China’s friends are few and far between and unreliable

[Gary]

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst with the non-profit, non-partisan Rand Corporation. He previously served as an adviser to the Pentagon.

In a context of increasing competition, China and the United States are actively strengthening their diplomatic relations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Such partnerships confer significant benefits, from access to a military base to favorable political outcomes, as well as potential business opportunities.
Despite threats of a trade war from the Trump administration and questioning of American alliances, the United States has done quite well diplomatically. The United States has deepened its ties with its Indo-Pacific allies – Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand – even though Manila and Bangkok have flirted with Beijing.
Washington has made progress with India, improved its informal partnership with Taiwan, stepped up engagement with Pacific island countries, and is competitive in much of Southeast Asia. America’s Indo-Pacific vision of keeping the region free and open also resonated with friendly countries in Western Europe, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The United States has also strengthened multilateral coordination with its partners. Last week in Tokyo, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with his counterparts from Australia, India and Japan for the latest Quad talks, and while not stated, it’s clear pushing back China was in top of their agenda.
China, on the other hand, has undermined trust with its neighbors in recent years. His bellicose tone, muscular foreign policy, and almost constant saber-rattling have won him no new friends. China maintains no alliances, and its partnerships are mostly with pariah states that are unreliable, unimportant, or both.

Take the example of Russia, China’s most powerful friend. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he and Russian President Vladimir Putin have met dozens of times. Xi even called Putin at one point “my most intimate best friend.” The two countries share many interests, including the promotion of authoritarianism over the democratic rule-based order of the West. Russia is also reflexively opposed to American interests, which perfectly meets China’s needs.

But even as China and Russia have steadily strengthened their security cooperation through military exchanges, secret agreements, joint exercises, as well as industrial, technical and defense coordination, they remain deeply suspicious of each other. .
Moscow is uncomfortable with Beijing’s growing influence in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and with Chinese claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea. He would prefer China to stay outside the Arctic. In addition, Russia is giving arms and military support to Vietnam and India – both wary of China.

Shortly after China fought with India in June along its disputed border in the Himalayas, Moscow postponed – or canceled – an S-400 surface-to-air missile contract with Beijing. In other words, Moscow sometimes seems to be working against Beijing’s interests. And with no security alliance in place, Beijing should not expect help from Moscow if ever attacked.
North Korea is the only country that has anything akin to a security alliance with China. In 1961, the two nations signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which obliges China to intervene on behalf of North Korea in the event of an attack. And yet, Xi only met Kim Jong Un for the first time in March 2018 – a meeting clearly sparked by Kim’s planned summit with President Donald Trump a few months later. The two leaders can hardly be seen in the eyes. Xi likely finds Kim too reckless with nuclear and ballistic missile testing and ungrateful for Chinese support.
Kim is probably partly engaging the United States in the hope of someday reducing his country’s economic dependence on China. Unable to control Kim, China gets minimal geostrategic value for North Korea’s liability. The 1961 treaty is due to be renegotiated next year, and the outcome should shed light on the current state of their relationship.
China often promotes its “all-weather” partnership with Pakistan, which Beijing has supported since the Cold War to distract India. In recent years, Islamabad has helped Beijing prevent suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan from entering China. In return, Pakistan asked for Chinese recognition of its claims to Kashmir.
But Pakistan offers no tangible advantage in China’s fierce competition against the United States. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – the multi-billion dollar flagship infrastructure project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative – is likely unaffordable for Islamabad. And while Pakistan’s location along the Indian Ocean would normally be a huge asset, its main port of Gwadar never materialized into a naval base.

Heavy cranes towering over the quay of Gwadar port, photographed in October 2017: the Sino-Pakistani economic corridor is probably unaffordable for Islamabad. © dpa / AP
China’s best friend in Southeast Asia is Cambodia. Prime Minister Hun Sen was the first foreign leader to visit China after the pandemic began, and Cambodia has strongly supported China’s claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Cambodia benefits from Xi’s Belt and Road initiative, and Beijing is reportedly building military bases in Ream and Dara Sakor.
If Beijing had access to it, it would greatly expand the reach and multidirectional threat of Chinese military operations, possibly making Cambodia China’s most useful geostrategic partner. Commercial footage shows Cambodia recently razed a US naval facility in Ream, suggesting Beijing should take advantage. But for now, at least, Hun Sen refuses even to admit that China is building bases because it violates the Cambodian constitution. Phnom Penh may not be too keen to grant access to something that shouldn’t exist in the first place. So the story is unfinished and needs to be watched closely.
Anyway, compared to the United States, China’s friends are certainly not so numerous, nor so reliable. This is a major challenge for Beijing as competition from the major powers continues to intensify.

China's friends are few and unreliable

Beijing maintains zero alliances, and its partnerships are mostly with pariah states

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