HOW AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH PAKISTAN CAN HELP IT DEAL WITH TURKEY
In its ties with Turkey, the United States finds itself in a classic Catch-22. Turkish foreign policy often runs afoul of U.S. interests. However, Ankara is also a member of NATO, America’s most important alliance. Thus, any move to punish Ankara for threatening Western interests would weaken the Turkish military and undermine the longstanding U.S. policy goal of increasing the capabilities of its allies, especially those facing Russia along NATO’s eastern flank.
Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air and missile defense system is a perfect example of Washington’s dilemma. In December 2017, Ankara finalized an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of the S-400. In response, the United States removed Turkey from participation in the F-35 fighter aircraft program, because the S-400 can collect valuable electronic intelligence on the West’s newest jet. This outcome upended decades of Turkish planning for the future of its air force. While Ankara has plans to develop an indigenous fighter, any such program will likely be extremely expensive, face serious delays, and may not deliver enough fighter aircraft to replace its current inventory of F-16s. The problem now is to protect the F-35 from Russian exploitation — even after Turkey has taken ownership of the S-400 — while developing a mechanism to ensure Turkey can purchase new fighter aircraft.
America’s experience with another troublesome ally — Pakistan — might have valuable lessons for U.S. defense officials in dealing with Turkey. The United States has sold and upgraded F-16s to Pakistan since the 1980s despite Islamabad’s support for the Taliban and Haqqani Network, growing nuclear arsenal, and use of terrorist groups to attack India. In order to buy F-16s after 9/11, Pakistan agreed to a program that allows U.S. technical security teams to monitor the end-use of the aircraft. A similar program could serve as a model to keep tabs on any future Turkish use of the F-35 and ensure a highly circumscribed S-400 deployment. The application of this strategy to Turkey faces a number of challenges, particularly given the state of Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the United States and other Western countries. However, it may be the only realistic approach to protect the F-35 program and America’s interest in a capable Turkish Air Force.
The Threat of Sanctions and the American Counter-Offer
Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 ran afoul of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, a bipartisan sanctions package passed in August 2017 to limit President Donald Trump’s ability to unilaterally lift sanctions imposed on Russia for its interference in the 2016 election. The legislation requires the president to impose secondary sanctions on countries or individuals that engage in a “significant transaction” with any entity linked to Russia’s Ministry of Defense.
Buying a Russian-made air defense system most certainly met the definition of “significant transaction,” but Trump has ignored the law and resisted imposing sanctions on Ankara. In response, Congress has also sought to protect the F-35 from flying regularly in the same airspace as the S-400 to prevent Russia from gathering intelligence on America’s premier fighter aircraft. Turkey was a member of the F-35 consortium since 2001, paying an initial $175 million to help develop the jet. It invested hundreds of millions more throughout the F-35’s development for upgrades to Turkish bases in preparation to take ownership of at least 100 jets. A slew of Turkish companies also manufacture parts of the F-35 (including some where Turkish firms are the sole supplier) and Ankara was slated to be a hub for engine maintenance for F-35s sold to European countries (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom).
During Ankara’s negotiations with Moscow on the S-400 purchase, the United States warned Turkey that finalizing the agreement could lead to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program. Ankara ignored the warning, perhaps reasoning that it could create a mechanism to assuage U.S. concerns about Russia collecting electronic information about the aircraft so that it could operate both systems. This proved to be a bad bet. In the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United States commissioned a study to identify alternative suppliers to replace Turkish firms in the F-35 program. It then removed Turkey from the program altogether, blocked the transfer of the jet, and appropriated money for the U.S. Air Force to purchase the jets made for Turkey and upgrade them to meet American specifications.
The American approach did not rely solely on sticks. Between the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, when the study was first commissioned, and FY2020, when Ankara was officially removed from the program, the United States sought to offer Turkey an alternative air and missile defense system. The American proposal to Turkey for the export of two systems — the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System and the Patriot missile system — came amidst broader bilateral acrimony. Turkey detained American pastor Andrew Brunson and the tensions over his detainment reached as high as the White House. Still, despite this, the Trump administration convinced a Turkey-skeptical Congress to authorize the export of both systems. By this point, however, the U.S. offer was too late. Ankara and Moscow already reached an agreement on a Russian loan for the purchase of the S-400, and plans were underway to begin the training of Turkish crews in Russia to operate the system.
The Turkish government began to receive its S-400 from Russia in July 2019 and accepted final delivery of the first of two regiments in January 2020. During this delivery, Ankara went as far as to test the S-400 radar against the F-16 in a showy display of defiance, undoubtedly intended to signal to the United States that Turkey was committed to using the S-400 regardless of a potential U.S. backlash. However, Turkey’s calculations changed after a severe economic downturn and the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the face of a foreign exchange and public health crisis, Ankara delayed the deployment of the system in April. Moreover, Trump indicated that he would hold off on imposing sanctions if Ankara kept the system in storage.
Faced with U.S. sanctions, Ankara chose not to “activate” the S-400. This move was purely symbolic since Turkey had already tested the system against the F-16, stored the S-400 at Akinci Air Base, and trained crews to operate it. However, keeping the missile defense system in storage does not solve the problem. Instead, it merely diminishes the likelihood of Turkey ever receiving the F-35, especially since the decision to use the S-400 is pegged to the whims of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With Turkey now having taken ownership of the S-400 and would-be Turkish F-35s destined for the U.S. Air Force, the time has come to explore whether it is possible for the two allies to move past this deterioration in bilateral relations. A compromise to manage Turkey’s S-400 operation may not enable Turkey’s return to the F-35 consortium, but it could create a pathway to allow Ankara to purchase the jet later down the road.
Ankara will face a tough decision in a few years: If Turkey no longer has access to the F-35, what aircraft should replace its aging F-16s? It could opt to appropriate money to extend the life of some of its airframes, wait for a costly and economically uncertain effort to produce its own fighter, look to other countries to purchase a front-line fighter, or cobble together some amalgamation of each of these options. The United States has an interest in ensuring that the S-400 is the last piece of Russian defense kit that Turkey buys and that Ankara foregoes the purchase of a second S-400 regiment. From Washington’s perspective, Turkey should have the option to purchase Western fighters and even the F-35 eventually so long as a mechanism is put in place to ensure that the S-400 is not deployed.
The Pakistan F-16 Model
One option the United States should consider is the Pakistan model. Admittedly, it is rare — especially lately — for Pakistan to be held up as a good example of defense cooperation with the United States. Its longstanding ties to insurgent groups in Afghanistan and shadowy nuclear program have bedeviled the bilateral relationship for decades. Nevertheless, there is one area where Pakistan has been, in many respects, a model foreign customer, and that is in its F-16 program.
Pakistan’s 85 F-16s are a source of national pride and position the Pakistan Air Force among the world’s elite. The origins of the program date back to 1981 when, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States agreed to sell Pakistan F-16s to engage the Soviet and Afghan jets that periodically crossed the border to bomb mujahideen training camps. Between 1986 and 1990, Pakistani F-16s shot down at least 10 Afghan and Soviet jets, helicopters, and transport planes.
In the 1990s, the program fell victim to one of the periodic ruptures in the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Becoming ever more concerned about Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear program — and having lost interest in Afghanistan after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal — the United States refused to deliver 28 F-16s for which Pakistan had paid some $658 million. Although the United States eventually refunded much of the money, Islamabad harbored deep reservations about what it saw as America’s lack of trustworthiness as an ally.
