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France and the United Kingdom both recognise the significance of the Indo-Pacific in economic as well as defence and security terms, but can they achieve the hoped-for balance of persistent presence and credible capability in the eyes of allies, partners and potential adversaries?
In its recent overhaul of defence and security policy, the United Kingdom declared its ambition to be ‘the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific’. The goal may appear challenging when the UK for now has no permanent naval presence in the region; by contrast, France is currently Europe’s leading presence in the Indo-Pacific, with ten ships, including four frigates, based there, along with a significant land-force footprint and a number of air assets.
In May of this year the UK deployed an aircraft-carrier strike group on a seven-month mission to the Indo-Pacific, led by the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth and supported by allies. However, with London keen to be seen as ‘committed [to the region] for the long term’, the question is whether this mission, and then what comes after, will carry sufficient weight as a token of credible commitment. Balanced against this new UK focus on the Indo-Pacific is the question: what is the trajectory of France’s presence in the region?
The French navy’s detachments around the Indo-Pacific of Floreal-class frigates and d’Entrecasteaux-class patrol ships support the country’s exclusive economic zones in the region. They are tasked in roles such as counter-narcotics, and fisheries and natural-resource protection, and as such the vessels are lightly armed. Deployments from France, meanwhile, are intended to show its ability to project hard power in the region, and to support and bolster military diplomacy among regional partners. They participate in multinational exercises with other armed forces, chiefly from, Australia, India, Japan and the United States.
While Paris’s maritime presence is greater than London’s, it still has limitations, not least the country’s difficulties in procuring new patrol ships swiftly enough within the framework of the patrouilleurs d’outre-mer (POM, overseas patrol-vessels programme). This means that it currently has to make do with a shrinking number of obsolete platforms and is struggling to fulfil duties around Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The Floreal-class vessels are also ageing and are approaching the end of their service lives. The likely candidate to replace this class of six ships is the multinational European Patrol Corvette, in the development of which France is a partner with Greece, Italy and Spain.
The British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia is home to important air and naval facilities used extensively by the US, but no British forces of any substance are permanently deployed in the region, other than a Gurkha battalion and a flight of helicopters in Brunei. After a gap in Royal Navy deployments to the Pacific during the last decade, a UK naval presence has been revived from 2018 with a succession of limited deployments, including patrols into the South and East China seas, and aircraft and small numbers of Army troops have occasionally exercised in the region. Activity has included low-level bilateral training and participation in Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises.
The review posited the then-imminent deployment to the Indo-Pacific region of a UK-led aircraft-carrier task group as emblematic of a new UK engagement in the region. Speaking at the IISS in mid-May, the professional head of the Royal Navy, the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Tony Radakin, said that two Batch 2 River-class offshore-patrol vessels would also be deployed to the region on an enduring basis, to be replaced by new Type-31 frigates when they become available; and that a new amphibious Littoral Response Group carrying Royal Marines would deploy to the Indian Ocean from 2023. There appears to be no plan for a sustained increase in UK land or air deployments to the region. The question remains whether and when there will be further periodic carrier deployments.
Whether this new pattern will achieve the hoped-for balance of persistent presence and credible capability in the eyes of allies and partners as well as potential adversaries remains to be seen. France will also have to manage its resources carefully against a changing strategic backdrop. Paris and London both now recognise the importance of the Indo-Pacific in economic as well as defence and security terms, and both face challenges in meeting their respective aims. France, with its established presence, risks being seen by regional partners as scaling back should its present level of commitment be reduced. The UK faces the challenge of convincing regional allies and partners that its commitment to the region is more than rhetoric and the occasional deployment.
Neither navy has a surfeit of resources, and while China’s growing military power is a focus of concern, including in the Indo-Pacific, matters far closer to home waters also clamour for attention. Abrasive relations with Moscow, including increased Russian naval activity that is both sub-surface and surface, demand French and British naval resources. Both the Euro-Atlantic area and the Indo-Pacific are clearly placing increasing demands on the French and British navies and the rest of both countries’ armed forces, and it is unclear whether there are adequate resources to fully address these. Part of the answer for both may be not just forging closer cooperative arrangements with like-minded regional states, but also increasing their own limited cooperation so far in the region. A further possible way forward is for France and the UK to provide centrepieces for further engagements by other European states who are also eyeing a greater security profile in the Indo-Pacific.
www.iiss.org
In its recent overhaul of defence and security policy, the United Kingdom declared its ambition to be ‘the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific’. The goal may appear challenging when the UK for now has no permanent naval presence in the region; by contrast, France is currently Europe’s leading presence in the Indo-Pacific, with ten ships, including four frigates, based there, along with a significant land-force footprint and a number of air assets.
In May of this year the UK deployed an aircraft-carrier strike group on a seven-month mission to the Indo-Pacific, led by the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth and supported by allies. However, with London keen to be seen as ‘committed [to the region] for the long term’, the question is whether this mission, and then what comes after, will carry sufficient weight as a token of credible commitment. Balanced against this new UK focus on the Indo-Pacific is the question: what is the trajectory of France’s presence in the region?
French presence
France has in recent years become the main European defence and security player in the Indo-Pacific. Its presence is built on three military commands and two forces covering the Indian and Pacific oceans and several thousand personnel stationed across the region, including four infantry regiments and multiple gendarmerie units. Local units are complemented by regular naval deployments from France of an amphibious group and recently a carrier strike group, within the framework of Mission Jeanne d’Arc and Operation Clemenceau respectively.The French navy’s detachments around the Indo-Pacific of Floreal-class frigates and d’Entrecasteaux-class patrol ships support the country’s exclusive economic zones in the region. They are tasked in roles such as counter-narcotics, and fisheries and natural-resource protection, and as such the vessels are lightly armed. Deployments from France, meanwhile, are intended to show its ability to project hard power in the region, and to support and bolster military diplomacy among regional partners. They participate in multinational exercises with other armed forces, chiefly from, Australia, India, Japan and the United States.
While Paris’s maritime presence is greater than London’s, it still has limitations, not least the country’s difficulties in procuring new patrol ships swiftly enough within the framework of the patrouilleurs d’outre-mer (POM, overseas patrol-vessels programme). This means that it currently has to make do with a shrinking number of obsolete platforms and is struggling to fulfil duties around Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The Floreal-class vessels are also ageing and are approaching the end of their service lives. The likely candidate to replace this class of six ships is the multinational European Patrol Corvette, in the development of which France is a partner with Greece, Italy and Spain.
UK posture
The UK set out its post-Brexit international ambitions in the grandly titled ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’. This included greatly increased emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, justified by the economic importance of the region to the UK.The British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia is home to important air and naval facilities used extensively by the US, but no British forces of any substance are permanently deployed in the region, other than a Gurkha battalion and a flight of helicopters in Brunei. After a gap in Royal Navy deployments to the Pacific during the last decade, a UK naval presence has been revived from 2018 with a succession of limited deployments, including patrols into the South and East China seas, and aircraft and small numbers of Army troops have occasionally exercised in the region. Activity has included low-level bilateral training and participation in Five Power Defence Arrangements exercises.
The review posited the then-imminent deployment to the Indo-Pacific region of a UK-led aircraft-carrier task group as emblematic of a new UK engagement in the region. Speaking at the IISS in mid-May, the professional head of the Royal Navy, the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Tony Radakin, said that two Batch 2 River-class offshore-patrol vessels would also be deployed to the region on an enduring basis, to be replaced by new Type-31 frigates when they become available; and that a new amphibious Littoral Response Group carrying Royal Marines would deploy to the Indian Ocean from 2023. There appears to be no plan for a sustained increase in UK land or air deployments to the region. The question remains whether and when there will be further periodic carrier deployments.
Whether this new pattern will achieve the hoped-for balance of persistent presence and credible capability in the eyes of allies and partners as well as potential adversaries remains to be seen. France will also have to manage its resources carefully against a changing strategic backdrop. Paris and London both now recognise the importance of the Indo-Pacific in economic as well as defence and security terms, and both face challenges in meeting their respective aims. France, with its established presence, risks being seen by regional partners as scaling back should its present level of commitment be reduced. The UK faces the challenge of convincing regional allies and partners that its commitment to the region is more than rhetoric and the occasional deployment.
Neither navy has a surfeit of resources, and while China’s growing military power is a focus of concern, including in the Indo-Pacific, matters far closer to home waters also clamour for attention. Abrasive relations with Moscow, including increased Russian naval activity that is both sub-surface and surface, demand French and British naval resources. Both the Euro-Atlantic area and the Indo-Pacific are clearly placing increasing demands on the French and British navies and the rest of both countries’ armed forces, and it is unclear whether there are adequate resources to fully address these. Part of the answer for both may be not just forging closer cooperative arrangements with like-minded regional states, but also increasing their own limited cooperation so far in the region. A further possible way forward is for France and the UK to provide centrepieces for further engagements by other European states who are also eyeing a greater security profile in the Indo-Pacific.
| Main French naval assets based in the Indo-Pacific | |||||
| Asset | Total ships in the class | Of which active | Of which based in the Indo-Pacific | Date of commissioning of the lead ship | Comment |
| Floreal-class frigates (FFH) | 6 | 6 | 4 | 1992 | First unit to be decommissioned in 2030 |
| D'Entrecasteaux-class patrol ships (PSO) | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2016 | |
| Lapérouse-class oceangoing patrol craft (PCO) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1990 | To be replaced as part of the POM procurement programme |
| Le Malin-class oceangoing patrol craft (PCO) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1997 | To be replaced as part of the POM procurement programme |
| L'Audacieuse-class coastal patrol craft (PCC) | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1986 | To be replaced as part of the POM procurement programme |
| Source: IISS |
Posturing and presence: the United Kingdom and France in the Indo-Pacific
France and the United Kingdom both recognise the significance of the Indo-Pacific in economic as well as defence and security terms, but can they achieve the hoped-for balance of persistent presence and credible capability in the eyes of allies, partners and potential adversaries?
www.iiss.org
