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Turkish navy continues to protect ships conducting research and drilling in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea
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How a rush for Mediterranean gas threatens to push Greece and Turkey into war
An increasingly fractious standoff over access to gas reserves has transformed a dispute between Turkey and Greece that was once primarily over Cyprus into one that now ensnares Libya, Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and feeds into other political issues in the Mediterranean and has raised fears of a naval conflict between the two Nato allies in the Aegean Sea.
The crisis has been deepening in recent months with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, leading those inside the EU opposing Turkey’s increasingly military foreign policy and saying Turkey can no longer be seen as partner in the Mediterranean. He has offered French military support to the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, including the possible sale of 18 Rafale jets.
The issue was on the agenda of a meeting of the Med7 group of southern Mediterranean leaders on the French island of Corsica on Thursday and again at an EU council meeting on 23 September that will discuss imposing severe sanctions on the already struggling Turkish banking sector over its demand for access to large swaths of the eastern Mediterranean.
Germany, the lead mediator between Turkey and Greece, is exploring an enhanced customs union between Turkey and the EU to calm the dispute, which has been exacerbated by vast hydrocarbon discoveries over the past decade in the eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey has long sought a broader customs union with the EU, and although Greece might see any such offer as a reward for bullying, Germany believes both carrots and sticks are needed to persuade Turkey to change its strategy..
Greek navy ships taking part in an exercise in the Mediterranean last month. Photograph: Greek Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty
But Germany is also warning Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that his current unilateral strategy is a commercial dead end, since no private gas company is going to touch cooperation with Turkey if it is trying to exploit illegal claims on gas reserves.
The scale of the reserves, and Turkish ambitions, last year prompted Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to form an East Med Gas forum to draw up a joint plan to extract and export gas from the region. France would also like to join, and the United Arab Emirates, also battling Turkish intervention in Libya, is a supporter, creating an imposing anti-Turkish web.
Turkey argues that Greece is claiming the Aegean Sea economically as purely Greek, even though Turkey has a greater length of coastline.
Emmanuel Macron gives a press conference at the Med7 summit in Corsica on Thursday. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPA
Some Turkish analysts, such as Cem Gürdeniz, a former admiral, see it as the geopolitical issue of the 21st century and a chance to challenge treaty settlements made a century ago amid the collapse of the Ottoman empire. “We are defending our blue homeland,” he says. “It is a defensive doctrine after our continental shelf was stolen by Greece and Cyprus [and] represents the greatest geostrategic challenge of the century.”
Macron has already increased the French naval presence in the sea, and called for withdrawal of the Turkish reconnaissance ship Oruç Reis, accompanied by Turkish naval ships. The ship is undertaking seismic surveys in Greek waters south of Cyprus. A key moment may come on 12 September, when the Turkish Navtex warning for Oruç Reis is due to end. If it is extended, the risk of a naval clash between Greece and Turkey two Nato partners either by accident or design rises.
The fear that the conflict could spiral out of control has led to an urgent search for a neutral arbitrator and an agreed agenda for talks. An effort by Nato to start technical naval deconfliction talks was delayed after Greece objected to Nato’s involvement. The Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, insisted that the talks would start only when the threats stopped. He then flew to New York to enlist the help of the UN secretary general, António Guterres.
Turkey’s Oruç Reis in the eastern Mediterranean. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Parallel mediation efforts by the EU, through the German presidency, had started to make progress. At the request of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, Erdoğan paused Turkish exploration activities near Cyprus last month, resuming only when Greece announced a maritime border agreement with Egypt similar to one signed by Turkey and Libya last November.
Germany’s mediation is hampered by Turkish warnings that the EU must be impartial and that the EU is biased towards the existing EU members, Greece and Cyprus. The Turkish ambassador to the UK, Ümit Yalçın, insists that his country is sincere in seeking talks with Greece.
A solution is difficult, since both sides have legitimate claims and the developing law of the sea, inherently complex, is interpreted differently by Greece and Turkey, leading to both sides publishing wholly contradictory maps showing the extent of their continental shelf and hence their economic exclusion zones.
The UN convention on the law of the sea (Unclos), signed by 167 states but not by Turkey, sets the limits of exclusive economic zones on the basis of a country’s continental shelf. As many as 300 similar maritime disputes have occurred worldwide. The convention also allows islands that are inhabited and economically viable to have exclusive economic zones. Greece, through its ownership of the 12 scattered Greek islands in the Dodecanese, can make a substantive claim to exploration rights.
The tiny island of Kastellorizo, just 1.2 miles (2km) from the Turkish coast and 300 miles (500km) from the Greek mainland, is a Greek possession, but in the past century has been held by Turkey, Italy and Germany and been a British protectorate. Turkey is threatening to send ships off the island to explore for hydrocarbon reserves.
Those analysts pressing both sides to attempt arbitration, as have many countries in similar disputes, say that in practice the international court of justice in The Hague, which acts as an arbitration body, may not endorse Greece’s maximalist position.
“In resolving the dispute, the primary question would be whether the islands have the same maritime area as mainlands,” wrote Yunus Emre Açıkgönül, a former Turkish diplomat and expert in maritime law. “Turkey wants to ignore the Greek islands from the EEZ definition, whereas Greece would like to give full weight to these islands. There is no clear answer to these questions. The effect to be accorded to islands has been one of the most controversial issues in the history of the law of maritime boundary definition.”
An offshore drilling rig off Limassol, Cyprus. Photograph: Petros Karadjias/AP
But he says case law shows factors including the size, status and location of an island and its distance from the mainland have to be taken into account. It is unlikely, for instance, that arbitration would find Kastellorizo justified expanding the exclusive Greek economic zone from Rhodes another 80 miles (125km) further east, depriving Turkey of 400,000 sq km of water.
To lure Turkey back into the lottery of arbitration would be hard since there is a risk that the bulk of the Aegean would remain Greek. But Turkey and Greece nearly agreed to settle their differences at the ICJ in 1976-78 and the plan foundered over preconditions. The stakes are higher now.
The bigger diplomatic judgment is whether the conflict is only a dispute about gas, capable of settlement by cartographers, or instead is driven by Erdoğan appropriating a pan-Islamic Ottoman ideology, largely because of his domestic political weakness.
The blue homeland theorists claim that Turkey’s troubles stem from unfair treatment by old colonial powers, including the pro-Greek former British prime minister David Lloyd George. Erdoğan’s supporters argue that at a point of historic weakness and without a navy, Turkey was forced to sign the treaty of Sèvres in 1920, and its inadequate revision at the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. This left Turkey in effect trapped as a landlocked power, even though it has about 5,000 miles (8,000km) of coastline.
Concern in French political classes about Turkey’s overall political direction is growing. Jacques Attali, who was adviser to the former French president François Mitterrand, recently said: “We have to hear what Turkey says, take it very seriously and be prepared to act by all means. If our predecessors had taken the Führer’s speeches seriously from 1933 to 1936, they could have prevented this monster from the accumulating the means to do what he did.”
The former French UN envoy Gérard Araud also put Turkish behaviour in a historical context. He wrote: “Russia, China and Turkey are revisionist powers which don’t accept a status quo based on a world order largely defined by the west in 1945 and 1991. They feel emboldened by a new global balance of power and by US policy. Where will they stop? What should the Europeans do?”
Macron put it bluntly at a conference in Lugano: “We have to create Pax Mediterranea because we see an imperial regional power coming back with some fantasies of its own history, and I am referring essentially to Turkey.”
Turkey accuses France of hysteria and pique. It claims France feels thwarted by the Turkish intervention in Libya at the start of 2020 to protect the UN-recognised Government of National Accord in Tripoli from an assault by the French-supported General Khalifa Haftar.
Turkey then exploited the GNA’s gratitude, and political vulnerability, to cajole its prime minister, Fayez al-Serraj, into signing a new bilateral maritime treaty. The treaty and associated maps totally contradict previously understood Greek and Cypriot drilling rights, in effect ignoring the existence of Crete. Erdoğan hailed the agreement as the reversal of Sèvres and the dawn of a new order.
The next few months will decide if he is right, and whether that order is achieved through war or diplomacy.
www.theguardian.com
An increasingly fractious standoff over access to gas reserves has transformed a dispute between Turkey and Greece that was once primarily over Cyprus into one that now ensnares Libya, Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, and feeds into other political issues in the Mediterranean and has raised fears of a naval conflict between the two Nato allies in the Aegean Sea.
The crisis has been deepening in recent months with the French president, Emmanuel Macron, leading those inside the EU opposing Turkey’s increasingly military foreign policy and saying Turkey can no longer be seen as partner in the Mediterranean. He has offered French military support to the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, including the possible sale of 18 Rafale jets.
The issue was on the agenda of a meeting of the Med7 group of southern Mediterranean leaders on the French island of Corsica on Thursday and again at an EU council meeting on 23 September that will discuss imposing severe sanctions on the already struggling Turkish banking sector over its demand for access to large swaths of the eastern Mediterranean.
Germany, the lead mediator between Turkey and Greece, is exploring an enhanced customs union between Turkey and the EU to calm the dispute, which has been exacerbated by vast hydrocarbon discoveries over the past decade in the eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey has long sought a broader customs union with the EU, and although Greece might see any such offer as a reward for bullying, Germany believes both carrots and sticks are needed to persuade Turkey to change its strategy..
Greek navy ships taking part in an exercise in the Mediterranean last month. Photograph: Greek Defence Ministry/AFP/Getty
But Germany is also warning Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, that his current unilateral strategy is a commercial dead end, since no private gas company is going to touch cooperation with Turkey if it is trying to exploit illegal claims on gas reserves.
The scale of the reserves, and Turkish ambitions, last year prompted Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to form an East Med Gas forum to draw up a joint plan to extract and export gas from the region. France would also like to join, and the United Arab Emirates, also battling Turkish intervention in Libya, is a supporter, creating an imposing anti-Turkish web.
Turkey argues that Greece is claiming the Aegean Sea economically as purely Greek, even though Turkey has a greater length of coastline.
Emmanuel Macron gives a press conference at the Med7 summit in Corsica on Thursday. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPA
Some Turkish analysts, such as Cem Gürdeniz, a former admiral, see it as the geopolitical issue of the 21st century and a chance to challenge treaty settlements made a century ago amid the collapse of the Ottoman empire. “We are defending our blue homeland,” he says. “It is a defensive doctrine after our continental shelf was stolen by Greece and Cyprus [and] represents the greatest geostrategic challenge of the century.”
Macron has already increased the French naval presence in the sea, and called for withdrawal of the Turkish reconnaissance ship Oruç Reis, accompanied by Turkish naval ships. The ship is undertaking seismic surveys in Greek waters south of Cyprus. A key moment may come on 12 September, when the Turkish Navtex warning for Oruç Reis is due to end. If it is extended, the risk of a naval clash between Greece and Turkey two Nato partners either by accident or design rises.
The fear that the conflict could spiral out of control has led to an urgent search for a neutral arbitrator and an agreed agenda for talks. An effort by Nato to start technical naval deconfliction talks was delayed after Greece objected to Nato’s involvement. The Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias, insisted that the talks would start only when the threats stopped. He then flew to New York to enlist the help of the UN secretary general, António Guterres.
Turkey’s Oruç Reis in the eastern Mediterranean. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Parallel mediation efforts by the EU, through the German presidency, had started to make progress. At the request of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, Erdoğan paused Turkish exploration activities near Cyprus last month, resuming only when Greece announced a maritime border agreement with Egypt similar to one signed by Turkey and Libya last November.
Germany’s mediation is hampered by Turkish warnings that the EU must be impartial and that the EU is biased towards the existing EU members, Greece and Cyprus. The Turkish ambassador to the UK, Ümit Yalçın, insists that his country is sincere in seeking talks with Greece.
A solution is difficult, since both sides have legitimate claims and the developing law of the sea, inherently complex, is interpreted differently by Greece and Turkey, leading to both sides publishing wholly contradictory maps showing the extent of their continental shelf and hence their economic exclusion zones.
The UN convention on the law of the sea (Unclos), signed by 167 states but not by Turkey, sets the limits of exclusive economic zones on the basis of a country’s continental shelf. As many as 300 similar maritime disputes have occurred worldwide. The convention also allows islands that are inhabited and economically viable to have exclusive economic zones. Greece, through its ownership of the 12 scattered Greek islands in the Dodecanese, can make a substantive claim to exploration rights.
The tiny island of Kastellorizo, just 1.2 miles (2km) from the Turkish coast and 300 miles (500km) from the Greek mainland, is a Greek possession, but in the past century has been held by Turkey, Italy and Germany and been a British protectorate. Turkey is threatening to send ships off the island to explore for hydrocarbon reserves.
Those analysts pressing both sides to attempt arbitration, as have many countries in similar disputes, say that in practice the international court of justice in The Hague, which acts as an arbitration body, may not endorse Greece’s maximalist position.
“In resolving the dispute, the primary question would be whether the islands have the same maritime area as mainlands,” wrote Yunus Emre Açıkgönül, a former Turkish diplomat and expert in maritime law. “Turkey wants to ignore the Greek islands from the EEZ definition, whereas Greece would like to give full weight to these islands. There is no clear answer to these questions. The effect to be accorded to islands has been one of the most controversial issues in the history of the law of maritime boundary definition.”
An offshore drilling rig off Limassol, Cyprus. Photograph: Petros Karadjias/AP
But he says case law shows factors including the size, status and location of an island and its distance from the mainland have to be taken into account. It is unlikely, for instance, that arbitration would find Kastellorizo justified expanding the exclusive Greek economic zone from Rhodes another 80 miles (125km) further east, depriving Turkey of 400,000 sq km of water.
To lure Turkey back into the lottery of arbitration would be hard since there is a risk that the bulk of the Aegean would remain Greek. But Turkey and Greece nearly agreed to settle their differences at the ICJ in 1976-78 and the plan foundered over preconditions. The stakes are higher now.
The bigger diplomatic judgment is whether the conflict is only a dispute about gas, capable of settlement by cartographers, or instead is driven by Erdoğan appropriating a pan-Islamic Ottoman ideology, largely because of his domestic political weakness.
The blue homeland theorists claim that Turkey’s troubles stem from unfair treatment by old colonial powers, including the pro-Greek former British prime minister David Lloyd George. Erdoğan’s supporters argue that at a point of historic weakness and without a navy, Turkey was forced to sign the treaty of Sèvres in 1920, and its inadequate revision at the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. This left Turkey in effect trapped as a landlocked power, even though it has about 5,000 miles (8,000km) of coastline.
Concern in French political classes about Turkey’s overall political direction is growing. Jacques Attali, who was adviser to the former French president François Mitterrand, recently said: “We have to hear what Turkey says, take it very seriously and be prepared to act by all means. If our predecessors had taken the Führer’s speeches seriously from 1933 to 1936, they could have prevented this monster from the accumulating the means to do what he did.”
The former French UN envoy Gérard Araud also put Turkish behaviour in a historical context. He wrote: “Russia, China and Turkey are revisionist powers which don’t accept a status quo based on a world order largely defined by the west in 1945 and 1991. They feel emboldened by a new global balance of power and by US policy. Where will they stop? What should the Europeans do?”
Macron put it bluntly at a conference in Lugano: “We have to create Pax Mediterranea because we see an imperial regional power coming back with some fantasies of its own history, and I am referring essentially to Turkey.”
Turkey accuses France of hysteria and pique. It claims France feels thwarted by the Turkish intervention in Libya at the start of 2020 to protect the UN-recognised Government of National Accord in Tripoli from an assault by the French-supported General Khalifa Haftar.
Turkey then exploited the GNA’s gratitude, and political vulnerability, to cajole its prime minister, Fayez al-Serraj, into signing a new bilateral maritime treaty. The treaty and associated maps totally contradict previously understood Greek and Cypriot drilling rights, in effect ignoring the existence of Crete. Erdoğan hailed the agreement as the reversal of Sèvres and the dawn of a new order.
The next few months will decide if he is right, and whether that order is achieved through war or diplomacy.
How a rush for Mediterranean gas threatens to push Greece and Turkey into war
Deepening dispute between Nato allies has dragged in neighbours and is in danger of spiralling out of control
I agree on all points!
Especially we should prioritize an agreement with Israel. In my opinion an agreement would brake the east med alliance. It would be a punch in the face of Greece. With a common base with Israel we would also lift the pressures from Europe. They wouldn't dare (at least not much) to criticize Israel, especially Germany.
It's not about making friends... It's more a win win for both...
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The pipeline is difficult anyway, it will either go through Egypt/Greek waters and be longer and more expensive or Turkish waters with a deal or if they want to connect it to Ceyhan for example it still needs to pass through Greek Cyprus, Northern Cyprus or Lebanon/Syria. Don't see how its going to happen.
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Yes.
I don’t understand why anyone would think otherwise. In the end Italy is in it for their own interest. Let’s not forget Italy did get to play colonial power too.
The best option for Turkey is make her own plans and not go with reactionary politics.
Which is sadly what has been the norm. Moving too slow. Making things too slowly.
Being reactionary is just proof of pure incompetence.
Ryder
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I said this before the italians cant be trusted. I was proven right again. Remember Italians were waiting for the right time to abandon the gna.
Last edited by a moderator:
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These are just political messages. Every country acts in its own interest, even France. It has already sold billions of dollars of weapons to Greece. I hope you don't think that French people will die for Greeks. Not long ago, the French people performed months of demonstrations for their quality of life. To die for Greeks? I do not think so. You think the European Union is one punch. This thought is like reading the book ''Alice in Wonderland''.
There are several important countries and their interests in the Union. Others serve interests and get paid.
Exactly. In the end Italy is a member of Europe. They have somehow the obligation to support Greece. But I think they also don't like expanding France in the Mediterranean like turkey. Therefore we should take the opportunity to put an edge in the European phalanx. Turkey should be flexible to form temporary alliances with every European member if it helps.
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If you were Germany, Italy or Spain, would you like France to become very powerful? There is also competition in the union.
S
Macron's Rhetoric Against Turkey Has Reached Its Limit
His words aren't hurting Erdogan, and he doesn't have the support needed to deploy sticks and stones.
No slouch at sharp rhetoric himself.
Photographer: Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images
For Emmanuel Macron, the moment of truth is approaching at a rate of knots. The French president has again fired off rhetorical broadsides at his Turkish counterpart over the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. But words are not going to break Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bones, and Macron will struggle to build an international consensus to use the economic sticks, much less the military stones to force a Turkish retreat.
The French leader’s verbal volleys have already lost a certain je ne sais quoi from repetition. At Thursday’s gathering in Corsica of the leaders of the so-called MED7 — France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta — Macron called for European countries to establish “red lines” for Turkish provocations.
But we’ve already heard this before. Indeed, only a couple of week ago, Macron was claiming to have already drawn those red lines, and boasting that Turkey would respect actions, not words. But his actions thus far — whether participating in military exercises in the troubled waters or hosting summits — have only earned him more scorn in Ankara.
The Turkish foreign ministry, no slouch at sharp rhetoric, responded to the French president’s latest salvo with an enfilade of its own: Macron, it said, should quit trying “to give lessons by speaking pedantically with his old colonial reflexes.” Turkey conducted military exercises of its own in northern Cyprus last week: They were dubbed “Mediterranean Storm.”
This leaves Macron with two options: put up, or shut up. He can send more French warships to waters already teeming with naval activity. (Oh look, the Russians have turned up, too.) But it is hard to imagine this will force Erdogan into recalling his naval and exploration vessels.
France can’t hope for much military support from NATO partners against a fellow member. Although the U.S. has eased a longstanding American embargo on arms sales to Cyprus, it isn’t likely to endorse sterner measures against Erdogan, who has President Donald Trump’s ear.
Macron can keep up with his philippics against Erdogan, but these have already passed the point of diminishing returns. The Greeks and Cypriots will soon tire of French expressions of solidarity, and Ankara might enjoy bandying more words with Paris.
And what of Berlin? Germany currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, and Chancellor Angela Merkel is trying to bring about a negotiated solution to the dispute between Turkey and Greece. Although the EU has warned of potential sanctions against Turkey, she seems reluctant to impose them.
It can’t possibly suit Merkel to have Macron rattling sabers while she talks peace. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has made it plain that military exercises aren’t helping.
Despite the presence of six other European leaders in Corsica, then, France is alone among the major powers in wanting to face down Turkey. And Macron has other crises demanding his attention. At home, coronavirus cases are spiking alarmingly, a reminder of his mishandling of the pandemic. His economic-stimulus plan, dubbed “France Relaunch” and unveiled last week, is a 100 billion-euro ($118 billion) gamble.
Abroad, there are other crises to contend with: Macron’s pledges to rescue the Lebanese from their politicians will come due in months, and the political upheaval in Mali challenges France’s counterterrorism goals in the Sahel. His other confrontation with Erdogan, in Libya, is not going well.
Under the circumstances, the president would be wise to hold his rhetorical fire in the Eastern Mediterranean dispute, and leave the talking to the chancellor.
His words aren't hurting Erdogan, and he doesn't have the support needed to deploy sticks and stones.
No slouch at sharp rhetoric himself.
Photographer: Adem Altan/AFP via Getty Images
For Emmanuel Macron, the moment of truth is approaching at a rate of knots. The French president has again fired off rhetorical broadsides at his Turkish counterpart over the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. But words are not going to break Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bones, and Macron will struggle to build an international consensus to use the economic sticks, much less the military stones to force a Turkish retreat.
The French leader’s verbal volleys have already lost a certain je ne sais quoi from repetition. At Thursday’s gathering in Corsica of the leaders of the so-called MED7 — France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta — Macron called for European countries to establish “red lines” for Turkish provocations.
But we’ve already heard this before. Indeed, only a couple of week ago, Macron was claiming to have already drawn those red lines, and boasting that Turkey would respect actions, not words. But his actions thus far — whether participating in military exercises in the troubled waters or hosting summits — have only earned him more scorn in Ankara.
The Turkish foreign ministry, no slouch at sharp rhetoric, responded to the French president’s latest salvo with an enfilade of its own: Macron, it said, should quit trying “to give lessons by speaking pedantically with his old colonial reflexes.” Turkey conducted military exercises of its own in northern Cyprus last week: They were dubbed “Mediterranean Storm.”
This leaves Macron with two options: put up, or shut up. He can send more French warships to waters already teeming with naval activity. (Oh look, the Russians have turned up, too.) But it is hard to imagine this will force Erdogan into recalling his naval and exploration vessels.
France can’t hope for much military support from NATO partners against a fellow member. Although the U.S. has eased a longstanding American embargo on arms sales to Cyprus, it isn’t likely to endorse sterner measures against Erdogan, who has President Donald Trump’s ear.
Macron can keep up with his philippics against Erdogan, but these have already passed the point of diminishing returns. The Greeks and Cypriots will soon tire of French expressions of solidarity, and Ankara might enjoy bandying more words with Paris.
And what of Berlin? Germany currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, and Chancellor Angela Merkel is trying to bring about a negotiated solution to the dispute between Turkey and Greece. Although the EU has warned of potential sanctions against Turkey, she seems reluctant to impose them.
It can’t possibly suit Merkel to have Macron rattling sabers while she talks peace. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has made it plain that military exercises aren’t helping.
Despite the presence of six other European leaders in Corsica, then, France is alone among the major powers in wanting to face down Turkey. And Macron has other crises demanding his attention. At home, coronavirus cases are spiking alarmingly, a reminder of his mishandling of the pandemic. His economic-stimulus plan, dubbed “France Relaunch” and unveiled last week, is a 100 billion-euro ($118 billion) gamble.
Abroad, there are other crises to contend with: Macron’s pledges to rescue the Lebanese from their politicians will come due in months, and the political upheaval in Mali challenges France’s counterterrorism goals in the Sahel. His other confrontation with Erdogan, in Libya, is not going well.
Under the circumstances, the president would be wise to hold his rhetorical fire in the Eastern Mediterranean dispute, and leave the talking to the chancellor.
S
I read a lot of articles from the Western World. They are all missing the main point. They understand this whole issue as Greece / Macron vs Erdogan. This is a huge mistake. They are not interviewing or asking the opinion of Turkish opposition / analysts / ex-Admirals. If they had asked they would understand that entire Turkish nation is behind Turkey's East Mediterranean doctrine. Same can't be said for Turkey's relations / operations with Libya, Eygpt, Israel, Syria. But in this specific issue for Turkish nation Map of Seville is no different from the Treaty of Sevres. They don't understand that Turkey / Turkish people will defend their rights to the death.
Of course not. Especially not France!
Most of the time the Europeans are busy to find a consensus. Very often they fail. Here are opportunities for a smart turkey to disturb the European unity.
We are pretty much all alone in this issue. Every country is either against us or just passive on this issue.
This is one of the bad consequences of having a bad relationship with everyone. Let's be honest Europe would have been always against us in this issue. But key allies like Israel and USA are lost, just when we need them the most now.
Especially loosing Israel for a bunch of Middle East Arabs who are digging our graves right now.
Erdoğan has all ready given up on the idea of Arab brotherhood but he's just too proud to accept and act according to it.
This is one of the bad consequences of having a bad relationship with everyone. Let's be honest Europe would have been always against us in this issue. But key allies like Israel and USA are lost, just when we need them the most now.
Especially loosing Israel for a bunch of Middle East Arabs who are digging our graves right now.
Erdoğan has all ready given up on the idea of Arab brotherhood but he's just too proud to accept and act according to it.
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Greece to Buy 18 Rafale Fighters, Four New Frigates to Boost Defense
Greece to Buy 18 Rafale Fighters, Four New Frigates to Boost Defense
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced on Saturday that Greece will buy 18 new Rafale aircraft and four frigates to address the defense needs of the country. The Greek premier, speaking in Thessaloniki, said that the defense of the country will also be boosted through the acquisition of...
greece.greekreporter.com
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Do you remember when we had a conversation about our relationship with Israel?
Should i say: I told you so ?
Truly, I don't remember. We might have had this conversation.
The problem is not trying new policies. The problem is sticking to them even though they are not working out.
The situations have changed quiet a lot and different camps have formed. The main problem is, we aren't in any of those camps at the moment, which makes us weak at the moment.
This should be a wake up call for the government to accelerate the naval procurement especially I class frigate. It's a pity that this ship is delayed for so long. Also there is no contract for the other three ships. Unbelievable if you consider the situation in the Mediterranean!Greece to Buy 18 Rafale Fighters, Four New Frigates to Boost Defense
Greece to Buy 18 Rafale Fighters, Four New Frigates to Boost Defense
Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced on Saturday that Greece will buy 18 new Rafale aircraft and four frigates to address the defense needs of the country. The Greek premier, speaking in Thessaloniki, said that the defense of the country will also be boosted through the acquisition of...greece.greekreporter.com
Glass🚬
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and they also delayed the meko upgrades.
cengaver
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