A Vision for the Future of Turkish-Algerian Relations: Convergence, Cooperation and Coordination (PART 1)

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A Vision for the Future of Turkish-Algerian Relations: Convergence, Cooperation and Coordination (PART 1)​

Enhancing cooperation and customising their regional policies will serve the interests of both Turkey and Algeria in the face of growing uncertainty in the wider MENA region as well as the Mediterranean.
Ismail Numan Telci 8 August 2021
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During the past few years, Algeria's foreign policy towards regional issues has been increasingly parallel to that of Turkey. [Turkish presidential press service]

As one of the key actors of the African continent in terms of its demography, geopolitical location and size, Algeria could be a key partner for Turkey in political, economic and military areas. There is a number of areas where both countries can be interested in long-term cooperation. With their similar approach to the regional crises, especially to the Libyan crisis, the two countries have a principled and inclusive stance thanks to their foreign policy principles. In this sense, the steps taken for the relations of these two Mediterranean countries with France and for the solution of the Libyan crisis are important, as they show the common aspects in their current agenda.
However, with an economy that is heavily dependent on natural gas and oil revenues, one of the main priorities of Algeria is to diversify its economy thus creating new job opportunities for its population of 44 million. To achieve these goals, the vision to be established for the future will include increasing the number of Turkish companies currently operating in Algeria, enhancing the commercial relations and encouraging mutual investment between the two countries. In addition, coordination in regional policies, cooperation in the defence industry and a common vision in foreign policy are of vital importance for the future of relations.

On the other hand, Turkey can increase its influence in the region and its volume of trade with Europe thanks to the cost-effective and secure trade routes through Algeria, which has an important geopolitical position in the Mediterranean. Again, considering that Algeria is also a gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey's access to friendly countries and developing markets in Africa within the scope of its African policies may reflect its strong cooperation with Algeria. (1)

A Turkish-Algerian Approach to Regional Issues​

Historically, Algeria and Turkey had not diverged sharply in terms of foreign policy. During the past few years, Algeria's foreign policy towards regional issues has been increasingly parallel to that of Turkey. This is mainly a result of common foreign policy principles such as territorial integrity and non-interventionism in other countries’ domestic affairs. There were also strong cultural and historical bonds that allowed the two countries to somewhat prevent foreign policy related differences. In order for Algeria and Turkey to initiate a rather constructive foreign policy direction, there has to be further integration in their regional policies in line with these common principles, policy choices and interests.

The Libyan Crisis​

Algeria, which has opposed military intervention since the beginning of the Libyan crisis, has supported the political dialogue process between the parties and has taken a clear stance against any foreign intervention in Libya. Moreover, Algeria engaged in the Libyan crisis through regional and international umbrella organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), but also strived to be a part of the local solution mechanisms with a separate emphasis on the regionalism of the crisis. As a matter of fact, the increasing conflicts and the emergent terrorist groups due to the power vacuum in Libya not only weakened the environment of trust and stability in the country, but also became a serious security threat to neighbouring states. In the following period, the active involvement of regional actors such as Egypt and Morocco in the Libyan crisis, as well as non-regional actors such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey and Russia, called into question Algeria's indifferent Libya policies. (2) The Algerian government, taking concrete steps in the face of this state of play, made some critical changes through a constitutional referendum on 1 November 2020. According to the relevant article in the new constitution adopted, the Algerian army will be able to participate in cross-border operations of the UN, the AU and the Arab League with the approval of two-thirds of the parliament. This constitutional amendment came to the fore as a necessary response against armed groups in Libya and the Sahel as well as the wave of illegal immigrants that has become difficult to control. (3)

Thus, Algeria's indifferent policies towards Libya that prioritised diplomatic solutions were replaced by limited interventionism due to national security concerns. The increasing violent activities and the rise of terror groups in Libya has been one of the most serious security concerns for Algeria. The attacks on the Tiganturin oil field in In Amenas in January 2013 marked a turning point in the government's policies towards Libya. (4) The Al-Mourabitoun organisation, against whom Algeria has been fighting in the Sahara and Sahel regions for a long time, claimed responsibility for the attacks where 150 Algerian citizens were captured and 40 workers were killed. The strong ties between the leader of the organisation, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are also noteworthy to Algerian decision-makers. Therefore, the situation in the western and southern borders of the country urged Algeria to increase its border control measures and military spending. Algeria is said to have spent over $500 million in order to prevent illegal immigration and terrorist activities on the Libyan border. (5) Following a meeting with the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al-Serraj, in January 2020, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune stated that any attack on the capital city of Tripoli is a "red line" to Algeria. This comment was a direct message to Khalifa Hafter who has been trying to seize the Libyan capital from the GNA. Likewise, the memory of a bloody civil war in the 1990s highlights the national security concerns of Algeria, which is already fragile politically. The possibility of radical and so-called Islamist groups, which regained their habitat as a result of the civil war and conflicts in Libya, expanding their sphere of influence to and within Algeria reminds the almost every part of the country of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) and the civil war experience.

On the other hand, the change in the Algerian military doctrine is somewhat similar to Turkey's political activism in Libya. In the beginning, Turkey, just like Algeria, approached all regional stakeholders in post-Gaddafi Libya at an equal distance and maintained its neutral stance, emphasizing the importance of the political process at every opportunity. The Turkish government, which supports the UN-recognised GNA in Libya with the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in the city of Skhirat, Morocco under the auspices of the UN in December 2015, also signed the Deal for Maritime Jurisdiction and Security with the Libyan government in November 2019, against the violations of rights and breach of international law by the bloc led by the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since then, the Turkish government has been providing military and logistical support to Tripoli, which has been subject to the increasing attacks and the coup attempt of Khalifa Haftar, in order to keep the legitimate administration in office and to protect its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (i.e. the Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal), which it approaches as a national security issue. (6)

Likewise, Algeria approached Haftar with suspicion and concern, whom it saw as the main culprit of the loss of lives and the internal division until 23 October 2020, when the armistice was concluded. In fact, in the eyes of Algeria, Haftar turned the neighbouring state of Libya into an unstable region and a breeding ground for terror as a result of the conflicts on the Algerian border and the internal upheaval he caused. In addition, the involvement of non-regional actors such as the UAE, Russia and France in the Libyan crisis through Haftar is another issue that disturbed Algerian decision-makers who consider the crisis as a regional problem. Haftar's collaboration with Madkhali-Salafi groups, which gained popularity in the country after the operations against the Islamic State (IS), is perceived as a serious threat by Algeria due to the ideology that these groups represent and their potential for radicalisation in the future. This is due to the belief that the rise of the Madkhali-Salafists in Libya would encourage other members in Algeria with the same view and ideology, and in turn empower them. (7) For Algerian decision-makers, such a development would allow for the indirect intervention of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Algeria due to the relations of these groups with the latter two.

Relations with France​

Algeria and Turkey's relations with France have taken a problematic turn following France's regional policies and the "bill against Islamist separatism" prepared after the initiatives of President Emmanuel Macron. (8) Because of his recent discourses and references, Macron, as one of the leading names behind increased Islamophobic rhetoric in Europe, has received strong reactions from both countries. The draft bill, which was put to the vote in the French parliament on 16 February, was adopted with 347 votes for; and 151 against. (9) The emergence of the bill is largely due to the fact that the Macron administration directly attributes the terrorist attacks that occurred in certain locations in France on religious motives. The law to be enacted in line with this approach aims at reducing the influence of Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan imams on the Muslim population in France, and provides for the strict supervision of mosques. According to French officials, it is estimated that 1,800 of 2,400 mosques in France are under the influence of imams from these countries. (10) However, France's Operation Barkhane in Mali and Niger since 2014 has been increasing the influence of the so-called Islamist groups in the southern borders of Algeria. From the Algerian point of view, France is on one hand the source of the crisis environment in Libya due to its support for Haftar as well as its double standard diplomacy with Libya, and the main driver of radicalism in the southern borders of the country as a result of its military presence in Mali on the other.

Moreover, as one of the main actors of the anti-Turkey camp in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, France is seeking ways to consolidate alliances in these regions into a political bloc, and despite openly supporting putschist Haftar, criticises Turkey's relations with the legitimate government recognised by the UN and considers them illegal. Macron and the mentality he represents, whereby islamophobia and xenophobia are institutionalised as foreign policy principles of France, have also been trying to develop oppressive practices against the Turkish diaspora in France.

Turkish-Algerian Cooperation: A Future Perspective​

Turkey pays special economic attention to Algeria within the framework of its African policy, and the country continues to be among the rising powers in the North African region thanks to its natural resources and demographic power. Turkey and Algeria can play a leading role in regional development through energy resources, new shipping routes and economic partnerships with other regional actors. Moreover, enhancing the military power of the two countries through cooperation in military training and the defence industry has the potential to change the regional balance in the Middle East and North Africa.

 

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