked Israel with the Israeli officials.

“The radar in Kürecik was installed totally for our national security and the protection of NATO allies. All the information gathered by the radar system is shared with NATO allies in line with NATO procedures. Sharing this information with non-NATO countries is out of the question,” they stated.

On a question, the officials’ said Türkiye has taken all the necessary measures during the Iranian retaliation against Israeli targets over the weekend.

Sorry, but this is just lipservice from the officials, I seriously doubt anyone from TAF is present in that HQ in Germany and oversees that no information is shared with Israel.

Only way to ensure that intelligence sharing doesn't occur is if the HQ for the radar is in Türkeye.
 

Bogeyman 

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The early warning radar in Kurecik was active during the Iran-Israel standoff. While the information is sent to a NATO HQ in Berlin first, there it is no 100% guarantee that information gathered by the radar was not shared with other parties too (there is a clause in the agreement prohibiting this).
Radar data can be filtered with software. Just because the radar is under US control does not mean that it can use it as it wishes.
 

Saithan

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Radar data can be filtered with software. Just because the radar is under US control does not mean that it can use it as it wishes.
I am not sure, I understand what you are saying.

Are you saying that the data from the radar that gets sent directly to Germany can not be passed on to Israel (in real time).
 

Bogeyman 

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I am not sure, I understand what you are saying.

Are you saying that the data from the radar that gets sent directly to Germany can not be passed on to Israel (in real time).
Unfortunately, I forgot the details about the subject. But I remember the data was filtered.
 

Saithan

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Unfortunately, I forgot the details about the subject. But I remember the data was filtered.
It's not that I don't believe you.

But you have to admit that it's hard to believe that our so called allies not sharing information or intel with Israel from a radar located on Turkish soil where the data gets sent to Germany doesn't sound realistic.

Especially if we don't have high ranking officers present in German HQ where these data are sent to.

And when our Officer went to the rest room, the so called allies could have past it on to Israel in 2 minutes.
 

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Kind of makes it even funnier in the context of erdogan screaming at Isreal full well knowing information gathering facilities exist on Turkish soil that will help Isreal foil any attack.

But the real issue is not about information being shared with Isreal, the real issue is why do we do so much for nations who are actively supporting our enemies like the PKK?

Iran is no friend of Turks nor Muslims, there battles are not our battles, but we cant allow others to benefit so cheaply from us.
 

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