Full article at:
https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/blog/four-day-near-peer-air-war
The Four-Day Near-Peer Air War
Peter Layton
Griffith University and Australian Defence Force
Evaluation
India achieved its initially stated aim of damaging the assessed terrorist camps on the first night. In contrast, Pakistan’s retaliatory attacks were not just ineffectual but demonstrated that India’s air defence systems were effective. India’s additional attacks after the first night further suggested India could potentially readily gain air superiority over eastern Pakistan through an offensive counter-air campaign (Organiser, 2025). While Pakistan’s fighters could defend against Indian crewed aircraft attacks, the nation’s air defence system could not comprehensively prevent rocket, missile and drone attacks. Pakistan’s eastern airbases would become unusable if hostilities continued. The four-day air war became an air superiority battle that India implicitly won.
Implications
The four-day air war continued the trend of the last few years of crewed combat aircraft being just one of the means air operations now use (Layton, 2025b). Crewed aircraft are now being used increasingly cautiously with rockets, missiles and drones instead picking up more and more of the warfighting burden. This increased use of dissimilar means dramatic changes for air defences as fighter aircraft alone are no longer sufficient. Ground-based surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns and electronic warfare jammers are now essential, even if many of each are needed to provide area coverage or to defend multiple widespread point targets.
Pakistan’s fighter success highlights that third party targeting is likely in future fighter-versus-fighter engagements. An AEW&C aircraft or a ground-based radar may be distant but will now present a threat in being able to cue and guide air-to-air missiles launched by radar-silent fighters. In electronic warfare terms, not just the higher frequency radars of hostile fighter aircraft will need to be countered but also the lower frequency radars of these now potential cueing systems.
Third party targeting also means longer range air-to-air engagements will become common. This reinforces the decades-long trend of shorter range visual engagements becoming rare (Stillion, 2015). Moreover, it suggests aircraft flying near national borders could be engaged by hostile aircraft that remain even well inside their own territorial airspace. Borders are becoming wide potential weapons engagement zones, perhaps 150km or more deep.
The short sharp air war between India and Pakistan fits into the broad trends shaping air warfare. Air superiority still matters but now requires both defending against, and attacking with, rockets, missiles and drones. Crewed aircraft are no longer enough, making embracing heterogenous airpower important (Layton, 2025a). Air power is constantly evolving. Air forces need to as well.