US Must Weigh ‘Strategic Impacts’ Of Arming The Heavens: Aerospace

Cabatli_TR · Oct 8, 2020

"I think probably the biggest single thing that I know Gen. Raymond is working on ... is really fleshing out that long-term vision for the Space Force," Justin Johnson, acting deputy assistant secretary for space policy says.

By THERESA HITCHENSon October 07, 2020 at 4:52 PM

Space-based laser weapon, Air Force graphic
WASHINGTON: A new study by the Aerospace Corporation calls for a public, in-depth and government-wide debate about America’s use of space weapons.
“[T]he United States has not had a robust public debate about the advantages and disadvantages of weaponizing space in almost 20 years. U.S. restraint carried the day then, but the threats and the strategic environment have changed a great deal since that era, leading to the need for a fresh examination,” the paper, A Roadmap for Assessing Space Weapons, states.

“U.S. decisionmakers should carefully examine this most fundamental and critical of all space security issues to assess how deployment of weapons in space by any country, including the United States, will affect U.S. strategic interests,” the study, released yesterday, adds.
The Space Force’s leadership is trying to hammer out just what America’s military presence and operations in space will look like.
“I think probably the biggest single thing that I know Gen. Raymond is working on — and, you know, more follow on this — is really fleshing out that long-term vision for the Space Force. What is the force design — the force development elements — of the Space Force? What does that future vision in 10, 20, 30 years need to look like?” Justin Johnson, acting deputy assistant secretary for DoD space policy told the Heritage Foundation today. “And then, we in the rest of the Department, need to figure out how does that fit in with our overall strategy.”
Johnson did not provide any details about when a new force posture document might be in hand; nor did he take audience questions during the Heritage event.

The study, authored by retired Lt. Col. Peter Hays, and former space analyst at DoD’s Office of Net Assessment, Michael Gleason, cautions against deploying weapons in space simply as a reaction to the increased threat.
“[R]ather than basing a U.S. decision primarily as a reaction to China’s and Russia’s provocations, the United States should carefully consider the viability and effectiveness of space weapons for itself, bearing in mind the advantages and disadvantages outlined above and in light of the changes in the strategic environment identified below. Only then should the United States consider the best strategy and best mix of capabilities needed to respond to China’s and Russia’s space weapons,” it says.

However, DoD has already determined that a top priority for Space Force is projecting power “in, from and to space,” as the Aerospace Corp. paper notes. As Breaking D readers know, providing “Combat Power Projection” is one of the five “core competencies” for the Space Force listed in the “Spacepower” Capstone Doctrine released on Aug. 10.
“This includes applying lethal force in, from, and to space,” the Aerospace paper adds. “That new organizational imperative, traditional military preferences for offensive doctrines, and advances in competitor capabilities all raise the question of whether the United States will decide to field weapons in space.”

The paper shies away from directly advocating that the US should deploy an arsenal of space-related weapons, including offensive weapons to target adversary space capabilities.

“The first paragraph points out that official publications imply the U.S. is thinking about deploying space weapons. The paper does not argue that such a decision, however, is a foregone conclusion,” Gleason told Breaking D in an email today. “The paper also suggests that before a decision to deploy space weapons is made, the risks and merits of ground-based space weapons should be given equal consideration with space-based weapons.” The goal, he said, is to spur public debate.
At the same time, the paper makes it pretty clear that the time for traditional US restraint regarding space weapons is probably past, given Chinese and Russian technology developments. Further, the paper points out that there isn’t a real option for the US to “leap ahead” either for the same reasons.
Hays and Gleason argue that the US government must thoroughly consider both the advantages and disadvantages for military operations of specific types of weapons — i.e. Earth-to-space, space-to-Earth, and space-to-space.

“The United States already has a large and varied arsenal of weapons that can attack different parts of adversary ground-based and space-based networks, helping to deter aggression or win a fight in space if deterrence fails. But if the United States decides deployment of space weapons is required, policymakers will need to decide the best mix of space weapons needed and decide which types of weapons should be prioritized in development and deployment,” the study says.
In the military realm, a key concern should be whether or not any particular type of space weapon — whether Earth-to-space, space-to-Earth or space-to-space — is survivable and can be built for a reasonable price.

For example, the DoD “will need to make significant investments to protect and defend U.S. space-based weapons” against the space-to-space attack capabilities that China and Russia might deploy. “In comparison, U.S. Earth-to-space weapons would not be directly threatened by these Chinese or Russian capabilities but, instead, would be able to threaten Chinese and Russian space-based weapons and other space-based capabilities,” the study explains.
The effect that space weapons of any kind might have on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability must also be considered, the authors say. For many years, one of the drivers of US restraint regarding space weapons has been fear that a space arms race would undercut nuclear first-strike capabilities, especially deployments of weapons based in space.

“Even if space weapons do not fatally undermine nuclear deterrence, they still offer another path to rapid nuclear escalation,” the paper stresses. “Those traditional concerns still exist and should be debated anew.”

There also is a possibility that “deploying any type of space-based weapon could weaken the right of overflight for other military satellites” under the foundational 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), the paper warns. While the OST currently provides for the “peaceful uses” of military satellites — which includes spying over another country’s territory — and prohibits interference, it is legally unclear whether weapon systems based in space would carry the same protections.
“Just deploying space-based weapons may mark all military satellites as targets, even in peacetime, since there is no guarantee that space-based weapons could be confidently distinguished from other military satellites,” the paper cautions. “Today’s debate should examine the indirect risks the deployment of space-based weapons might create for military and intelligence community intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), communication, and other satellites.”
(The same could be said for commercial satellites, although the paper doesn’t mention that.)
Finally, the paper stresses that the affects of how a space weapons arsenal is put together will affect the ability of the United States to wield diplomatic and economic soft power and should not be overlooked. It is important, the paper stresses, to consider whether some constraints on negative actions by adversaries could be created via diplomacy.

“While current political tensions may make it unlikely in the near term, it is possible the United States,
China, Russia, and other countries could find it in their mutual interest to agree to formally proscribe weapons that create space debris. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols regulate armed conflict and seek to limit its effects, providing an example of a framework for limiting conflict that extends into space,” the paper notes.

“Mutual restraint in deployment and/or employment of debris-creating space weapons would reduce the indirect risk of indiscriminate, disproportionate harm to civilians or non-combatants, help preserve the sustainability of space environment, and temper decisionmakers’ dilemmas. The community should continue to investigate ways to develop diplomatic instruments that would reduce the indiscriminate
risks of debris-producing space weapons,” the paper recommends.