Corvus
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I asked for statistics and sources.
Military Operations Syria
- Thread starter Mis_TR_Like
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There are no realistic, public statistics. More than 50 thousand people were killed in Anfal, up to 100 thousand people came to the border. Border region of Turkey/Iraq is just mountains. Up to 80 thousand people took shelter in Turkey. Most of them did not join PKK, they joined KDP's peshmerga. Still to this day number of Iraqi Kurds in PKK is miniscule. Refugees that joined PKK are the Turkish Kurds that ran to Iraq and then to Mahmur after 90s; not the ones Saddam killed in 80s.
In any case, whatever we do, we have to wait for the Israeli elections on October 27th. Otherwise, Netanyahu will claim there's a crisis threatening national security and postpone the elections. One extra day of Netanyahu remaining in power is detrimental to everyone.
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US moves to prevent Türkiye-Israel military clash in Syria
ANKARA
The United States is working to strengthen military communication among Türkiye, Israel and Syria after an Israeli airstrike near the Turkish border raised the risk of an unintended confrontation, U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack has said.
Barrack said Ankara was not warned before Israel struck the Abu Duhur air base in Syria’s Idlib province on Aug. 18, although Israeli officials had informed the White House.
Türkiye observed Israeli aircraft flying north toward its territory and “could have reasonably prepared its own response,” he told Reuters.
“Thankfully, calm heads were able to prevent the situation from deteriorating further,” Barrack said.
Washington is now working on a stronger deconfliction mechanism among the three countries to prevent similar incidents, he added.
Barrack earlier described the strike, which damaged runways and hangars but caused no casualties, as an “unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.”
https://labsroyal.com
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said the attack was intended to prevent Turkish troops from deploying at the base, arguing that such a move would breach a security understanding with Damascus.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani said there were no plans for a Turkish base or permanent military presence at the facility. He acknowledged that Turkish officers had visited the site but said the trip formed part of cooperation on training and military reconstruction.
Türkiye’s Communications Directorate rejected Israel’s account, saying the allegations sought to justify unlawful attacks on Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Some senior U.S. officials believe the strike was partly motivated by Israel’s Oct. 27 election, Axios reported.
Washington urged Damascus to show restraint, saying the issue could be addressed more easily after the vote.
US moves to prevent Türkiye-Israel military clash in Syria - Türkiye News
The United States is working to strengthen military communication among Türkiye, Israel and Syria after an Israeli airstrike near the Turkish border raised the risk of an unintended confrontation, U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack has said.
Yeah. The Jews pretty much own the West unfortunately.
But I don't buy the "we'd lose completely". People underestimate us way too much.. it's just we have cowards as leaders so people assume we're weaker than we actually are.
Honestly, it is highly likely that he will win the upcoming elections as well
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Bibi (Hitler of our age) is pulling out all the stops to recover from his election defeat.
The latest polls ahead of the October 2026 general elections in Israel clearly show that Netanyahu and Likud have lost their majority (61 seats) needed to form a government. Politically cornered, Bibi is using regional tensions (especially those centered on Turkiye and Syria) as a tool for domestic politics to consolidate votes.
A tremendous irony: while the Israeli Air Force is bombing an airport in Syria, the country's largest airport, Ben Gurion, is grappling with domestic strikes and an economic crisis. Netanyahu is trying to balance the deep domestic economic crisis with war policies abroad, but this time his task is much more difficult.
This radical, bigoted regime alliance, which has violated and bombed the sovereignty of nine different countries in the last year, is becoming increasingly difficult to defend internationally. Furthermore, an unprecedented anti-Zionist wave and reaction is forming in US public opinion.
Our hope is that this situation does not become a price that Jews will pay for generations, at the hands of a war criminal who thinks of nothing but his own self-interest. Dragging Türkiye into an all-out war would produce consequences far beyond Israel's capacity and scope.
As for our side: Turkiye has incurred higher costs when reacting to provocations from hostile countries at the time and under the conditions desired by those countries. However, when it waited until the time and conditions were in its favor and prepared, it was able to balance crises in the medium term and even turn many of them to its advantage with lower costs. Ironically, every time Turkiye acted this way, there were those who argued that it was acting cowardly. The historical examples of 1963-74, 2013-25, and many more show us that we must remain level-headed and continue to work hard.
The latest polls ahead of the October 2026 general elections in Israel clearly show that Netanyahu and Likud have lost their majority (61 seats) needed to form a government. Politically cornered, Bibi is using regional tensions (especially those centered on Turkiye and Syria) as a tool for domestic politics to consolidate votes.
A tremendous irony: while the Israeli Air Force is bombing an airport in Syria, the country's largest airport, Ben Gurion, is grappling with domestic strikes and an economic crisis. Netanyahu is trying to balance the deep domestic economic crisis with war policies abroad, but this time his task is much more difficult.
This radical, bigoted regime alliance, which has violated and bombed the sovereignty of nine different countries in the last year, is becoming increasingly difficult to defend internationally. Furthermore, an unprecedented anti-Zionist wave and reaction is forming in US public opinion.
Our hope is that this situation does not become a price that Jews will pay for generations, at the hands of a war criminal who thinks of nothing but his own self-interest. Dragging Türkiye into an all-out war would produce consequences far beyond Israel's capacity and scope.
As for our side: Turkiye has incurred higher costs when reacting to provocations from hostile countries at the time and under the conditions desired by those countries. However, when it waited until the time and conditions were in its favor and prepared, it was able to balance crises in the medium term and even turn many of them to its advantage with lower costs. Ironically, every time Turkiye acted this way, there were those who argued that it was acting cowardly. The historical examples of 1963-74, 2013-25, and many more show us that we must remain level-headed and continue to work hard.
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Israeli strike puts Türkiye-Syria defense ties in focus
ANKARA
Israel’s latest strike on a Syrian airbase near Türkiye has drawn renewed attention to defense cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, which includes training and support for the restructuring of Syria’s armed forces.
Israeli aircraft struck the runways and hangars of the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria on Aug. 18.
The facility lies about 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. No casualties were reported.
Israel said the attack was intended to prevent Turkish troops from deploying at the base, alleging that Syria was close to breaching an agreed security status quo. Both Ankara and Damascus rejected the claim.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said the airbase was being rehabilitated for use by the Syrian Air Force and that no Turkish base or permanent deployment was planned.
He acknowledged that Turkish military officers had visited the facility several days before the strike but said the visit was part of ongoing cooperation on training and the exchange of expertise.
Türkiye’s Defense Ministry said no Turkish military delegation was present at the base during the attack.
It also said Ankara would continue supporting Syria’s efforts to rebuild its infrastructure and military capacity under the principle of “one state, one army.”
Türkiye and Syria signed a memorandum on joint military training and consultancy on Aug. 13, 2025.
Turkish officials have said its implementation covers training, consultancy, technical assistance and reciprocal visits aimed at strengthening Syria’s defense capacity.
Ankara appointed a defense attaché to its embassy in Damascus earlier that year and has supported efforts to bring armed factions under a single national command.
Türkiye says its assistance is provided at the request of the Syrian government and is intended to reinforce the country’s unity, territorial integrity and ability to combat terrorism.
Israel has repeatedly opposed the establishment of Turkish bases or air-defense systems in Syria, arguing that they could threaten its security and restrict its freedom of military action.
In the spring of 2025, Israel struck facilities at the T4, Palmyra and Hama airbases after reports that Turkish teams had assessed some of the sites.
The attacks prompted Turkish and Israeli officials to hold technical talks in Azerbaijan on establishing a channel to prevent unintended clashes.
Israel has carried out hundreds of attacks on Syrian military sites since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024.
The Israeli military said its initial campaign included more than 350 airstrikes on airfields, air-defense systems, weapons facilities and other military assets.
Following the latest strike, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack said Washington was working to establish a deconfliction mechanism involving Türkiye, Syria and Israel to prevent further miscommunication.
Israeli strike puts Türkiye-Syria defense ties in focus - Türkiye News
Israel’s latest strike on a Syrian airbase near Türkiye has drawn renewed attention to defense cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, which includes training and support for the restructuring of Syria’s armed forces.
IDF did push for a strike on the Abu Duhur base in Syria. One plausible operational concern is that Turkish radar, SIGINT/EW or air-defence capabilities in Syria could restrict Israeli freedom of action, including in a future confrontation with Iran. Two things changed recently that caused a rift in Israel-Turkish relations in that sense:
1) During Assad’s rule Damascus was largely naked in terms of SIGINT. Israel enjoyed an extraordinary degree of SIGINT penetration of Syrian military and security communications, particularly as Russian attention and resources shifted toward Ukraine after 2022. The air-defense systems provided by Russia were good, if not perfect, but due to operational problems and a lack of training they were not enough to stop Israeli raids, although the IAF still had to make meticulous plans to fly over Syria. Mount Hermon was another problem for Israel in terms of SIGINT and radar facilities, but after rapid IDF operation capturing it hours after Assad's fall, it will probably remain a red line for Israel alongside the status of the Golan and it is already very heavily fortified.
Damascus today is no longer naked. Israeli intelligence is legendary and probably still has access to a great deal of highly classified information about what is going on in Damascus, but Turkish support should have provided important capabilities for securing communication channels while countering Israeli SIGINT. Turkish assistance also improved Syrian counterintelligence and communications security, potentially exposing previously compromised networks or technical collection infrastructure dating from the Assad period.
However, one must also remember that Israeli land forces are waiting just 20 km away from Damascus. Many people forget this reality.
2) Separating Abu Duhur attacks from the broader political problems between Israel and Turkey, I suspect that one deeper operational consideration is Iran as another Israeli-Iranian round remains. The root of the problem related with Abu Duhur Base (seperating it feom the other problems between two countries) lies with Iran as final round with Iran has not yet been staged.
Jordanian airspace will be open only if there is an imminent and major threat to the whole region that would effect Jordan itself, but otherwise it is not reliable. Saudi Arabia can turn a blind eye once or twice but it would strongly protest repeated use of its airspace. Yet, the Iraqi KRG has no meaningful air-defense capability, while the Iraqi state lacks air-defense systems capable of stopping Israel. For this reason preserving freedom of action over Syrian airspace is therefore a major Israeli strategic requirement. Probably, if Israel trusted Turkey not to intercept Israeli jets in the next round with Iran, it would not have attacked Abu Duhur Base in order to deter possible future Turkish military installations elsewhere in Syria.
This raises the question: Why does the Israeli government believe Turkey would intercept Israeli jets on their way to Iran? Or that Turkey would share with Iran information obtained from possible radar units deployed on Syrian soil? As mentioned before, the mass media, "experts" and governmental advisors have been poisoning Israeli decision makers for long years that they think Turkey will help Iran and other other state that is against Israel blindly. They have no ideas about the "cold peace" between Iran and Turkey for decades and rivalry in huge number of subjects, but demonizing Turkey works to make decision makers believe Turkey will help Iran.
Another point is that Israel does not need to fly close to the Turkish border as I argued in the quoted post last year before all this mess. The southern route alongside Jordan and Iraqi borders is safe enough for IAF. Flying close to Turkey is therefore unnecessary and dangerous, as last time it took 17 seconds of breaching Turkish airspace to shot down a Russian Su-24 and it is not unusual to breach an airspace as Israel did it to Turkey in 2007 and later apologized as it was accepted by both countries unintentionally made. In 2007 Turkish-Israeli relations were very different from today, so the breach resulted only in a protest. Today, even an unintentional airspace violation caused by human error or a technical malfunction could trigger an escalation that marks the point of no return.
Turkish-Russian relations slowly recovered after that incident but in a similar case with Israel things will escalate further more. The structural basis of Turkish-Russian relations is very different from that of Turkish-Israeli relations. Barrack mentioned the Su-24 case in an optimistic way but as I'll explain in another post, nature of Turkish-Russian relations is strikingly different than Turkish-Israel relations.
1) During Assad’s rule Damascus was largely naked in terms of SIGINT. Israel enjoyed an extraordinary degree of SIGINT penetration of Syrian military and security communications, particularly as Russian attention and resources shifted toward Ukraine after 2022. The air-defense systems provided by Russia were good, if not perfect, but due to operational problems and a lack of training they were not enough to stop Israeli raids, although the IAF still had to make meticulous plans to fly over Syria. Mount Hermon was another problem for Israel in terms of SIGINT and radar facilities, but after rapid IDF operation capturing it hours after Assad's fall, it will probably remain a red line for Israel alongside the status of the Golan and it is already very heavily fortified.
Damascus today is no longer naked. Israeli intelligence is legendary and probably still has access to a great deal of highly classified information about what is going on in Damascus, but Turkish support should have provided important capabilities for securing communication channels while countering Israeli SIGINT. Turkish assistance also improved Syrian counterintelligence and communications security, potentially exposing previously compromised networks or technical collection infrastructure dating from the Assad period.
However, one must also remember that Israeli land forces are waiting just 20 km away from Damascus. Many people forget this reality.
2) Separating Abu Duhur attacks from the broader political problems between Israel and Turkey, I suspect that one deeper operational consideration is Iran as another Israeli-Iranian round remains. The root of the problem related with Abu Duhur Base (seperating it feom the other problems between two countries) lies with Iran as final round with Iran has not yet been staged.
Jordanian airspace will be open only if there is an imminent and major threat to the whole region that would effect Jordan itself, but otherwise it is not reliable. Saudi Arabia can turn a blind eye once or twice but it would strongly protest repeated use of its airspace. Yet, the Iraqi KRG has no meaningful air-defense capability, while the Iraqi state lacks air-defense systems capable of stopping Israel. For this reason preserving freedom of action over Syrian airspace is therefore a major Israeli strategic requirement. Probably, if Israel trusted Turkey not to intercept Israeli jets in the next round with Iran, it would not have attacked Abu Duhur Base in order to deter possible future Turkish military installations elsewhere in Syria.
This raises the question: Why does the Israeli government believe Turkey would intercept Israeli jets on their way to Iran? Or that Turkey would share with Iran information obtained from possible radar units deployed on Syrian soil? As mentioned before, the mass media, "experts" and governmental advisors have been poisoning Israeli decision makers for long years that they think Turkey will help Iran and other other state that is against Israel blindly. They have no ideas about the "cold peace" between Iran and Turkey for decades and rivalry in huge number of subjects, but demonizing Turkey works to make decision makers believe Turkey will help Iran.
Another point is that Israel does not need to fly close to the Turkish border as I argued in the quoted post last year before all this mess. The southern route alongside Jordan and Iraqi borders is safe enough for IAF. Flying close to Turkey is therefore unnecessary and dangerous, as last time it took 17 seconds of breaching Turkish airspace to shot down a Russian Su-24 and it is not unusual to breach an airspace as Israel did it to Turkey in 2007 and later apologized as it was accepted by both countries unintentionally made. In 2007 Turkish-Israeli relations were very different from today, so the breach resulted only in a protest. Today, even an unintentional airspace violation caused by human error or a technical malfunction could trigger an escalation that marks the point of no return.
Turkish-Russian relations slowly recovered after that incident but in a similar case with Israel things will escalate further more. The structural basis of Turkish-Russian relations is very different from that of Turkish-Israeli relations. Barrack mentioned the Su-24 case in an optimistic way but as I'll explain in another post, nature of Turkish-Russian relations is strikingly different than Turkish-Israel relations.
