Actually according to Wikipedia they already operate at least 11 MRTP16s and other light boats in small quantities. Of course, it is not even near enough to patrol effectively Somali waters, but it is a start at least.Actually thinking a little we come to a simple conclusion;
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And few with these;
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Lastly, after a Navy is trained, few of these for rapid intervention.
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Minimal needed infastructure for maintenance, easy to operate, highly protected and agile systems for CO&IN and anti-piracy.
NTPB + Inspection Boats + Ares OPV. These two are very suitable to launch a Navy from scratch. NTPB is a multi-purpose, small craft that is easy to handle in shipyards (that can be even lifted and maintained on the Pier, not requiring a Dock. Or improve Inspection boats a little with a STAMP;
NTPB costs $10 million, each inspection boat goes as low as $1 million or even less, a larger variant with STAMP shall not cost a lot either and there are larger versions of the Inspection Boat.
We can subsidize them all, train the crew / personnel within 3 years and field in 5 years and then make of the costs. But prior to these, we need skilled fisherman and fisheries that can operate at those seas, utilize high tech equipment and marine research to make use of the sources. I am doubting if we have any enterprise level skilled fishermen, companies from north would be likely holders of the license we grant.
What we are probably going to do with the Somali Navy, we previously did in Libya to some extent. Libyan personnel came in Turkiye for training, but also the Turkish Navy regularly conducts training courses aimed at improvement of the professional qualities of the Libyan Navy/Coast Guard personnel. They have some limited capability to patrol their waters, they even successfully completed an EOD operation overseen by the Turkish Navy, but in Libya there is another problem that may be a common problem with what is to come in Somalia.
Many of the Libyan Navy/Coast Guard personnel are in contact with smugglers and criminal gangs busy with refugee smuggling. In this sense the operations regarding illegal migration are not as effective. I fear that a similar situation may erupt within the Somali Navy as it expands in both personnel number and technical capabilities. This is why we need to oversee the work of the intelligence and the public security forces of Somalia in order to prevent corruption or illegal collaboration with pirates or other smugglers as much as possible. This is of crucial importance so our investments regarding the security of Somali waters don't go in vain.
What I am happy about is that the Turkish Navy gradually expands its footprint and ensure its presence wherever there are Turkish interests. I am glad that the Navy is also getting new capabilities so we can provide security to our military and diplomatic missions along with securing effectively our business interests by showing our deterrence. Slowly, but surely we are getting there!