- Ukraine HYDREMA 910 MCV mine-clearing vehicle
- China China to unveil J-35A stealth fighter jet
- Indonesia Indonesia Russia naval exercise
- Scientific Hydrogen Energy
- Algeria WJ-700 UAV officially in Algeria
- Messages
- 4,785
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
F-35 program costs are evolving, and these savings matter
An F-35A takes off during a combat exercise at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, on May 1, 2019. (R. Nial Bradshaw/U.S. Air Force)
Last month, Congress held an oversight and accountability hearing regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s burdensome logistical IT system. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General reported earlier this year that millions of additional dollars were spent in the form of labor hours by military personnel who manually tracked the plane’s spare parts since its electronic logistical system didn’t. The congressional review was undoubtedly warranted, especially as the F-35 program office phases in a newer system over the next two years to replace its legacy IT platform.
But noticeably absent from this testimony, was a more fulsome discussion (and understanding) about the affordability of the program and how both acquisition costs and the price to fly the aircraft are significantly trending downward at a time that matters most.
In an era of increased military competition against peer adversaries and during a period of tremendous budgetary constraints in the United States, incremental savings across a large enterprise such as the F-35 program matter. The Defense Department understands this well. It has smartly leveraged its buying power, driving down the cost of each F-35A to approximately $80 million one year earlier than planned — now costing taxpayers less than some of the less capable fourth-generation aircraft, and on a par with others. The F-15EX, for example, costs nearly $88 million, and gives our forces no help in a fifth-gen fight.
Why spend more for less? This is critical because over the next five years, the number of F-35s purchased will more than double to approximately 1,200 aircraft. That translates to increased capacity and capability for the United States and its allies as they operate in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.
Congress recognizes that the costs to acquire the aircraft have been significantly reduced, and it has now rightfully turned its attention to the costs associated with sustaining the aircraft. But most lawmakers missed the opportunity during July’s hearing to more fully explore a key statement made by the F-35′s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin.
Lockheed announced that it has reduced its share of the aircraft’s sustainability cost per flying hour over the past five years by nearly 40 percent, plummeting the costs to fly the aircraft to nearly $5,000 less each hour than earlier hourly costs.
The company says it has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to build state-of-the-art tools, analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence, which has led to labor efficiency gains as well as improvements to supply response times and data quality. The company implemented robust asset management tools and robotic automation to eliminate manual tasks, while placing a concerted focus on improving the reliability of aircraft parts to meaningfully reduce future repair requirements and material costs.
This is significant because the number of hours flown each year will increase by approximately 140,000 hours over the next five years alone. Those savings add up.
And more can be done. The F-35′s manufacturer believes it can further drive down its cost share to fly the aircraft by approximately an additional 50 percent. This is all the more significant when considering that the military services and aircraft’s engine maker, Pratt & Whitney, are responsible for more than one-half of the total sustainment costs of the program.
If a similar level of savings can be achieved by the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Pratt & Whitney, those savings can be confidently reinvested back into the program to ensure enough aircraft are being procured to deter and, if necessary, fight our adversaries. As the military services and foreign countries consider future threats and the capabilities needed to impede adventuresome opponents, these savings matter.
These savings come at the same time the DoD reports that the aircraft’s mission-capable rate has increased from the mid-50th percentile to the low 70th percentile from just a couple of years ago. And further improvements in the aircraft’s mission-capable rate should be forthcoming as repair backlogs and mismatched spare parts are corrected by a new IT logistical system.
A theoretical military principle suggests that steady quantitative changes can lead to a sudden, qualitative leap. After many, many years of sustained focus to drive down F-35 costs, the program may be representative of that maxim and allow the Defense Department to fully realize the advantages of the F-35′s gamechanging technologies.
www.defensenews.com
Last month, Congress held an oversight and accountability hearing regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s burdensome logistical IT system. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General reported earlier this year that millions of additional dollars were spent in the form of labor hours by military personnel who manually tracked the plane’s spare parts since its electronic logistical system didn’t. The congressional review was undoubtedly warranted, especially as the F-35 program office phases in a newer system over the next two years to replace its legacy IT platform.
But noticeably absent from this testimony, was a more fulsome discussion (and understanding) about the affordability of the program and how both acquisition costs and the price to fly the aircraft are significantly trending downward at a time that matters most.
In an era of increased military competition against peer adversaries and during a period of tremendous budgetary constraints in the United States, incremental savings across a large enterprise such as the F-35 program matter. The Defense Department understands this well. It has smartly leveraged its buying power, driving down the cost of each F-35A to approximately $80 million one year earlier than planned — now costing taxpayers less than some of the less capable fourth-generation aircraft, and on a par with others. The F-15EX, for example, costs nearly $88 million, and gives our forces no help in a fifth-gen fight.
Why spend more for less? This is critical because over the next five years, the number of F-35s purchased will more than double to approximately 1,200 aircraft. That translates to increased capacity and capability for the United States and its allies as they operate in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.
Congress recognizes that the costs to acquire the aircraft have been significantly reduced, and it has now rightfully turned its attention to the costs associated with sustaining the aircraft. But most lawmakers missed the opportunity during July’s hearing to more fully explore a key statement made by the F-35′s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin.
Lockheed announced that it has reduced its share of the aircraft’s sustainability cost per flying hour over the past five years by nearly 40 percent, plummeting the costs to fly the aircraft to nearly $5,000 less each hour than earlier hourly costs.
The company says it has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to build state-of-the-art tools, analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence, which has led to labor efficiency gains as well as improvements to supply response times and data quality. The company implemented robust asset management tools and robotic automation to eliminate manual tasks, while placing a concerted focus on improving the reliability of aircraft parts to meaningfully reduce future repair requirements and material costs.
This is significant because the number of hours flown each year will increase by approximately 140,000 hours over the next five years alone. Those savings add up.
And more can be done. The F-35′s manufacturer believes it can further drive down its cost share to fly the aircraft by approximately an additional 50 percent. This is all the more significant when considering that the military services and aircraft’s engine maker, Pratt & Whitney, are responsible for more than one-half of the total sustainment costs of the program.
If a similar level of savings can be achieved by the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Pratt & Whitney, those savings can be confidently reinvested back into the program to ensure enough aircraft are being procured to deter and, if necessary, fight our adversaries. As the military services and foreign countries consider future threats and the capabilities needed to impede adventuresome opponents, these savings matter.
These savings come at the same time the DoD reports that the aircraft’s mission-capable rate has increased from the mid-50th percentile to the low 70th percentile from just a couple of years ago. And further improvements in the aircraft’s mission-capable rate should be forthcoming as repair backlogs and mismatched spare parts are corrected by a new IT logistical system.
A theoretical military principle suggests that steady quantitative changes can lead to a sudden, qualitative leap. After many, many years of sustained focus to drive down F-35 costs, the program may be representative of that maxim and allow the Defense Department to fully realize the advantages of the F-35′s gamechanging technologies.
F-35 program costs are evolving, and these savings matter
In an era of increased military competition and during a period of tremendous budgetary constraints, incremental savings across a large enterprise program matter.
www.defensenews.com
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
F-35 speed profile:
https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.2018-3371
www.quora.com
For comparison here is F-18E speed profile:
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-200.pdf
Here a comparison between F-35A and F-18E with 4 A-A missiles based on these charts:
https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.2018-3371
Why does F-35, which has the most advanced and powerful engine for any fighter jet, has only max speed of M. 1.6?
Answer (1 of 15): There are a few key reasons (with #3 being the main one): 1) The F-35’s intakes are fixed, relatively short S-ducts with tight bends; this ultimately means that it’s difficult for the intakes to provide effective pressure recovery over a wide range of supersonic airspeeds. 2) ...
For comparison here is F-18E speed profile:
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-200.pdf
Here a comparison between F-35A and F-18E with 4 A-A missiles based on these charts:
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
The F-35 sensor suite includes the:
1)AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar,
2)AN/ASQ-239 Electronic Warfare (EW)/Countermeasures (CM) system,
3)AN/AAQ-40 Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS),
4)AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical (EO) Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and
5)AN/ASQ-242 Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) avionics suite.
AN/APG-81 RADAR
The AN/APG-81 is designed to operate as a radar, electronics support measures (ESM) receiver, and jammer. It includes active and passive air-to-air (A/A) and air-to-surface (A/S) target detection, track, and identification capabilities. In addition, it allows many of these to be interleaved, providing both A/A and A/S functionality. The sensor also supports the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM®) and synthetic aperture radar mapping, ground and sea moving target detection and track, and A/S ranging. Radar functions include electronic protection for operation in jamming environments and low probability of intercept features to minimize the likelihood of emissions being usefully detected by airborne or surface-based receivers. Radar functions also support system health determination and calibration.
1)AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar,
2)AN/ASQ-239 Electronic Warfare (EW)/Countermeasures (CM) system,
3)AN/AAQ-40 Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS),
4)AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical (EO) Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and
5)AN/ASQ-242 Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) avionics suite.
AN/APG-81 RADAR
The AN/APG-81 is designed to operate as a radar, electronics support measures (ESM) receiver, and jammer. It includes active and passive air-to-air (A/A) and air-to-surface (A/S) target detection, track, and identification capabilities. In addition, it allows many of these to be interleaved, providing both A/A and A/S functionality. The sensor also supports the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM®) and synthetic aperture radar mapping, ground and sea moving target detection and track, and A/S ranging. Radar functions include electronic protection for operation in jamming environments and low probability of intercept features to minimize the likelihood of emissions being usefully detected by airborne or surface-based receivers. Radar functions also support system health determination and calibration.
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
1. Not every AESA can work as jammer. Plus very few fighters beside US have AESA.
2. F-35 makes sensor fusion of all 5 systems listed above + external data.
Last edited:
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
AN/ASQ-239 Electronic Warfare / Countermeasures system
The AN/ASQ-239 EW/CM system is an integrated suite of hardware and software. It is optimized and designedto provide the F-35 with a high level of A/A and A/S threat detection and self-protection. It can search, detect, identify, locate, and counter RF and IR threats. The EW system supports the application of electronic support measures (ESM) through such functions as:
1)radar warning,
2)emitter geolocation,
3)multi-ship emitter location (including high-sensitivity states),
4)high-gain (HG) ESM,
5)HG electronic CM, and
6)HG electronic attack (EA) via radar MFA utilization.
The EW functions are designed for:
1)wide frequency coverage,
2)quick reaction time,
3)high sensitivity and probability of intercept,
4)accurate direction finding and emitter geolocation,
5)multi-ship geolocation, and
6)self-protection countermeasures and jamming.
The countermeasure subsystem provides multiple self-defense responses, including pre-emptive and reactive techniques, based on available expendable payload and/or threat-specific self-protection plans. The EW/CM system provides emitter tracks to the sensor fusion function, which fuses EW track reports and other sensors (e.g., radar and DAS, off-board sensors) and displays the information to the pilot. The EW/CM system consists of the following primary elements:
1)Band 3/4 apertures,
2)Band 3/4 aperture electronics,
3)centralized EW electronics (Racks 2A and 2B),
4)CM controller unit,
5)CM dispensers,
6)RF and digital interfaces with the MFA, and
7)digital-clock reference interfaces with the CNI system.
The AN/ASQ-239 EW/CM system is an integrated suite of hardware and software. It is optimized and designedto provide the F-35 with a high level of A/A and A/S threat detection and self-protection. It can search, detect, identify, locate, and counter RF and IR threats. The EW system supports the application of electronic support measures (ESM) through such functions as:
1)radar warning,
2)emitter geolocation,
3)multi-ship emitter location (including high-sensitivity states),
4)high-gain (HG) ESM,
5)HG electronic CM, and
6)HG electronic attack (EA) via radar MFA utilization.
The EW functions are designed for:
1)wide frequency coverage,
2)quick reaction time,
3)high sensitivity and probability of intercept,
4)accurate direction finding and emitter geolocation,
5)multi-ship geolocation, and
6)self-protection countermeasures and jamming.
The countermeasure subsystem provides multiple self-defense responses, including pre-emptive and reactive techniques, based on available expendable payload and/or threat-specific self-protection plans. The EW/CM system provides emitter tracks to the sensor fusion function, which fuses EW track reports and other sensors (e.g., radar and DAS, off-board sensors) and displays the information to the pilot. The EW/CM system consists of the following primary elements:
1)Band 3/4 apertures,
2)Band 3/4 aperture electronics,
3)centralized EW electronics (Racks 2A and 2B),
4)CM controller unit,
5)CM dispensers,
6)RF and digital interfaces with the MFA, and
7)digital-clock reference interfaces with the CNI system.
- Messages
- 4,785
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
9 things you may not know about F-35C stealth strike fighter
U.S. Navy screen grab
For the first time in U.S. naval aviation history, radar-evading stealth capability comes to the carrier deck. With stealth technology, advanced sensors, supersonic speed, weapons capacity and superior range, the F-35 is most advanced fighter to ever operate aboard a Carrier deck.
Lockheed Martin Corporation shared on its F-35.com website 9 facts about the Naval version of a stealth fighter.
1. It brings stealth to the sea. The F-35C is the first and world’s only long-range stealth strike fighter designed and built explicitly for Navy carrier operations. It’s configuration, embedded sensors, internal fuel and weapons capacity, aligned edges, and state of the art manufacturing processes all contribute to the F-35’s unique Very Low Observable stealth performance. This enables pilots to evade enemy detection and operate in anti-access and contested environments, improving lethality and survivability.
2. It has the most advanced and comprehensive sensor suite of any fighter jet in history. Including the Active Electronically Scanned Arrays (AESA) radar, Distributed Aperture System (DAS), Electro Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and Helmet Mounted Display System, this package allows the pilot to see everything in the battlespace with unprecedented situational awareness.
3. It is a Force Multiplier. The F-35 can operate as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset and battle manager, sharing information to all networked ground, sea and air assets in the battlespace. This ensures men and women in uniform can execute their mission and come home safe.
4. It has range and mission persistence.The F-35C carries nearly 20,000 lbs of internal fuel and has a range of greater than 1,200 nm. The enables F-35C pilots to fly further and remain in a desired battlespace longer before refueling is necessary.
5. It has the largest wingspan and most robust landing gear of all F-35 variants. The design of the F-35C’s wings and landing gear make it suitable for catapult launches and fly-in arrestments aboard naval aircraft carriers. Its wingtips also fold to allow for more room on the carrier’s deck while deployed.
6. It is supersonic. The F-35C can reach speeds of 1.6 Mach (~1,200 mph) even with a full internal weapons load. With its fuel and internal weapons load, the F-35C can fly faster with no drag associated with external tanks and weapons required for legacy fighters.
7. It can carry internal and external weapons. The F-35C can carry more than 5,000 lbs of internal weapons, or more than 18,000 lbs of combined internal and external weapons. This allows the Navy to operate in stealth when necessary, or increase lethality with additional weapons externally when the air space is permissive.
8. The U.S. Navy is the largest F-35C operator and has plans to procure 273 F-35Cs. Naval Air Station Lemoore is home to the Navy’s Joint Strike Fighter Wing. The U.S. Marine Corps is also acquiring F-35C aircraft along with their F-35BSs.
9. The F-35 is built by thousands of men and women in the United States and around the world.Lockheed Martin leads the F-35 industry team with Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems and Pratt & Whitney. The program is managed by the Department of Defense’s F-35 Joint Program Office. More than 1,900 suppliers build and sustain the F-35 program in 48 U.S. states and in more than 10 countries.
defence-blog.com
U.S. Navy screen grabFor the first time in U.S. naval aviation history, radar-evading stealth capability comes to the carrier deck. With stealth technology, advanced sensors, supersonic speed, weapons capacity and superior range, the F-35 is most advanced fighter to ever operate aboard a Carrier deck.
Lockheed Martin Corporation shared on its F-35.com website 9 facts about the Naval version of a stealth fighter.
1. It brings stealth to the sea. The F-35C is the first and world’s only long-range stealth strike fighter designed and built explicitly for Navy carrier operations. It’s configuration, embedded sensors, internal fuel and weapons capacity, aligned edges, and state of the art manufacturing processes all contribute to the F-35’s unique Very Low Observable stealth performance. This enables pilots to evade enemy detection and operate in anti-access and contested environments, improving lethality and survivability.
2. It has the most advanced and comprehensive sensor suite of any fighter jet in history. Including the Active Electronically Scanned Arrays (AESA) radar, Distributed Aperture System (DAS), Electro Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and Helmet Mounted Display System, this package allows the pilot to see everything in the battlespace with unprecedented situational awareness.
3. It is a Force Multiplier. The F-35 can operate as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset and battle manager, sharing information to all networked ground, sea and air assets in the battlespace. This ensures men and women in uniform can execute their mission and come home safe.
4. It has range and mission persistence.The F-35C carries nearly 20,000 lbs of internal fuel and has a range of greater than 1,200 nm. The enables F-35C pilots to fly further and remain in a desired battlespace longer before refueling is necessary.
5. It has the largest wingspan and most robust landing gear of all F-35 variants. The design of the F-35C’s wings and landing gear make it suitable for catapult launches and fly-in arrestments aboard naval aircraft carriers. Its wingtips also fold to allow for more room on the carrier’s deck while deployed.
6. It is supersonic. The F-35C can reach speeds of 1.6 Mach (~1,200 mph) even with a full internal weapons load. With its fuel and internal weapons load, the F-35C can fly faster with no drag associated with external tanks and weapons required for legacy fighters.
7. It can carry internal and external weapons. The F-35C can carry more than 5,000 lbs of internal weapons, or more than 18,000 lbs of combined internal and external weapons. This allows the Navy to operate in stealth when necessary, or increase lethality with additional weapons externally when the air space is permissive.
8. The U.S. Navy is the largest F-35C operator and has plans to procure 273 F-35Cs. Naval Air Station Lemoore is home to the Navy’s Joint Strike Fighter Wing. The U.S. Marine Corps is also acquiring F-35C aircraft along with their F-35BSs.
9. The F-35 is built by thousands of men and women in the United States and around the world.Lockheed Martin leads the F-35 industry team with Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems and Pratt & Whitney. The program is managed by the Department of Defense’s F-35 Joint Program Office. More than 1,900 suppliers build and sustain the F-35 program in 48 U.S. states and in more than 10 countries.
9 things you may not know about F-35C stealth strike fighter
For the first time in U.S. naval aviation history, radar-evading stealth capability comes to the carrier deck. With stealth technology, advanced sensors, supersonic speed, weapons capacity and superior range, the F-35 is most advanced fighter to ever operate aboard a Carrier deck. Lockheed...
Hexciter
Experienced member
- Messages
- 2,575
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Only Israel Can Modify Its F-35 Stealth Fighters. Here's Why.
Key Point: Israel’s unique geopolitical situation in the Middle East necessitates a rapid domestic-repair capability.
Israel secured a number of contractual rights from Lockheed-Martin that make their F-35I variants optimized for conflicts in the Middle East — and potentially the most capable F-35 variant in the world.
Domestic Repair and Maintenance
The F-35 Lightning II program is tightly owned by Lockheed. Physical or data systems modifications to the aircraft are essentially not allowed. Any maintenance other than the routine is to be done at specialized Lockheed facilities to protect the airframe’s design from prying eyes.
But not for Israel.
Israel’s Nevatim Air Base hosts F-35 maintenance facilities that have the necessary repair tooling and the properly trained personnel to conduct not only routine maintenance but beyond-routine overhauls as well. Other F-35 partner countries are contractually required to have any deep maintenance done at Lockheed facilities. While this is more lucrative for Lockheed, it would also keep F-35 know-how under wraps and could help to keep technical details about the F-35 program a secret.
Israel’s unique geopolitical situation in the Middle East necessitates a rapid domestic-repair capability. In the event of a regional conflict, Israel could require rapid on-site repairs to keep their F-35I fleet in the air. Although the requisite technician training tooling installation won’t happen overnight, Israel is the only F-35 partner country with a domestically operated maintenance regime.
Israeli C4 Systems
One of the F-35’s greatest strengths is its ability to gather real-time battlefield information and use this information to update battlespace knowledge, also known as command, control, communications, and computing (C4) architecture, which is state of the art. Israel has essentially been allowed to create an “app” that operates on top of Lockheed’s C4 information architecture. This “app” will use data gathered by the F-35 to network with the other “nodes” in their information-gathering network — Israeli F-15s and F-16s that operate on in tandem with Israeli C4 architecture.
Electronic Warfare
All F-35s are equipped with BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-239 EW suite, which offers “offensive and defensive options for the pilot and aircraft to counter current and emerging threats,” designed to “optimize situational awareness while helping to identify, monitor, analyze, and respond to threats.” Essentially BAE’s EW system allows the F-35 to stop enemy radar and beat opposing aircraft and their missile threats.
Lockheed has allowed Israel to modify the standard BAE EW suit with their own Israeli-made system, presumably a kind of attachable pod, which could be tailored to counter regional capabilities.
Support of Israeli Weapons
One of the weapons systems Israel uses with the F-35 platform is their Spice family of guidance kits. The Spice kit is essentially a guidance kit that can be equipped to a variety of munitions to improve their accuracy through electro-optics, GPS, or through a “man-in-the-loop” system in which an onboard Weapons Officer can guide bombs to a target using the bomb’s nose camera and a secure television link for very high accuracy.
Conformal Fuel Tanks
Typically aircraft can increase their range thorough inflight refueling — which the F-35 is capable of — with drop tanks, which are attached to hardpoints under the wings or fuselage of an aircraft, or by installing conformal fuel tanks, which are contoured tanks that usually hug the fuselage or wing roots of a plane.
Drop tanks negatively impact an airframe’s stealth characteristic because they are optimized for internal volume and not for defeating radar, although they can be jettisoned when empty. Conformal fuel tanks, however, can be more “stealthy” than drop tanks. If carefully contoured, Israel could, in theory, installed fuel tanks that not only increase the F-35’s range but also only marginally affect the Lightning II’s stealth characteristics.
Once fully implemented, Israel’s F-35Is will be among the deadliest in the world.
Caleb Larson is a defense writer for the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture. This article first appeared earlier this year and is reprinted due to reader interest.
nationalinterest.org
Key Point: Israel’s unique geopolitical situation in the Middle East necessitates a rapid domestic-repair capability.
Israel secured a number of contractual rights from Lockheed-Martin that make their F-35I variants optimized for conflicts in the Middle East — and potentially the most capable F-35 variant in the world.
Domestic Repair and Maintenance
The F-35 Lightning II program is tightly owned by Lockheed. Physical or data systems modifications to the aircraft are essentially not allowed. Any maintenance other than the routine is to be done at specialized Lockheed facilities to protect the airframe’s design from prying eyes.
But not for Israel.
Israel’s Nevatim Air Base hosts F-35 maintenance facilities that have the necessary repair tooling and the properly trained personnel to conduct not only routine maintenance but beyond-routine overhauls as well. Other F-35 partner countries are contractually required to have any deep maintenance done at Lockheed facilities. While this is more lucrative for Lockheed, it would also keep F-35 know-how under wraps and could help to keep technical details about the F-35 program a secret.
Israel’s unique geopolitical situation in the Middle East necessitates a rapid domestic-repair capability. In the event of a regional conflict, Israel could require rapid on-site repairs to keep their F-35I fleet in the air. Although the requisite technician training tooling installation won’t happen overnight, Israel is the only F-35 partner country with a domestically operated maintenance regime.
Israeli C4 Systems
One of the F-35’s greatest strengths is its ability to gather real-time battlefield information and use this information to update battlespace knowledge, also known as command, control, communications, and computing (C4) architecture, which is state of the art. Israel has essentially been allowed to create an “app” that operates on top of Lockheed’s C4 information architecture. This “app” will use data gathered by the F-35 to network with the other “nodes” in their information-gathering network — Israeli F-15s and F-16s that operate on in tandem with Israeli C4 architecture.
Electronic Warfare
All F-35s are equipped with BAE Systems’ AN/ASQ-239 EW suite, which offers “offensive and defensive options for the pilot and aircraft to counter current and emerging threats,” designed to “optimize situational awareness while helping to identify, monitor, analyze, and respond to threats.” Essentially BAE’s EW system allows the F-35 to stop enemy radar and beat opposing aircraft and their missile threats.
Lockheed has allowed Israel to modify the standard BAE EW suit with their own Israeli-made system, presumably a kind of attachable pod, which could be tailored to counter regional capabilities.
Support of Israeli Weapons
One of the weapons systems Israel uses with the F-35 platform is their Spice family of guidance kits. The Spice kit is essentially a guidance kit that can be equipped to a variety of munitions to improve their accuracy through electro-optics, GPS, or through a “man-in-the-loop” system in which an onboard Weapons Officer can guide bombs to a target using the bomb’s nose camera and a secure television link for very high accuracy.
Conformal Fuel Tanks
Typically aircraft can increase their range thorough inflight refueling — which the F-35 is capable of — with drop tanks, which are attached to hardpoints under the wings or fuselage of an aircraft, or by installing conformal fuel tanks, which are contoured tanks that usually hug the fuselage or wing roots of a plane.
Drop tanks negatively impact an airframe’s stealth characteristic because they are optimized for internal volume and not for defeating radar, although they can be jettisoned when empty. Conformal fuel tanks, however, can be more “stealthy” than drop tanks. If carefully contoured, Israel could, in theory, installed fuel tanks that not only increase the F-35’s range but also only marginally affect the Lightning II’s stealth characteristics.
Once fully implemented, Israel’s F-35Is will be among the deadliest in the world.
Caleb Larson is a defense writer for the National Interest. He holds a Master of Public Policy and covers U.S. and Russian security, European defense issues, and German politics and culture. This article first appeared earlier this year and is reprinted due to reader interest.
Only Israel Can Modify Its F-35 Stealth Fighters. Here's Why.
Lockheed-Martin has afforded Israel special privileges.
nationalinterest.org
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
AN/AAQ-40 Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS)
Features
• Rugged, low-profile, faceted window for low-observable performance
• Compact single aperture design
• Lightweight
• Advanced sensors
• Air-to-surface/air-to-air FLIR tracker and air-to-air IRST modes
• Modular design for two-level maintenance reduces life cycle cost
• Automatic boresight and aircraft alignment
• Tactical and eye-safe laser
• Laser spot tracker
• Passive and active ranging
• Precise guidance for laser weapons
• Highly accurate coordinate generation for GPS weapons
The F-35 requirement for a low observable (LO) combat configuration did not allow for the traditional targetingforward-looking infrared (TFLIR) solution. The legacy pod systems could not be both missionized and easily concealed for LO operations. The solution was to integrate the targeting pod system into the outer mold line of the aircraft. The EOTS, built by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, was built specifically for the F-35 to provide the jet with an LO IR targeting capability. Its integration was approached in a buildup fashion, as shown in Fig. 10. The initial open-air testing was performed with a modified Sabreliner T-39 jet to test the EOTS as a stand-alone sensor to verify sensor-level behavior. The EOTS was integrated into the rest of the avionics system on the Lockheed Martin CATB flying testbed to test the interactions between the sensor and the full avionics system with a pilot in the loop. The final testing and verification came with the full integration of the EOTS into the F-35.
The EOTS is an internally mounted advanced mid-wave infrared (MWIR) targeting system with a faceted window having LO characteristics, designed for A/A and A/S targeting support. By using the mid-wave portion of the IR spectrum the EOTS provides a sharper image and less susceptibility to target obscuration from smoke and haze. The EOTS may be used in the imaging mode in A/A and A/S, or in the IR search and track (IRST) mode in A/A. Design consideration has been given to achieving:
1)a good receiver signal-to-noise ratio,
2)effective FOVs for A/A and A/S performance,
3)a broad field of regard,
4)auto-search pattern modes, and
5)low false alarm rates.
The EOTS’s functionality consists of a TFLIR image, laser range finder/designator, laser spot tracker, and IRST, as shown in Fig. 11. The EOTS uses low-profile gimbals with an optical system that maintains boresight accuracy between the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and laser functions. Precise stabilization of the EOTS’s line of sight is achieved by gyro-controlled AZ and EL gimbals, and fine stabilization is achieved through a fast-steering mirror. Equipped with a staring 1024-by-1024-element MWIR focal plane array, the EOTS is a dual-FOV system. The narrow FOV is optimized for targeting functions, and the wide FOV is developed to maximize search performance.
Features
• Rugged, low-profile, faceted window for low-observable performance
• Compact single aperture design
• Lightweight
• Advanced sensors
• Air-to-surface/air-to-air FLIR tracker and air-to-air IRST modes
• Modular design for two-level maintenance reduces life cycle cost
• Automatic boresight and aircraft alignment
• Tactical and eye-safe laser
• Laser spot tracker
• Passive and active ranging
• Precise guidance for laser weapons
• Highly accurate coordinate generation for GPS weapons
The F-35 requirement for a low observable (LO) combat configuration did not allow for the traditional targetingforward-looking infrared (TFLIR) solution. The legacy pod systems could not be both missionized and easily concealed for LO operations. The solution was to integrate the targeting pod system into the outer mold line of the aircraft. The EOTS, built by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, was built specifically for the F-35 to provide the jet with an LO IR targeting capability. Its integration was approached in a buildup fashion, as shown in Fig. 10. The initial open-air testing was performed with a modified Sabreliner T-39 jet to test the EOTS as a stand-alone sensor to verify sensor-level behavior. The EOTS was integrated into the rest of the avionics system on the Lockheed Martin CATB flying testbed to test the interactions between the sensor and the full avionics system with a pilot in the loop. The final testing and verification came with the full integration of the EOTS into the F-35.
The EOTS is an internally mounted advanced mid-wave infrared (MWIR) targeting system with a faceted window having LO characteristics, designed for A/A and A/S targeting support. By using the mid-wave portion of the IR spectrum the EOTS provides a sharper image and less susceptibility to target obscuration from smoke and haze. The EOTS may be used in the imaging mode in A/A and A/S, or in the IR search and track (IRST) mode in A/A. Design consideration has been given to achieving:
1)a good receiver signal-to-noise ratio,
2)effective FOVs for A/A and A/S performance,
3)a broad field of regard,
4)auto-search pattern modes, and
5)low false alarm rates.
The EOTS’s functionality consists of a TFLIR image, laser range finder/designator, laser spot tracker, and IRST, as shown in Fig. 11. The EOTS uses low-profile gimbals with an optical system that maintains boresight accuracy between the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) and laser functions. Precise stabilization of the EOTS’s line of sight is achieved by gyro-controlled AZ and EL gimbals, and fine stabilization is achieved through a fast-steering mirror. Equipped with a staring 1024-by-1024-element MWIR focal plane array, the EOTS is a dual-FOV system. The narrow FOV is optimized for targeting functions, and the wide FOV is developed to maximize search performance.
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System
The DAS provides:
The program required a 360-degree spherical coverage missile warning system. The EO DAS consists of six identicalMWIR sensors distributed on the aircraft, each with a corresponding airframe window panel. The sensors are installed such that their respective FOVs (95-degree AZ and EL) overlap to provide total spherical coverage. This EO DAS subsystem provides the pilot with both an MWIR tracking capability and FLIR visual scene, but its FLIR is more comprehensive. In legacy FLIR systems the pilot’s visual scene was limited to the forward sector. With the F-35’s EO DAS, the pilot has a 360-degree spherical view of the environment. This allows for a true synthetic vision system, with the image displayed on the pilot’s helmet-mounted display (HMD).
The EO DAS integration began with a single sensor installation within a pod. This pod was mounted on an F-16 to support initial testing and data collection for image processing algorithm validation. This podded system was also mounted on a QF-4 drone to enable testing of the missile warning function. The next step in integration was to mount a sensor in an integration-representative fashion on the Northrop Grumman-owned BAC 1-11 flying testbed. The first introduction of multiple EO DAS cameras into the integrated avionics system was performed on the Lockheed Martin CATB platform. This marked the beginning of integrating the EO DAS sensors into the Lockheed Martin-developed fusion algorithms. The final step to fully incorporate the EO DAS into the integrated avionics system came in March 2011, with the first flight testing on an F-35.
The DAS provides:
- Missile detection and tracking
- Launch point detection
- Situational awareness IRST & cueing
- Weapons support
- Day/night navigation
The program required a 360-degree spherical coverage missile warning system. The EO DAS consists of six identicalMWIR sensors distributed on the aircraft, each with a corresponding airframe window panel. The sensors are installed such that their respective FOVs (95-degree AZ and EL) overlap to provide total spherical coverage. This EO DAS subsystem provides the pilot with both an MWIR tracking capability and FLIR visual scene, but its FLIR is more comprehensive. In legacy FLIR systems the pilot’s visual scene was limited to the forward sector. With the F-35’s EO DAS, the pilot has a 360-degree spherical view of the environment. This allows for a true synthetic vision system, with the image displayed on the pilot’s helmet-mounted display (HMD).
The EO DAS integration began with a single sensor installation within a pod. This pod was mounted on an F-16 to support initial testing and data collection for image processing algorithm validation. This podded system was also mounted on a QF-4 drone to enable testing of the missile warning function. The next step in integration was to mount a sensor in an integration-representative fashion on the Northrop Grumman-owned BAC 1-11 flying testbed. The first introduction of multiple EO DAS cameras into the integrated avionics system was performed on the Lockheed Martin CATB platform. This marked the beginning of integrating the EO DAS sensors into the Lockheed Martin-developed fusion algorithms. The final step to fully incorporate the EO DAS into the integrated avionics system came in March 2011, with the first flight testing on an F-35.
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
AN/ASQ-242 Communications, Navigation, and Identification System
The CNI system (Fig. 14) is an integrated subsystem designed to provide a broad spectrum of:
1)secure/anti-jam/covert voice and data communications,
2)precise radio navigation and landing capability,
3)self-identification, beyond-visual-range target identification, and
4)connectivity with off-board sources of information.
In support of the stealthy operation and design goals of the F-35, the CNI subsystem includes techniques to reduce the probability of detection, interception, and exploitation, and can deploy electronic CM. These techniques include frequency agility, spread spectrum, emission control, antenna directivity, and low probability of intercept design capabilities. The CNI system provides interoperability with existing (legacy) military and civilian communication, RF navigation, and Identification Friend Foe (IFF)/surveillance systems. It is also interoperable with appropriate civilian systems for U.S. and European airspace operations. The CNI system provides an inherent growth capability and the flexibility to incorporate additional functionality through software upgrades. It also provides for hardware upgrades driven by parts obsolescence and enables manufacturing cost reduction and/or performance improvement.
The CNI-specific data, signal, and cryptographic processing are performed in unique CNI processors and the integrated core processor as required. The CNI system includes all functionality related to audio generation and distribution for the aircraft. This includes the pilot intercom; integrated caution, advisory, and warning messaging; pilot audio alerts; and support for the voice recognition function.
The CNI system includes an all-attitude inertial navigation system (INS) and anti-jam GPS. These provide outputs of linear and angular acceleration, velocity, body angular rates, position, attitude (roll, pitch, and platform AZ), magnetic and true heading, altitude, time tags, and time. The INS and GPS provide navigation data to the ownship kinematic model, which produces the navigation solution for the aircraft. The baseline system provides high-rate motion compensation data to the radar and EOTS.
The CNI system (Fig. 14) is an integrated subsystem designed to provide a broad spectrum of:
1)secure/anti-jam/covert voice and data communications,
2)precise radio navigation and landing capability,
3)self-identification, beyond-visual-range target identification, and
4)connectivity with off-board sources of information.
In support of the stealthy operation and design goals of the F-35, the CNI subsystem includes techniques to reduce the probability of detection, interception, and exploitation, and can deploy electronic CM. These techniques include frequency agility, spread spectrum, emission control, antenna directivity, and low probability of intercept design capabilities. The CNI system provides interoperability with existing (legacy) military and civilian communication, RF navigation, and Identification Friend Foe (IFF)/surveillance systems. It is also interoperable with appropriate civilian systems for U.S. and European airspace operations. The CNI system provides an inherent growth capability and the flexibility to incorporate additional functionality through software upgrades. It also provides for hardware upgrades driven by parts obsolescence and enables manufacturing cost reduction and/or performance improvement.
The CNI-specific data, signal, and cryptographic processing are performed in unique CNI processors and the integrated core processor as required. The CNI system includes all functionality related to audio generation and distribution for the aircraft. This includes the pilot intercom; integrated caution, advisory, and warning messaging; pilot audio alerts; and support for the voice recognition function.
The CNI system includes an all-attitude inertial navigation system (INS) and anti-jam GPS. These provide outputs of linear and angular acceleration, velocity, body angular rates, position, attitude (roll, pitch, and platform AZ), magnetic and true heading, altitude, time tags, and time. The INS and GPS provide navigation data to the ownship kinematic model, which produces the navigation solution for the aircraft. The baseline system provides high-rate motion compensation data to the radar and EOTS.
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Summary:
1) AN/APG-81 AESA Radar ------------------ air and sea targets detection and track, SAR, GMTI, high gain ESM and EA.
2) AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda EW/CM ------- radar warning and geolocation, CM (RFCM & IRCM dispensers), high gain ESM and EA (shared with APG-81).
3) AN/AAQ-40 EOTS --------------------------- air-to air and air-to-surface hi-res TFLIR, long range IRST, laser designator, laser spot tracker, NAVFLIR.
4) AN/AAQ-37 EO DAS ------------------------- 360° spherical IR coverage, situational awereness IRST, missile launch warning, NAVFLIR.
5) AN/ASQ-242 CNI ---------------------------- covert anti-jam voice and data communications, pilot audio alerts, INS, anti-jam GPS, RF navigation, IFF.
SAR - Synthetic aperture radar
ESM - Electronic counter measures.
EA - Electronic attack.
GMTI - Ground moving target indicator.
RFCM - radio frequency countermeasure.
IRCM - infra red countermeasure.
IRST - Infra red search and track.
FLIR - Forward looking infra red.
TFLIR - Targheting FLIR.
NAVFLIR - Navigation FLIR.
INS - Inertial navigation system.
IFF - Identification Friend Foe.
Fusing the Data into Information
The F-35 fusion engine is the software module at the heart of the integrated mission systems capability on the aircraft. Fusion involves constructing an integrated description and interpretation of the tactical situation surrounding ownship [2]. It draws from onboard, cooperative, and off-board data sources to enhance situational awareness, lethality, and survivability [2]. The fusion functionality is divided into two major sub-functions: air target management (ATM) and surface target management (STM). The purposes of these functions are to optimize the quality of air and surface target information, respectively. Their functionality is implemented in three primarily software modules: the A/A tactical situation model (AATSM), the A/S tactical situation model (ASTSM), and the sensor schedule (SS).
The AATSM software module receives data from onboard and off-board sources about air objects in the environment. It then integrates this information into kinematic and identification estimates for each air object. Similarly, the ASTSM software module receives data from onboard and off-board sources about surface objects in the environment. It then integrates this information into kinematic and identification estimates for each surface object.
Objects that are ambiguous between air and surface are sent to both tactical situation models (TSMs). Each TSM assesses the quality of its tracks to identify any information needs. The system track information needs (STINs) are sent from the TSMs to the SS software module. The SS prioritizes the information needs by track and selects the appropriate sensor mode command to issue in order to satisfy the information need. The SS provides the autonomous control of the tactical sensors to balance the track information need and the background volume search needs.
Measurement and track data is sent to fusion from the onboard sensors (e.g., radar, EW, CNI, EOTS, DAS) and off-boards sources (e.g., MADL, Link 16). When this information is received at the TSM, the data enter the data association process. This process determines whether the new data constitute an update for an existing system (fusion) track or potentially new tracks. After being associated with a new or existing track, data are sent to the state estimation to update the kinematic, identification, and rules of engagement (ROE) states of the object.
Kinematic estimation refers to the position and velocity estimate of an object. It can also include an acceleration estimate for maneuvering air track. The kinematic estimate also includes the covariance for the track, an estimate of the track accuracy. Identification estimation provides an estimate and confidence of the affiliation, class, and type (platform) of the object. The identification process also evaluates the pilot-programmable ROE assistant rule to determine when the sensing states and confidences have been met for declaration. Estimation publishes the updated track state (kinematic, identification, and ROE statuses) to the system track file. At a periodic rate (about once a second), each track is prioritized and then evaluated to determine whether the kinematic and identification content meets the required accuracy and completeness. Any shortfall for a given track becomes STINs. The STIN message for the air and surface tracks are sent to the SS to make future tasking decisions for the onboard sensor resource. The process continues in a closed-loop fashion with new pieces of data from the sensors or datalinks. Figure 15 illustrates this process.
The results of this fusion of information are provided to the other elements in mission systems. They are provided to the pilot/vehicle interface (PVI) for display, fire control and stores for weapon support, and EW for CM support. This allows these elements to perform their related mission functions to provide:
1)a clearer tactical picture,
2)improved spatial and temporal coverage,
3)improved kinematic accuracy and identification confidence, and
4)enhanced operational robustness.
For a clearer tactical picture, multiple detections of an entity are combined into a single track instead of multiple tracks. For improved spatial and temporal coverage, a target can be continuously tracked across multiple sensors and FOVs. This is made possible by the extended spatial and temporal coverage of the onboard sensors, as well as the off-board contributor. Improved kinematic accuracy and identification confidence requires the effective integration of independent measurements of the track from multiple sensors or aircraft. This integration is what improves the detection, tracking, positional accuracy, and identification confidence. Enhanced operational robustness requires the abilities to fuse observations from different sensors and hand off targets between sensors. This leads to increased track resilience to sensor outages or countermeasures. Increased dimensionality of the measurement space (i.e., different sensors measuring various portions of the electromagnetic spectrum) then reduces vulnerability to denial of any single portion of the measurement space.
1) AN/APG-81 AESA Radar ------------------ air and sea targets detection and track, SAR, GMTI, high gain ESM and EA.
2) AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda EW/CM ------- radar warning and geolocation, CM (RFCM & IRCM dispensers), high gain ESM and EA (shared with APG-81).
3) AN/AAQ-40 EOTS --------------------------- air-to air and air-to-surface hi-res TFLIR, long range IRST, laser designator, laser spot tracker, NAVFLIR.
4) AN/AAQ-37 EO DAS ------------------------- 360° spherical IR coverage, situational awereness IRST, missile launch warning, NAVFLIR.
5) AN/ASQ-242 CNI ---------------------------- covert anti-jam voice and data communications, pilot audio alerts, INS, anti-jam GPS, RF navigation, IFF.
SAR - Synthetic aperture radar
ESM - Electronic counter measures.
EA - Electronic attack.
GMTI - Ground moving target indicator.
RFCM - radio frequency countermeasure.
IRCM - infra red countermeasure.
IRST - Infra red search and track.
FLIR - Forward looking infra red.
TFLIR - Targheting FLIR.
NAVFLIR - Navigation FLIR.
INS - Inertial navigation system.
IFF - Identification Friend Foe.
Fusing the Data into Information
The F-35 fusion engine is the software module at the heart of the integrated mission systems capability on the aircraft. Fusion involves constructing an integrated description and interpretation of the tactical situation surrounding ownship [2]. It draws from onboard, cooperative, and off-board data sources to enhance situational awareness, lethality, and survivability [2]. The fusion functionality is divided into two major sub-functions: air target management (ATM) and surface target management (STM). The purposes of these functions are to optimize the quality of air and surface target information, respectively. Their functionality is implemented in three primarily software modules: the A/A tactical situation model (AATSM), the A/S tactical situation model (ASTSM), and the sensor schedule (SS).
The AATSM software module receives data from onboard and off-board sources about air objects in the environment. It then integrates this information into kinematic and identification estimates for each air object. Similarly, the ASTSM software module receives data from onboard and off-board sources about surface objects in the environment. It then integrates this information into kinematic and identification estimates for each surface object.
Objects that are ambiguous between air and surface are sent to both tactical situation models (TSMs). Each TSM assesses the quality of its tracks to identify any information needs. The system track information needs (STINs) are sent from the TSMs to the SS software module. The SS prioritizes the information needs by track and selects the appropriate sensor mode command to issue in order to satisfy the information need. The SS provides the autonomous control of the tactical sensors to balance the track information need and the background volume search needs.
Measurement and track data is sent to fusion from the onboard sensors (e.g., radar, EW, CNI, EOTS, DAS) and off-boards sources (e.g., MADL, Link 16). When this information is received at the TSM, the data enter the data association process. This process determines whether the new data constitute an update for an existing system (fusion) track or potentially new tracks. After being associated with a new or existing track, data are sent to the state estimation to update the kinematic, identification, and rules of engagement (ROE) states of the object.
Kinematic estimation refers to the position and velocity estimate of an object. It can also include an acceleration estimate for maneuvering air track. The kinematic estimate also includes the covariance for the track, an estimate of the track accuracy. Identification estimation provides an estimate and confidence of the affiliation, class, and type (platform) of the object. The identification process also evaluates the pilot-programmable ROE assistant rule to determine when the sensing states and confidences have been met for declaration. Estimation publishes the updated track state (kinematic, identification, and ROE statuses) to the system track file. At a periodic rate (about once a second), each track is prioritized and then evaluated to determine whether the kinematic and identification content meets the required accuracy and completeness. Any shortfall for a given track becomes STINs. The STIN message for the air and surface tracks are sent to the SS to make future tasking decisions for the onboard sensor resource. The process continues in a closed-loop fashion with new pieces of data from the sensors or datalinks. Figure 15 illustrates this process.
The results of this fusion of information are provided to the other elements in mission systems. They are provided to the pilot/vehicle interface (PVI) for display, fire control and stores for weapon support, and EW for CM support. This allows these elements to perform their related mission functions to provide:
1)a clearer tactical picture,
2)improved spatial and temporal coverage,
3)improved kinematic accuracy and identification confidence, and
4)enhanced operational robustness.
For a clearer tactical picture, multiple detections of an entity are combined into a single track instead of multiple tracks. For improved spatial and temporal coverage, a target can be continuously tracked across multiple sensors and FOVs. This is made possible by the extended spatial and temporal coverage of the onboard sensors, as well as the off-board contributor. Improved kinematic accuracy and identification confidence requires the effective integration of independent measurements of the track from multiple sensors or aircraft. This integration is what improves the detection, tracking, positional accuracy, and identification confidence. Enhanced operational robustness requires the abilities to fuse observations from different sensors and hand off targets between sensors. This leads to increased track resilience to sensor outages or countermeasures. Increased dimensionality of the measurement space (i.e., different sensors measuring various portions of the electromagnetic spectrum) then reduces vulnerability to denial of any single portion of the measurement space.
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
HMS Queen Elizabeth has embarked the largest number of warplanes ever onto her deck as she prepares to take her place at the heart of a UK-led NATO Carrier Strike Group.
HMS Queen Elizabeth welcomes UK and US jets for major exercise | Royal Navy
HMS Queen Elizabeth has embarked the largest number of warplanes ever onto her deck as she prepares to take her place at the heart of a UK-led NATO Carrier Strike Group.
www.royalnavy.mod.uk
- Messages
- 799
- Solutions
- 1
- Reactions
- Nation of residence
-
- Nation of origin
-
Weapons carried by F-35 per bay (in addition to 1 AMRAAM missile):
Bombs
GBU-38 JDAM --------------- 500 lb GPS bomb
GBU-12 Paveway ---------- 500 lb laser bomb
GBU-32 JDAM -------------- 1000 lb GPS bomb
GBU-31 JDAM -------------- 20000 lb GPS bomb
CBU-105 --------------------- 1000 lb cluster bomb with 10 BLU-108 submunitions
Stand off weapons
AGM-154 JSOW ------------ 130 km, 497 kg (227 kg) glide bomb
JSOW-ER --------------------- 463 km , * kg (227 kg) powered glide bomb
JSM ---------------------------- 185 km, 403 kg (125 kg) cruise missile (up to 560 km with hi-hi-low profile)
SOM-J ------------------------- 220 km, 450 kg (140 kg) cruise missile
AGM-88G AARGM-ER --- 110 km, 2 Mach anti-radiation missile
4 weapons per bay
GBU-39 SDB-I ----------- 110 km, 129 kg GPS glide bomb
GBU-53 SDB-II ---------- 72 km, 93 kg (48 kg) AR/IIR/laser GPS glide bomb
SPEAR-3 ------------------ 130 km, 100 kg multispectral missile
Bombs
GBU-38 JDAM --------------- 500 lb GPS bomb
GBU-12 Paveway ---------- 500 lb laser bomb
GBU-32 JDAM -------------- 1000 lb GPS bomb
GBU-31 JDAM -------------- 20000 lb GPS bomb
CBU-105 --------------------- 1000 lb cluster bomb with 10 BLU-108 submunitions
Stand off weapons
AGM-154 JSOW ------------ 130 km, 497 kg (227 kg) glide bomb
JSOW-ER --------------------- 463 km , * kg (227 kg) powered glide bomb
JSM ---------------------------- 185 km, 403 kg (125 kg) cruise missile (up to 560 km with hi-hi-low profile)
SOM-J ------------------------- 220 km, 450 kg (140 kg) cruise missile
AGM-88G AARGM-ER --- 110 km, 2 Mach anti-radiation missile
4 weapons per bay
GBU-39 SDB-I ----------- 110 km, 129 kg GPS glide bomb
GBU-53 SDB-II ---------- 72 km, 93 kg (48 kg) AR/IIR/laser GPS glide bomb
SPEAR-3 ------------------ 130 km, 100 kg multispectral missile
