The Beginning of the Nightmare-The Great War between Zetas and Gulf Cartel
The Bullets Warmed up and the War Began.
Gulf Cartel goes public on break-up with former allies Los Zetas
The testimony of El Mamito Z7-(Historic leader of the Zetas) Rejon later said that all of Zeta’s profits were directly concluded with the payment of the war against the Gulf Cartel.
“Mexican forces have seized more than 5,800 live grenades since 2007-2010, a small fraction of a vast armory maintained by the drug cartels, officials said.Not all grenades found in Mexico are American-made. Many are of Asian or Soviet and Eastern European manufacture, ATF officials said, probably given to leftist insurgents by Cuba and Nicaragua’s Sandinistas.One of the most common hand grenades found in Mexico is the M67, the workhorse explosive manufactured in the United States for American soldiers and for sale or transfer to foreign militaries. Some 266,000 M67 grenades went to El Salvador alone between 1980 and 1993, during the civil war there.” By Nick Miroff and William Booth
The Washington Post
This is not a game .This is a real war.These men have enough resources to fight anyone.They’are making billions and billions of dollars.
By July 17, 2006, Lazcano had taken control of the outfit. Al-though not a product of the military as he claimed, Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño Morales became No. 2 in the ranks of the upstarts. Los Zetas gradually turned with a vengeance against their master. They entered into situational alliances with the rival BLO, a Sinaloa-founded cartel that had severed ties with the Sinaloa Cartel.Zeta-Gulf fissure gradually widened, but the break did not occur until early-2010; nevertheless, “El Goyo” Saucedo (arrested on April 29, 2009), “Tony Tormenta” (killed on No-vember 5, 2010), and “El Coss” (captured on Septem-ber 12, 2010) were businessmen who regarded the grotesque practices relished by Lazcano and Treviño Morales as bad for their sales of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Never more than a few hundred cadres .
Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño Morales
When Cárdenas Guillén was arrested by Mexican security forces in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, on 14 March 2003, the leadership of the Gulf Cartel was handed over to his brother Antonio Cárdenas Guillén (alias “Tony Tormenta”) and Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez (alias “El Coss”). The leadership of Los Zetas, on the other hand, was kept under the control of Lazcano.
HERİBERTO LAZCANO-Z3
Mexico’s drug war has become so brutal that nothing seems off-limits to the criminal imagination. It is as if rival cartels are competing for ever more shocking methods of execution.‘The Changing Mexican Drug War Brings New Challenges”.
American agents have been concerned for some time about military weapons and explosives falling into the hands of Mexican cartels.The problem is, the drug war is not underfunded; it’s unwinnable. As long as a lucrative market exists, the cartels will find a way to serve it. Eliminating operatives, even high-level leaders, merely diversifies and redistributes the business. Cartels have years of experience building flexible structures, with new leaders or rival gangs replacing displaced or weakened ones. At the lower levels, they draw from an inexhaustible pool of young men with few prospects in life, who have adopted the slogan, “Better to die young and rich than old and poor.”
THE WAR IS BEGINNING
“There was already a war between CDS and CDG and a conflict between CDS and AFO and a conflict between CDS and Juarez Cartel. CDG and Zetas split after a major arrest. The leader of CDJ dies and then the military invades Juarez and then CDS follows. CDS and CDJ go to war. Then a huge war between CDG and Zetas begins. La Familia Michoacana gets involved. War becomes apocalypse.
CDG began to do business with La Familia Michoacána, El Mayo Zambada with el Chapo Guzman and people from Jalisco. They created their alliance.That’s when the organization was split in two: Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel. ” PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
The Zetas cartel executes members of the Gulf cartel.
Osiel was captured at his daughter’s birthday party. When he was extradited to the United States in 2007, the cartel he directed was divided into two large cells. The first civilian wing, Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen, Tony Tormenta and José Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, were left by El Coss. The other was in the shadow of Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Angel Treviño: mostly the capo’s guardian circle.As the Gulf Cartel Zetas grew and expanded, he could not control more. Lazcano partially increased the organization’s capabilities. The absence of Cárdenas Guillén has expanded Zetas’s regional presence. The Zetas cartel members skillfully dispersed and organized geographically.
They raised their cells and hired elite military commanders. They recruited police and later local representatives.Poverty, corruption and the earning power of illicit drugs are the three pillars on which the Zetas and the other cartels have been built.They developed themselves as firepower and educational level. As another factor, Zetas was not limited to drug trafficking.For this reason, the Zetas expanded the territory of the organization.Hard forces brought new business opportunities.This is supply side capitalism in its purest and most brutal form. The U.S. has created the demand for the product(s). The U.S. consumers pay their money and are supplied.
They were involved in local criminal affairs and ganged elsewhere.Criminal activities such as kidnapping and extortion; control of gambling, horse racing and shopping centers.Robbing shops, kidnapping, selling drugs on the street, stealing fuel, performing illegal activities, collecting tribute from nightclubs, smuggling DVDs and smuggling alcohol. I think the main reason for Zetas’s diversification of crimes: high profitability rates and tax payments to CDG when cross-border drug trafficking. The Gulf Cartel commanders focused on strengthening their main strength.
Source of income: cross-border drug trafficking, particularly from Matamoros to Brownsville and Reynosa to McAllen, This limited the interaction between the two structures and
It freed Zetas’ independence and operational capacity. Zetas was directly earning income. Zetas was no longer part of the commanders of the Gulf Cartel. Over time this triggered a series of friction between the Zetas and other units in the US. The ZETAS cartel expanded on the Gulf coast of Mexico and reached Central America. Nuevo León, San Luis, Coahuila, Hidalgo and ın areas like Chiapas, Zetas fought hard against rival organizations. In several regions, La Familia was fighting with the Michoacana family for control of Lázaro Cárdenas – from Michoacán. They also worked hard to reach Guatemala’s cocaine and immigrant routes in South America. The Zetas controlled liquor sales, drug smuggling, border crossings of illegal aliens, loan sharks, beer distribution (en los depositios), they were even shaking down street taco vendors for (la quota)This expansion also required the recruitment of new members. Thus, the core of Zetas’s main operation expanded. It is worth clarifying that the recruitment process continued after 1998; the Zetas gradually brought into their ranks soldiers with less training, former policemen, and even criminals, whom they sent to training camps run by the organization. The elite and respectability of the Zeta began to decline at this point.
The strategic value of border crossings in Tamaulipas may be a factor explaining the persistence of violence. Tamaulipas is the main route of access to illegal substances to the US territory (from 2006 to 2013, 56% of smuggling in the northern border states corresponds to Tamaulipas). Therefore, the Tamaulipas border produces enormous income for organized crime.Prior to Zetas’ departure, the Gulf Cartel intensified its efforts to hire municipal police officers in border-bound cities. In addition, the Gulf and Los Zetas managed to silence the local media through threats to companies or individuals exposing their crimes and acts of violence. Given the anemia of the state security institutions, these threats reached their goal.
The Bullets Warmed up and the War Began.
Gulf Cartel goes public on break-up with former allies Los Zetas
Q. And how much money did the Zetas make in any year from cocaine trade to America?
A. $350 million. About.
Q. And what type of expenses did the Zetas have that they had
to pay from that $350 million?
A. The expenses of the war. That’s it.
Q.Fight who?
A: Gulf Cartel
The testimony of El Mamito Z7-(Historic leader of the Zetas) Rejon later said that all of Zeta’s profits were directly concluded with the payment of the war against the Gulf Cartel.
“Mexican forces have seized more than 5,800 live grenades since 2007-2010, a small fraction of a vast armory maintained by the drug cartels, officials said.Not all grenades found in Mexico are American-made. Many are of Asian or Soviet and Eastern European manufacture, ATF officials said, probably given to leftist insurgents by Cuba and Nicaragua’s Sandinistas.One of the most common hand grenades found in Mexico is the M67, the workhorse explosive manufactured in the United States for American soldiers and for sale or transfer to foreign militaries. Some 266,000 M67 grenades went to El Salvador alone between 1980 and 1993, during the civil war there.” By Nick Miroff and William Booth
The Washington Post
This is not a game .This is a real war.These men have enough resources to fight anyone.They’are making billions and billions of dollars.
By July 17, 2006, Lazcano had taken control of the outfit. Al-though not a product of the military as he claimed, Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño Morales became No. 2 in the ranks of the upstarts. Los Zetas gradually turned with a vengeance against their master. They entered into situational alliances with the rival BLO, a Sinaloa-founded cartel that had severed ties with the Sinaloa Cartel.Zeta-Gulf fissure gradually widened, but the break did not occur until early-2010; nevertheless, “El Goyo” Saucedo (arrested on April 29, 2009), “Tony Tormenta” (killed on No-vember 5, 2010), and “El Coss” (captured on Septem-ber 12, 2010) were businessmen who regarded the grotesque practices relished by Lazcano and Treviño Morales as bad for their sales of cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. Never more than a few hundred cadres .
Miguel Ángel “El 40” Treviño Morales
When Cárdenas Guillén was arrested by Mexican security forces in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, on 14 March 2003, the leadership of the Gulf Cartel was handed over to his brother Antonio Cárdenas Guillén (alias “Tony Tormenta”) and Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez (alias “El Coss”). The leadership of Los Zetas, on the other hand, was kept under the control of Lazcano.
HERİBERTO LAZCANO-Z3
Mexico’s drug war has become so brutal that nothing seems off-limits to the criminal imagination. It is as if rival cartels are competing for ever more shocking methods of execution.‘The Changing Mexican Drug War Brings New Challenges”.
American agents have been concerned for some time about military weapons and explosives falling into the hands of Mexican cartels.The problem is, the drug war is not underfunded; it’s unwinnable. As long as a lucrative market exists, the cartels will find a way to serve it. Eliminating operatives, even high-level leaders, merely diversifies and redistributes the business. Cartels have years of experience building flexible structures, with new leaders or rival gangs replacing displaced or weakened ones. At the lower levels, they draw from an inexhaustible pool of young men with few prospects in life, who have adopted the slogan, “Better to die young and rich than old and poor.”
The Zetas waged hard-fought battles against rival organizations in various territories, from Michoacán—for the control of Lázaro Cárdenas’ port—to Guatemala, to access South American cocaine and migrant routes.” Dudley Zetas in Guetemala”
THE WAR IS BEGINNING
“There was already a war between CDS and CDG and a conflict between CDS and AFO and a conflict between CDS and Juarez Cartel. CDG and Zetas split after a major arrest. The leader of CDJ dies and then the military invades Juarez and then CDS follows. CDS and CDJ go to war. Then a huge war between CDG and Zetas begins. La Familia Michoacana gets involved. War becomes apocalypse.
CDG began to do business with La Familia Michoacána, El Mayo Zambada with el Chapo Guzman and people from Jalisco. They created their alliance.That’s when the organization was split in two: Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel. ” PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
The Zetas cartel executes members of the Gulf cartel.
Osiel was captured at his daughter’s birthday party. When he was extradited to the United States in 2007, the cartel he directed was divided into two large cells. The first civilian wing, Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen, Tony Tormenta and José Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, were left by El Coss. The other was in the shadow of Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Angel Treviño: mostly the capo’s guardian circle.As the Gulf Cartel Zetas grew and expanded, he could not control more. Lazcano partially increased the organization’s capabilities. The absence of Cárdenas Guillén has expanded Zetas’s regional presence. The Zetas cartel members skillfully dispersed and organized geographically.
They raised their cells and hired elite military commanders. They recruited police and later local representatives.Poverty, corruption and the earning power of illicit drugs are the three pillars on which the Zetas and the other cartels have been built.They developed themselves as firepower and educational level. As another factor, Zetas was not limited to drug trafficking.For this reason, the Zetas expanded the territory of the organization.Hard forces brought new business opportunities.This is supply side capitalism in its purest and most brutal form. The U.S. has created the demand for the product(s). The U.S. consumers pay their money and are supplied.
They were involved in local criminal affairs and ganged elsewhere.Criminal activities such as kidnapping and extortion; control of gambling, horse racing and shopping centers.Robbing shops, kidnapping, selling drugs on the street, stealing fuel, performing illegal activities, collecting tribute from nightclubs, smuggling DVDs and smuggling alcohol. I think the main reason for Zetas’s diversification of crimes: high profitability rates and tax payments to CDG when cross-border drug trafficking. The Gulf Cartel commanders focused on strengthening their main strength.
Source of income: cross-border drug trafficking, particularly from Matamoros to Brownsville and Reynosa to McAllen, This limited the interaction between the two structures and
It freed Zetas’ independence and operational capacity. Zetas was directly earning income. Zetas was no longer part of the commanders of the Gulf Cartel. Over time this triggered a series of friction between the Zetas and other units in the US. The ZETAS cartel expanded on the Gulf coast of Mexico and reached Central America. Nuevo León, San Luis, Coahuila, Hidalgo and ın areas like Chiapas, Zetas fought hard against rival organizations. In several regions, La Familia was fighting with the Michoacana family for control of Lázaro Cárdenas – from Michoacán. They also worked hard to reach Guatemala’s cocaine and immigrant routes in South America. The Zetas controlled liquor sales, drug smuggling, border crossings of illegal aliens, loan sharks, beer distribution (en los depositios), they were even shaking down street taco vendors for (la quota)This expansion also required the recruitment of new members. Thus, the core of Zetas’s main operation expanded. It is worth clarifying that the recruitment process continued after 1998; the Zetas gradually brought into their ranks soldiers with less training, former policemen, and even criminals, whom they sent to training camps run by the organization. The elite and respectability of the Zeta began to decline at this point.
The strategic value of border crossings in Tamaulipas may be a factor explaining the persistence of violence. Tamaulipas is the main route of access to illegal substances to the US territory (from 2006 to 2013, 56% of smuggling in the northern border states corresponds to Tamaulipas). Therefore, the Tamaulipas border produces enormous income for organized crime.Prior to Zetas’ departure, the Gulf Cartel intensified its efforts to hire municipal police officers in border-bound cities. In addition, the Gulf and Los Zetas managed to silence the local media through threats to companies or individuals exposing their crimes and acts of violence. Given the anemia of the state security institutions, these threats reached their goal.