Canada Two decades old Canadian Navy investigation into Amphibious Assault ships

[oldcpu]

I have not been tracking a lot of Navy stuff, so after stumbling across some obscure references to a year 2006 activity by the Canadian navy in regards to amphibious assault ship, I thought to dig further.

Presumably such a ship could be useful not only for wartime , but also for disaster relief on a coast area badly impacted by a storm or other disaster.

What I put together is NOT official by any stretch - rather it is information pulled from difference public unclassified sources ... so take it with a bit of < salt > as I may have some aspects wrong.

Summary of the 2006 Canadian Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE)​

Introduction​

In November 2006, the Canadian Forces conducted the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment (ITEE), a proof-of-concept exercise to evaluate the feasibility of developing a maritime expeditionary force with amphibious capabilities. This initiative was supported by the United States Navy, including the loan of the USS Gunston Hall, a Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship. The experiment was part of broader efforts to assess requirements for the Standing Contingency Force (SCF), a high-readiness task force proposed in Canada's 2005 Defence Policy Statement.

Background​

The SCF, initially termed the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF), was envisioned as an integrated force comprising maritime, land, air, and special operations elements capable of deploying on 10 days' notice for expeditionary operations, such as stability missions in failed states or rapid evacuations. Canada's lack of dedicated amphibious capabilities was a noted gap, as it was the only G8 nation without an amphibious ship for overseas missions. While the concurrent Joint Support Ship (JSS) project was intended to provide some strategic sealift, it was not a dedicated amphibious assault platform. Historical Canadian involvement in amphibious operations, such as during World War II at Dieppe and Normandy, highlighted the need for coordinated air, sea, and land efforts, but no persistent capability was maintained post-war.

The 2005 policy emphasized the creation of a high-readiness force to provide initial presence in crises, potentially handing off to larger mission-specific task forces. The SCF concept centered on an amphibious platform to enable littoral operations, where forces could project power from sea to shore in coastal regions. To explore this, the Canadian Navy sought U.S. assistance, leading to the loan of USS Gunston Hall for the ITEE.

The Experiment​

The ITEE took place from November 17-20, 2006, primarily at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, with preliminary activities in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia, starting November 2. The exercise was navy-led and commanded by Commodore Paul Maddison. It involved over 1,000 Canadian Forces members and focused on assessing challenges in building an integrated, seaborne force for amphibious operations.

The USS Gunston Hall, a 16,000-ton Landing Ship Dock (LSD-44), served as the primary amphibious platform, embarking Canadian soldiers, light armored vehicles (LAV IIIs), G-Wagons, and Bison armored fighting vehicles. U.S. Navy mentors, including a beachmaster team, provided guidance, and additional support came from USS Doyle, an Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate.

Participants and Assets​

The ITEE involved over 1,000 Canadian Forces personnel throughout its planning and execution phases, culminating in a coordinated amphibious landing exercise at Camp Lejeune. The core assault force for this final phase consisted of approximately 300 personnel, built around an infantry company from B Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment, supported by command, liaison, and specialist elements. The Maritime Amphibious Unit was led by Canadian Navy Commander Steven Bell.

The naval task group comprised HMCS Athabaskan, HMCS Halifax, HMCS Preserver, and HMCS Windsor (the latter pre-positioned but sidelined by an electrical fault). An air expeditionary unit included four CH-124 Sea King helicopters (though only one arrived due to issues) and two CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. Logistical support from the U.S. II Marine Expeditionary Force included Lieutenant Colonel Terry Harwood as a liaison. All Canadian personnel aboard USS Gunston Hall were required to pass the Canadian Forces Swim Test and Sea Survival training.

Activities​

The exercise simulated an amphibious landing in Onslow Bay, where Canadian forces disembarked from landing craft units (LCUs) provided by USS Gunston Hall, exiting on light armored vehicles to secure a military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) training town. Sea King helicopters, converted for troop lift, facilitated air connectors, with familiarization training in Halifax Harbor. Activities tested over-the-beach operations, including vehicle and personnel movement via landing craft from the ship's well deck.

Challenges addressed included air and surface threats, maritime interdiction, counter-piracy, and protection in shallow waters. The experiment emphasized joint command and control, common operating pictures, and interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces. Operations were conducted in permissive environments, focusing on rapid deployment for scenarios like humanitarian assistance or warfighting.

"Analysis" / "Assessment "​

The ITEE provided a clear set of observations regarding the technical and structural barriers to a Canadian amphibious capability. These were formally categorized as follows:

• Command and Control (C2) Integration: A primary friction point was the inability to seamlessly integrate Canadian and U.S. command systems. While U.S. Navy mentors provided essential guidance, the "joint-ness" required to synchronize naval and land elements at the tactical level was often obstructed by differing command doctrines and unaligned C2 architectures.
• Aviation and Logistics Constraints: The experiment revealed a critical "connector" gap. The CH-124 Sea King helicopters were not optimized for rapid troop lift in a littoral environment, and the reliance on a single arrival due to maintenance issues highlighted the fragility of current air expeditionary assets. Furthermore, the lack of dedicated "marinized" transport slowed the tempo of ship-to-shore movement.
• Interoperability and Equipment: Tactical communications systems between the Canadian land forces (LAV IIIs and Bisons) and the USS Gunston Hall’s onboard systems were not fully compatible, requiring manual workarounds. This emphasized the need for common Operating Pictures and standardized NATO communication protocols for future joint operations.
• Force Sustainment: It was observed that while the basic skill sets for a Maritime Amphibious Unit existed, sustaining a force of this size (approximately 1,000–1,100 personnel) required a level of logistical support and specialized training (such as advanced Sea Survival and beachmaster protocols) that the Canadian Forces were not yet equipped to provide on a permanent basis.
• Infrastructure Gaps: The failure of HMCS Windsor due to an electrical fault and the maintenance delays of the Sea King fleet underscored the high demand that expeditionary operations place on aging naval and air platforms, suggesting that a persistent capability would require new, purpose-built assets rather than converted legacy equipment.

Outcomes and Aftermath​

The ITEE demonstrated that basic skill sets existed within Canadian forces to assemble a maritime amphibious unit, highlighting potential for amphibious operations in new mission sets, such as post-disaster beach remediation. Preliminary observations noted the need for a robust naval task group, dedicated helicopters, and a battalion-sized landing force (1,000-1,100 soldiers) for mid-intensity operations. Training weaknesses were identified in joint elements' command and control, staff interactions, and collective training for littoral operations.

Due to operational and fiscal pressures, work on the SCF was suspended in early 2007. The broader Amphibious Assault Ship Project, proposed in the mid-2000s, was placed on hold by late 2008 due to budget constraints, though it was briefly revived in 2013-2014 with offers for Mistral-class vessels before being abandoned again. The CF Maritime Warfare Centre continued developing concepts for joint littoral manoeuvre and amphibious warfare.

Conclusion​

The 2006 ITEE represented a collaborative effort between Canada and the U.S. to investigate amphibious assault capabilities through practical trials aboard USS Gunston Hall. While it validated certain operational concepts, fiscal and strategic priorities led to the suspension of related projects, leaving Canada without dedicated amphibious vessels.