Canada Navy Canada SSK program

Chocopie

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Problem with Type 216 is that the actual design doesn't exist just yet. They need a first customer like what Greece was for Type 214. Then again the situation is even less ideal since Type 216 is almost an all-new design unlike Type 214 which leveraged design features from Type 209 and Type 212A. Type 212CD and Kokums A26 are unsuited for Canada considering what they are built for and where they will operate. They will most probably offer what they're trying to sell to India. Also just like what Chocopie said, there's the problem of capacity when it comes to TKMS since they've got a few ships to build for the German, Norweigean and Italian Navies. Dutch and Polish Navies could join the queue if they are to select 212CD as well.

Navantia should first get the S80+ sorted out if they want to sell that design abroad. The program was woefully managed since they've parted ways with the French.

So the competition is really between France, Korea and Japan. Naval Group can offer both the Scorpene with FC2G or Shortfin Barracuda depending on what the Canadian Navy wants. Mitsubishi will probably enter with Taigei and Hanwha only has KSS-III, and they'll probably offer a model based on batch II with Li-ion batteries.
True, Type 216 is a non-existent „paper boat“ right now. Thinking of all the initial issues of Greek Type 214s and recurring fuel cell and cable defects on Korean Son Won Il-class, any introduced new sub design is a risk factor. 30 years deployment of a faulty sub could easily become a financial and strategic disaster for any Navy.

The Japanese later Soryu and new Taigei-class are the 1st to mainly use Li-Ion batteries without AIP. Koreans, French and Germans combine them with fuel cell AIP. Still a unproven technology, the risk of highly inflammable Li-Ion batteries in a sub was for years unacceptable up to now.

Didn‘t take the Scorpene-class or Type 214 into the procurement pool, expecting RCN seeks at minimum a heavier weight class as replacement of the Victoria-class.
Beefed up TKMS versions of 2000+ tons Israeli Dolphin-class or Singaporean Type 218SG could be considered as well.

Afaik Naval Group’s Shortfin Barracuda-class plan of putting a conventional diesel electric with AIP in a SSN hull specially designed for a LEU-fuelled reactor didn‘t go well (costs overflow) before the Aussies pulled the plug and switched over to AUKUS with nuclear subs.
 
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Nilgiri

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Afaik Naval Group’s Shortfin Barracuda-class plan of putting a conventional diesel electric with AIP in a SSN hull specially designed for a LEU-fuelled reactor didn‘t go well (costs overflow) before the Aussies pulled the plug and switched over to AUKUS with nuclear subs.

I mean in the end you were getting an SSK for SSN price essentially....you can change things only so much, plenty things are baked in for SSN.

So the Aussies decided might as well get an SSN for SSN price.

Left a real sour taste in French mouth though, given this approach could have been done from start and open bid done regarding that.

But in the end there is anglo-saxon alliance stuff going on....French can't really break that.
 

Ted Barnes

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k.numbers

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I found the High-Level Manditory Requirements that went out with the RFI posted in September:

HLMR #1 - Urgency, Availability, and Sustainment

Ability to deliver submarine, maintenance facilities and training systems to achieve Initial Operating Capability no later than 2037.

Explanation: The anticipated reduced availability of the VCS will directly impact force generation and the production of key qualifications within the submarine force. To avoid a capability gap and to ensure that crews can be generated as the CPS fleet is delivered the requirement is to have the first of class CPS delivered no later than 2035. IOC is defined as the first CPS being fully operational with requisite infrastructure and In-Service-Support in place.

HLMR #2 – Fleet Size

Ability to perform lines of tasking as follows: 3 submarines for continental defence/global deployment, 3 submarines for national and international exercises and force generation simultaneously.

Explanation: In accordance with ONSAF, CPSP is exploring the renewal and expansion of the CAF’s submarine fleet to enable the RCN to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines. The CPS fleet size must be sufficient to complete assigned missions and roles throughout its service life. In order to achieve 6 simultaneously operational submarines as described above, it is acknowledged that the total fleet size must be larger to accommodate submarines in various levels of maintenance.

HLMR #3 – Endurance and Persistence

Ability to operate discretely without external support for minimum transits of 7000nm (2x 3500nm) at 8kts, and a minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations while on station. Capable of no less than 60 days self-sustained operation.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of conducting continental defence missions including Arctic patrols from home ports in Halifax and Esquimalt. The absence of support facilities in the Arctic mean that the submarine must be able to conduct such patrols unsupported.

HLMR #4 – Lethality

Ability to perform precision attacks to include the use of the following weapons systems: heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of detecting, targeting, engaging, and destroying threats, both at sea (surface and subsurface) and ashore. To achieve this, the CPS must be capable of carrying and employing an appropriate combination of sensors and weapons to detect and deter maritime threats, control Canada’s maritime approaches, and hold distant adversaries at risk with the capability to project power ashore.

HLMR #5 – Operating Environment

Ability to operate worldwide throughout the year, both by day and by night, in temperatures ranging from tropical to Arctic. Ability to operate near, in and if necessary, under ice (for limited periods of time).

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of global deployment. Arctic operations will predominantly take place within navigable waters, which are expected to expand in the coming decades. CPS will operate near and in ice, and on occasion, will be required to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

HLMR #6 – Environmental Compliance

Ability to operate in compliance with the environmental regulations in all areas of operation, including the Arctic.

HLMR #7 – Crew Size

Ability to minimize crew size using automation and remote monitoring.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to be operated with a core crew of no more than 40 personnel. In addition, the submarine must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel (riders) in permanent bunks.

HLMR #8 – Survivability (Stealth)

Ability to operate in contested environments while maintaining tactical advantage with low acoustic (passive and active), magnetic, and Infrared (IR) signatures to prevent counter-detection.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to maintain tactical advantage over new and developing detection systems including airborne magnetic anomaly detection, electric field detection and acoustic detection through reduced signature and low target echo strength. Stealth should also be enabled by operational signature management that allows the submarine to manage its signature to meet operational conditions.

HLMR #9 – Interoperability

Ability to communicate and share information and data within mission frameworks utilizing high-assurance cryptographic capabilities (algorithms and protocols) compliant with the US Crypto Modernization Program to ensure a high degree of security for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of data and information flow with organizations, submarines, systems and applications necessary to complete its missions. This includes all aspects of being able to work with others in a robust, secure and sustainable manner, both integrated and networked. More specifically, it includes regulatory compliance and standardization to ensure operational and tactical interoperability.

HLMR #10 – GBA+

Ability to create an inclusive environment in which all crew members have equitable opportunity for employment.

Explanation: DND and the CAF are dedicated to creating an inclusive and safe environment for a diverse defence team, including aboard vessels. As people will be central to submarine operations for the foreseeable future, intersectional considerations will be included in the overall requirements for the project. Specifically, these considerations will be integrated in the submarine selection process through the inclusion of a High-Level Mandatory Requirement requiring a “safe and inclusive environment for all crew members”. For reference, this requirement would evaluate how each submarine meets the “5-95th percentile” criteria. Specifically, this means ensuring that submarines are adapted to bodies which are found between the anthropometric measurements of the 5th percentile female and the 95th percentile male. This will ensure that the submarine and its amenities are adapted to the vast majority of men, women, and gender-diverse individuals, therefore increasing the meaningful participation and operational effectiveness of all submariners.

HLMR #11 – Extended Operational Effectiveness

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems to extend the sensor reach and deliver effect to the underwater battlespace.

Explanation: As a “system of systems,” modern submarines are equipped to employ and support crewed and uncrewed vehicles, in addition to other armaments and intelligence gathering capabilities – making submarines a true force multiplier. The CPS must be capable of contributing to seabed warfare.

HLMR #12 – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Ability to conduct multi-domain, multi-spectral sensing and to process, analyze and store data from onboard systems and external sources for real or near real-time exploitation and dissemination.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of sensing across maritime surface and sub-surface domains and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, locate, classify, identify, track and collect intelligence on targets of interest in all conditions, day and night. It also includes the use of automation, data fusion, decision support tools and advanced algorithms and methods (e.g. machine learning and artificial intelligence) to lower operator workload and increase effectiveness in processing sensor data.

HLMR #13 - Infrastructure

Provide infrastructure and equipment on both East and West Coasts to meet operational support requirements, including all levels of maintenance, and training requirement.

Explanation: Recapitalization of existing and construction of new submarine support infrastructure will be required to enable and support the operations of the future submarine fleet. The physical characteristics of the future submarines and their designed operation, maintenance and training philosophy will be assessed against the existing infrastructure portfolio to determine a comprehensive set of submarine support infrastructure requirements.

HLMR #14- Training

Conduct shore-based operational and technical training on the East Coast and West Coast.

Explanation: Individual and collective training must be available to submariners on both the East and West Coasts. This can be a combination of real, virtual and augmented reality training with an aim to end the requirement for submariners to be away from home for extended periods of time for shore-based training.

HLMR #15 – Upgradeability and Growth Potential

Ability to upgrade submarine capability to maintain an operational advantage for the CPS service life.

Explanation: The CPS must maintain an operational advantage by keeping pace with technological change to counter and/or leverage disruptive technologies, as well as being prepared for rapid technical insertion through Continuous Capability Sustainment (CCS). To help achieve this, the CPS must possess the ability to upgrade existing systems and payloads. It must also have the growth potential to integrate new systems and payloads. This drives the requirement for sufficient excess margin for size (volume), weight, workstations, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), power, data busses, computational nodes, etc. The ability to integrate new systems and payload is also required to support special operations, by integrating mission tailored capabilities within an acceptable level of effort and in short timescales. This justifies the consideration for a modular open architecture approach that facilitates individual sensor updates and additions of new sub-systems and sensors on shorter timescales.
 
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