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In the midst of his visit to Australia for a Foreign Ministerial meeting of QUAD nations, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted out the Fact Sheet of the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy, the first such region-specific policy document released by the White House/National Security Council.
While the Secretary's tweet only contains the Fact Sheet which provides a quick, brief look at the points, the actual full 19-page document itself (linked below) provides a lot more context, detail & nuance:
Delving into some of the stated objectives & goals, each followed by a little bit of analysis on my part...
It appears the general scope of the QUAD agenda (to include the now oft-repeated "Free & Open Indo-Pacific", maritime security, vaccine partnership, cyberspace & emerging technologies regulation, space, etc.) has largely remained on the same track as it was left by the meeting of national Leaders in Washington DC last year.
Note how the part about QUAD talks about developing/deploying/setting the desired standards whereas the parts about the wider Indo-Pacific talk about the US 'promoting' the said secure standards. Simply put, the desired standards (which will likely underpin US strategic alignment with a given country) would be developed/determined by the QUAD countries and the rest of the Indo-Pacific will be expected to adopt them and them alone - edging out Chinese alternatives in the process which could compromise said efforts. I've previously talked about these standards on the forum before:
defencehub.live
defencehub.live
Nothing new on this front, but then again it hasn't been that long since the initial AUKUS announcement. I don't expect a lot of new information to go on at least until after the 18-month assessment period is over - and to an extent after the Australian federal elections, because I'd reckon it'll be interesting to see how the new government (assuming it won't be another term of the incumbent dispensation) looks at AUKUS.
At some level, I believe the US is concerned about the possibility of fractures developing along the Japan-South Korea relationship, especially should one of them choose to equip themselves with nuclear weapons in this decade or the next. The US seems to be more interested than ever in making sure any differences are addressed and any fears are allayed, all under the watchful eye of the US - whilst keeping both of these industrialized powers focused on the common threat of DPRK & China.
Lots of interesting stuff here. I don't know if that's only because I'm from India, or because its the only big country in the region which still has a very evolving relationship with the US, as opposed to Alliance partners like Australia, ROK or Japan which have been on more or less the same footing with the US for the better part of the last half-century.
Firstly "Major Defence Partner" was a designation created for India by the Obama administration and continued by Trump & now Biden. It was created as a means of getting India on equal footing with Alliance partners of the US in terms of accessing & purchasing defence technologies, despite India still remaining officially a non-Ally. In more common parlance over the years it has often meant "Ally but not on paper".
Secondly, going over the wording of these statements, it would appear that India would continue maintaining an independent defence & nuclear weapons posture, but with strategic convergence of goals between itself & the US and its Allies. The US expresses no concerns regarding India's increasing ways & means of deploying nuclear weapons on far-off targets as part of its efforts to build a full spectrum of deterrence against China, including survivable means like SSBNs, and in fact appears to support it - in stark contrast to the open demand contained within the same document toward the complete de-nuclearization of North Korea, though on paper both India & DPRK are non-signatories to the NPT and by definition 'illegitimate' nuclear powers. Though this distinction with regard to nuclear affairs (both unofficially & on paper) was actually made back in 2005 by way of the '123 Agreement' under Bush Jr.
Thirdly, the repeated statement of phrases such as "Regional Leadership" and more importantly "Net security Provider" - terms not used (at least in this document) to describe any of the other Alliance partners of the US are interesting for two reasons: A) it signals a willingness (or desire) on the part of US leadership to let India function as what has been oft described by strategic policy watchers as the US' "Deputy Sheriff" (a term I don't really agree with) in the Indian Ocean Region, and perhaps beyond in future (South China Sea). B) It indicates India has been more or less successful in convincing the US to give it a free hand in dealing with threats that more directly concern its immediate neighbourhood (like Myanmar) in a way that's more amicable to India's interests...such as continuing to work with the Military junta that toppled Suu Kyi's democratic government in that country.
Additionally, it would certainly appear that CAATSA is now more or less off the table for good. Even if some watered-down version were to be applied for sake of optics lest the double-standards become apparent, its unlikely to be anything that hinders the defence relationship on the ground in a major way, though diplomatically it will still cause irreparable damage (hence the hesitance to begin with). To quote James O'Brien, the US President's nominee for Coordinator of Sanctions Policy: "...there are important geostrategic considerations, particularly with [unintelligible] relationship to China..."
All in all, it will be interesting to see how the US-India defence/strategic relationship develops in the coming decades.
While the Secretary's tweet only contains the Fact Sheet which provides a quick, brief look at the points, the actual full 19-page document itself (linked below) provides a lot more context, detail & nuance:
This one line from the Conclusion section says quite a lot:
"We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War"
"We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than has been asked of us since the Second World War"
Delving into some of the stated objectives & goals, each followed by a little bit of analysis on my part...
1) QUAD & the wider Indo-Pacific
"The Quad...will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles."
"...helping Indo-Pacific partners close the region’s infrastructure gap...As we do, we will promote resilient and secure global telecommunications, focusing on 5G vendor diversification and Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) technology..."
"The Quad...will advance work on critical and emerging technologies, driving supply-chain cooperation, joint technology deployments, and advancing common technology principles."
"...helping Indo-Pacific partners close the region’s infrastructure gap...As we do, we will promote resilient and secure global telecommunications, focusing on 5G vendor diversification and Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) technology..."
It appears the general scope of the QUAD agenda (to include the now oft-repeated "Free & Open Indo-Pacific", maritime security, vaccine partnership, cyberspace & emerging technologies regulation, space, etc.) has largely remained on the same track as it was left by the meeting of national Leaders in Washington DC last year.
Note how the part about QUAD talks about developing/deploying/setting the desired standards whereas the parts about the wider Indo-Pacific talk about the US 'promoting' the said secure standards. Simply put, the desired standards (which will likely underpin US strategic alignment with a given country) would be developed/determined by the QUAD countries and the rest of the Indo-Pacific will be expected to adopt them and them alone - edging out Chinese alternatives in the process which could compromise said efforts. I've previously talked about these standards on the forum before:
QUAD Joint Statement & Fact Sheet: A Few Pointers
The official release of the Joint Statement from the first in-person summit of Quad leaders (US, India, Australia & Japan) can be found here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/ And the subsequent fact sheet here...
defencehub.live
Quad Archive
Yeah I'm aware of this, what about the MKI ? Any plan to install AESA radar ? @Nilgiri indigenous scaled up UTTAM AESA radar?
defencehub.live
2) Australia & AUKUS
"Through the AUKUS partnership, we will identify the optimal pathway to deliver nuclearpowered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest achievable date"
"Through the AUKUS partnership, we will identify the optimal pathway to deliver nuclearpowered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy at the earliest achievable date"
Nothing new on this front, but then again it hasn't been that long since the initial AUKUS announcement. I don't expect a lot of new information to go on at least until after the 18-month assessment period is over - and to an extent after the Australian federal elections, because I'd reckon it'll be interesting to see how the new government (assuming it won't be another term of the incumbent dispensation) looks at AUKUS.
3) Japan & South Korea
"Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK...Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context."
"Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States’ allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK...Increasingly, we will seek to coordinate our regional strategies in a trilateral context."
At some level, I believe the US is concerned about the possibility of fractures developing along the Japan-South Korea relationship, especially should one of them choose to equip themselves with nuclear weapons in this decade or the next. The US seems to be more interested than ever in making sure any differences are addressed and any fears are allayed, all under the watchful eye of the US - whilst keeping both of these industrialized powers focused on the common threat of DPRK & China.
4) ASEAN
"Strengthen an Empowered and Unified ASEAN"
"The United States is making new investments in U.S.-ASEAN ties, including by hosting ASEAN leaders for a historic U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit—the first-ever to be held in Washington, D.C. We are committed to the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and will also seek new ministerial-level engagements with ASEAN. We will implement more than $100 million in new U.S.-ASEAN initiatives. We will also expand bilateral cooperation across Southeast Asia, prioritizing efforts to strengthen health security, address maritime challenges, increase connectivity, and deepen people-to-people ties."
"We will work with ASEAN to build its resilience as a leading regional institution and will explore opportunities for the Quad to work with ASEAN. We will also support closer ties between South Asian partners & ASEAN."
It would appear US is intent on using any & all means available with itself, G7 & QUAD to keep ASEAN tethered to a US-led global order, and away from Chinese influence. It would also appear that they wish to use QUAD as a platform to allay any fears in SE Asia regarding the increasing pace of arms race/buildup of both tactical & strategic (read: nuclear) capabilities to ASEAN's East as well as South."Strengthen an Empowered and Unified ASEAN"
"The United States is making new investments in U.S.-ASEAN ties, including by hosting ASEAN leaders for a historic U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit—the first-ever to be held in Washington, D.C. We are committed to the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, and will also seek new ministerial-level engagements with ASEAN. We will implement more than $100 million in new U.S.-ASEAN initiatives. We will also expand bilateral cooperation across Southeast Asia, prioritizing efforts to strengthen health security, address maritime challenges, increase connectivity, and deepen people-to-people ties."
"We will work with ASEAN to build its resilience as a leading regional institution and will explore opportunities for the Quad to work with ASEAN. We will also support closer ties between South Asian partners & ASEAN."
4) India
"Support India's Continued Rise & Regional Leadership"
"We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific"
"...Steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider"
"We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development."
"Support India's Continued Rise & Regional Leadership"
"We will continue to build a strategic partnership in which the United States and India work together and through regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia; collaborate in new domains, such as health, space, and cyber space; deepen our economic and technology cooperation; and contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific"
"...Steadily advance our Major Defense Partnership with India and support its role as a net security provider"
"We recognize that India is a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia, a driving force of the Quad and other regional fora, and an engine for regional growth and development."
Lots of interesting stuff here. I don't know if that's only because I'm from India, or because its the only big country in the region which still has a very evolving relationship with the US, as opposed to Alliance partners like Australia, ROK or Japan which have been on more or less the same footing with the US for the better part of the last half-century.
Firstly "Major Defence Partner" was a designation created for India by the Obama administration and continued by Trump & now Biden. It was created as a means of getting India on equal footing with Alliance partners of the US in terms of accessing & purchasing defence technologies, despite India still remaining officially a non-Ally. In more common parlance over the years it has often meant "Ally but not on paper".
Secondly, going over the wording of these statements, it would appear that India would continue maintaining an independent defence & nuclear weapons posture, but with strategic convergence of goals between itself & the US and its Allies. The US expresses no concerns regarding India's increasing ways & means of deploying nuclear weapons on far-off targets as part of its efforts to build a full spectrum of deterrence against China, including survivable means like SSBNs, and in fact appears to support it - in stark contrast to the open demand contained within the same document toward the complete de-nuclearization of North Korea, though on paper both India & DPRK are non-signatories to the NPT and by definition 'illegitimate' nuclear powers. Though this distinction with regard to nuclear affairs (both unofficially & on paper) was actually made back in 2005 by way of the '123 Agreement' under Bush Jr.
Thirdly, the repeated statement of phrases such as "Regional Leadership" and more importantly "Net security Provider" - terms not used (at least in this document) to describe any of the other Alliance partners of the US are interesting for two reasons: A) it signals a willingness (or desire) on the part of US leadership to let India function as what has been oft described by strategic policy watchers as the US' "Deputy Sheriff" (a term I don't really agree with) in the Indian Ocean Region, and perhaps beyond in future (South China Sea). B) It indicates India has been more or less successful in convincing the US to give it a free hand in dealing with threats that more directly concern its immediate neighbourhood (like Myanmar) in a way that's more amicable to India's interests...such as continuing to work with the Military junta that toppled Suu Kyi's democratic government in that country.
Additionally, it would certainly appear that CAATSA is now more or less off the table for good. Even if some watered-down version were to be applied for sake of optics lest the double-standards become apparent, its unlikely to be anything that hinders the defence relationship on the ground in a major way, though diplomatically it will still cause irreparable damage (hence the hesitance to begin with). To quote James O'Brien, the US President's nominee for Coordinator of Sanctions Policy: "...there are important geostrategic considerations, particularly with [unintelligible] relationship to China..."
All in all, it will be interesting to see how the US-India defence/strategic relationship develops in the coming decades.
That said - this document puts to rest any doubts anyone may have regarding the US' lack of interest in the region, a lack of desire to address the Chinese threat, or a desire to seek a more isolationist foreign policy...at least until the next US Presidential election cycle.
++++
@Nilgiri @Paro @Cabatli_53 @T-123456 @Test7 @RogerRanger @Bilal Khan(Quwa) @Isa Khan @Indos @AlphaMike and all other geopolitics enthusiasts
++++
@Nilgiri @Paro @Cabatli_53 @T-123456 @Test7 @RogerRanger @Bilal Khan(Quwa) @Isa Khan @Indos @AlphaMike and all other geopolitics enthusiasts
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