India Defence Industry, R&D and Procurements

Nilgiri

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So India circling back to FGFA v2.0 potentially:

 

Nilgiri

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Are you hese even useful. Ig they could be used against small drones but thats not the kind of threat india is facing right now?

Given what happened in Russia recently, base and asset defence needs multi-layered security to respond to the threat from cheap cost of drone swarm stockpiling.
 

Nilgiri

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So India circling back to FGFA v2.0 potentially:



India’s potential acquisition of Russia’s Su-57E fifth-generation stealth fighter has become a test case for what the country now sees as non-negotiable: complete control over mission systems, code, and the underlying electronics. At the heart of this high-stakes negotiation is India’s insistence on replacing Russia’s N036 “Byelka” AESA radar with its indigenous Uttam GaN-based radar, an integration request that has reportedly triggered behind-the-scenes friction within Moscow’s defence circles.


India’s demand goes beyond radar. It includes indigenous electronic warfare (EW) suites, source code access, mission computer integration, and the continued supply and integration rights for Russian-origin R-77 and R-37M air-to-air missiles. The Su-57E will only be considered if it is delivered not just as a platform, but as a programmable, sovereign combat system, an evolution shaped by past procurement frustrations, most notably the Rafale.


From Radar to Sovereignty​




The technical divergence between Russia’s GaAs-based Byelka radar and India’s locally developed GaN radar systems is only part of the story. Indian defence planners now view foreign sensors and electronics as incompatible with their increasingly synergized domestic stack. As one DRDO official put it: “Our radar, mission computer, EW suite, and secure communication stack are integrated at the system level. Inserting a foreign radar disrupts that cohesion. It’s not just a technical mismatch, it undermines the architecture.”


India’s radar maturity is no longer theoretical. From compact missile-borne seekers to long-range surveillance arrays, Indian radar technology spanning land, sea, air, and space is largely indigenous. The Uttam AESA radar, already deployed on the Tejas Mk1A, and the new Virupaksha radar being tested on upgraded Su-30MKIs, both operate on Gallium Nitride (GaN) architecture. These radars offer increased thermal tolerance, higher frequency agility, and resistance to electronic warfare factors deemed critical for Indo-Pacific theatres.


A Local Stack, Silicon and All​




Behind India’s radar push is a more significant, long-range strategy: localization of the entire semiconductor supply chain. While radar design gets headlines, India’s move toward domestic GaN fabrication, indigenous RF front-ends, local radar processors (potentially RISC-V based), and secure mission computing is what actually unlocks strategic autonomy.


“Designing a radar is one thing. Owning the materials, the chips, the signal processors, and the firmware stack is where the real control lies,” said an MoD official close to the Super-30 upgrade program. “We’ve localized almost everything except base silicon manufacturing, which is next.”


Indian firms are already producing GaN wafers domestically. The roadmap includes locally designed radar processors, digital signal units, power semiconductors, and compute logic, which would allow India to fully own and export radar/EW suites in the near future.


Russia Offers Flexibility, For Now​


Russia, keen to retain one of its largest defence clients, has offered unprecedented flexibility. According to Rosoboronexport and Ambassador Denis Alipov, Russia is open to configuration changes, full technology transfer, and even the use of Indian-built radars and avionics aboard the Su-57E. Moscow has also offered to repurpose India’s Su-30MKI production lines for local assembly of the Su-57E, making the proposal one of the most open-source-friendly export packages Russia has ever offered.


Still, this cooperation is driven less by goodwill and more by necessity. Russia’s aerospace sector is under pressure due to sanctions and competition from Chinese fifth-gen exports. Losing India to Western platforms or seeing it build its own would cost Moscow both revenue and long-term influence.


Beyond Platforms: Interoperability and Ecosystem Control​


India’s posture is no longer about buying the most advanced jet off the shelf. It’s about creating a tightly interoperable air combat ecosystem with shared sensors, secure data pipelines, and mission control software across platforms. The vision is to create seamless combat integration between upgraded Su-30MKI “Super-30s,” Tejas Mk1A/Mk2s, and the Su-57E, if acquired, using common Indian radars, secure communication suites, AI-based targeting, and indigenous weapons.


India is also seeking guaranteed integration of homegrown weapons like:


  • Astra Mk1/Mk2 beyond-visual-range missiles
  • Rudram series anti-radiation missiles
  • SAAW precision glide bombs
  • BrahMos-NG, a compact supersonic cruise missile
  • And AI-enabled EW and targeting systems currently under trial

A Pivot Away from Closed Systems​


India’s difficult experience with the French Rafale has significantly influenced this hardline stance. Despite paying over €7.8 billion, the lack of source code access for the RBE2 AESA radar and mission computers has blocked integration of Indian weapons. The IAF’s leadership has been blunt in closed circles: no future fighter deal will be signed without full stack control from software to radar to weapons.


This aligns with the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) doctrine, which now interprets tech sovereignty not just in terms of production, but software-defined battlefield control. If India can’t reprogram, upgrade, or weaponize a platform independently, it’s no longer considered viable.


Silent Competition: The F-35 Shadow​


In the backdrop of these negotiations looms the American F-35A. While not officially offered, multiple reports suggest Washington has opened informal channels indicating future willingness contingent on broader strategic alignment under the QUAD and Indo-Pacific frameworks. However, the F-35 is seen as a “black box” – a stealth marvel with heavy restrictions on software, code access, and local integration. For India, that’s a red flag.


“It’s not about the best platform on paper anymore,” said a senior official in the Indian MoD. “It’s about who gives us the keys. Control over code, data, and upgrades, that’s the new benchmark.”


A New Model for Defence Cooperation?​


If accepted, the Su-57E deal, custom-fitted with Indian radars, EW suites, and mission systems could signal a new model in global arms exports: where one country provides the airframe, and the buyer controls the combat brain. India would become not just a client, but a co-developer, with the potential to export Su-57E variants enhanced with Indian tech.


Such an outcome could see India move from buyer to export partner, leveraging its own radar and EW stack in third-party sales, redefining the traditional supplier-client dynamic in global defence.
 

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India’s potential acquisition of Russia’s Su-57E fifth-generation stealth fighter has become a test case for what the country now sees as non-negotiable: complete control over mission systems, code, and the underlying electronics. At the heart of this high-stakes negotiation is India’s insistence on replacing Russia’s N036 “Byelka” AESA radar with its indigenous Uttam GaN-based radar, an integration request that has reportedly triggered behind-the-scenes friction within Moscow’s defence circles.


India’s demand goes beyond radar. It includes indigenous electronic warfare (EW) suites, source code access, mission computer integration, and the continued supply and integration rights for Russian-origin R-77 and R-37M air-to-air missiles. The Su-57E will only be considered if it is delivered not just as a platform, but as a programmable, sovereign combat system, an evolution shaped by past procurement frustrations, most notably the Rafale.


From Radar to Sovereignty​




The technical divergence between Russia’s GaAs-based Byelka radar and India’s locally developed GaN radar systems is only part of the story. Indian defence planners now view foreign sensors and electronics as incompatible with their increasingly synergized domestic stack. As one DRDO official put it: “Our radar, mission computer, EW suite, and secure communication stack are integrated at the system level. Inserting a foreign radar disrupts that cohesion. It’s not just a technical mismatch, it undermines the architecture.”


India’s radar maturity is no longer theoretical. From compact missile-borne seekers to long-range surveillance arrays, Indian radar technology spanning land, sea, air, and space is largely indigenous. The Uttam AESA radar, already deployed on the Tejas Mk1A, and the new Virupaksha radar being tested on upgraded Su-30MKIs, both operate on Gallium Nitride (GaN) architecture. These radars offer increased thermal tolerance, higher frequency agility, and resistance to electronic warfare factors deemed critical for Indo-Pacific theatres.


A Local Stack, Silicon and All​




Behind India’s radar push is a more significant, long-range strategy: localization of the entire semiconductor supply chain. While radar design gets headlines, India’s move toward domestic GaN fabrication, indigenous RF front-ends, local radar processors (potentially RISC-V based), and secure mission computing is what actually unlocks strategic autonomy.


“Designing a radar is one thing. Owning the materials, the chips, the signal processors, and the firmware stack is where the real control lies,” said an MoD official close to the Super-30 upgrade program. “We’ve localized almost everything except base silicon manufacturing, which is next.”


Indian firms are already producing GaN wafers domestically. The roadmap includes locally designed radar processors, digital signal units, power semiconductors, and compute logic, which would allow India to fully own and export radar/EW suites in the near future.


Russia Offers Flexibility, For Now​


Russia, keen to retain one of its largest defence clients, has offered unprecedented flexibility. According to Rosoboronexport and Ambassador Denis Alipov, Russia is open to configuration changes, full technology transfer, and even the use of Indian-built radars and avionics aboard the Su-57E. Moscow has also offered to repurpose India’s Su-30MKI production lines for local assembly of the Su-57E, making the proposal one of the most open-source-friendly export packages Russia has ever offered.


Still, this cooperation is driven less by goodwill and more by necessity. Russia’s aerospace sector is under pressure due to sanctions and competition from Chinese fifth-gen exports. Losing India to Western platforms or seeing it build its own would cost Moscow both revenue and long-term influence.


Beyond Platforms: Interoperability and Ecosystem Control​


India’s posture is no longer about buying the most advanced jet off the shelf. It’s about creating a tightly interoperable air combat ecosystem with shared sensors, secure data pipelines, and mission control software across platforms. The vision is to create seamless combat integration between upgraded Su-30MKI “Super-30s,” Tejas Mk1A/Mk2s, and the Su-57E, if acquired, using common Indian radars, secure communication suites, AI-based targeting, and indigenous weapons.


India is also seeking guaranteed integration of homegrown weapons like:


  • Astra Mk1/Mk2 beyond-visual-range missiles
  • Rudram series anti-radiation missiles
  • SAAW precision glide bombs
  • BrahMos-NG, a compact supersonic cruise missile
  • And AI-enabled EW and targeting systems currently under trial

A Pivot Away from Closed Systems​


India’s difficult experience with the French Rafale has significantly influenced this hardline stance. Despite paying over €7.8 billion, the lack of source code access for the RBE2 AESA radar and mission computers has blocked integration of Indian weapons. The IAF’s leadership has been blunt in closed circles: no future fighter deal will be signed without full stack control from software to radar to weapons.


This aligns with the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) doctrine, which now interprets tech sovereignty not just in terms of production, but software-defined battlefield control. If India can’t reprogram, upgrade, or weaponize a platform independently, it’s no longer considered viable.


Silent Competition: The F-35 Shadow​


In the backdrop of these negotiations looms the American F-35A. While not officially offered, multiple reports suggest Washington has opened informal channels indicating future willingness contingent on broader strategic alignment under the QUAD and Indo-Pacific frameworks. However, the F-35 is seen as a “black box” – a stealth marvel with heavy restrictions on software, code access, and local integration. For India, that’s a red flag.


“It’s not about the best platform on paper anymore,” said a senior official in the Indian MoD. “It’s about who gives us the keys. Control over code, data, and upgrades, that’s the new benchmark.”


A New Model for Defence Cooperation?​


If accepted, the Su-57E deal, custom-fitted with Indian radars, EW suites, and mission systems could signal a new model in global arms exports: where one country provides the airframe, and the buyer controls the combat brain. India would become not just a client, but a co-developer, with the potential to export Su-57E variants enhanced with Indian tech.


Such an outcome could see India move from buyer to export partner, leveraging its own radar and EW stack in third-party sales, redefining the traditional supplier-client dynamic in global defence.
Didnt the defence secretary deny being in any formal negotiations for the su57 or the f35? Instead we are betting on HAL who have a STELLAR track record for delivering stuff on time
 
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