Durand Line: A Border Recognized
By
Saiyan0321
By
Saiyan0321
It has become a common Practice for members of the Afghan Jirga or opposition to denounce the Durand line, an internationally recognized boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The recent Chaman-Spin Boldak incident and the continuous border fencing, has once again allowed for the same statements and declarations to be made by the Afghan government.Pakistan has defended its action of fencing and criticized the Afghan government in calling the act as ‘Illegal’. The Durand line is the historical boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan which was demarcated through an ongoing process that started with the ‘Treaty of Gandamak’ in 1879 and was done again in 1893 and reached its maximum form in 1919 with the ‘Treaty of Rawalpindi’. In 1947, Afghan government raised concerns with Pakistan inheriting the treaty and became the only state to vote against the membership of Pakistan. On 26th July 1949, Afghanistan unilaterally declared all treaties void in a Loya Jirga and called the lands beyond the Durand Line as part of Afghanistan. Now the position of the Afghan government is that previously it was not a sovereign nation in 1893 (although it was one in 1919) and that they had not signed the treaty with Pakistan thus they do not recognize the border with Pakistan. The question to ask is whether this claim of not recognizing the border with Pakistan is true or false? For this we must first look into International law and some of the views of the ICJ.
Now Vienna Convention on the Succession of States 1978, Article 11, that states:
A succession of States does not as such affect:
(a) a boundary established by a treaty; or
(b) obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary.
And it should also be remembered that in 1945, around partition, the UN Charter had come into existence and its entire super structure was based on Article 2(4) where principle of non-intervention was factually linked with a clearly identified boundary among states. Therefore, the view was that in 1945 all boundaries' treaties were sacrosanct and whatever they had decided, whether in Africa, Asia or elsewhere, the said boundaries would not be altered on the pretext of war or of a boundary treaty being 'invalidly executed'.
The sanctity of treaty law has been repeatedly stated in the ICJ judgments where it was discovered that the ICJ, firstly avoids declaring any border demarcation as void and if there exists any treaty on that demarcation then it most certainly upholds the demarcation. This was seen in the famous case of ‘Libya vs Chad’. A careful study of ICJ judgments on multiple cases allows us to understand that there exists a tripartite hierarchy in cases where the courts have decided the border disputes. The court looks to a broad understanding of treaty law where treaty is treated both as a civil contract and as the very foundation of International law. The court used the contract nature of the treaty and created consent from it and consent plays a vital role. Even willingness to enter into a treaty plays a vital role and signed treaties are always seen as a formal expression of consent. The importance of treaty could be determined with the fact that the courts even gave importance to treaties where the original parties to the treaty weren’t even the litigants and through the doctrine of Uti Possedites, the court established the legal aspirational force of a treaty. They elevated this concept to International law by stating that the parties were to be governed by the border treaties even if they were post-colonial constructs of colonial empires.
In the tripartite, the court placed importance firstly to ensure stabilized borders by protecting states harmonized expectations; secondly the court places more importance on contract based justification over property based justification however that does not mean that the concept of adverse possession is completely ignored in International boundary. In fact the courts have placed great importance to effective control and that is where the third hierarchy stems from. Adverse possession. It has been the nature of ICJ to focus first on treaty law, then on Uti Possedetis and then lastly on effective control as to who administers the territory and for how long has it administered and is this administration legal in itself. Now the third factor does not mean that a nation annexes a land and then goes to ICJ claiming effective control. It is not based on aggression of states but on stability of the frontier. The principle behind such a thought is ‘Quieta Non Movere’ which means ‘Don’t move settled things’. This was meant to create stability in the world and in the absence of a formal treaty, demarcate borders where effective control had been placed for a long period of time. These have been applied in various case laws. Three concepts of Civil Law which are Acquiescence; Recognition and Estoppel also play a role in International boundary agreements. In context of the Durand line, all three play a major role.
Acquiescence
Now the old understanding in Civil law is that the absence of opposition per se does not necessarily or always imply consent. It is also used in criminal law as well however in state, silence or protest is relevant where it would call for a response in expressing disagreement or objection upon the conduct of state. This is to highlight how Acquiescence is seen in International Law. A diplomatic protest is the most common way of expressing those rights and the state, whose rights are being challenged by the conduct of another state, reserves its juridical position in relation to those rights, thus preventing the formation of adverse rights.
Recognition
Acquiescence deals with implicit condonation whereas recognition is the formal expression however it is almost impossible to determine the difference between Acquiescence and implicit recognition and in many cases, it is very hard to separate one from the other and with this we can understand why International changed the principle of Acquiescence from the general municipal law concept. Ivor Jennings stated in 1963, “Recognition itself need not be express but may be implied in certain circumstances…Whereas recognition is the adaption of the positive acknowledgement on the part of the state, acquiescence may arise from mere omission to protest against a situation where a right to protest existed and its exercise was called for.”
Estoppel
Estoppel is a juridical concept according to which a party is prevented from arguing and rebutting a previously made (explicit or tacit) statement of fact or representation on one same issue. As will be shown later, the circumstances in which that party is hindered from subsequently altering its position and denying the truth of a prior statement are, nonetheless, very restricted. An important distinction has to be made. Acquiescence and recognition, as expressions of consent, are the “method by which a situation becomes opposable to a state. Estoppel, on the other hand, is not in itself a manifestation of consent. It is a sanctio juris that operates provided that certain prerequisites are met. In practical terms, however, the distinction is barely feasible, because the same facts concerning the respondent state’s conduct may be regarded as showing the attitude it did adopt, or as estopping it from denying that it had adopted that attitude, even if it had not.
To be continued due to character limit