Navy Canada Surface Combatant (CSC) Program

DAVEBLOGGINS

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" Future-Proofing the LM/BAE CSC TYPE 26 FRIGATE"

I have witten an article on "future-proofing" the CSC Type 26 Frigate that forum members may wish to comment on. This article is In My Own Opinion (IMO) and not those of others. Please feel free to comment and discuss. Cheers!

“future-proofing” the LM/BAE TYPE 26 CSC FRIGATE

The process of choosing the winning design for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) has been long and arduous. Now that the Locheed Martin/BAE consortium has won the contract to design the Type 26 CSC, it is time to debate what weapons and sensor requirements and capabilities will provide Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) with the best bang for the buck on these 15 nearly 8000-ton frigates over the next several decades. These frigates will be nearly 50% larger than the Halifax-class Frigates and nearly as large as most modern destroyers. Designed to be multi-modal and versatile, the CSC Type 26 Frigate is equipped with a reconfigurable mission bay for light boats, unmanned surface/aerial vehicles, and/or cargo containers. This will allow the vessels to be reconfigured depending on mission and requirements. Leadmark 2050, is clear: while the CSC will undertake a variety of mission types, it will be designed primarily to operate in a high-end war-fighting environment. That makes sense since a ship designed to just fight pirates and provide Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) wouldn’t fare well against modern anti-ship cruise missiles or torpedoes.

Operating in a high-end environment requires a Combat Management System (CMS) that tightly integrates the ship’s weapons, sensors, communications and Tactical Data Links (TDLs) to allow it to defend itself, and take the fight to an adversary. This is especially true for air defence, as the nature of contemporary air threats means that the ship’s crew may only have seconds to react to a missile threat coming over the horizon. The CMS 330 will be key to this task, as it must gather and display data from the ship’s sensors, activate active and passive countermeasures, and cue incoming threats to its weapon systems much faster than ever before.

There are three categories of air defence capabilities that the government must consider when “future-proofing” the CSC’s Type 26 design: short-to medium-range; long-range; and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Having an effective short-to medium-range air defence capability is perhaps most important in terms of ship survivability. But being able to detect and engage threats at longer ranges will become just as important, as threats become more advanced. So, decisions made about the CMS now, will likely have long-term effects down the road. Missiles such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), with ranges of around 50 kilometers (kms), will likely form the main defence of the CSC’s short-to medium-range air capability, so having a Combat Management System (CMS) that works well with it will be critical. Lockheed Martin (LM) Canada’s CMS 330 is already integrated with ESSM II in mind.

In terms of providing a long-range air defence capability, things get more complicated. Two of three systems on offer (CMS 330 and 9LV) have not yet been integrated with long-range air defence missiles such as the SM-3 or SM-6 RIM-174 Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) with ranges of over 150 kms. The inclusion of Tomahawk long range attack missiles to the CSC MK 41 VLS system arsenal is a game changer for Canada. The RCN’s needs dictate what systems are required, given the importance of long-range air defence in the CSC and Area Air Warfare (AAW) roles, that the government has already stated the CSC Type 26 must fulfill. That is not to say longer-ranged missile systems cannot be integrated into the CMS 330, however systems integration is a complex process and additional integration increases the risk of cost overruns and delays. The Australian Type 26 Hunter class Frigates faced the same problem. Australia’s solution was to “combine” their 9LV/CEAFAR radar combination with the US Navy’s (USN) Aegis CMS to facilitate the integration of future US missile systems like the SM-3/SM-6 to give their Type 26 Frigate variant, a greater long-range air defence capability. By doing this, Australia is hedging the future viability of its Type 26 Frigates on the continued ability of the USN to be on the cutting edge of naval weapons and sensors technology. Having Aegis CMS and their CEAFAR S band long range radar on its Type 26 ships reduces the burden (and cost) of integrating future American weapons systems and sensors into the Royal Australian Navy’s CMS architecture.

The Canadian government must think carefully about its approach to ‘future-proofing’ the CSC to ensure that the ships can be upgraded as cost-efficiently as possible if it wants to include a sea-based BMD capability in the future. Currently, the US, Australia, Spain and Japan are the only four countries with an effective sea-based BMD capability to track and engage Theatre Ballistic Missiles using a special configuration of the Aegis CMS, the SM-3/SM-6 missile system and the MK 41 VLS. If Aegis BMD is included in the LM Type 26 CSC along with the robust AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 air search radar system to compliment the US, UK, AUS, JAPAN and SPAIN 3D search radar systems, Canada will then be able to lessen future integration costs through collaboration with all four Aegis BMD allies. If Aegis BMD is not included, Canada would then be responsible for integrating future weapons systems and sensors into its CMS architecture which has the potential of increasing costs. Given the nature of threats the CSC is likely to face in the future, careful deliberation is required when deciding which CMS best meets Canada’s short-and long-term requirements. The incoming missile risk profiles associated with the LM CMS 330, are likely to be important factors in positioning the CSC Type 26 for future upgrades. Judicious planning should ensure that Canada is able to field an effective, upgradeable CSC that can fulfill the government’s requirements now and in the future. A part of this would be that the government should reconsider the decision made by then, Prime Minister Paul Martin in 2005 to not directly join the US BMD program. If this decision is reversed, the Canadian government must then restart discussions with the Americans with the possibility of participating in Continental and Naval BMD systems. Canada remains largely alone among its major allies in not directly participating in some form of BMD. It is time for the government to listen to the growing voices within Canada in support of BMD.

The MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) could be reconfigured from 32 to 48 or even 64 cells to accommodate a precision strike and BMD capability. The $61 Billion (CAD) allocated for the Type 26 build and equipment acquisition, will ensure the RCN gets the ‘best bang for the buck’ enabling a more robust AAW MK 41 VLS with a BMD capability along with an “Aegis-style platform” as recommended to the government by the Senate Committee on National Defence in May 2017 (Eleventh Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence-A Plan For The Future- Pg. 40 Recommendation 15). The first four CSC Type 26 frigates could very easily have this extended AAW capability incorporated into their design.

While the CSCs will be based on the British design City class Type 26 Global Combat Ship, systems and capabilities will be tailored to Canadian requirements, a process which will ultimately produce a uniquely Canadian ship. Although the weapons, sensors and combat systems fitted to the LM/BAE Type 26 Frigate, will differ in some respects to the Canadianized CSC Type 26 Frigate, there will still be significant commonality of components coming from the UK’s City class Type 26 design, especially the propulsion system, CAAM weapon system and sonar systems, along with secondary X/I band navigation radars. Updated Naval Surface Missiles (NSM) silos will be fitted, although the SM-6 RIM-174 ERAM will also have a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) mode. A mandatory requirement for the Canadian platform is the LM AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 fixed phased array radar. What will remain unchanged is the ship’s acoustically quiet hull, an essential feature for the kind of anti-submarine warfare on which the RCN has focused since the Second World War. The ship will also have advanced sonar and towed array systems for tracking submarines. In the realm of submarine detection and warfare, surface ships have long been enabled by helicopters. As such, the Canadian CSC will possess an expanded flight deck capable of landing the Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone and Boeing Chinook helicopters. The hangar/mission bay will be able to accommodate up to two Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone aircraft, which are currently being delivered to the Canadian Armed Forces. It will also have the SKELDAR V-200 drones for aerial surveillance. The Canadian government will fund the cost of refining the BAE Type 26 into the detailed LM CSC Type 26 design. Success will vindicate the CSC design and should Canada adopt the Aegis BMD program as Australia has potentially done with the USN, these three close allies would have superior interoperability and capabilities unmatched by any other allied Nation.

Conclusion:

Procurement of the CSC Type 26 Frigates into the RCN will likely take place throughout the next decade or so to gradually replace the Halifax-class which is slated for retirement in the early to mid 2030s. Once brought into service, the CSC will be the backbone of the RCN for a generation, serving well into the 2050s. If Canada is to gain the most value for money, in a project, the effects of which, are planned to span more than 40 years from construction to full operation to disposal, the weapons and sensors applied to the LM Type 26 CSC Frigate, combined with short-medium range ESSM’s and long range SM3/SM6 missiles with BMD, paired with the AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 S-band 3D Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), then an Aegis BMD system makes common sense. The CSC Type 26 will then, provide the RCN with not only the most effective ASW hull specifically designed for the role, considering noise signatures and sensor and weapon use, but also the clearest winner in AAW capabilities and “future-proofing.”
 

AlphaMike

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" Future-Proofing the LM/BAE CSC TYPE 26 FRIGATE"

I have witten an article on "future-proofing" the CSC Type 26 Frigate that forum members may wish to comment on. This article is In My Own Opinion (IMO) and not those of others. Please feel free to comment and discuss. Cheers!

“future-proofing” the LM/BAE TYPE 26 CSC FRIGATE

The process of choosing the winning design for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) has been long and arduous. Now that the Locheed Martin/BAE consortium has won the contract to design the Type 26 CSC, it is time to debate what weapons and sensor requirements and capabilities will provide Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) with the best bang for the buck on these 15 nearly 8000-ton frigates over the next several decades. These frigates will be nearly 50% larger than the Halifax-class Frigates and nearly as large as most modern destroyers. Designed to be multi-modal and versatile, the CSC Type 26 Frigate is equipped with a reconfigurable mission bay for light boats, unmanned surface/aerial vehicles, and/or cargo containers. This will allow the vessels to be reconfigured depending on mission and requirements. Leadmark 2050, is clear: while the CSC will undertake a variety of mission types, it will be designed primarily to operate in a high-end war-fighting environment. That makes sense since a ship designed to just fight pirates and provide Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) wouldn’t fare well against modern anti-ship cruise missiles or torpedoes.

Operating in a high-end environment requires a Combat Management System (CMS) that tightly integrates the ship’s weapons, sensors, communications and Tactical Data Links (TDLs) to allow it to defend itself, and take the fight to an adversary. This is especially true for air defence, as the nature of contemporary air threats means that the ship’s crew may only have seconds to react to a missile threat coming over the horizon. The CMS 330 will be key to this task, as it must gather and display data from the ship’s sensors, activate active and passive countermeasures, and cue incoming threats to its weapon systems much faster than ever before.

There are three categories of air defence capabilities that the government must consider when “future-proofing” the CSC’s Type 26 design: short-to medium-range; long-range; and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Having an effective short-to medium-range air defence capability is perhaps most important in terms of ship survivability. But being able to detect and engage threats at longer ranges will become just as important, as threats become more advanced. So, decisions made about the CMS now, will likely have long-term effects down the road. Missiles such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), with ranges of around 50 kilometers (kms), will likely form the main defence of the CSC’s short-to medium-range air capability, so having a Combat Management System (CMS) that works well with it will be critical. Lockheed Martin (LM) Canada’s CMS 330 is already integrated with ESSM II in mind.

In terms of providing a long-range air defence capability, things get more complicated. Two of three systems on offer (CMS 330 and 9LV) have not yet been integrated with long-range air defence missiles such as the SM-3 or SM-6 RIM-174 Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) with ranges of over 150 kms. The inclusion of Tomahawk long range attack missiles to the CSC MK 41 VLS system arsenal is a game changer for Canada. The RCN’s needs dictate what systems are required, given the importance of long-range air defence in the CSC and Area Air Warfare (AAW) roles, that the government has already stated the CSC Type 26 must fulfill. That is not to say longer-ranged missile systems cannot be integrated into the CMS 330, however systems integration is a complex process and additional integration increases the risk of cost overruns and delays. The Australian Type 26 Hunter class Frigates faced the same problem. Australia’s solution was to “combine” their 9LV/CEAFAR radar combination with the US Navy’s (USN) Aegis CMS to facilitate the integration of future US missile systems like the SM-3/SM-6 to give their Type 26 Frigate variant, a greater long-range air defence capability. By doing this, Australia is hedging the future viability of its Type 26 Frigates on the continued ability of the USN to be on the cutting edge of naval weapons and sensors technology. Having Aegis CMS and their CEAFAR S band long range radar on its Type 26 ships reduces the burden (and cost) of integrating future American weapons systems and sensors into the Royal Australian Navy’s CMS architecture.

The Canadian government must think carefully about its approach to ‘future-proofing’ the CSC to ensure that the ships can be upgraded as cost-efficiently as possible if it wants to include a sea-based BMD capability in the future. Currently, the US, Australia, Spain and Japan are the only four countries with an effective sea-based BMD capability to track and engage Theatre Ballistic Missiles using a special configuration of the Aegis CMS, the SM-3/SM-6 missile system and the MK 41 VLS. If Aegis BMD is included in the LM Type 26 CSC along with the robust AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 air search radar system to compliment the US, UK, AUS, JAPAN and SPAIN 3D search radar systems, Canada will then be able to lessen future integration costs through collaboration with all four Aegis BMD allies. If Aegis BMD is not included, Canada would then be responsible for integrating future weapons systems and sensors into its CMS architecture which has the potential of increasing costs. Given the nature of threats the CSC is likely to face in the future, careful deliberation is required when deciding which CMS best meets Canada’s short-and long-term requirements. The incoming missile risk profiles associated with the LM CMS 330, are likely to be important factors in positioning the CSC Type 26 for future upgrades. Judicious planning should ensure that Canada is able to field an effective, upgradeable CSC that can fulfill the government’s requirements now and in the future. A part of this would be that the government should reconsider the decision made by then, Prime Minister Paul Martin in 2005 to not directly join the US BMD program. If this decision is reversed, the Canadian government must then restart discussions with the Americans with the possibility of participating in Continental and Naval BMD systems. Canada remains largely alone among its major allies in not directly participating in some form of BMD. It is time for the government to listen to the growing voices within Canada in support of BMD.

The MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) could be reconfigured from 32 to 48 or even 64 cells to accommodate a precision strike and BMD capability. The $61 Billion (CAD) allocated for the Type 26 build and equipment acquisition, will ensure the RCN gets the ‘best bang for the buck’ enabling a more robust AAW MK 41 VLS with a BMD capability along with an “Aegis-style platform” as recommended to the government by the Senate Committee on National Defence in May 2017 (Eleventh Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence-A Plan For The Future- Pg. 40 Recommendation 15). The first four CSC Type 26 frigates could very easily have this extended AAW capability incorporated into their design.

While the CSCs will be based on the British design City class Type 26 Global Combat Ship, systems and capabilities will be tailored to Canadian requirements, a process which will ultimately produce a uniquely Canadian ship. Although the weapons, sensors and combat systems fitted to the LM/BAE Type 26 Frigate, will differ in some respects to the Canadianized CSC Type 26 Frigate, there will still be significant commonality of components coming from the UK’s City class Type 26 design, especially the propulsion system, CAAM weapon system and sonar systems, along with secondary X/I band navigation radars. Updated Naval Surface Missiles (NSM) silos will be fitted, although the SM-6 RIM-174 ERAM will also have a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) mode. A mandatory requirement for the Canadian platform is the LM AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 fixed phased array radar. What will remain unchanged is the ship’s acoustically quiet hull, an essential feature for the kind of anti-submarine warfare on which the RCN has focused since the Second World War. The ship will also have advanced sonar and towed array systems for tracking submarines. In the realm of submarine detection and warfare, surface ships have long been enabled by helicopters. As such, the Canadian CSC will possess an expanded flight deck capable of landing the Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone and Boeing Chinook helicopters. The hangar/mission bay will be able to accommodate up to two Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone aircraft, which are currently being delivered to the Canadian Armed Forces. It will also have the SKELDAR V-200 drones for aerial surveillance. The Canadian government will fund the cost of refining the BAE Type 26 into the detailed LM CSC Type 26 design. Success will vindicate the CSC design and should Canada adopt the Aegis BMD program as Australia has potentially done with the USN, these three close allies would have superior interoperability and capabilities unmatched by any other allied Nation.

Conclusion:

Procurement of the CSC Type 26 Frigates into the RCN will likely take place throughout the next decade or so to gradually replace the Halifax-class which is slated for retirement in the early to mid 2030s. Once brought into service, the CSC will be the backbone of the RCN for a generation, serving well into the 2050s. If Canada is to gain the most value for money, in a project, the effects of which, are planned to span more than 40 years from construction to full operation to disposal, the weapons and sensors applied to the LM Type 26 CSC Frigate, combined with short-medium range ESSM’s and long range SM3/SM6 missiles with BMD, paired with the AN/SPY 7 V1/V2 S-band 3D Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), then an Aegis BMD system makes common sense. The CSC Type 26 will then, provide the RCN with not only the most effective ASW hull specifically designed for the role, considering noise signatures and sensor and weapon use, but also the clearest winner in AAW capabilities and “future-proofing.”
hello @DAVEBLOGGINS , what do think if the space used for the RHIB in middle section are instead removed and the space used for another addition of VLS cells, from the look of it, 16x VLS could be fitted on the peripherals akin to the config of a Zumwalt class MK-57 VLS.

While the canisters are moved a bit to the center. IMO, Canada's likely adversary like that of China and Russia are all gearing even the smallest of their ships into packing as much VLS as possible. So it justifies that for a ship with a displacement of 8000 tons like the CSC armed with no less than 90 VLS. Do you think it could be possible to do so,as part of future proofing the ships??
Canadian-Surface-Combatant-CSC-Royal-Canadian-Navy-stern-1024x768.jpg


Canadian-Surface-Combatant-CSC-Royal-Canadian-Navy-dsei-2019-1024x768.jpg


the RHIB's could be moved into a ramp style launching position like this.
4-rhib-deployment.jpg


and as for the CMS, if the RCN are gearing towards ABM capabilities with the ship then they should go with the AEGIS, especially the latest baseline 10 iteration when available. Should be ready once the ships are starting to take shape.
 

DAVEBLOGGINS

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hello @DAVEBLOGGINS , what do think if the space used for the RHIB in middle section are instead removed and the space used for another addition of VLS cells, from the look of it, 16x VLS could be fitted on the peripherals akin to the config of a Zumwalt class MK-57 VLS.

While the canisters are moved a bit to the center. IMO, Canada's likely adversary like that of China and Russia are all gearing even the smallest of their ships into packing as much VLS as possible. So it justifies that for a ship with a displacement of 8000 tons like the CSC armed with no less than 90 VLS. Do you think it could be possible to do so,as part of future proofing the ships??
Canadian-Surface-Combatant-CSC-Royal-Canadian-Navy-stern-1024x768.jpg


Canadian-Surface-Combatant-CSC-Royal-Canadian-Navy-dsei-2019-1024x768.jpg


the RHIB's could be moved into a ramp style launching position like this.
4-rhib-deployment.jpg


and as for the CMS, if the RCN are gearing towards ABM capabilities with the ship then they should go with the AEGIS, especially the latest baseline 10 iteration when available. Should be ready once the ships are starting to take shape.
Hello AlphaMike. Using the centre of the Multi-Mission Bay for 16 MK 41 VLS Canisters Cells would defeat the the purpose of the Mission Bay entirely and IMO will not happen. If you use a Stern well for RHIBS, then where would you put the VDS & TAS? Again not feasible and won't happen. What might work is more VLS Canister cells Forward (possibly going from 32 to at least 48 Cells or even possibly 64. There could be possibly room port/stbd midships a couple of VLS Canisters where the CIWS was going to be but don't know how doing both FWD and port/stbd would affect weight and speed issues. I can see you want the CSC Frigate to be more like a Destroyer/Cruiser but I think we can leave those Ops to the "big boys". I like your thinking! Nice try though!:D
 
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DAVEBLOGGINS

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