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Primary and critical role of Bangladesh’s intelligence agencies are warning the state about external threats, terrorism, espionage, cyberattacks, political violence and risks to critical infrastructure. Yet their overlapping roles, limited public legal framework and weak independent oversight have blurred the line between protecting national security and serving political interests.
The central reform challenge is therefore twofold: improve professional intelligence capacity while ensuring that agencies act under clear law and cannot be used to intimidate political opponents or evade accountability. The reported cooperation between India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Israel’s Mossad merits careful monitoring because it may affect Bangladesh’s regional security environment. Although publicly available information does not establish that the two agencies are jointly directing operations against Bangladesh, policy should be based on verified threat reporting, not assumption.
BANGLADESH’S principal intelligence bodies are the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the Special Branch (SB) of Bangladesh Police. The armed forces also maintain service intelligence elements; police units such as the Detective Branch and Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime unit gather intelligence in support of investigations and law enforcement. These bodies differ in institutional home and primary purpose, but their responsibilities have sometimes overlapped. Public sources describe NSI and DGFI as having both domestic and external responsibilities, with reporting lines historically concentrated in the executive branch.
DGFI: A military intelligence organisation whose core purpose is to assess threats to Bangladesh’s armed forces and defence, and to support national security decision-making. Its military staffing can provide operational discipline, regional knowledge and access to defence networks. Its mandate should not be treated as a general licence to police political life.
NSI: A civilian national intelligence service expected to provide strategic warning and assessments on internal and external security. Its civilian character can support whole-of-government analysis, but its limit has not been defined or bounded with sufficient public clarity.
Special Branch: A police organisation with public-facing duties as well as security and intelligence functions. Its official site lists immigration, foreigner registration, visa services, police verification and security monitoring among its responsibilities.
Service Intelligence and Police Units: Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence elements support their respective services. Police and specialist counterterrorism units collect evidence and intelligence for law-enforcement action. Their work requires defined coordination with DGFI, NSI and SB to avoid parallel investigations and unclear accountability.
The precise staffing numbers, budgets, technical capabilities and internal structures of these services are not reliably available in public sources. Claims about their ‘professional strength’ should therefore be qualitative, not based on unverified headcounts.
Real-world performance, strengths and weaknesses
BANGLADESH’S agencies have accumulated substantial local knowledge, field networks and experience in counterterrorism, border security, protection of foreign missions and security at major national events. The state has also developed practical intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign partners. These capacities are valuable in a country facing transnational crime, extremist violence, cyber threats, refugee-related pressures and strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal.
But the record also shows serious institutional failures. The 2016 Holey Artisan attack, which killed 20 hostages, exposed the cost of failing to identify and disrupt a major extremist plot before it unfolded. Subsequent arrests and prosecutions demonstrated investigative capability, but they do not erase the warning failure.
A deeper failure has been the reported use of security and intelligence bodies for political repression. Bangladesh’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reported that disappearances were politically motivated and involved state security institutions; its final report was submitted in January 2026. The commission’s findings, as reported by Bangladeshi outlets, identify intelligence agencies including DGFI and NSI among bodies implicated in cases. Allegations and institutional findings must be investigated fairly, with individual responsibility determined through due process. They nevertheless point to a grave breakdown in safeguards and command accountability.
The principal professional weaknesses are:
(1) Overlapping mandates: Several agencies may collect similar information, creating duplication, rivalry and gaps in responsibility.
(2) Politicisation: When agencies monitor lawful political activity or dissent, they divert resources from addressing genuine threats and risk undermining public trust.
(3) Weak oversight and remedy: Secrecy is necessary for operations, but it cannot replace legal authority, audit or independent investigation of abuse.
(4) Uneven analytic capacity: Information collection is not the same as sound analysis. Agencies need stronger source evaluation, interagency assessment and strategic forecasting.
(5) Insufficient public accountability: Staffing and operations can remain classified while laws, broad mandates, spending controls and complaint procedures are made clear.
Regional comparison and foreign cooperation
REGIONAL services offer useful comparisons, but none should be copied wholesale.
Country and service: Broad role and relevant lesson
India: RAW is India’s external intelligence service. India and Israel have maintained reported strategic and intelligence cooperation; its existence does not prove a specific hostile operation against Bangladesh. India’s intelligence system benefits from scale and technical resources, but its parliamentary oversight remains limited.
Pakistan: ISI is a powerful military-linked service with foreign and domestic roles. Analysts and official country assessments have noted the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework and limited external oversight — an example of the risks of concentrated, weakly scrutinised authority.
China: Ministry of State Security (MSS) combines foreign intelligence and counterintelligence with broad state-security responsibilities. Its scale and technical capacity may be useful in carefully bounded exchanges, but its model reflects China’s own political and legal system, not a template for Bangladesh.
Türkiye: National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) provides intelligence to national security decision-makers under a specific law (Law No. 2937). Its formal legal basis illustrates the value of specifying an agency’s remit in law, while Bangladesh should design oversight suited to its own constitution and institutions.
Indispensability of cooperation friendly countries
Cooperation is imperative to improve training, language skills, cyber defence, counterterrorism, maritime awareness and protection of critical infrastructure. Bangladesh has already publicly stated cooperation with China that includes information-sharing and capacity-building against terrorism and transnational crimes. Effort must be made to set up similar cooperation with other friendly countries.
Such cooperation must however be selective and reciprocal. Bangladesh should avoid dependence on any one partner, protect sensitive data, assess the human-rights record and end-use conditions of supplied technology, and ensure that foreign partners cannot use Bangladeshi territory or systems for activities outside agreed purposes. A balanced policy strengthens sovereignty better than replacing one dependency with another.
Recommendations
(1) Enact an intelligence framework law defining each agency’s remit, permitted powers, limits on domestic collection, data retention and procedures for interagency tasking.
(2) Create parliamentary oversight through a properly cleared, cross-party committee with access to classified briefings and authority to review budgets, legality and complaints.
(3) Separate intelligence from policing. Intelligence agencies may assess and refer threats, but arrests, detention and prosecution should remain with legally authorised bodies subject to judicial process.
(4) Investigate past abuses independently. Preserve records, protect witnesses and apply individual accountability through fair trials. No agency should investigate itself.
(5) Build professional capacity. Recruit analysts, linguists, cyber specialists and financial investigators and train personnel in source verification, human-rights laws, counterintelligence, interagency assessment and crisis warning.
(6) Set measurable performance standards. Assess agencies by warning accuracy, disrupted threats, analytic quality and lawful conduct — not political reporting volume or arrest numbers.
(7) Adopt a balanced external-intelligence policy. Monitor RAW–Mossad cooperation and other foreign activity through evidence-led analysis, while pursuing diversified partnerships with China, Pakistan, Türkiye and others under clear safeguards.
Bangladesh’s strategic location at the northern apex of the Bay of Bengal places it close to vital maritime routes and at the intersection of intensifying Indo-Pacific competition among major powers. This makes strong, professional and technologically capable intelligence agencies indispensable for protecting national sovereignty, maritime interests and critical infrastructure. As competition among India, China, the United States and other powers grows around the Bay of Bengal, timely and independent intelligence is essential to prevent Bangladesh from becoming a theatre of external rivalry.
An effective intelligence establishment is not merely a security requirement but an essential instrument for safeguarding Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy, national security and economic interest.
Lieutenant Colonel Mudassir Hossain Khan (Retd), Bir Protik, is a freedom fighter, the first recipient of the ‘Sword of Honour’ in independent Bangladesh and a former Bangladesh Army and National Security Intelligence officer.
The central reform challenge is therefore twofold: improve professional intelligence capacity while ensuring that agencies act under clear law and cannot be used to intimidate political opponents or evade accountability. The reported cooperation between India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Israel’s Mossad merits careful monitoring because it may affect Bangladesh’s regional security environment. Although publicly available information does not establish that the two agencies are jointly directing operations against Bangladesh, policy should be based on verified threat reporting, not assumption.
BANGLADESH’S principal intelligence bodies are the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the Special Branch (SB) of Bangladesh Police. The armed forces also maintain service intelligence elements; police units such as the Detective Branch and Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime unit gather intelligence in support of investigations and law enforcement. These bodies differ in institutional home and primary purpose, but their responsibilities have sometimes overlapped. Public sources describe NSI and DGFI as having both domestic and external responsibilities, with reporting lines historically concentrated in the executive branch.
DGFI: A military intelligence organisation whose core purpose is to assess threats to Bangladesh’s armed forces and defence, and to support national security decision-making. Its military staffing can provide operational discipline, regional knowledge and access to defence networks. Its mandate should not be treated as a general licence to police political life.
NSI: A civilian national intelligence service expected to provide strategic warning and assessments on internal and external security. Its civilian character can support whole-of-government analysis, but its limit has not been defined or bounded with sufficient public clarity.
Special Branch: A police organisation with public-facing duties as well as security and intelligence functions. Its official site lists immigration, foreigner registration, visa services, police verification and security monitoring among its responsibilities.
Service Intelligence and Police Units: Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence elements support their respective services. Police and specialist counterterrorism units collect evidence and intelligence for law-enforcement action. Their work requires defined coordination with DGFI, NSI and SB to avoid parallel investigations and unclear accountability.
The precise staffing numbers, budgets, technical capabilities and internal structures of these services are not reliably available in public sources. Claims about their ‘professional strength’ should therefore be qualitative, not based on unverified headcounts.
Real-world performance, strengths and weaknesses
BANGLADESH’S agencies have accumulated substantial local knowledge, field networks and experience in counterterrorism, border security, protection of foreign missions and security at major national events. The state has also developed practical intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign partners. These capacities are valuable in a country facing transnational crime, extremist violence, cyber threats, refugee-related pressures and strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal.
But the record also shows serious institutional failures. The 2016 Holey Artisan attack, which killed 20 hostages, exposed the cost of failing to identify and disrupt a major extremist plot before it unfolded. Subsequent arrests and prosecutions demonstrated investigative capability, but they do not erase the warning failure.
A deeper failure has been the reported use of security and intelligence bodies for political repression. Bangladesh’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reported that disappearances were politically motivated and involved state security institutions; its final report was submitted in January 2026. The commission’s findings, as reported by Bangladeshi outlets, identify intelligence agencies including DGFI and NSI among bodies implicated in cases. Allegations and institutional findings must be investigated fairly, with individual responsibility determined through due process. They nevertheless point to a grave breakdown in safeguards and command accountability.
The principal professional weaknesses are:
(1) Overlapping mandates: Several agencies may collect similar information, creating duplication, rivalry and gaps in responsibility.
(2) Politicisation: When agencies monitor lawful political activity or dissent, they divert resources from addressing genuine threats and risk undermining public trust.
(3) Weak oversight and remedy: Secrecy is necessary for operations, but it cannot replace legal authority, audit or independent investigation of abuse.
(4) Uneven analytic capacity: Information collection is not the same as sound analysis. Agencies need stronger source evaluation, interagency assessment and strategic forecasting.
(5) Insufficient public accountability: Staffing and operations can remain classified while laws, broad mandates, spending controls and complaint procedures are made clear.
Regional comparison and foreign cooperation
REGIONAL services offer useful comparisons, but none should be copied wholesale.
Country and service: Broad role and relevant lesson
India: RAW is India’s external intelligence service. India and Israel have maintained reported strategic and intelligence cooperation; its existence does not prove a specific hostile operation against Bangladesh. India’s intelligence system benefits from scale and technical resources, but its parliamentary oversight remains limited.
Pakistan: ISI is a powerful military-linked service with foreign and domestic roles. Analysts and official country assessments have noted the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework and limited external oversight — an example of the risks of concentrated, weakly scrutinised authority.
China: Ministry of State Security (MSS) combines foreign intelligence and counterintelligence with broad state-security responsibilities. Its scale and technical capacity may be useful in carefully bounded exchanges, but its model reflects China’s own political and legal system, not a template for Bangladesh.
Türkiye: National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) provides intelligence to national security decision-makers under a specific law (Law No. 2937). Its formal legal basis illustrates the value of specifying an agency’s remit in law, while Bangladesh should design oversight suited to its own constitution and institutions.
Indispensability of cooperation friendly countries
Cooperation is imperative to improve training, language skills, cyber defence, counterterrorism, maritime awareness and protection of critical infrastructure. Bangladesh has already publicly stated cooperation with China that includes information-sharing and capacity-building against terrorism and transnational crimes. Effort must be made to set up similar cooperation with other friendly countries.
Such cooperation must however be selective and reciprocal. Bangladesh should avoid dependence on any one partner, protect sensitive data, assess the human-rights record and end-use conditions of supplied technology, and ensure that foreign partners cannot use Bangladeshi territory or systems for activities outside agreed purposes. A balanced policy strengthens sovereignty better than replacing one dependency with another.
Recommendations
(1) Enact an intelligence framework law defining each agency’s remit, permitted powers, limits on domestic collection, data retention and procedures for interagency tasking.
(2) Create parliamentary oversight through a properly cleared, cross-party committee with access to classified briefings and authority to review budgets, legality and complaints.
(3) Separate intelligence from policing. Intelligence agencies may assess and refer threats, but arrests, detention and prosecution should remain with legally authorised bodies subject to judicial process.
(4) Investigate past abuses independently. Preserve records, protect witnesses and apply individual accountability through fair trials. No agency should investigate itself.
(5) Build professional capacity. Recruit analysts, linguists, cyber specialists and financial investigators and train personnel in source verification, human-rights laws, counterintelligence, interagency assessment and crisis warning.
(6) Set measurable performance standards. Assess agencies by warning accuracy, disrupted threats, analytic quality and lawful conduct — not political reporting volume or arrest numbers.
(7) Adopt a balanced external-intelligence policy. Monitor RAW–Mossad cooperation and other foreign activity through evidence-led analysis, while pursuing diversified partnerships with China, Pakistan, Türkiye and others under clear safeguards.
Bangladesh’s strategic location at the northern apex of the Bay of Bengal places it close to vital maritime routes and at the intersection of intensifying Indo-Pacific competition among major powers. This makes strong, professional and technologically capable intelligence agencies indispensable for protecting national sovereignty, maritime interests and critical infrastructure. As competition among India, China, the United States and other powers grows around the Bay of Bengal, timely and independent intelligence is essential to prevent Bangladesh from becoming a theatre of external rivalry.
An effective intelligence establishment is not merely a security requirement but an essential instrument for safeguarding Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy, national security and economic interest.
Lieutenant Colonel Mudassir Hossain Khan (Retd), Bir Protik, is a freedom fighter, the first recipient of the ‘Sword of Honour’ in independent Bangladesh and a former Bangladesh Army and National Security Intelligence officer.
