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“This is an opinion piece by the author for promotion of general discussions by forum members only and not to be published in whole or in part by any other media”.
Ottawa seems to be going against allied cost-reduction trends in putting all its “surface warship eggs” in one, large, expensive CSC Type 26 design basket. Herein lies the quality versus quantity debate concerning naval fleets. The impulse toward a capable, general-purpose fleet is understandable. When you cannot afford a large number of smaller, purpose-built warships, then you try to load as much flexibility and versatility into the limited number of larger platforms you build. Canada has made the case that, by planning to take care of the most demanding missions first, then other roles generally would be covered off as well. The most onerous missions require a fairly large, well-armed, general-purpose surface ship.
Canada's problem is that we tend to procure low-to-middle capability ships, but with a high-end price tag. In terms of capability, the DDH-280 destroyers were an exception with their area air-defence weapons, but even the Halifax-class frigates which followed them were primarily anti-submarine warfare platforms, but with higher general-purpose versatilities added in. At the same time, each ship class cost much more than anticipated- some being labeled “Cadillacs” of their day. The result was that Canada systematically priced itself out of an affordable and effective navy. Canada is not alone with this trend. Even the United States is experiencing the affordability squeeze on its naval force posture as is the United Kingdom. Driven by budget constraints, the USN is divesting some of its larger, high-value naval assets in favour of more mid-sized, lower-end ships. US Navy officials support the idea of shifting the USN’s surface combatant force to a more reduced proportion of large surface ships (cruisers and destroyers), an increased percentage of small surface ships (frigates and littoral combat ships), and a new third tier of unmanned surface vehicles. The current FFG(X) frigate program is a prime example of this trend for the USN. The UK also appears to be following the same trend, with its larger Type 26 frigate being backed up with smaller, less capable Type 31 ships as part of their own National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).
In Canada, the cost of new warships continues to escalate, but is our navy getting better, more capable warships? The current CSC Requirements Reconciliation and Design process will determine how much capability Ottawa is willing to pay for. The NSS appears to prefer incentive contracting with target price ceilings. These ceilings have thus far not done much to curb cost growth on the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels. In any event, it is a good bet that Canada’s variant of the BAE Type 26 Global Combat Ship may be significantly more capable than either the UK or Australian variants.
Ottawa seems to be putting most of its warship “eggs in one basket,” but only because it has to. In my opinion (IMO), not only does Canada not have the financial ability to produce more of these ‘cadillacs’ but it could not man them even if we had the where-with-all. The CSC Frigate, at almost 8000 tonnes, is not a low-to-middle class capability, but a very high-end 5th generation warship with growth potential for the future. This is a "Rolls Royce" of ships which may very well out-perform both the British City and Australian Hunter class Global Combat Ships (GCS). Canada’s reality is that it must produce a very capable warship because we are forced to do more with less due to our geography, environment, mission requirements and defence budget. The CSCs SPY 7 (V) 1 radar system has already been fully developed by Lockheed Martin (LM) with characteristics that are now more capable than the Arleigh Burke SPY 1 family of radars and may rival the SPY 6 AMDR radar system now scheduled to be fitted on the Arleigh Burke Flt III destroyers. The USN FFX (based on the Italian FREMM class) is a mid-sized frigate, but not “low-end” by any means as well.
At the end of the day, will Canada’s CSC be more capable than say a 9,500 tonne Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer? The answer is, probably not. But is Ottawa willing to pay nearly double the price for a single CSC frigate? Increasing costs per ship doesn’t necessarily reflect better quality. It may only be an indicator of the greater expense involved in Ottawa’s ‘build-in-Canada’ policy. Perhaps one reason Canada has concluded that a small number of mid-sized, very capable, general-purpose warships are preferred over significantly greater numbers of much smaller, more specialized warships comes down to the fact that smaller never equates to cheaper under Ottawa’s ponderously slow, multi-layered, and always expensive defence procurement system. So why try to buck the trend?
The CSC Type Frigate, as so far designed, is a very high-end and capable Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) warship with a combined AAW, ASW and ASuW capability. The first batch of CSC frigates will be AAW orientated, able to take on this roll with weapons like SM-2 Block IIIC with possible growth for the SM-3/6 systems, ESSM missile systems , Tomahawk Long Range Cruise Missiles in its MK 41 VLS, along with an improved Naval Surface Missile (NSM) and Close In Air Defence Missile System (CAAMS). The inclusion of the Leonardo 5” 127mm naval gun for Naval Gunfire Support with the ability to strike with guided and Anti-Air munitions is a much better choice for Canada, than the American 5” MK 45 Mod 4 gun to be fitted on the Hunter and City class frigates. LMs SPY 7 V (1) AESA radar along with a new and improved CCMS 330 Combat System, also by LM, will be key components to all of this. You cannot, and should not compare apples to oranges with the Arleigh Burke destroyers and CSC frigates, but IMO in terms of Aegis platforms, the CSC can more than hold its own, and will be the back-bone of the RCN for this century. Yes, Canada is “bucking the trend”, however Canada will have a much more capable navy because of it.
Ottawa seems to be going against allied cost-reduction trends in putting all its “surface warship eggs” in one, large, expensive CSC Type 26 design basket. Herein lies the quality versus quantity debate concerning naval fleets. The impulse toward a capable, general-purpose fleet is understandable. When you cannot afford a large number of smaller, purpose-built warships, then you try to load as much flexibility and versatility into the limited number of larger platforms you build. Canada has made the case that, by planning to take care of the most demanding missions first, then other roles generally would be covered off as well. The most onerous missions require a fairly large, well-armed, general-purpose surface ship.
Canada's problem is that we tend to procure low-to-middle capability ships, but with a high-end price tag. In terms of capability, the DDH-280 destroyers were an exception with their area air-defence weapons, but even the Halifax-class frigates which followed them were primarily anti-submarine warfare platforms, but with higher general-purpose versatilities added in. At the same time, each ship class cost much more than anticipated- some being labeled “Cadillacs” of their day. The result was that Canada systematically priced itself out of an affordable and effective navy. Canada is not alone with this trend. Even the United States is experiencing the affordability squeeze on its naval force posture as is the United Kingdom. Driven by budget constraints, the USN is divesting some of its larger, high-value naval assets in favour of more mid-sized, lower-end ships. US Navy officials support the idea of shifting the USN’s surface combatant force to a more reduced proportion of large surface ships (cruisers and destroyers), an increased percentage of small surface ships (frigates and littoral combat ships), and a new third tier of unmanned surface vehicles. The current FFG(X) frigate program is a prime example of this trend for the USN. The UK also appears to be following the same trend, with its larger Type 26 frigate being backed up with smaller, less capable Type 31 ships as part of their own National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).
In Canada, the cost of new warships continues to escalate, but is our navy getting better, more capable warships? The current CSC Requirements Reconciliation and Design process will determine how much capability Ottawa is willing to pay for. The NSS appears to prefer incentive contracting with target price ceilings. These ceilings have thus far not done much to curb cost growth on the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels. In any event, it is a good bet that Canada’s variant of the BAE Type 26 Global Combat Ship may be significantly more capable than either the UK or Australian variants.
Ottawa seems to be putting most of its warship “eggs in one basket,” but only because it has to. In my opinion (IMO), not only does Canada not have the financial ability to produce more of these ‘cadillacs’ but it could not man them even if we had the where-with-all. The CSC Frigate, at almost 8000 tonnes, is not a low-to-middle class capability, but a very high-end 5th generation warship with growth potential for the future. This is a "Rolls Royce" of ships which may very well out-perform both the British City and Australian Hunter class Global Combat Ships (GCS). Canada’s reality is that it must produce a very capable warship because we are forced to do more with less due to our geography, environment, mission requirements and defence budget. The CSCs SPY 7 (V) 1 radar system has already been fully developed by Lockheed Martin (LM) with characteristics that are now more capable than the Arleigh Burke SPY 1 family of radars and may rival the SPY 6 AMDR radar system now scheduled to be fitted on the Arleigh Burke Flt III destroyers. The USN FFX (based on the Italian FREMM class) is a mid-sized frigate, but not “low-end” by any means as well.
At the end of the day, will Canada’s CSC be more capable than say a 9,500 tonne Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer? The answer is, probably not. But is Ottawa willing to pay nearly double the price for a single CSC frigate? Increasing costs per ship doesn’t necessarily reflect better quality. It may only be an indicator of the greater expense involved in Ottawa’s ‘build-in-Canada’ policy. Perhaps one reason Canada has concluded that a small number of mid-sized, very capable, general-purpose warships are preferred over significantly greater numbers of much smaller, more specialized warships comes down to the fact that smaller never equates to cheaper under Ottawa’s ponderously slow, multi-layered, and always expensive defence procurement system. So why try to buck the trend?
The CSC Type Frigate, as so far designed, is a very high-end and capable Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) warship with a combined AAW, ASW and ASuW capability. The first batch of CSC frigates will be AAW orientated, able to take on this roll with weapons like SM-2 Block IIIC with possible growth for the SM-3/6 systems, ESSM missile systems , Tomahawk Long Range Cruise Missiles in its MK 41 VLS, along with an improved Naval Surface Missile (NSM) and Close In Air Defence Missile System (CAAMS). The inclusion of the Leonardo 5” 127mm naval gun for Naval Gunfire Support with the ability to strike with guided and Anti-Air munitions is a much better choice for Canada, than the American 5” MK 45 Mod 4 gun to be fitted on the Hunter and City class frigates. LMs SPY 7 V (1) AESA radar along with a new and improved CCMS 330 Combat System, also by LM, will be key components to all of this. You cannot, and should not compare apples to oranges with the Arleigh Burke destroyers and CSC frigates, but IMO in terms of Aegis platforms, the CSC can more than hold its own, and will be the back-bone of the RCN for this century. Yes, Canada is “bucking the trend”, however Canada will have a much more capable navy because of it.
