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A second island chain strategy for Asia
Key points
The United States has two core interests in Asia worth protecting with military power: defending the U.S. homeland and safeguarding access to key economic markets and trade routes. The first priority requires little in the way of a forward military presence while the second benefits from a modest air and naval presence to hedge against outcomes that would threaten U.S. interests.
A strategy that shifts U.S. military commitments and presence from the vulnerable “first island chain” toward a more defensible “second island chain” would reduce U.S. military requirements and the risk of a war with China while still protecting U.S. interests.
The United States should narrow its defense commitments in the region, shifting to a clear non-intervention position on Taiwan, ending mutual defense alliances with South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan, and negotiating narrower and flexible security partnerships in their place. U.S. military posture should change accordingly.
The United States should remove most Army and Marine Corps deployments from Asia and cut air and naval power significantly. The remaining U.S. forces should be consolidated at more survivable bases farther from China’s coast and tasked with securing U.S. economic interests and signaling continued U.S. involvement in the Pacific region.
The United States should provide a clear plan of its intentions and communicate carefully with its allies and China. Changes should be phased over a period of three to eight years, with most changes complete by 2030 and all finalized by 2035.
For over a decade, the United States has defined Asia as its priority theater, that is, the region of greatest importance for U.S. national security and economic interests.1 This designation owes most obviously to the region’s economic importance. Asia is home to several of the most important U.S. trade partners, including China, Taiwan, and Japan. It is a hub of manufacturing and technological development and the site of many of the world’s most important trade routes.2
Asia is also home to the only serious U.S. peer competitor, the People’s Republic of China. Today, China is the geopolitical equal of the United States, with a nearly equivalent GDP and formidable military force. Over the past two decades, U.S. policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the trajectory and purpose of this military development. Many worry that China intends to use its growing military power to push the United States out of Asia or that it has aggressive intentions against U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea.3
The United States has long maintained a massive military presence in Asia, spread across Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and U.S. territories such as Guam. The origins of this posture go back at least to the end of World War II, when the United States occupied Japan and turned many of its regional outposts into permanent military installations. Long-term alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines gave the United States an enduring stake in the region’s security. Over time, these relationships became the central pillars of U.S. military dominance over the western Pacific.
Since the height of the Cold War, the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the region has fallen, with most U.S. military forces leaving the Philippines and many exiting South Korea as well. But about 90,000 personnel remain, and the institutional barriers to removing them are fierce.4 Especially since President Barack Obama announced an intention to “pivot to Asia” in 2011, the Pentagon has explored increasing its access to regional military bases for rotational U.S. military deployments or the forward positioning of U.S. assets.5
The U.S. policy debate about strategy in Asia is imbalanced. It starts from the assumption that the current U.S. posture in Asia is the minimum required for U.S. national security. When alternatives to the status quo are considered, they involve additions to U.S. presence and commitments—deploying more forces, more warships, more aircraft, and more weapons platforms to “strengthen deterrence.” But this leaves out a fundamental question: do U.S. military commitments and the existing U.S. posture really make Americans safer and more prosperous?
This paper will examine this question. It will start by clearly defining U.S. vital interests in Asia and separating them from the maximalist intentions set out by proponents of U.S. military dominance. It will then consider what military partnerships and what types of military capabilities are required to defend these interests.
The recommendations presented here would move the United States toward a “second island chain strategy” that would concentrate U.S. military force farther from the Chinese coast in places like Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and other U.S. operating locations nearby. This strategy would stand in contrast to the “first island chain strategy” the United States currently maintains, which focuses on Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. It would reduce the overall U.S. regional footprint without sacrificing U.S. interests. Over time, the proposed posture would leave the United States more secure rather than less and with a more sustainable military footprint.
......
www.defensepriorities.org
Key points
The United States has two core interests in Asia worth protecting with military power: defending the U.S. homeland and safeguarding access to key economic markets and trade routes. The first priority requires little in the way of a forward military presence while the second benefits from a modest air and naval presence to hedge against outcomes that would threaten U.S. interests.
A strategy that shifts U.S. military commitments and presence from the vulnerable “first island chain” toward a more defensible “second island chain” would reduce U.S. military requirements and the risk of a war with China while still protecting U.S. interests.
The United States should narrow its defense commitments in the region, shifting to a clear non-intervention position on Taiwan, ending mutual defense alliances with South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan, and negotiating narrower and flexible security partnerships in their place. U.S. military posture should change accordingly.
The United States should remove most Army and Marine Corps deployments from Asia and cut air and naval power significantly. The remaining U.S. forces should be consolidated at more survivable bases farther from China’s coast and tasked with securing U.S. economic interests and signaling continued U.S. involvement in the Pacific region.
The United States should provide a clear plan of its intentions and communicate carefully with its allies and China. Changes should be phased over a period of three to eight years, with most changes complete by 2030 and all finalized by 2035.
For over a decade, the United States has defined Asia as its priority theater, that is, the region of greatest importance for U.S. national security and economic interests.1 This designation owes most obviously to the region’s economic importance. Asia is home to several of the most important U.S. trade partners, including China, Taiwan, and Japan. It is a hub of manufacturing and technological development and the site of many of the world’s most important trade routes.2
Asia is also home to the only serious U.S. peer competitor, the People’s Republic of China. Today, China is the geopolitical equal of the United States, with a nearly equivalent GDP and formidable military force. Over the past two decades, U.S. policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the trajectory and purpose of this military development. Many worry that China intends to use its growing military power to push the United States out of Asia or that it has aggressive intentions against U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea.3
The United States has long maintained a massive military presence in Asia, spread across Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and U.S. territories such as Guam. The origins of this posture go back at least to the end of World War II, when the United States occupied Japan and turned many of its regional outposts into permanent military installations. Long-term alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines gave the United States an enduring stake in the region’s security. Over time, these relationships became the central pillars of U.S. military dominance over the western Pacific.
Since the height of the Cold War, the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the region has fallen, with most U.S. military forces leaving the Philippines and many exiting South Korea as well. But about 90,000 personnel remain, and the institutional barriers to removing them are fierce.4 Especially since President Barack Obama announced an intention to “pivot to Asia” in 2011, the Pentagon has explored increasing its access to regional military bases for rotational U.S. military deployments or the forward positioning of U.S. assets.5
The U.S. policy debate about strategy in Asia is imbalanced. It starts from the assumption that the current U.S. posture in Asia is the minimum required for U.S. national security. When alternatives to the status quo are considered, they involve additions to U.S. presence and commitments—deploying more forces, more warships, more aircraft, and more weapons platforms to “strengthen deterrence.” But this leaves out a fundamental question: do U.S. military commitments and the existing U.S. posture really make Americans safer and more prosperous?
This paper will examine this question. It will start by clearly defining U.S. vital interests in Asia and separating them from the maximalist intentions set out by proponents of U.S. military dominance. It will then consider what military partnerships and what types of military capabilities are required to defend these interests.
The recommendations presented here would move the United States toward a “second island chain strategy” that would concentrate U.S. military force farther from the Chinese coast in places like Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and other U.S. operating locations nearby. This strategy would stand in contrast to the “first island chain strategy” the United States currently maintains, which focuses on Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. It would reduce the overall U.S. regional footprint without sacrificing U.S. interests. Over time, the proposed posture would leave the United States more secure rather than less and with a more sustainable military footprint.
......
A second island chain strategy for Asia - Defense Priorities
Key points The United States has two core interests in Asia worth protecting with military power: defending the U.S. homeland […]
www.defensepriorities.org
