Canada's new Subs..

[S. Scott]

Hello my friend, hope all is well with you!? Just wanted to ask you what are your thoughts on possible south sea war with Korea being cought in between two major aggreser, chinaa and crazy north korea? do you believe that in a scenario/case like this the military complex on Hanwah would be affected, destroyed while building subs for Canada? Would the Tri-Party NATO Nation of Germany, Norway, Canada interpolarity, cost saving maintenance, armement, tech transfer be best with a potential to have 24 212CD subs (biggest conventional modern Subs fleet in the world) to patrol our three Oceans?

"previous text";
Well, latest news, Germany/Norway just propose the best offer possible for Canada (Koresa Can’t match that)…imagine 4 Subs by 2026…a year later than korea’s 4 Subs BUT the 212CD offer nullify the one $1 B reno-refit for our only Antigue Vict Sub left. Plus a total of 24, yes 24 new 212CD combine in a Tri-Party nation/NATO compatible unity (something the korean model is not and cannot match the Yti-Party nation's Lethality power of 24 of 212CD combine) to defend all three Ocean of Canada waters. $86 B Vs $70 B for Hanwah in return investment for Canada plus a ton of other wiser offers. If these "agents" in Ottawa cannot see the “No Brainer fact matter’s” here then Canada is in for a possible long term Non-sequential sad procurement story! Yes, the KSS-III is a very good modern Sub but not in the same spec/potential has the 212CD is, sorry!

Reminding that south Korea is still under the state of “War” with its Crazy northern communist neighbour, North Korea/Chinaa crazy expension in the south philippine waters…If War starts over there, forget the completion of new Sub contract with Hanwah, it will never happen then! just this should tell us every common sense Canadian Navy Admirals/Generals to focus only on Nato’s Western Europe best option to get the Tri-Party Nation with these Best in class 212CD Subs (Way More Stealthier, dive way deeper 700 meters+), stay’s longer underwater up to 41 Days without surfacing or snorkeling than the Hanwah model at 20-22 days). The KSS-III model is base on a old TKMS 214 that they re-manufacture, modernise it under Tech transfer from Germany to create and to sell on marquet a very good modern Sub but not even in the same class has the 212CD is, Hope we do go for these Game Changer 212CD German/Norway Subs..
P.S: Dont get misinformed/misguided by the Trollers/agent/publicist working and founded by Hanwah Corp. ..;-)

 

[oldcpu]

IMHO, while the above post goes into some of the open source debate comments surrounding the submarine procurement program, it contains inaccuracies or at best, unsubstantiated statements regarding both TKMS and the Hanwha Ocean platform. Specifically, the figures cited for the acquisition price, maximum diving depth, and underwater endurance do not align with established data for the KSS-III design nor the Type-212CD. The actual operational envelope, submerged endurance, and cost structure of the platform are not publicly confirmed for either boat.

Furthermore, focusing on these technical parameters misses the current reality of the selection process. The evaluation of baseline capabilities and pricing has already been finalized. The final decision now rests entirely on industrial offsets and economic benefits and delivery schedule, making the strength of the domestic industrial cooperation packages plus delivery schedule the true deciding factor moving forward.

 

[mehmed beg]

Canada is very big country with the huge coast line.
Personally, I think that Canada should go with Souffren class nuclear submarines.
Australia chose not to, now they are going to get some second hand American subs , God knows when.
As time goes by, French can make them faster than previously.

 

[Yasar_TR]

Canada is very big country with the huge coast line.
Personally, I think that Canada should go with Souffren class nuclear submarines.
Australia chose not to, now they are going to get some second hand American subs , God knows when.
As time goes by, French can make them faster than previously.

Actually, @mehmed beg has a valid point. If Australia is going for a nuclear submarine programme, why shouldn’t Canada do the same?

But Australians have done the right thing and gone for AUKUS submarines. These are the next generation to the well known Astute subs Royal Navy uses. Royal Navy is going to have 12 of these and build a further 5 for the Australian Navy. These are going to be 10 thousand ton subs with VLS fitted. They will be powered by the RR PWR3+ (enhanced version of the PWR3 used on Astute) nuclear reactors which use HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) fuel. These reactors are much smaller and don’t need refuelling. They will outlast the subs they power.

The main drawback to the Aukus programme is the amount of proprietary US technologies used on it. Also the slow production speed of UK manufacturing.
As still in production Astute class can be available sooner. But even the current Astute class contains a certain degree of US tech. But these can be replaced with UK tech as the US tech is basically used for integration of tomahawk missiles and IFF systems. Also UK were assisted by US’s General Dynamics with the CAD tools in the design of the subs.

So French Suffren sub route would be the correct one to take. But the French use LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) fuel. This means the reactors are much bigger and it will need refuelling during it’s use. Also these are smaller vessels; around 4500-5000tons with 4 torpedo tubes and 20 total munitions. But they could be considerably cheaper. By the way, even Suffren class use a number of US tech for interoperability under NATO. But predominantly it is a French design.

 

[oldcpu]

While nuclear-powered submarines are unquestionably superior in endurance, speed, and sustained presence, I am not convinced they are necessarily the best fit for Canada - especially given the current US administration.

The reality is that nuclear submarines are enormously expensive to acquire, operate, maintain, and crew. Given Canada's defence budget and historical procurement experience, a nuclear submarine fleet would likely be limited to perhaps 4–6 boats. Applying the usual rule of thumb that roughly three submarines are needed to keep one continuously available for operations, that could mean only one submarine on station at any given time.

By contrast, a fleet of 12 advanced conventional submarines could potentially provide greater overall coverage of Canada's Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic approaches.

There is also the question of sovereignty and political dependence. Canada examined nuclear submarines in the late 1980s under the Canada-class proposal, but the project encountered significant obstacles, including U.S. opposition to the transfer of submarine reactor technology. Under the 1959 U.S.-Canada agreement on cooperation in atomic energy for mutual defence purposes, the United States effectively held a veto over Canada's acquisition of submarine reactors from third parties such as France [edit: ???? TBC ] or the United Kingdom. Although the Reagan administration supported Canada's nuclear submarine proposal, Canada would still have been dependent on both U.S. presidential and congressional approval to acquire French nuclear-powered submarines. Such approval could be given, and then taken away at a 'whim's notice, dependent on whom comes to power next in the USA. At a time when some Canadian policymakers are emphasizing greater strategic autonomy, that dependence may be viewed as a disadvantage compared with a conventionally powered fleet that Canada can procure and sustain with fewer external constraints.

 

[oldcpu]

Under the 1959 U.S.-Canada agreement on cooperation in atomic energy for mutual defence purposes, the United States effectively held a veto over Canada's acquisition of submarine reactors from third parties such as France or the United Kingdom. Although the Reagan administration supported Canada's nuclear submarine proposal, Canada would still have been dependent on both U.S. presidential and congressional approval to acquire French nuclear-powered submarines. Such approval could be given, and then taken away at a 'whim's notice, dependent on whom comes to power next in the USA. At a time when some Canadian policymakers are emphasizing greater strategic autonomy, that dependence may be viewed as a disadvantage compared with a conventionally powered fleet that Canada can procure and sustain with fewer external constraints.

I read in the Canada class wiki (that USA had a veto over French nuclear submarine reactor procurement by Canada) but when I try to follow it up, I find no agreement where USA can veto a Canadian nuclear propulsion submarine procurement from France. I note the 1959 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes makes no mention of such a veto.

So I am struggling to prove what is stated in that Wiki re: France. In fact a 1987 USNI Proceedings article stated " The United States can therefore veto the sale of a modified Trafalgar, although it cannot affect a possible French sale." ... assuming any French submarine nuclear reactor has no USA parts.

So take what I typed earlier, about USA possibly having a veto, over a Canadian nuclear submarine procurement from France, with healthy skepticism, until a more definitive source of proof can be found.

Having typed that ... there is still the issue of cost. Canada would likely need ~12 nuclear submarines, to keep on on station in each of the three oceans (Arctic, Atlantic, Pacific) at any one time. That is very expensive, and would require a highly skilled crew, much more than that of conventional boats. All at the time when Canada is suffering from a "Crisis of Invisibility" where it can not recruit enough sailors , much less train them to the skills needed for a nuclear propulsion submarine.

 

[oldcpu]

For my own edification, I dug into this further, as the Canada-class wiki, erroneously I believe, states "under a 1959 agreement between the US and Canada the US had the right to block the purchase of submarine nuclear reactors by Canada from any third party (i.e. the United Kingdom or France)"

It referencs page '48' Guillory, Theodore (September 1988). Canada: The Decision to Procure Nuclear Attack Submarines and its Significance for NATO. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School for that statement ... ie used to justify the wiki statement that "under a 1959 agreement between the US and Canada the US had the right to block the purchase of submarine nuclear reactors by Canada from any third party (i.e. the United Kingdom or France)".

I went to page-48 in Guillory's paper, and it says NO such thing. Ergo, the wiki appears to be wrong re USA having a veto over Canadian nuclear submarine procurment from 'France'.

I note from "Guillory" reference (page-48):

Although in October 1987 the U.S. gave Britain preliminary approval to provide Canada with data on the Trafalgar propulsion plant and President Reagan reaffirmed this decision in his meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney in May 1988, the Canadian government is cautiously awaiting the final approval of the U.S. Congress before announcing its decision as to which submarine it will purchase. In an article for the Toronto Globe and Mail, U.S. Congressman Charles E. Bennett, Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, voiced his concerns with the transfer of nuclear technology to Canada. He stated that:

...Congress should bear in mind [when considering this issue]... that buying anything but the best submarines would likely not make much of a difference in combating Soviet submarines.... Canada does not appear ready to spend enough money to buy such a capability. Unless Canadians are willing to pay the costs of developing a truly independent nuclear-propulsion program....U.S. assistance at the outset could lead to U.S. involvement forever.

The United States would be put in the position of accepting considerable responsibility for a long-term program over which it would not exercise adequate control.

Should the Canadians choose the smaller French Rubis class submarine, nuclear technology could be transferred without U.S. consent; but the French submarine is not compatible with the superior U.S. -built MK 48 torpedo, the standard torpedo of NATO.

The two fundamental differences between the French-built L5 and the MK 48 are the homing modes and speeds at which the torpedo travels. The L5 has only a passive/active homing mode with a maximum speed of 35 knots.

There is nothing there in Guillory's paper stating a Canadian purchase of a French nuclear submarine could be veto'd by USA.

Further, there is nothing in the 1959 "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes" giving USA a veto over Canadian procurment from France.

So apologies for my inaccuracy, as indeed the USA does not have any treaty that I can find, giving them a veto over Canadian nuclear propulsion submarine procurement from France (and I concede to having being misled by a mistake in the noted wiki).

Again thou - there is the matter of cost. Nuclear submarines are very expensive. One probably needs a dozen nuclear submarines to keep one on station at all times in each of its 3 oceans. That is a very expensive proposition.

 

[oldcpu]

Best in class 212CD Subs (Way More Stealthier, dive way deeper 700 meters+), stay’s longer underwater up to 41 Days without surfacing or snorkeling than the Hanwah model at 20-22 days).

This "41" day figure actually includes snorkeling. More accurate information:


When evaluating the open-source data for Canada’s Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), it is critical to look past manufacturer marketing templates and isolate known design parameters from classified performance variables. A direct architectural comparison between the Hanwha Ocean KSS-III Batch-II and the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) Type 212CD reveals two fundamentally different hull configurations built around distinct operational doctrines.

Total Range and Transit Capacity​

The physical disparity in displacement dictates the basic engineering limits of internal fuel and volume distribution. The KSS-III Batch-II is an ocean-going strategic platform displacing approximately 3,600 tonnes surfaced and up to 4,250 tonnes submerged. This massive physical scale allows for substantial internal fuel storage, resulting in a publicly reported maximum transit range of approximately 10,000 nautical miles at an economical transit speed of 8 knots.

Conversely, the Type 212CD represents a dramatic 65% scale-up over the legacy Type 212A—reaching 2,500 tonnes surfaced and 2,800 tonnes submerged. This expansion accommodates a dual MTU 4000 diesel engine configuration to support its broader North Atlantic and Arctic operational profile. However, official transit range figures for the 212CD remain classified. While the smaller legacy Type 212A achieved a published 8,000 nm at 8 knots, it is reasonable to infer that the significantly larger 212CD is designed to expand on or at least match this capability, though its physical volume limits for diesel storage remain tighter than the much larger South Korean platform.

Operating and Dive Depth​

The maximum operating, test, and crush depths for both platforms are strictly classified, and public forum speculation must be treated with caution. The Type 212CD utilizes a non-magnetic high-tensile austenitic steel for its pressure hull, a material choice Germany has optimized for submarine applications over decades to minimize magnetic signatures against anomaly detectors and mines. Public baselines for the legacy Type 212A list a test depth of 250 meters, with a crush depth reportedly exceeding 700 meters, but the 212CD’s upgraded deep-water limits are undisclosed.

The KSS-III Batch-II utilizes high-yield structural steel designed to withstand open-ocean pressure and to absorb the localized hydrodynamic and structural stresses of its integrated vertical launch system (VLS). While internet commentary frequently attributes a deeper operational bracket to the KSS-III due to its size and structural requirements, public information does not allow any meaningful conclusion, and there is zero verifiable public data to definitively prove a depth advantage for either hull.

Underwater Speed​

In terms of pure velocity parameters, both manufacturers claim a maximum submerged sprint speed of "greater than 20 knots," with some European defense literature attributing up to 23 knots to the Type 212CD. Maintaining these maximum thresholds exhausts conventional energy reserves within hours, regardless of configuration. Both builders have integrated modern lithium-ion battery technology into their designs—Samsung SDI modules for the KSS-III and a newly developed European lithium chemistry for the 212CD—to flatten the discharge curve and mitigate the quick voltage drops seen in older energy cells.

While it is a reasonable engineering inference that the 40% larger displacement of the KSS-III allows it to house a larger total volume of battery modules, the true sprint duration and high-draw tactical stamina cannot be verified. The exact battery capacities, motor power demands, and hull drag coefficients remain proprietary secrets for both Hanwha and TKMS. At the opposite end of the performance envelope, both vessels drop to a low-speed tactical crawl of 4 to 6 knots when operating on low-speed propulsion.

True Underwater Endurance​

Continuous, non-snorkeling submerged endurance numbers are widely distorted in public commentary, often because total mission endurance (which includes diesel snorkeling) is conflated with pure Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) loitering. Unclassified figures associated with the Type 212CD project outline an extended total mission endurance of up to 41 days, utilizing an operational mix of conventional snorkeling and fuel-cell AIP deployment. When sealed entirely deep underwater, the 212CD relies on a 4th-generation closed-loop Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cell system drawing from external metal-hydride hydrogen storage tanks—a technology branch long associated with roughly three weeks of continuous submerged operation in earlier iterations.

The KSS-III Batch-II similarly combines a fuel-cell AIP system with a large-capacity Lithium-ion battery installation, with public reports frequently citing a submerged endurance in excess of 20 days. Ultimately, while both hulls are explicitly engineered for highly extended, multi-week submerged persistence, public data does not permit a definitive conclusion as to which platform holds the operational edge or the exact limits of either boat's underwater endurance.