DK - Longer conscription and larger admissions increase the risk of more disciplinary proceedings

[Saithan]

DEBATE: Defense personnel are often encouraged to intervene in the public debate. Major Kasper Kyvsgaard Bie follows the call here and identifies a number of focus areas that politicians should consider before the upcoming settlement negotiations. Among other things, a longer conscription can lead to lower volunteering and more disciplinary and criminal cases, he believes.​

Several politicians, journalists and commentators have encouraged my colleagues and I to participate in the public debate. The calls are based on a very reasonable expectation that we must contribute with our expertise and insight, but I myself have hesitated. Such contributions should be relevant and professional, but at the same time they can hardly be a comprehensive, well-analysed solution to the overall challenges, as something like this requires a lot of resources. At my level, we are not involved in the settlement preparations and do not have sufficient insight for me to make independent recommendations, but at the same time I do not want to simply air broad positions and resolve wishes for the future of the Armed Forces.

However, I believe I have now found a relevant way to contribute, as I have come across some concrete parts of the public debate where my expertise can potentially provide some perspective. All points are entirely at my own expense and should not be seen as official positions from my workplace.

Several commentators have stated that the analytically correct approach would be a definition of the tasks of the Armed Forces, identification of derived needs and determination of the defense budget on that basis. To that extent I do not disagree, but in practice it will be close to impossible, as no one will be able to describe the task in enough detail for a sober assessment of needs to be made. The overall military recommendations may well be based on the intelligence service's assessment of threats against the nation, but such assessments will hardly be able to be translated into concrete needs, as this will require the determination of dimensioned individual parts (how much/how/how quickly/how long, etc.).

Personally, on that background, I see it as sensible that, within the framework of Nato, a minimum requirement is established so that individual member states do not "suck on the money", but contribute meaningfully to common security. Of course, this does not exempt us from having to discuss and decide how the funds are used with the greatest effect on our national security, but the economy can, in my eyes, determine the end result, if only a political level aligns expectations with this.

It may become necessary to have a separate division level​

If the defense of Danish territory on land is a task that the Army has to solve, this will at least create a need for a divisional level, which I generally miss being mentioned. It may seem obvious that the Army must defend the national lands, but Sweden's and Finland's expected membership of Nato may potentially give us the opportunity to rethink this, as we will no longer be a frontline state at that time.

If the Army alone is to contribute to NATO's land-based defense with a qualified unit, this can be done by setting up a brigade, which can be handed over in command to another nation's division level. This is historically well known, as Danish brigades have both been attached to German and English divisions, and our current participation in the multinational divisions may seem obvious for this purpose. This approach will partly require such a brigade to form a capable unit (which the 1st Brigade is not seen to be doing at the time of writing), and then we will not expect to have to contribute to the division level's other capacities as well.

If the Army is to be able to independently defend our territory, however, it will be necessary to set up our own divisional level. A brigade is the smallest doctrinal troop unit because it contains the necessary combat, combat support, and support assets to be able to fight independently within an assigned area of responsibility. However, it is not designed to fight in isolation, but needs neighbors and a hinterland.

A division is precisely designed for independent and isolated deployment in a geographical area. It contains sufficient capabilities to secure its flanks, control its rear, gather long-range intelligence, and shape the enemy before its brigades meet him. A division will, for example, often have:

• long-range drones or special forces to locate the enemy
• long-range rocket launchers or missile systems to combat high-priority targets in depth
• engineering funds for improving and establishing infrastructure
• logistical capabilities with low mobility such as field hospitals, large depots or large repair units
• Devices for securing installations and flanks
• A mobile combat unit for weight shifting such as tanks or attack helicopters

A division will be the smallest unit we can doctrinally ask to carry out an independent defense of Denmark. It will not be able to cover the entire country, but will be able to stop an enemy advance in part of the country.

Conscription is inextricably linked to readiness for mobilization​

It may of course be a good idea to have a longer conscription with a larger intake, but in my eyes it requires that in that case you utilize these personnel in a mobilization preparedness. If it is only to be an "incubator" for future professional soldiers, a longer conscription will hardly be worth the costs.

I will then deal with mobilisation, but at the outset I would like to warn against continuing the discussions against the background of the current level of voluntariness. I have heard several politicians and commentators highlight and argue on the basis that virtually all conscripts are volunteers today, and that there is a long wait to be able to serve one's military service. This is of course correct, but will hardly continue if we return to call-up lengths and numbers, as when I started in the Armed Forces 25 years ago.

The army has previously been adept at training conscripts with a lower degree of voluntariness, but in that case one should have an appetite for a comparable number of disciplinary cases, absentee handling by the military police and more criminal cases. Such a situation will be completely natural for us who were part of it last time, but I can well fear that the general population will be a little surprised.

I believe, as I said, that the previous conscription is inextricably linked to a mobilization defence. It makes limited sense to use resources to train completed units if you cannot subsequently mobilize them for deployment. One could imagine a model with a medium-term conscription which only includes functional training, but again this will only make sense if the soldier in question can later be mobilized.

The current conscription is relatively light on material costs. The basic basic training primarily requires basic personal standard equipment, which is far cheaper than specialized functional equipment. It is obvious that if you extend the educational goal of conscription by extending it, it entails increased costs for equipping the individual soldier and a further increase if the number increases. If larger conscription teams are to be trained as units, then in principle they must also use the same equipment as the current standing units, such as personnel carriers, artillery pieces and trucks.

Since the Army in its time had a mobilization capacity, there was not only a need for the above equipment for the standing units and the units that were undergoing training. There was also a need for depots of war-ready materiel that mobilized units could use upon activation. Such an approach naturally ties up many resources for purchases, maintenance and upgrades, which will not deliver a visible effect in everyday life. You can possibly look at what resources the US defense uses to have material for a single brigade in Kuwait on such terms, if you need concrete contemporary figures.

I would like to make it absolutely clear that I am not speaking against a relevant mobilization preparedness. I also do not believe that it is an unsuitable means for a credible defense of Denmark, but I see a need for us to keep our eyes open to the costs when we discuss it.

The framework conditions should be followed closely​

The framework conditions for the Armed Forces have been broadly stated, and that is really good. In previous settlement discussions, the physical framework in the form of establishment and material coverage has not filled much, which I believe was a mistake. However, I would very much like to expand the scope of these terms.

The army (and perhaps also the rest of the Armed Forces) has, over the last 20-30 years, been restricted more and more in the performance of its core tasks as we have adapted to the framework conditions of the rest of society. In general, we should seek to reduce the restrictions on the activities of the Armed Forces as much as possible in order to achieve the greatest possible effect for the allocated funds. I therefore see a need for adjustments to relevant provisions and legal bases, which do not require separate funding, but will have a large effect on strength production.

It would be too far-fetched to list all the topics, and I certainly don't know about them all either. But as an example, moving our platforms outside the training grounds often causes so much pain that the units are not adequately trained in their use. Since no platform categories have been described specifically for the Armed Forces, we have to be "squeezed in" under civilian regulations that are not designed for our activities.

Another example could be the provisions for the transport of dangerous goods, where the international treaties allow for exemptions in relation to the Armed Forces, but in Denmark we have only chosen to use this for ammunition items. A third example could be the application of the Working Environment Act, where armed guarding of military installations e.g. does not count as actual military service.

Of course, the above are not conditions that are normally included in settlement negotiations, but I would clearly encourage it to happen this time, as it does not cost money and can have an extensive positive effect.

Building pace​

It has not yet been decided at what pace the increased defense budget will be implemented during the settlement period. It has been loosely argued that it will not be possible for the Armed Forces to use the funds from the start, and I have to trust that this is correct, even if the underlying sub-conclusions are not entirely clear to me. But with that starting point, it seems logical to me that there should be an almost exponential increase up to the maximum amount quite a short time into the settlement. As soon as the settlement is decided, the relevant procurement and construction processes should be able to be started in parallel, after which the delivery time alone becomes the delaying factor.

If one were more bleak, one might fear that the winning argument for a gradual build-up must be found to a greater extent in the task of freeing up the funds in the public budget. In the worst case, this could lead to the famous "hockey stick" model, which unfortunately also perfectly describes the budget increase in the current settlement.

Green transition​

It is in every way a good idea to minimize the Army's consumption of fossil fuels. Not only is it good for the state of the planet, but it also reduces the load on the logistic chain. However, it is crucial that this does not happen in competition with the operational needs and I was therefore also happy to hear Anne Valentina Berthelsen from the Socialist People's Party in Frontline on 21 June say that any green solutions must work for the operational. In war, a superior technological level can potentially be exchanged for victory and fewer losses of our own lives, which is why we must always seek to get the best tactical technology that we can afford. If it can be good for the climate at the same time, then of course it must also be used.

A small example of the opposite can be found, for example, in the new Scania trucks. Since civilians add additives to diesel to lower emissions, the Army's new trucks must now also be filled with AdBlue. It constitutes an additional separate fluid in the logistic chain, which must be used in larger quantities, cannot be stored in the same containers, and does not reduce fuel consumption or increase power, so there are no operational benefits associated with it.

In Frontlinjen on 13 September, Martin Lidegaard from Radikale Venstre said that it costs nine liters of fuel to get one liter to the front line in an "active conflict". On that basis, he argued for a reduction through the use of solar cells and referred to British and American experience. I think I can guess where Mr. Lideggard has his information from, but in that case it was used here somewhat out of context. The numbers 1 to 9 probably derive from investigations into Nato's deployment in Afghanistan, but there were several special circumstances which will not apply in a doctrinal deployment on our own territory.

In Afghanistan, all fuel for the Helmand province had to be transported by local civilian vehicles up through Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, where something was often lost along the way. At the same time, by far the largest share was not used to run the tactical platforms, but rather to operate the camps' infrastructure, as these had to be self-sufficient in electricity. It is precisely this last part that the British and Americans have tried to reduce with some success through the use of solar cells, which is very positive. However, the need will not exist in a doctrinal war against an equal adversary where we do not build permanent self-sufficient camps with the comforts of home. In that case, the vast majority of the fuel will be used in our tactical platforms, and the supply routes will primarily use ships and pipelines. For the last part of the transport, we can set up a fictitious but quite realistic calculation, where a truck with 24,000 liters of fuel must bring it 500 kilometers to the front. In that situation, it will only require 5 milliliters of fuel to deliver a single litre.

CARRYING IMAGE: Conscripts at the Training Regiment complete a water passage during an exercise. Photo: Niels Porsbøl, Training Regiment, Armed Forces

Major Kasper Kyvsgaard Bie is section leader for the capacity-related professional responsibility at the 1st Logistics Battalion in the 1st Brigade, which i.a. handles the training of personnel on the now much talked about and scandal-ridden mobile workshop flatracks. Private photo

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I used google translate, but the translation is pretty decent compared to Danish.

I think it's interesting that politicians wants military officers to participate in the public debate considering the institution. In a way it's good, but also bad because it's the politicians duty to get rid of incompetent General Staff and not end up like Shoigu and Putin or as I see it Y.G. in TAF.