On why proxy warfare in South Korea is more favorable than proxy warfare in Taiwan.


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On why proxy warfare in South Korea is more favorable than proxy warfare in Taiwan.


The United States imposed sanctions on Japan in 1986 to prevent Japan from monopolizing semiconductors and transferring technology to Taiwan and South Korea. Fearing a technological threat from the anti-Japanese South, Japan transferred mainly semiconductor production facilities and key advanced industrial technologies to the pro-Japanese Taiwan, which has since overtaken the South in semiconductor technology. Since the 1972 U.S.-China summit, Japan's policies have not been an issue in U.S.-China economic cooperation. However, in the aftermath of the U.S.-China trade dispute in 2021, war through proxy warfare could occur in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula. In the event of a war in Taiwan or South Korea, the United States would have no choice but to use Scorched Earth Tactics to prevent China from acquiring equipment and technology and producing advanced weapons, and radioactive Scorched Earth Tactics to prevent human access, depending on the degree of geopolitical threat to the United States that would be posed if China gained territory. Taiwan and South Korea currently produce 90% of the world's advanced 5-nanometer chips, and if proxy warfare in Taiwan results in a South Korean monopoly on semiconductors, South Korea will coordinate and weaponize its semiconductor production. In this article, I argue that it is more beneficial for the United States to engage in proxy warfare against China in the South than in Taiwan and South Korea.

Scenario 1.

If there is a Sino-Taiwan war and the Taiwanese military, a proxy for the U.S. military, does not take Taiwan from the Chinese, it will become a protracted financial war, which is not in the U.S. national interest.

China has shied away from war with the United States in recent years because of domestic economic problems, including rising real estate prices, a slowing economy, and an aging population. Militarily, China's indigenously developed weapons are inferior and its naval forces are weaker than those of the United States, which cannot land on Taiwan. Taiwan also lacks the naval power to control the Taiwan Strait to land on China. Any future war in the Taiwan Strait would likely end in an expendable artillery battle. (Previously, in 1954 and 1958, China and Taiwan fought artillery battles for control of each other's small islands.) Militarily, imposing a naval blockade on China would cost the United States a lot of money and manpower. Economically, the U.S. would impose economic sanctions on China, including asset freezes, which would harm U.S. companies with investments in China. A war in the Taiwan Strait would reduce semiconductor production in Taiwan, the world's No. 1 semiconductor producer, and cause South Korean semiconductor manufacturers, the world's No. 2, to adjust their prices in the United States. In particular, advanced technology transfers would be concentrated in South Korea instead of Taiwan, and anti-Japanese sentiment and pro-China sentiment in South Korea would lead to a leakage of advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology to China. This poses a potential threat to the U.S. that its technological edge in advanced weapons will be overtaken by China. Meanwhile, U.S. naval blockades and economic sanctions will increase trade between China, Russia, and Iran, rendering U.S. public sanctions ineffective. (In the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war of aggression, despite U.S. economic sanctions, Russia increased weapons production with the support of China and Iran, and the intended damage of increased inflation and unemployment did not occur.) China, Russia, and Iran will further expand the BRICS system to undermine the dollar's hegemony as the core currency of the global payment system.

Scenario 2.

If a Sino-Taiwan war were to break out and the Taiwanese Army, a proxy for the U.S. military, were to lose Taiwan to the Chinese, it would be a short-term nuclear war, which would be very bad for U.S. national interests.

As China masses amphibious assault ships to cross the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. military engages in Scorched Earth Tactics, bombarding semiconductor factories in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, China is unable to acquire semiconductor production facilities and advanced industrial technology to produce advanced weapons. The United States requests the deployment of South Korean troops, but South Korea is uncooperative, aiming to monopolize the semiconductor market. The Taiwanese surrender without resistance after landing in China because they share the same ethnicity and language as the Chinese and lack hostility toward China. (The U.S. experienced the rapid collapse of pro-U.S. governments after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.) The U.S. withdraws from the Nuclear Weapons Treaty in fear of Chinese ballistic missile bases and uses radioactive night operations to unmanned Taiwan. The U.S. uses tactical nuclear weapons to destroy China's aircraft carrier battle groups, prompting China to use nuclear weapons in Taiwan, Guam, Saipan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and elsewhere, but China does not retaliate with nuclear weapons, using Taiwan as a base for unsinkable aircraft carriers and unsinkable submarines. The United States drops nuclear weapons on Taiwan's semiconductor production areas and Chinese troops, contaminating the island with radioactivity before handing it over to China. When the U.S. military withdraws from Taiwan, South Korea, with 26 nuclear reactors, feels threatened and produces dirty bombs from nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. (As of 2022, the United States has about 6,000 nuclear warheads, Russia has about 6,000, China has about 800 to 1,000, India has about 160, and North Korea has about 20.) South Korea's dirty bomb production stimulates North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons production and improve its capabilities. As North Korea's warhead stockpile grows, Japan, the world's No. 1 plutonium producer, becomes armed with nuclear weapons, and Russia and China build up their nuclear arsenals out of a sense of crisis against Japan. (China and Russia will double their nuclear arsenals by 2035, and North Korea and India will increase theirs by up to 13 times by 2035.) Their neighbors will also accelerate their nuclear arsenals, and Pakistan and Iran's mutual nuclear technology exchanges will allow non-nuclear Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons. After a long period of radioactive contamination of the island of Taiwan, China will build missile bases and naval bases on Taiwan, threatening U.S. forces in Guam, Saipan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Chinese military presence in the East China Sea, Chinese military influence in the South China Sea, and Chinese attempts to expand into the Indian Ocean will cause U.S. forces to lose control and withdraw from South Korea, Japan, and Indonesia.

Scenario 3.

If there is a North Korea-South Korea war and the South Koreans, proxies for the U.S. military, don't lose South Korea to the North Koreans, proxies for the Chinese military, it will be a short-term hybrid war, which is good for U.S. national interests.

As the U.S. actively supports South Korea and intensifies joint exercises, North Korea, faced with the prospect of invasion, launches a preemptive strike against South Korea. (In 2016, Russia invaded Ukraine because it felt threatened by U.S. arms support.) North Korea uses chemical and tactical nuclear weapons to occupy South Korea in the short term because it is disadvantageous to fight a protracted war with South Korea. (In 2023, North Korea realizes that a protracted war is not possible and plans to reorganize its operational doctrine and defense system to fight a short-term, speed war.) The United States, Russia, China, and Japan initiate peace negotiations to prevent the spread of nuclear war due to North Korea's use of nuclear weapons. However, the negotiations over the division of North Korea-occupied South Korean territory into a five-nation division and rule are stalled due to friction between Russia and Japan over territorial claims to Takeshima and the Sea of Japan. Dissatisfied with the five-nation division, South Korea withdrew from the Chemical Weapons Convention and attacked North Korea with chemical weapons, citing North Korea's use of tactical nuclear weapons. (Despite the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, South Korea has not destroyed its chemical arsenal in case North Korea develops nuclear weapons.The use of chemical weapons by the South Korean military broke off peace negotiations and prolonged the war, and the South Korean military won the war as North Korea depleted its tactical nuclear and chemical munitions. (Since 1972, South Korea has developed a heavy chemical industry to develop chemical weapons as an asymmetric weapon against China's nuclear arsenal, and South Korea has stockpiled 4,000 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons.) South Korea enters North Korean territory without China's consent to reunification, and a U.S.-led allied force arrives to stop South Korea's occupation of North Korea.When China's proxy, the North Korean Army, is destroyed, China invades North Korea and occupies North Korean territory. (Chinese troops entered the war in 1950 when South Korea's occupation of North Korea was imminent.) When South Korean troops, backed by China, use chemical weapons, the Chinese respond with biological weapons of the type AB target. (In 1985, Sis AB blood type was discovered in 11% of South Koreans.) South Korea loses North Korean territory to China, and the U.S., fearing that China will seize South Korean territory, scrambles nuclear bombers from the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan, to destroy Chinese forces. (North Korea exists because the U.S. Far East Command refused to use nuclear weapons against Chinese forces and North Korean military installations in 1951. The United States and China resume peace negotiations, fearing that a nuclear war limited to the Korean Peninsula and Japan could escalate into a nuclear attack on the U.S. and Chinese mainland. (In 2009, the U.S. developed a plan for four-party rule in the event of North Korea's collapse, which was agreed to by China in 2015.) At the end of the division, Russia and the U.S., which failed to create a corridor with the mainland, return their ceded territory to China and South Korea, respectively. (Germany, which was divided and ruled by the four powers during World War II, was reunified in 1990.) However, China would incorporate the northern part of North Korea as an autonomous region for ethnic minorities, making it Chinese territory, and only a small part of it South Korean. South Korea, which grew stronger by absorbing North Korea's military power under the pretext of disarmament, wants to nuclearize itself with its own dirty bomb and militarily reclaim North Korean territory that has been annexed by China. The U.S. demands that South Korea send troops to conflict zones such as Poland, Jordan, Yemen, and Taiwan to weaken the South Korean military, but is rebuffed. The U.S. fails to disarm South Korea through economic sanctions, and South Korea threatens China with nuclear weapons to absorb its former territory. (China entered the Korean Peninsula civil war in 668 and seized territory from North Korea, but withdrew in 676 after a South Korean attack.) The U.S.-led coalition, including China, invades South Korea in a military amphibious invasion, citing evidence of South Korean chemical weapons use to disarm the South Korean military. (The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition was based on WMD stockpiles, and the 2014 invasion of Syria by the U.S.-led coalition was based on chemical weapons use.) After the allied invasion of South Korea, the South Koreans are pushed back to their original territory, and China reinstates the North Korean government. Chinese troops mass on the Chinese border with North Korea, fearing that North Korea will reclaim border territory ceded to it in the Korean War. Meanwhile, as China's military power is weakened by proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula, Russia and India rally their armies to expand their territory on the border with China, causing China's borders to shrink.The border between China and the Soviet Union, the territory of the Amur River, the Manchurian region, and the Ussuri River basin with its tributaries are annexed by Russia. Russia claims the U.S. territory of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and has expanded its presence in Northeast Asia, posing a military threat to the Aleutian Islands. Relations between Russia and China deteriorate, BRICS is dismantled, China's economy shrinks, and global GDP declines.

Scenario 4.

If there is a North Korea-South Korea war and the South Koreans, proxies for the U.S. military, lose South Korea to the North Koreans, proxies for the Chinese military, it will be a protracted war of racial extinction, which is very good for the U.S. national interest.

The U.S. has shifted the balance of missile power between South Korea and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula and is engaged in a protracted war of attrition through proxy warfare. South Korea has so far responded moderately to North Korean provocations because asymmetric forces have created a military balance on the peninsula (in 2009, a South Korean naval vessel engaged a North Korean naval vessel in the Yellow Sea; in 2010, North Korea retaliated with missiles on South Korean islands, but South Korea only responded with artillery fire due to its weaker missile capabilities). But as the U.S. has bolstered South Korea's vulnerable missile capabilities, it has become more preemptive. (In the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, U.S. Navy ships attacked North Vietnamese naval vessels, starting the Vietnam War.) In the Yellow Sea, South Korean and North Korean ships engage in a large-scale amphibious landing drill, prompting North Korea to attack South Korea. Unlike the situation in Taiwan, which is separated by sea, the Korean Peninsula is a proxy warfare force of China, called the North Korean Army, which is connected to China by land, so it fights a protracted war with logistical support from China. In a show of force, North Korean naval vessels invade South Korean territorial waters and South Korean naval vessels destroy North Korean naval vessels, and North Korea retaliates with missiles. The far-right regime in South Korea, now hostile to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, retaliates with hypersonic missiles loaded with chemical weapons instead of artillery, and North Korea escalates to the point of using nuclear weapons. Russia and China pressure North Korea not to use nuclear weapons, so a war of attrition with chemical weapons continues. South Korea and North Korea fight a prolonged, intense, and violent war with high levels of fighting spirit due to intra-ethnic conflict, resulting in devastating casualties in both countries.China provides biological weapons targeting South Koreans to control the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, which has fewer chemical weapons than South Korea, as the war of attrition continues. (China took over the Japanese military's biological weapons laboratories in China after Japan's defeat in 1945 and developed biological weapons that, like the current coronavirus, are harmless to Chinese people but attack specific targeted races, such as whites, blacks, and Hispanics.) The nature of chemical weapons limits their use over long distances because when used in artillery shells, the heat and acceleration deforms the viruses and bacteria. Due to the genetic similarities between Chinese and South Koreans, South Koreans have similar resistance to Chinese, making biological weapons ineffective. Therefore, while the Chinese military is harmless to the Chinese population, the targeting of biological weapons is limited to attacks on specific target races, such as Caucasians, blacks, and Hispanics, which makes U.S. troops of Caucasian ethnicity a target. After being severely damaged by biological weapons, U.S. forces retreat to Jeju Island, the largest island in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, and establish a South Korean government-in-exile. The United States, which deems biological weapons inhumane, does not send U.S. troops to the peninsula to restore the South Korean government's territory, fearing that China and North Korea will retaliate against the U.S. mainland for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. China recognizes U.S. supremacy over Taiwan in exchange for preventing U.S. deployment. The South Korean government-in-exile on Jeju Island becomes a second Taiwan, serving as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and unsinkable submarine for the U.S. military. In particular, the island's geographic location, one-twentieth the size of Taiwan, would put China under pressure from U.S. landings in Shandong province using Jeju Naval Base, disperse naval forces in the South China Sea, and limit the operations of the Chinese fleet. (The 1944 D-Day landings at Normandy were the precursor to the Korean War's Inchon landings, and U.S. amphibious tactics had already proven effective in Northeast Asia.) As anti-American sentiment rises over the U.S. refusal to enter the war, the United States provides economic assistance to the South Korean government-in-exile by transferring Taiwan's advanced semiconductor technology to Jeju Island. However, when the South Korean government exhausts its conventional military forces and creates a rebel group that uses Taiwan's advanced semiconductor technology to launch cyber attacks against the United States, the United States dismantles the exile government and returns Jeju and Dokdo to Japan. As Japan's territorial claims in the Sea of Japan expand, North Korea is blocked by a powerful Japanese navy and unable to access Jeju and Takeshima. With the collapse of South Korea, China demands more territory in a border dispute with North Korea in exchange for military support to undermine the hegemony of a reunified North Korea. (In the 1950 Korean War, North Korea received Chinese military support in exchange for recognizing the disputed border with China as Chinese territory after the collapse of the North Korean army. But now that the Chinese military is more stable, it can demand more territory from North Korea, which leads to border problems between China and North Korea.North Korea invades China, whose military is weakened by its support for proxy warfare against the United States, in response to China's policy of colonizing North Korea and denuclearizing North Korea. (As in the Cambodian-Vietnamese War of 1978, Vietnam attacked Cambodia, an ally, after its war with the United States ended.) North Korea goes to war with its ally, China, to prevent a coup by its more experienced militants. In response, China attacks North Korea with biological weapons targeting its leadership, the Kim family, to eliminate the nuclear threat to itself, and North Korea attacks China with nuclear weapons when its leadership is threatened with destruction. China retaliates by using nuclear weapons to abolish North Korea's hereditary system. Radioactive contamination from the nuclear war causes genetic mutations in Chinese and North Koreans, while radioactive fallout from Japan's prevailing westerlies leads to racial inferiority among East Asians. China establishes a tyrannical government in North Korea and disarms the North Korean army in lieu of annexation until the peninsula is cleaned up. China then declares the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under the North Korean government, and the nuclear threat in Northeast Asia is stabilized with the emergence of a single state on the peninsula. (China allowed North Vietnam to overthrow the South Vietnamese regime and reunify with Vietnam in 1976.) However, as China's involvement in nuclear-armed proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula weakened, local Chinese warlords broke away and seceded, splitting China into several countries.


The leveling of missile and drone technology among nations has made it possible for hostile states to effectively resist the U.S. strategy of a line of defense through U.S. outposts, including countering the U.S. Navy with anti-ship missiles, countering the U.S. Air Force with surface-to-air missiles, and countering the U.S. Army with self-destructive drones. In the long term, the shrinking U.S. hegemony due to Third World challenges and the lack of U.S. forces due to expanding theater of engagement will force the U.S. to withdraw from South Korea, which serves as the Line of Control, and defend the Sea of Japan as an obstacle. (U.S. forces in Iraq will withdraw in 2024, but South Korea will not withdraw in the short term, but will in the long term.) Japan, separated from China by sea, is more advantageous to the U.S. in maintaining hegemony in the Pacific and defending Pacific islands than the land-linked Korean Peninsula. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which are connected by land, Japan is separated by sea and does not pose a threat from China, so there is no need to withdraw U.S. troops from Japan, which will remain there in perpetuity.China, which has one-tenth the nuclear warheads of the United States, is steadily increasing its nuclear warhead production. China will have no nuclear weapons by then, so it will use unfinished biological weapons such as coronavirus to counter the U.S. lack of nuclear weapons. Under wartime conditions, China's shipbuilding capacity is 70 times that of the United States, and with naval deployments in the Middle East, U.S. ship production is insufficient for naval combat in the Taiwan Strait.While a confrontation between the United States and Russia, which holds 10 percent of the world's uranium reserves, risks nuclear apocalypse, an aggressive military response to China, which holds 1.2 percent of the world's uranium reserves, is a reasonable option for the United States because the United States has the advantage and has so far maintained proxy warfare powers Taiwan and South Korea.

In pursuit of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States became involved in the stabilization of Europe after World War II, which allowed the United States to expand its hegemony and dominate the world order. This led to the U.S. involvement in the current NATO-Russia confrontation, and Russia's threat of military aggression against Ukraine has created a sense of crisis in U.S. hegemony. This sense of crisis prompted China, which had been obedient to the United States, to use its military might to challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia, including Taiwan and South Korea. China has intervened in conflicts in the Middle East, and has used its economic power to bring third countries into the BRICS system, challenging US dollar hegemony. China plans to expand its hegemony in the East China Sea region by annexing the island of Taiwan. (Britain's 1997 return of Hong Kong diminished its global hegemony and gave way to Chinese control.) China plans to acquire Taiwan to threaten U.S. military bases in the Pacific Islands, and China plans to extend its military and economic sphere to the Indian Ocean and Africa, creating a single economic zone based on the Chinese yuan. (In 2013, China announced plans to establish a new Silk Road Economic Zone.) If the United States is to prevent China's military and economic challenge from diminishing its hegemony, it will need to take aggressive military action, such as dividing China into multiple states.

Proxy warfare in the Taiwan Strait is economical for China because war is cheap, while proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula is not a burden on the U.S. economy. The threat of Chinese submarines to U.S., Japanese, and South Korean merchant shipping is significant because the U.S. relies on maritime transportation to supply its proxy, the Taiwanese military. (In World War I, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare caused much damage to Allied merchant shipping.) Amphibious assaults are more costly for the attacking side than land-based battles, and logistics are expensive after landing, so even if China were to capture Taiwan based on its geographical proximity to the Taiwan Strait, it would be costly for China. To avoid these losses, China may choose to confront the United States overland instead of landing through the Taiwan Strait. (In the 1950 Korean War, the United States was initially outmatched on the Korean Peninsula because the U.S. Far Eastern Command anticipated a Chinese landing on Taiwan and overlooked support from South Korean forces.) South Korea already serves as a U.S. bridgehead, eliminating the need for a costly amphibious assault, and it has a logistics base in Japan, the world's third-largest steel producer after China and India. It is advantageous for the U.S. to wage war on the Korean Peninsula because the South Korean military, especially with its strong conventional forces, would ensure a U.S. victory against China. In addition, South Korea, the world's sixth-largest steel producer after the United States and Russia, is able to produce its own weapons without U.S. economic support, which would not burden the U.S. budget. Conversely, proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula poses a geopolitical threat to China because it would allow the United States to land in Beijing, the Chinese capital. This would weaken Chinese naval forces deployed to the blockade of the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait by dispersing them across the Yellow Sea, and would require China to spend productive time and money expanding its fleet to offset this.

While a U.S. military failure in the Taiwan Strait would weaken the U.S. military, a U.S. military failure on the Korean Peninsula would benefit the U.S. military. The Chinese military uses long-range tactical ballistic missiles developed by Russia and Iran to launch nuclear weapons, so it does not need submarines and bombers like the U.S. military. While China has about 13 percent fewer nuclear warheads than the United States, the U.S. and China have similar capabilities, given that bombers are responsible for 20 percent of U.S. nuclear weapon launches and submarines have a 40 percent success rate for nuclear ballistic missiles, compared to 70 percent. Despite its diverse missile force, the United States has only two types of nuclear ballistic missiles that can be launched from submarines: the Trident and Poseidon missiles. If Taiwan becomes China's unsinkable aircraft carrier and an unsinkable submarine base that prevents U.S. submarines from reaching China, the United States would only have the means to launch bombers, eliminating the power differential with China, which only uses missiles from land. For U.S. military bombers, U.S. air bases in Guam, Saipan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and elsewhere are essential, but the installation of Chinese missiles in Taiwan poses a threat to the United States. The failure of U.S. military operations in the Taiwan Strait is directly linked to the weakening of U.S. hegemony. However, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula caused by a failed U.S. military operation would lead to a military buildup in Japan, and the Japanese military would voluntarily defend Guam, Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa. Japan's military buildup also poses a threat to South Korea, strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance and serving U.S. economic interests by saving military supplies for U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Chinese military chooses the Korean Peninsula, which is further inland than the Taiwan Strait, as a battleground for military conflict with the U.S. military. (When the U.S. created the Far East Command in 1947, it mistakenly assumed that China would take control of Taiwan, and it mistakenly provided weapons primarily to Taiwan rather than to South Korea, making it easier for North Korea to defeat South Korean forces.) A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would require the Chinese military to directly confront the U.S. proxy Taiwanese military, whereas a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would involve the U.S. confronting China's proxy North Korean military, thus reducing the risk of direct destruction of mainland China. The U.S. believes that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Taiwan to contaminate the island with radioactivity and to unmanned the island through Scorched Earth Tactics is realistic. China, on the other hand, would use biological weapons as an asymmetric weapon to compensate for its lack of nuclear capabilities, but the nature of biological weapons limits their effectiveness in the Taiwan Strait.

Proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula could involve the use of chemical and biological weapons but is unlikely to result in a nuclear war, while proxy warfare in the Taiwan Strait would necessarily turn into a nuclear war. A confrontation with China in Taiwan would force the United States to attack mainland China directly, and if China is destroyed in a war, Russia's territory in the Sino-Russian conflict zone would grow. Proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula does not provide a justification for directly destroying China and eliminates the need for potentially problematic U.S. Scorched Earth Tactics in the future. The geographical distance between Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and Beijing, the capital of China, is closer than the geographical distance between Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Therefore, China would have to use chemical or biological weapons instead of nuclear weapons, and as in the Iraq War, China's use of WMD would give the U.S. and its allies ammunition to oust Xi Jinping's regime in Beijing in the future. In addition, radioactive contamination of the Korean Peninsula would lead to radioactive contamination of Japan through the prevailing westerly winds, causing genetic modification of the Japanese population and making them an inferior people. Contaminating the Korean Peninsula with radioactive material, more so than Taiwan, would frustrate Japan's attempts to trade resources with Russia and China in defiance of the U.S. economic blockade. The Korean Peninsula and the Japanese archipelago have a high percentage of granite and a high concentration of natural radioactivity, so South Koreans have high levels of radiation. Furthermore, a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula would not be inhumane because South Koreans have a relatively high adaptive capacity to biological weapons and radiation exposure compared to Caucasian populations, as evidenced by past events such as SARS, COVID-19, and the Great East Japan Earthquake.

While proxy warfare in the Taiwan Strait is a conflict between mainstream ethnic groups in China, proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula extends to conflicts between ethnic minorities in Northeast Asia. (China's Ming dynasty, which militarily supported North Korea and waged proxy warfare against Japan, suffered military losses and was eventually overthrown by the Qing dynasty in Manchuria in 1644.) The United States should engage China in proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula to provoke local uprisings and ethnic conflicts in Northeast Asia through the exhaustion of Chinese military power. China has a history of falling after waging proxy warfare against Japan on the Korean Peninsula through North Korea. (In the 16th century, Japan unified its local lords and attacked China by landing in South Korea twice, in 1592 and 1597, to eliminate internal dissenters.) China's fragmentation weakens the central government. (After engaging in proxy warfare on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950 Korean War, China lost its hegemony in the Cultural Revolution and became a satellite state of the United States, engaging in manufacturing to survive.

Like the ethnic conflict in Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula is a belligerent conflict between ethnic groups, which lends itself to proxy warfare. And unlike Taiwan, which speaks the same language as China, South Koreans who speak other languages, including Chinese, are belligerent toward China. The conservative government currently in power in South Korea treats both North Koreans and Chinese as racially inferior and perceives the Chinese as more threatening. High national incomes make the Chinese homogeneous with the Taiwanese, but South Koreans are unsympathetic because they see themselves as different from North Koreans, who have been left behind by a prolonged economic crisis.

The only country that can currently disarm the North Korean military is the South Korean military, and the only country that can later disarm the South Korean military is the Chinese military. Therefore, the United States must disarm both the South Korean and North Korean militaries on the Korean Peninsula through proxy warfare with China, in order to prepare for the threat of the South Koreans being absorbed by Russia, China, and Japan as a war machine after the U.S. hegemony is reduced. (The U.S. disarmed the Indians in the American Indian Wars, which ended in 1924, so that it could control them on reservations.) If U.S. outposts were to withdraw from the East Asian continent, North Korea would become a satellite state of China and South Korea would merge with Japan. Historically, the Korean Peninsula has served as a war machine for East Asian nations with its abundant human resources, and control of the peninsula would make it a world power. (In 1270, Mongolia annexed the Korean Peninsula and invaded Japan twice; in 1910, Japan annexed the Korean Peninsula and invaded China and Russia; and in 1941, the Korean Peninsula served as a war machine for Japan, which attacked the United States, including the destruction of Pearl Harbor.) Within half a century, South Korea would be annexed by Japan, and North Korea would be annexed by China, serving as a war machine to accelerate the decline of American hegemony. (Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, South Korea has served as a U.S. war machine, sending troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere.) Before U.S. military bases are removed from the Korean Peninsula, South Korea and North Korea must be disarmed to eliminate the future consequences of East Asian ethnicity on Caucasian ethnicity.

Taiwan will not collapse if South Korea collapses, but South Korea will collapse if Taiwan collapses. In the long run, the United States will lose hegemony over the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula to China due to the unwillingness of its European allies to re-engage with China rather than Russia. After Japan's defeat in World War II, China actively sought to acquire Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. However, with only Taiwan remaining for China, South Korea's and North Korea's attempts to nuclearize posed such a serious threat to China that China's plans to absorb Taiwan were put on hold indefinitely, and China's next war target would be the Korean Peninsula. As a result, after the collapse of Taiwan, South Korea's attempts to nuclearize will be directly linked to China's security threats, and South Korea will be absorbed by China like dominoes. While China's acquisition of Taiwan would cause China to actively expand its hegemony through military force, China's acquisition of the Korean Peninsula would cause China to be passive and defensively reduce its military power. The U.S. does not want to make the same mistake as the Vietnam War in the South, where it has real interests, such as semiconductors, and does not want the South to become a Chinese satellite state. Losing South Korea would create a sense of crisis in the United States like that of World War II, deepen antipathy toward the Republican Party's isolationist policies, and enable active warfare against China on the Korean Peninsula.

If China suffers ethnic extermination on the Korean Peninsula, it will institute a Chinese version of Monroe Doctrine when U.S. forces withdraw from the peninsula. If it is in U.S. interests, the United States should recognize the Korean Peninsula as a North Korean-led autonomous government and seek to stabilize East Asia. China will no longer resist U.S. hegemonic expansion outside of East Asia, and China will once again kowtow to the U.S. to restore the post-war Korean Peninsula and rebuild the Chinese economy. Therefore, the U.S. should wage proxy warfare against China instead of the Taiwan Strait, such as disarming the South Korean and North Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula.

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