Mil Intelligence Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Bogeyman 

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In 2015 a prominent Russian specialist advised me to never underestimate Russia’s intentions regarding Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW). Since 1991 Russian developments within TNW doctrine show a clear intent to maintain an active, and deployable, tactical nuclear arsenal unbound by Western morality. In 2015 Russia had the capability and intent, but not the opportunity to use them. A lot has changed since that 2015 conversation, not least Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which has seen debates about their use resurface.

This paper argues that Russian TNW are not a new threat nor one that will go away. Russia views TNW as a battlefield capability which is a doctrinally available option in conventional warfare. Russia’s intent is conceptually different to the West; they view TNW as a form of coercion and, crucially, as a form of de-escalation. The West should be mindful that ‘cornering’ Russia may result in a nuclear show of force that stretches beyond Western conventional warfare.

Capability

For most, 1991 signalled the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union collapsed and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia could deploy.1 The strategic nuclear ‘triad’ of heavy bombers, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had been curtailed. The world busied itself with Operation Desert Storm, the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty, the Euro single currency, and the 1990s. Russia largely become an afterthought as the West focused on other things.

However, Russia was not as stagnant as it had the world believe. Its military reforms (now well documented) modernised Russian defence and capitalised on the fact that TNW were not included in the arms reduction agreements. This was in part driven by a Western belief that they had no real function2 either on the battlefield or as a deterrent.3

In 1993 Russia began to show signs that, unlike the United States, the UK, and France, it had no intentions of decreasing its nuclear arsenal. Russia abandoned Brezhnev’s ‘no first use’ policy.4. By 2008 Russian military reforms improved their nuclear arsenal and breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 19875 and withdrew from Russo-American discussions such as the Nuclear Security Summit.6 The Russian military began conducting training in nuclear exercises where the scenarios often simulated a threat from Eastern Europe.7

Army2016demo-075.jpg


By 2009 Russia’s last nuclear inhibition was abandoned and Russia did not include the no first use clause in their military doctrine that prohibited the use of TNW against non-nuclear countries.8 This significant change in posture, along with the evolving capability and the emphasis in military doctrine, placed Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ in a compromising situation.9

The capability of TNW do not pose an existential threat to nations and they were originally designed for local use and to compensate for shortfalls in conventional firepower.10. During the post-Cold War era the US prioritised technological advances in the fields of precision-guided weapons and integrated command and control systems. To offset the advantage in high-tech conventional weapons Russia modernised its TNW arsenal. It replaced the Scud missile system with the Iskander-M12 Today, it is estimated that Russia has 2,000 TNW in its arsenal with the majority aimed towards Eastern Europe.13 Conversely the United States is estimated to possess about 200 TNW in Europe spread across five different NATO nations.1415

Intent

The purpose of TNW range from deterrent to intentional deployment. It can be argued that the presence of TNW is a threat in itself. Their strategic positioning allows for nuclear coercion extending Russia’s control across borders. If Ukraine had not agreed to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and maintained the remnants of Soviet nuclear weapons, Russia’s 2022 invasion may have developed differently. Instead Russia can use TNW to create asymmetric stand-off with conventionally superior NATO forces whilst delivering a means to pressurise non-nuclear post-Soviet states.16

Russian mentality is different to that of the West. Whilst nuclear weapons have not been used since World War Two that does not account for intent. In 1991 Yeltsin entertained the idea of a preventive nuclear strike on Ukraine. 8 years later it was also considered in Chechnya. Of the former it is crucial to note that it was dismissed because of the political turmoil of the time and not for moral reasons.17.

Russian Law of Defence allows the use of Russian military forces outside of the Russian Federation for the following tasks: To counter an attack against the armed forces of the Russian Federation and to counter or prevent aggression against another government and to protect Russian citizens abroad. This encompasses an extremely large, and global, demographic and Putin was quoted “When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens I am referring to those people who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community, they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people”. 18 Russia is careful to include that such measures may be to counter as well as also to prevent aggression. Incidents and pretexts are easily created or found.19 For Russia, the concept of deploying nuclear weapons is not limited to extreme situations or regional conflicts, they can be used in a local or small-scale war.

There are numerous courses of action that could see Russia deploy TNW. First is the 2000 doctrinal amendment which states that TNW can be used as a means of shocking adversaries into military ‘de-escalation’, should a crisis escalate and Russia loses situational control. Second is a misunderstanding of the military situation due to poor analysis of intelligence or misinformation, as seen in 1962 and the Cuban missile crisis. Third is a breakdown in command and control. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, the use of TNW can be delegated down to local commanders or other nations, which does not allow for central control.20 The lack of training and experience, exacerbated by chaos of battle, increases the chance of unauthorized or accidental use. The ‘escalate to de-escalate’ seems the most rational possibility, given how the invasion of Ukraine is playing out.

Opportunity

The development of TNW capability and doctrinal intent suggests that the Russian psychology towards TNW differs from that of the West. Russia views TNW as another weapon to be deployed on the battlefield. The evidence suggests that the morality of their use is considered second to pragmatism, if it is considered at all. The expansion of NATO, in terms of geography, capability, and support to countries such as Ukraine, has aggravated Russia offering new opportunities. To date, Russian doctrinal changes have coincided with its perception of increased threat and now there is a realistic possibility of their use. We can see from the current invasion of Ukraine that the escalation process is already in motion. Be it the long term deployment of American TNW in Europe or now arming Ukraine with lethal aid, the combination of these are likely to offer Russia an opportunity to use TNW.

‘Opportunity’ may also arise through the inaction of an adversary. The West has previously stated a ‘red line’ when it comes to use of chemical weapons, but recent examples show that such statements often fall flat. In 2013, then Vice President Biden exclaimed that Syria ‘must be held accountable’ for use of chemical weapons. Within weeks the US ‘got cold feet about using force’, an act seen as having subsequently ‘emboldened’ President Bashar al-Assad.21 In March 2022, now President Biden repeated his claim that use of chemical weapons would come at a ‘severe price’, this time in relation to President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.22 It is likely that Putin will see this not as a threat but as permission. The lack of detail as to how exactly the West would respond serves only to confirm that, like 2013, there is no planned response. From a Russian perspective, the use of prohibited weapons of mass destruction (chemical, nuclear, or biological) are not red lines for Russia, but for the West. Putin tends to be unambiguous in his use of language, making his intentions clear, as detailed in his essay of July 2021.23 Therefore the West needs a smarter response to meet the growing threat of weapons which break international law; timely and specific enough to deter the threat, realistic enough to be carried through, and measured enough so as to be immune to misinformation and propaganda. If the West already has a response in mind then it needs to be communicated clearly and in a way that Putin understands.

Conclusion

In 2015, I, and I suspect many Russia watchers, concluded that whilst the deployment of TNW remained a realistic possibility it was not believed to be a short-term threat. Russia had not sought to use TNW in Georgia, Crimea, or the first (2014) invasion of Ukraine. In the long-term the prevalent concern was not TNW but the modernisation of the Russian military. In 2015 it was considered weak, fragmented, and in the flux of reforms and was unlikely to become tactically superior for some time. However a greater TNW capability, alongside a reformed conventional force, would pose a threat to the West.

The right question to ask in 2015, given the development of Russian conventional, TNW, and enduring START capabilities, is how would NATO respond to the emergence of a credible Russian military machine backed up by revised doctrine and as psychologically committed to maintaining Russia’s influence on the global stage?

It was exactly this question that flashed across my mind when, on 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. It is both surprising and unsurprising to have witnessed the ongoing crisis. The former because the world believed Russian forces to be far superior to the capabilities they have since shown. The latter because the difficulties they have encountered echo those of Georgia 2008. Ironically, when assessing purely TNW, the lack of conventional capability (along with the expertise of the Ukrainian forces) may only serve to push the deployment of battlefield nuclear missiles higher up the agenda, as was mooted in March 2022.24 The deployment of TNW in order to make up shortfalls in conventional capability may not be the military prowess that Russia seeks, but it does place the West between a rock and a hard place.

Russia possesses the capability and doctrine, and intent to use TNW as a coercion or de-escalation tactic. The opportunity will be measured against how Russia views the actions and inactions of their adversaries. The West must maintain balance and ensure that the military situation is viewed with the mentality that Russian escalation and use of TNW is considered very differently to the West. It is different because Russia has a perspective on the world where they are oppressed and subjugated, that control over the Near Abroad is crucial to their survival. This perspective has been born out of history and magnified under the leadership of Putin who, when backed into a corner, will always opt to come out fighting.25 The Russians are a fiercely proud nation, and proud people do not like to be embarrassed.


Footnotes​

  1. United States Department of State Website, “New START”, United States Department of State, 16 July 2015
  2. Marcel H. Van Herpen. “Russia’s Embrace of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Its Negative Impact on U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions” Cicero Foundation 11/04, 2011
  3. These weapons were subject to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), an informal policy at best and one that Russia does not deem legally binding. Studies in European Security and Strategy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Euro-Atlantic Security: The Future of NATO (Routledge, 2013)
  4. Strategic Studies Institute. Russian Military Politics and Russia’s Defence Doctrine 2010. (Strategic Studies Institute, 2011)
  5. Karl-Heinz Kamp. “Nuclear Implications of the Russian Ukrainian Conflict”, NATO Defence College Research Paper, 2015
  6. Karl-Heinz Kamp. “Nuclear Implications of the Russian Ukrainian Conflict”, NATO Defence College Research Paper, 2015
  7. Russian troops within the Southern Military District are assessed to have been exercising in drills with the missile since 2015.
  8. signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty Designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and currently signed by 172 nations
  9. The Lithuanian Minister of Defence stated in 2011 that “Lithuania is concerned about the accumulation of tactical nuclear weapons at its frontiers, especially in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (…)”. Marcel H. Van Herpen. “Russia’s Embrace of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Its Negative Impact on U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions” Cicero Foundation 11/04, 2011
  10. ibid
  11. The missile delivery system is road-mobile, capable of being equipped with a nuclear warhead capability and has a delivery range of between 50 and 500 km. The launch carrier consists of two missiles, each independently targetable against fixed and moving targets, such as a tank column or convoy, within seconds. The optically guided warhead can also be controlled by a coded radio signal, which can be transmitted from an AWACS or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), providing a self-homing capability. The missile, after receiving an image of the target, locks on and travels towards it at supersonic speed. Unknown Author. “Why Is It Difficult to Defend against Ballistic Missiles” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 March 1999[/note] and the Kalibr missile (land and sea).11Gordon Corera, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” BBC, March 16, 2020 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60664169
  12. Unknown Author. “Why Is It Difficult to Defend against Ballistic Missiles” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 March 1999
  13. Arms Control Association website, “NATO Struggles to Define New Nuclear Doctrine”, dated Sep 10, accessed 12 Oct 15
  14. Unknown Author. “The Current Status” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 11 February 2015
  15. Marcel H. Van Herpen. “Russia’s Embrace of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Its Negative Impact on U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions” Cicero Foundation 11/04, 2011
  16. Marcel H. Van Herpen. “Russia’s Embrace of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Its Negative Impact on U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions” Cicero Foundation 11/04, 2011
  17. The New York Times and Office of the President of Russia, “Putin Vows to ‘Actively Defend’ Russians Living Abroad”, The Atlantic Council, July 2, 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blo...ows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad.
  18. Marcel H. Van Herpen. “Russia’s Embrace of Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Its Negative Impact on U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions” Cicero Foundation 11/04, 2011
  19. Thompson, Loren. “Four Ways the Ukraine Cruise Could Escalate to the Use of Nuclear Weapons” Forbes Business, 24 April 2014
  20. James Politi, Henry Foy, John Paul Rathbone, “US and Allies Weigh ‘Red Lines’ in Putin’s Assault on Ukraine”, March 16, 2022 https://www.ft.com/content/b8f53766-aa15-4d31-922c-f72f8ea68854
  21. BBC, “Ukraine: NATO will respond if Russia Uses Chemical Weapons, warns Biden”, BBC, March 25, 2020 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60870771
  22. Peter Dickinson, “Putin’s New Ukraine Essay Reveals Imperial Ambitions”, July 15, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blo...ew-ukraine-essay-reflects-imperial-ambitions/
  23. Gordon Corera, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” BBC, March 16, 2020 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60664169
  24. As a child Putin would kill rats by ‘bottling’ them. A particularly large rat, having been cornered, went on the attack because it had no other option. Putin claims that this was a pivotal point in his childhood and it became a philosophy he has always adopted. Putin, V., Gevorkyan, N., Timakova, N., Kolesnikov, A. First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs Books 2000).
 

Bogeyman 

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gettyimages-1240502878_slide-26a8d7b70af7401d8c21f20a81d7e49d16347d09-s800-c85.jpeg

A Russian Iskander-M missile launcher parades through Red Square in central Moscow on May 7, 2022. The Iskander is one of several Russian systems that can launch nuclear weapons.


Russia's nuclear arsenal is huge, but will Putin use it?​


For decades, the threat of nuclear armageddon has kept Russia and the West out of a direct confrontation. The prospect of global nuclear war has been a line that neither side is willing to cross.

But now, analysts who study Russia's nuclear strategy say they are increasingly worried that this stark nuclear line is becoming blurred. As Russia's conventional war in Ukraine falters, thanks in large part to Western weapons and training, some see an effort to bend nuclear deterrence to fit the current conflict. Others say that long-standing policies in Russia might encourage nuclear use to prevent it from losing the war.

With neither side showing signs of backing down, the possibility of a nuclear strike appears more real than it has in decades.

"We are at this fairly dangerous junction," says Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research who tracks Russia's nuclear forces. Podvig says he thinks the likelihood Russia would use a nuclear weapon is "extremely low." But he adds, "I do worry."

Diverging Doctrines

At the height of the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union amassed enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Many were so-called "strategic" weapons — large warheads delivered by submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles — and designed to be used in a global thermonuclear war.

But the two nations also had thousands of "tactical" nuclear weapons that could be smaller in size and were able to be delivered by planes, short-range missiles or even artillery. NATO powers prepared to use such weapons, for example, if they were faced with an overwhelming conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe.

By the 1990s, the U.S. had largely given up on tactical nuclear weapons. New, more precise conventional weapons had the same long-range strike capability with none of the radioactive fallout. And the tactical nukes were seen as a security risk — because they were smaller and more portable, terrorists might more easily get their hands on one.

Russia, however, decided to keep its tactical arsenal, says Anya Fink, a research scientist at the Center for Naval Analysis who has studied Russian nuclear doctrine. The decision has been driven in large part by what the Russian military sees as a vast gap in conventional weapons technology.

"For Russia, nuclear weapons, in particular non-strategic nuclear weapons, are really intended to counterbalance what they see as U.S. and NATO conventional superiority," Fink says.

Today, Russia is believed to have the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, including 1,000-2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, says Hans Kristensen, head of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington think tank. While the public often imagines tactical nukes as smaller weapons, Kristensen says the Russian arsenal is diverse. "They have a very wide range of explosive yields, going up to a couple of hundred of kilotons – so much more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb," he says.

Rattling the Saber

At the start of the Ukraine conflict, Russian President Vladimir Putin put his nuclear forces on a "special mode of combat duty." It was later determined that the move did little more than boost staffing at nuclear weapons sites. Still, as the invasion began, it was a clear reminder to the West of Russia's powerful nuclear deterrent.

To a certain extent, that classic nuclear deterrence has been effective at containing the Ukraine war, says Olga Oliker, the Director of Europe and Central Asia for the International Crisis Group.

"We have seen nuclear deterrence work, on the part of both Russia and Western countries," she says. So far NATO troops are not fighting inside Ukraine, and Russia isn't attacking neighboring NATO countries either.

But as Russia's war has stalled, thanks in large part to supplies from the West, Putin has renewed his nuclear threats. During a speech in late September, as he annexed Ukrainian land, Putin said more directly that he might be willing to consider a nuclear strike in the current conflict.

"In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us," he said. "This is not a bluff."

Oliker says in part, the renewed talk of nuclear weapons may be an effort to compel the West to reduce or stop its shipments of supplies to Ukraine. In other words, Putin is seeking to push his nuclear deterrence to do more. "Russia keeps trying to have the deterrence go a little bit further," she says.

But the statements also hint that Putin may be trying to expand the territory he can defend with nukes. Russia recently annexed four regions of Ukraine. Fink says Russia's official policy is that it would only use nuclear weapons to defend its own territory:

"The big question is, 'Are the parts of Ukraine that Russia has attempted to join to itself Russian territory or not?'"

Nuclear use

Fink says that she still believes that Putin is unlikely to take the war nuclear. As the drone and cruise missile strikes of the past week illustrate, Russia has plenty of powerful conventional weapons it can use to attack Ukraine.

"There's other ways to make a point to the Ukrainians that don't have to do with the use of nuclear weapons," she says.


ap22283683311732_slide-efe1a56469d135b001f1b35f0b995cc609ae4f4a-s800-c85.jpg

A Russian warship launches a non-nuclear cruise missile at a target in Ukraine. Experts say Russia would probably use a single tactical nuclear weapon as a signal before escalating further.


But Matthew Kroenig a professor of international relations at Georgetown University thinks that the conflict is moving in a way that may push Putin closer to making that fateful choice. With Ukraine on the offensive, Russia's conventional military forces depleted and a chaotic conscription process underway at home, he says, Putin is likely to face more and more domestic political pressure.

"I think as his position gets more dire, the more willing he might be to gamble for resurrection with nuclear use," Kroenig says.

If Russia did decide to respond with a nuclear strike, most experts agree they wouldn't use their weapons in an attack against frontline Ukrainian troops. Tactical nukes were originally designed to take out big juicy Cold War-era targets: such as columns of armored tanks, or aircraft carriers. Ukraine's forces are spread out. Putin would have to use a bunch of little nukes, which would create a radioactive mess his troops would also have to deal with.

More likely, says Fink, is that Russia would decide to use a single nuclear weapon to try and freeze the conflict. That weapon could be used as a demonstration, over the Black Sea or even at a test site inside of Russia. Or it could be against any one of a number of fixed targets inside Ukraine, such as those the Russian military has hit with cruise missiles and drones in recent days.

Podvig worries that given the resolve of Ukraine and the West, Putin will choose to do something more extreme.

For the use of a nuclear weapon to be shocking, "You really need to make it clear that you are willing to target civilians, and that means, to put it bluntly, killing a lot of people," he says.

Kroenig says that if Russia did use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, he believes the U.S. would have to respond with force, otherwise "we essentially teach Putin and the world that nuclear coercion pays." He believes a conventional strike, perhaps on the military unit that launched the nuke, would send a powerful message.

Olga Olikar says such a strike would carry huge risks.

"I think the Russians would see a conventional attack on their nuclear capacity, as effectively a nuclear attack," she says. Things could escalate further from there.

But Oliker points out that all of this is still highly theoretical. She hopes that the two sides will still find a way to begin de-escalating the conflict.

"If I try to tell myself a story of how to get there, it requires a whole bunch of leaps and jumps," she says. "But the path to global thermonuclear war also has some leaps and jumps."
 
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