German warship searches Libya-bound Turkish freighter

[Test7]

Piracy like Actions of Germany and the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean​

Cem Gürdeniz

On 22nd November 2020, morning hours, German Sachsen Class (Type 124) multi-purpose frigate Hamburg operating under the tactical command of Greek Commodore T Micropoulos, in the EU-led Operation Irini has interrogated the Turkish container vessel MV Roseline-A carrying food and paint supplies to Libya in the area 100 miles off the Benghazi Coast. The ship had departed from Istanbul to go Misratah port of Libya. The ship belongs to and she is operated by the well-respected Arkas Holding Company. Although the captain was fully cooperative, declaring there was no contraband against the UN resolutions, at 1745 Hamburg’s naval assault team boarded the vessel through helicopter fast rope operations. Officers and crew were deactivated through force and ship was searched and controlled until next morning 0938 hours.

The Turkish aid Greece is desperate to forget: the story of the SS Kurtulus (Liberation)

International law governs the conditions to board a merchant ship operating in the high seas which is the case for the Turkish ship. Foreign merchant ships cannot be boarded unless they are involved in slavery, piracy, unlawful radio broadcasting; or save for special conditions provided by treaties or UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. Hamburg’s intervention to Roseline-A is an intervention to the freedom of navigation in high seas, as well as to Turkey’s sovereignty as the flag-state. It is unlawful unless it can be justified with special conditions provided by treaties or UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. To this end, Germany authorities indicated that the ship was searched for suspected arms cargo and invoked UN Security Council resolution 2292(2016), which was extended for an additional 12 months by UN Security Council resolution 2526(2020), to support their claims. Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the said resolutions may indeed provide “special conditions”, namely an exception to the prohibition of interventions. That said, specific conditions provided in the resolution is diligently observed to render an otherwise unlawful intervention lawful.

The US’ ‘Accidental’ Attack On The Turkish Navy

In this regard, Operative paragraph 3 (and below) of the Resolution 2292(2016) requires two conditions to be fulfilled for a lawful intervention. These conditions are that a) the intervening state or international organization has “reasonable grounds to believe are carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya”; and that the intervening state or international organization makes b) “good-faith efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag State prior to any inspections”. None of these two conditions were observed.
First, while “reasonable grounds” may leave some discretion to the searching state or international organization, it does not give a carte blanche. It requires making a thorough factual assessment, based on credible intelligence, the track-record / reputation of the shipping company, or activities of the vessel. Moreover, it is the duty of the searching authority -be it a state or an international organization- to document and demonstrate the grounds of suspicion in the request for search to be submitted to the flag state. This is not only a duty under the Security Council resolution, but also best practices, as evidenced by the guidelines of UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Given that neither Germany nor the EU demonstrated credible -or any- intelligence on Roseline-A; that the ship was operated by a company with a spotless track-record; that no suspicious activities of the vessel were recorded, there was no “reasonable ground” for inspection. In this regard, it is particularly important that after 16 hours of search, no arms were found. Germany and/or EU boarded the ship for the solely because it did fly the Turkish flag. Second, and most importantly, under Resolution 2292, the searching authorities are required to make good faith efforts to obtain the flag-state’s permission before (not after) the boarding and search. To put it simply, the rule is “make sure you do all you can to get consent before and then search”. It is not “go ahead if the flag-state does not immediately declines the requests or before it even respond”. In this regard, the requests should be made by the competent authority of the searching state or the organizations to the competent authority of the flag-state. Evidently, this requires that either the German Embassy or the EU Delegation (the head of which is also a German career diplomat) in Ankara to contact Turkish Foreign Ministry to request permission. In other words, Irini Operation Authorities must have contacted their Ministry of Foreign Affairs or their Embassies at Ankara to obtain official consent of Turkish MFA. Moreover, “making good-faith efforts” is plural, requiring the searching authority to do more than a mere formal request. Neither Germany, nor the EU did make any statement regarding authority which requested the permission from the Turkish government, or which branch of Turkish government they sent the request. Turkish MFA indicates that these procedures were not followed. From vague and unsubstantiated statements of various German ministries as well as EU sources, it seems that the request may not have filed through competent channels, that no sustained efforts or diplomatic contacts were made, and that Germany or EU did not wait long enough for Turkey to even review a request. Consequently, on these two grounds, UN Security Council Resolution 2292 is violated. The outcome was that a defenseless merchant ship was occupying for almost 16 hours with armed Seal teams threatening the captain and crew at gunpoint. The authority that was granted under the resolution was abused by Germany or the EU for a political grandstanding against Turkey in the wider Eastern Mediterranean dispute. Therefore, the acts of Germany and/or EU are not only in violation of freedom of navigation and of Turkey’s sovereignty, but they do also warrant a proper investigation by the UN Security Council.

Will Turkey`s great victory against Greece be repeated 100 years later?

However, the overall damage this incident caused is beyond our imagination with legal, strategic and even geopolitical repercussions. Under these conditions it can be said that:

1. This intervention with freedom of navigation and with Turkey’s sovereignty shall pave the way for an enlarging distrust between Turkey and European Union.
2. It shall damage the NATO solidarity too since the ship involved (German), The Tactical Commander OTC-IRINI (Greek Admiral) and the Operational Commander/EUNAVFOR-IRINI (Italian Admiral) authorized the operation were belonging to the NATO states. Where is the trust and solidarity?
3. It distorted the very basis of freedom of navigation dating back to 16th century, Hugo Grotius era through forceful boarding and searching an armless merchant ship.
4. This is a very serious hostile act of EU against Turkey which cannot be resolved easily. In the minds and hearts of the Turkish people the effect of this hostility will be similar of American assault against Turkish Special Forces at Iraq/Sulaymaniyah on 4th July 2003.
5. Since EU acted on suspicion without firm and undeniable operational intelligence, this will open the way and set examples for conducting bogus interventions and boarding’s for other players in the oceans. So, EU has the privilege for the opening Pandoro’s Box.
6. This intervention is not done with a “public purpose”. While it does not entail “obtaining profits”, it is done for “private gains” for Germany and EU, with the instigation and manipulation of a Greek commodore. It is, in this regard, akin to a modern form of “privateering”, in other words, piracy. This shall have negative and disturbing effects over the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean disputes, destroying mutual trust, good faith and confidence among the related parties. As to be remembered that Turkey had cancelled the 21st July NAVTEX of Oruçreis through a request of German Chancellor Merkel and opened the doors for Turkish-Greek Exploratory Talks. However Greek side exploited the cancellation, and they concluded a so-called delimitation agreement with Egypt. That had undermined the Germany’s umpireship and good office status. Now Turkey has second strike from Germany. These amateurish acts will yield no tangible added values to neither the regional stability nor international order.

Piracy like Actions of Germany and the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean - United World International

Piracy like Actions of Germany and the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean - On 22nd November 2020, morning hours, German Sachsen Class (Type 124) multi-purpose frigate Hamburg operating under the tactical command of Greek

unitedworldint.com

 

[Test7]

Operation IRINI: How arms embargo on Libya has become a ‘joke’​

IRINI has become a clear manifestation of how some members of the Union have taken hostage the EU27 leadership for the sake of their narrow-sighted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean​

The writer is a Master of Laws (LL.M.) in International and Comparative Law candidate at Trinity College Dublin. He is a 2019-2020 European Union (EU) Jean Monnet scholar. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree in law and minor degree in political science from Bilkent University. His main focus areas are Turkey-EU relations, Eastern Mediterranean and contemporary debates in Turkish foreign policy. He has a special interest in public international law, EU law and Late-Ottoman Era legal-political developments.

ISTANBUL

On Nov. 23, 2020, the Eastern Mediterranean witnessed another unlawful and hostile action against Turkey. As confirmed by many Turkish and international sources, a German frigate participating in the European Union (EU)-led Operation IRINI stopped and searched a Turkish cargo vessel carrying humanitarian aid to Libya, without the consent of Turkey, the flag-state.[1] On paper, Operation IRINI (Greek for “peace”), initiated on March 31, 2020, aims to enforce the United Nations (UN) arms embargo on Libya in accordance with the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2292 (2016). The EU confirms that the mission is capable of carrying out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected to be carrying arms.[2] To be fair, IRINI has been detached from its core tenets since the very beginning of its so-called monitoring activities. Most importantly, IRINI has become a clear manifestation of how some members of the Union have taken hostage the EU27 leadership for the sake of their narrow-sighted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has already stated that the Libyan Civil War serves as a litmus test for the EU, in his latest article for Politico.[3] Not surprisingly, Stephanie Williams, the UN deputy special representative to Libya, confessed at the Munich Security Conference held in February 2020 that the arms embargo had become a “joke”.[4] It has not been long since militias loyal to Haftar and to his ardent supporter President Macron of France overtly violated the arms embargo and blocked the oil exports from Libya’s main ports on the eve of the Berlin Conference, which was organized in order to safeguard the arms embargo. Bearing in mind that these inflammatory actions persistently continue, the recent hostile action against Turkey under the guise of IRINI has eventually revealed a contemporary debate in international law: maritime zones and freedom of navigation on the high seas.

Maritime zones

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law set the legal basis for maritime zones. These zones, briefly, are considered under a triple-layered system. Primarily, internal waters and territorial sea are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state. Meanwhile, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are the areas where states can enjoy their sovereign rights, except for specific exceptions such as “the right of innocent passage” (Article 17) and “the criminal jurisdiction on board” (Article 27), which can be exercised by flag-states in these zones, under specific circumstances. Lastly, the high seas, which constitute the subject matter of the recent raid by the German frigate, are the zones where all littoral and non-littoral states can enjoy the freedoms enumerated in Article 87 of the UNCLOS, such as freedom of navigation. In other words, Article 87 explicitly states that high seas are open to all states.

From a legal standpoint, it is necessary to understand that since freedom of navigation is a norm of customary international law, the obligation to refrain from any activities and/or actions that may jeopardize these freedoms is binding for all states, including the non-states parties to the UNCLOS.

The EU, once again, remained indifferent towards a flagrant violation of the freedom of navigation of a Turkish ship carrying humanitarian aid, while disregarding that freedom of navigation on the high seas are rooted in the “Mare Liberum” (Latin for “freedom of the seas”) doctrine of the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius. It is a shame that the EU member states, particularly Germany, the current term president of the Council of the EU, saw no harm in infringing upon the Westphalian principles. It is also an unfortunate development that the raid happened in the wake of President Erdogan’s G20 address in the virtual summit presided by Saudi Arabia. It is noteworthy that one of the things made clear by Erdogan in his statement was that Turkey contemplated a future with Europe.[5]

UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016)

Apart from the provisions of the UNCLOS and the principles of customary international law, the UNSC Resolution 2292 also deserves consideration. Under its framework, the UNSC, while expressing its determination to support the sole legitimate government of Libya, the Government of National Accord (GNA), primarily aims to provide a one-year authorization for member states to inspect, on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels bound to or from Libya. Interestingly, the Resolution, which is referred as the ground of the Operation IRINI by the EU leadership, stipulates that the member states “make good efforts to first obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag-state prior to any inspections…” However, as confirmed by the Turkish authorities, the participants of the Operation IRINI did not seek the consent of Turkey, the flag-state of the aforementioned cargo vessel. In the simplest terms, this raid under the guise of “inspection” is a state-sponsored piracy. Moreover, the Resolution also states that member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations, ensure the implementation of the arms embargo on Libya with appropriate consultations with the GNA. Even though some EU member states pretend to act as peace-brokers between the GNA, the de-jure government, and the illegitimate government of Haftar, they are well-known for their activities supporting the warlord Haftar’s offensives on the battlefield. Turning a blind eye to the massive arms transfers to warlord Haftar’s mercenaries and Wagner Private Military Contractors (PMCs) does not conform with the EU’s and relevant EU member states’ obligations under the UNSC Resolution 2292. In fact, they are far from “consulting with” the GNA.

Fuat Oktay, the vice president of Turkey, said that the EU once again demonstrated its partisan approach against Turkey and the GNA. Oktay also revealed that the consent of Turkey, NATO and the GNA had not been sought by the participants of the Operation IRINI.[6] In the prior disputes, the EU remained insistent on ignoring the fact that it does not have any jurisdiction over the maritime areas in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a basic interpretation of EU law; now the Union undeniably shares the responsibility of the violation of international law with its member states. State-sponsored piracy in opposition to the freedom of navigation on the high seas should not be the modality of ensuring the sovereign rights of the EU member states. Instead, the EU should embrace a sound approach that ensures its impartiality in the Eastern Mediterranean, in accordance with EU law and international law. In this regard, denouncing the sudden raid on Turkish-flagged cargo vessel would lay the foundation stone of a law-abiding and peaceful status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.

[1] https://www.dailysabah.com/politics...er-illegally-stops-turkish-vessel-in-east-med

[2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/...eration-irini-to-enforce-libya-arms-embargo/#

[3] https://www.politico.eu/article/road-to-peace-in-libya-goes-through-turkey-khalifa-haftar/

[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-libya-idUSKBN20A09X

[5] https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-contemplate-to-build-our-future-with-europe-erdogan-says-160229

[6] https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gund...gunu-bir-kez-daha-tescil-etmistir-533370.html

ANALYSIS - Operation IRINI: How arms embargo on Libya has become a ‘joke’

IRINI has become a clear manifestation of how some members of the Union have taken hostage the EU27 leadership for the sake of their narrow-sighted interests in the Eastern Mediterranean - Anadolu Ajansı

www.aa.com.tr

 

[Saithan]

Penned by 4 ret. adm.

Modern Korsanlık Kabul Edilemez - Deniz Kartalı

Mora Yarımadası’nın güney batısında Türk bayraklı M/V Roselina A kargo gemisinin Alman fırkateyni tarafından durdurularak operasyon timinin helikopterle gemiye çıkmasının uluslararası hukuka aykırı olduğunu söyleyen uzmanlar sert tepki gösterilmesi gerektiğini belirtti. Libya’ya yasadışı silah...

denizkartali.com

 

[Saithan]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1332365329293570048

There is an attempt to blame Turkey for illegal arms smuggling.

 

[Saithan]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1332360695481069572

IRINi isn’t an operation condoned by UN.

 

[Sinan]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1332365329293570048

There is an attempt to blame Turkey for illegal arms smuggling.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1332360695481069572

IRINi isn’t an operation condoned by UN.

Nedim Şener and Mete Yarar are both "yandaş" conspiracy theorists funded by government.

They are kind of equivalent of Burak Bekdil.

 

[Test7]

EU officials say;

Social media disinformation disrupts EU missions worldwide​

Disinformation campaigns that target the EU’s military and civil security missions in Africa and elsewhere to undermine their credibility are rising, according to EU officials. A new approach to analyse and counter the problem will be launched in the coming months.

“The simple fact is all our missions are being targeted by disinformation,” said Admiral Hervé Bléjean, head of the EU Military Staff and its operational headquarters, Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). Adm Bléjean and others addressed their remarks to a 16 November meeting of the European Parliament’s sub-committee on security and defence (SEDE).

For example, Bléjean said that Operation ‘EUNAVFOR MED IRINI’, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya, regularly contends with disinformation from Turkey “which uses any ambiguity to its advantage” in the region, while in Mali – where the EU has a mission to train Malian troops – the problems tend to come from disgruntled locals who circulate rumours linked to anti-colonial sentiment.

A boarding team from the German frigate Hamburg arrives to inspect the merchant vessel Royal Diamond 7 , which was carrying jet fuel from the United Arab Emirates to the Libyan city of Benghazi, on 10 September 2020. The operation was part of ‘EUNAVFOR MED IRINI’, launched in May.

The acutest problem lies with Moscow’s activities in the Central African Republic (CAR), where the EU has had a military training mission since mid-2016. “I was there in October and the disinformation is a real handicap. Our EU head of mission in Bangui is constantly bombarded by it: unscrupulous and low-quality disinformation fed to the local media that attempts to portray [the] EU as a poor partner,” he said.


How can they claim otherwise? Irini operation does not work against GNA. Have Russia, UAE, Egypt, France been raided within the scope of the operation?

 

[Ryder]

Irini is headquartered in Rome.

Didnt I say the Italians are two faced backstabbers who are working against our interests. Dont forget how they were going to switch sides once it looked like tripoli was going to fall.

When Turkey intervened in Libya they opposed us and accused us of many things.

Funny how the Italians were willing to let the GNA die off.

 

[Saithan]

Interesting POV.

According to the video foreign intelligence units would plant weapons on the vessel with Turkish flag that sailed to Libya, and that is why the German SOF landed on the vessel to start searching.

According to the timestamp by Def. Min. Akar the rejection to board was given in due time, but was ignored.

The conclusion would be the SOF with cams would record these weapons and show to the world that Turkey and RTE was breaking Arms embargo and bring Turkey into line of fire for arming GNA.

 

[Fuzuli NL]

Interesting POV.

According to the video foreign intelligence units would plant weapons on the vessel with Turkish flag that sailed to Libya, and that is why the German SOF landed on the vessel to start searching.

According to the timestamp by Def. Min. Akar the rejection to board was given in due time, but was ignored.

The conclusion would be the SOF with cams would record these weapons and show to the world that Turkey and RTE was breaking Arms embargo and bring Turkey into line of fire for arming GNA.

A bit over the top!
70 UAV/UCAV to Pakistan?