I don’t see a problem here: two AI-322F engines are cheaper than most other engines worldwide. This is a Soviet-era design from the 1980s, and if produced under license — for example, with a 10-year contract — the costs could be reduced even further. By 2032, the TF-10000 would also be ready and in serial production.
There is therefore no reason why costs should spiral out of control with two of these Ukrainian engines.
A single engine of this class only provides a thrust-to-weight ratio of about 0.30–0.40 (dry) or 0.50–0.60 (wet). That is not competitive for a loyal wingman concept — it is simply underpowered.
With two engines, however, the ratio would reach around 0.70–0.80 (dry) and 1.0–1.10 (wet).
A drone powered by just one AI-322F or TF-10000 would be at a clear disadvantage — lacking the kinetic performance for BVR engagements in Mid Range and offering virtually no agility in a dogfight.
The drones should operate like a wolf pack – fast, agile, and in coordination. Light, highly maneuverable drones take on the role of scouts and first-contact assets in air combat. They disrupt the enemy, force defensive maneuvers, and simultaneously act as forward sensors.
Kızılelma functions as a combat drone in the front and mid-range, capable of employing its own air-to-air missiles. Anka-3, operating from greater distance, serves both as a “stealth bomber” and, more importantly, as an AAM truck. Carrying a large payload of long-range missiles (e.g., Gökhan, Gökbora, six to eight units), it amplifies firepower while remaining concealed further back.
The KAAN fighter jet acts as the command and data-fusion hub. It deliberately holds its own missiles in the internal bays until the decisive moment. This layered approach forces adversaries into a defensive posture: they must constantly react to swarming drones and BVR (beyond visual range) threats, while KAAN remains in control and chooses when to strike.
The synergy of these systems – swarm drones in close/mid range with Kızılelma as a flexible combat drone, and Anka-3 as a long-range missile carrier – creates a distributed and resilient air combat ecosystem. The opponent loses initiative, while the Turkish side maximizes its striking power through networking, sensor fusion, and tactical layering.
This is the air combat doctrine of the 21st Century, System of Systems in Network.
