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Is the Conflict a mean towards a Profitable End?
Saiyan0321
Saiyan0321
“Being a defense hawk and a budget hawk are not mutually exclusive.” Pete Hegseth
It is common practice for armies around to the world for demand greater budget either by throwing light on the defensive and offensive capabilities of the army or their lack of, or by overstating the threat the nation has from foreign militaries. This is often well secured in countries that have enemies and greater ambition. The Chinese military is one as such whose nation has a great ambition to be a dominating world power and has the resources to back such aspirations. Recently China has looked to start confrontations in the South China sea and has declared naval objectives in the Pacific and especially in the Indian Ocean. One look at the map reveals why is this being done since China truly believes that it will remain a prisoner of its geography and if it is to have any foreign influence, as is demanded of a dominating power, then it must have a great navy which can project its interest. Now ‘Real Politik’ and concept of ‘Power’ declare that such is very much normal and is the clear and rightful objective of strong nations. However what has been most interesting is the fact that as China started building more and more naval strength, its ground forces have started to find conflict in the borders with India with operations seizing from encroachments to outright hostile actions. The events of Dokalam and the current ongoing conflicts with India, baffle the mind and one is left wondering if there is a more hidden meaning behind it.
As the Chinese naval aspirations grew, by 2000s China has started on various programs to increase and modernize its naval capabilities which reached its zenith by 2017 and by now, the Chinese projected to be one of the most advanced naval armies in a decade. The Chinese have always kept their budget a secret and have not revealed how it gets divided amongst the different departments of the army but in 2017, it was clear that the Chinese PLAAN was to get a significant increase in budget as China saw the navy as under the most threat and its most significant and lone outlet for military domination and influence in the region. The PLAAGF could find significance only against enemies on land and till the 1980s it could always point to the military power of Russia as the reason for its significance in the modernization program especially the program it underwent in the 1990s where 40% of its divisions were modernized and formed into armored and mechanized divisions to deal with any conventional threat. It has also maintained strategic importance by maintaining extreme relations with paramilitary outfits such as the Chinese Militia and People’s armed police which is home to 1.5 million personal. The growing period of the Chinese ground forces hit a snag when the USSR was dissolved and China now had new countries with weak militaries and a defeated Russia rather than a United Soviet State. During the 1990s the PLAAGF faced another important development and this was the China-India peace development along the Macmohan Line and efforts to demarcate and create peace in the region. During this period the Sino-Indian relations improved and as the Indian economy improved, China found itself a huge market and together the two nations created better relations. Thus the PLAAGF now lost two of its major enemies that it could convince the Chinese government to be major threats to its conventional capability. India was looking for more peaceful ventures and Russia was simply no longer in the game. The remaining neighbors were either too weak to challenge to China and be considered and showcased as potential threats and the militarily strong nations like Pakistan were too friendly to be considered as such. The Internal conflicts were nowhere to the level Pakistan faced in its northwestern region nor what India faced in Kashmir or its eastern states. Neither Xinjiang nor Tibet were offering nor could offer any military threat that would become the central focal point for demand of a greater share.
During this period, Chinese government came to an understanding that the Naval strength needed to be improved and the South China Sea was where military dominance was needed and if the navy is not up to par, the ground forces would play no role in the military domination of China. Till the early 1990s, the Chinese navy was little more than a Brown Water Navy and it was in this mid 1990s that attempts were made to strengthen the fleet and increase its capabilities and by 2000s, the navy was the central point of the Chinese military evolution with work on aircraft carriers, naval airforce, marine corps, all this was being done as the Chinese saw the PLAAGF as less to the PLAAN. This can be highlighted with the fact that in 2017, the PLA decided to reduce its PLAAGF strength and focusrd more on its PLAAN, PLAARF (Rocket Force) and PLAASSF (Strategic Support Force) since it saw them as being the main drivers of its military strength and it was in this year that it was reported that the Chinese Navy was getting a large chunk of the military budget as the Chinese attempted to modernize its navy. This has been going on since 1985 and although this would create a leaner and easily deployed force, however it doesn’t change the fact that it was also meant to reduce the military burden on the military budget. 7 months later of this report, the first Chinese confrontation in years happened at Dokalam. The PLAAGF declared that they were attempting to protect Chinese Sovereignty from an aggressive neighbor and since then the Chinese PLAAGF has been involved in more and more incidents, most notably the recent clashes which started at Galwan and have now spiraled all across the MacMohan line. As the conflict continues and Chinese forces are deployed more and more and as the PLAAGF becomes more hostile in face of another neighbor that is also looking for conflicts to help the threat perception that it will deliver to the government, it is becoming abundantly clear that the conflicts will not end and will only become worse. As the conflicts continue and military weapons become the norm, the PLAAGF will demand greater military funding for better defense. Failures may also be displayed as well to deliver home the point that without increase in funding, the PLAAGF will not be able to contain the Indian offensive and only through adequate funding could the PLAAGF bring forth the capability to not only protect its sovereignty or blunt any conventional offensive but also bring forth conventional capabilities that can hit deep inside India. I will not be surprised if it cited 1962 as an example of when it was the center of the military budget, it was able to take Aksai Chin, Tibet and was able to unite China and the Chinese focal strength can only come from adequately funding PLAAGF. The army will have seen how Pakistan and India themselves operate and use the LOC to secure budgets against threats which are declared exponentially greater than their capabilities for greater funding. Both sides have used internal conflicts as well to take as such.
The PLAAGF also lacks the military experience which is centered on taking the opportunity to strike and immediately take the offensive to confuse the enemy, something both Pakistan and India have repeatedly done to each other and have experienced in their handling of internal conflicts. Immediate strikes and tactical upping of one and the other is the center point of the LOC and both armies have experienced this since 1947, whereas the PLAAGF has no such experience and may find itself outfoxed on more than one occasion.
If such is what is happening, then China is playing a dangerous game. To make the LAC into the LOC may get the PLAAGF the central attention in military funding but it will be paid in blood as soldiers will be forced to be deployed in hostile conditions, defending inches of wastelands and ‘Strategic areas’ made strategic because both armies wanted them.
Ok the above is my, what can you call it, opinion on another aspect of the matter. I never claim nor state that I have military experience or have deep understanding of the Chinese military but this does fit in the puzzle. If you guys think this is rubbish then feel free to call it such.
Frankly this is another thread i had no idea where to post. So i am posting it in the Chinese section
So what do you guys think? Could this be possible because you witness this alot in militaries especially armies whose central point was initially one department and was moved to the other. Man i wish we had Chinese members here and i dont mean bots, i mean actual Chinese members like those on Weibo and stuff
@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer @T-123456 @Combat-Master @Cabatli_53 @Saithan @Blackeyes90
