TR HÜRJET-Advanced Jet Trainer/ Light attack aircraft

[dBSPL]

My humble opinion is that expanding Hürjet into two distinct variants is an operational luxury; TAI should pursue a unified airframe architecture where the Hürjet-D and Hürjet LCA are the exact same aircraft. By baking STOBAR (naval) requirements into the baseline design, we can eliminate the systemic overhead of managing two separate production lines, supply chains, and lifecycle management programs.

Operationally, a STOBAR-optimized Hürjet unlocks a true "Distributed Fleet Architecture" reminiscent of Sweden's BAS 90 doctrine. With heavy-duty naval landing gears, the aircraft can aggressively "crash" onto rough, un-prepped highway strips under 1,000 meters without structural risk.

The low logistical footprint means forward rearming and refueling points (FARP) can be hidden in roadside wooded areas or vehicle tunnels. Utilizing mobile, containerized support systems and a handful of conscripts/mechanics just like the Swedish Saab Gripen concep, a single highway segment may becomes a lethal and untargetable sortie-generation hub.

Given Turkiye's unique geography and the vulnerability risks of static airbases, this "Highway/STOBAR LCA" concept offers an asymmetric, highly survivable deterrent on our western coasts. Streamlining the entire fleet into a single, ruggedized variant is not just a logistical shortcut; it is also a strategic opportunity.

Admittedly, this approach also introduces a structural weight penalty inherent to naval designs, which critics will rightly argue could compromise the aircraft's internal fuel capacity and payload. However, within the compact operational theater of our western coasts, raw range is secondary to rapid reaction and high survivability. Any payload or radius deficits can be effectively mitigated through the implementation of buddy-refueling capabilities or the deployment of lightweight, precision-guided stand-off munitions (like TOLUN or Kuzgun), maximizing lethality without overloading the airframe.

Furthermore, this evolutionary step for Hürjet would inevitably shape the logistical framework and operational deployment of its accompanying loyal wingmen under the MUM-T concept. By establishing a ruggedized, highway-capable manned platform, the entire dynamic shifts toward a unified, highly agile ecosystem where companion UCAVs must also synchronize with this low-footprint, distributed-base logic.

 

[Zafer]

My humble opinion is that expanding Hürjet into two distinct variants is an operational luxury; TAI should pursue a unified airframe architecture where the Hürjet-D and Hürjet LCA are the exact same aircraft. By baking STOBAR (naval) requirements into the baseline design, we can eliminate the systemic overhead of managing two separate production lines, supply chains, and lifecycle management programs.

Operationally, a STOBAR-optimized Hürjet unlocks a true "Distributed Fleet Architecture" reminiscent of Sweden's BAS 90 doctrine. With heavy-duty naval landing gears, the aircraft can aggressively "crash" onto rough, un-prepped highway strips under 1,000 meters without structural risk.

The low logistical footprint means forward rearming and refueling points (FARP) can be hidden in roadside wooded areas or vehicle tunnels. Utilizing mobile, containerized support systems and a handful of conscripts/mechanics just like the Swedish Saab Gripen concep, a single highway segment may becomes a lethal and untargetable sortie-generation hub.

Given Turkiye's unique geography and the vulnerability risks of static airbases, this "Highway/STOBAR LCA" concept offers an asymmetric, highly survivable deterrent on our western coasts. Streamlining the entire fleet into a single, ruggedized variant is not just a logistical shortcut; it is also a strategic opportunity.

Admittedly, this approach also introduces a structural weight penalty inherent to naval designs, which critics will rightly argue could compromise the aircraft's internal fuel capacity and payload. However, within the compact operational theater of our western coasts, raw range is secondary to rapid reaction and high survivability. Any payload or radius deficits can be effectively mitigated through the implementation of buddy-refueling capabilities or the deployment of lightweight, precision-guided stand-off munitions (like TOLUN or Kuzgun), maximizing lethality without overloading the airframe.

Furthermore, this evolutionary step for Hürjet would inevitably shape the logistical framework and operational deployment of its accompanying loyal wingmen under the MUM-T concept. By establishing a ruggedized, highway-capable manned platform, the entire dynamic shifts toward a unified, highly agile ecosystem where companion UCAVs must also synchronize with this low-footprint, distributed-base logic.

We have the export market to address too so we should make both variants. Depending on future engine opportunities we may make even more variants and stop making some of them if there is no more the need. Cost of development is not a big issue.

 

[dBSPL]

We have the export market to address too so we should make both variants. Depending on future engine opportunities we may make even more variants and stop making some of them if there is no more the need. Cost of development is not a big issue.

Diverging variants based on distinct customer needs and future engine alternatives is a standard defense industry practice. However, my argument is less about limiting options and more about "strategic prioritization." Even if we pursue multiple variants for export, building the baseline LCA model on a ruggedized (STOBAR) airframe creates an immediate "high-readiness" baseline. Historically, aircraft that were over-engineered for naval/carrier operations (like F-18 or Rafale M) retained incredible structural advantages when sold or operated purely from land bases. Ruggedness is a premium selling point in itself, especially for air forces operating from austere or threatened environments.

So while development cost might not be the bottleneck, production speed, structural resilience, and domestic doctrine optimization on a "unified baseline" could give TAI a much faster route to both operational deployment and export success. My idea is about a matter of finding the sweet spot between market customization and industrial agility, not about Hürjet program's whole life-cycle...

 

[Zafer]

Diverging variants based on distinct customer needs and future engine alternatives is a standard defense industry practice. However, my argument is less about limiting options and more about "strategic prioritization." Even if we pursue multiple variants for export, building the baseline LCA model on a ruggedized (STOBAR) airframe creates an immediate "high-readiness" baseline. Historically, aircraft that were over-engineered for naval/carrier operations (like F-18 or Rafale M) retained incredible structural advantages when sold or operated purely from land bases. Ruggedness is a premium selling point in itself, especially for air forces operating from austere or threatened environments.

So while development cost might not be the bottleneck, production speed, structural resilience, and domestic doctrine optimization on a "unified baseline" could give TAI a much faster route to both operational deployment and export success. My idea is about a matter of finding the sweet spot between market customization and industrial agility, not about Hürjet program's whole life-cycle...

We need to achieve the easier target, get the low hanging fruit first with the basic LCA. A short field capable version is harder to make and will take longer too. We will not make use of a light fighter waiting for a longer timeline.

 

[Sanchez]

My humble opinion is that expanding Hürjet into two distinct variants is an operational luxury; TAI should pursue a unified airframe architecture where the Hürjet-D and Hürjet LCA are the exact same aircraft. By baking STOBAR (naval) requirements into the baseline design, we can eliminate the systemic overhead of managing two separate production lines, supply chains, and lifecycle management programs.

By doing this, you're also however also increasing costs related to procurement, service and maintenance, lowering the export chances.

A "light fighter" is many things to many people. If there is no interest from the air force for the LCA variant while navy is asking for a navalized combat variant, TAI should make that. If they see an export market for LCA; TAI should make that.

 

[mTT]

ai ?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2056366207893196814

 

[Pokemonte13]

ai ?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2056366207893196814

its real

 

[Zafer]

That's #3 Hürjet flying already, I think even the prototypes count for production when it comes to trainers.

 

[Pokemonte13]

That's #3 Hürjet flying already, I think even the prototypes count for production when it comes to trainers.

its the second prototype

 

[Sanchez]

its the second prototype

Indeed. A003 is the second prototype. Those are not Hurjet numbers but TAI numbers. A007 for example was a Hürkuş prototype. A001 was the first Hürjet prototype, later dubbed 24-001 as it was the first aircraft HvKK incurred in that year; which was a workaround to allow the aircraft to fly international to Spain and Egypt without certification. We don't know what A002 was; there's no photos of it. We also don't know how this numbering system works.

 

[Bogeyman]

ai ?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2056366207893196814

It has pylons attached under the wings. This looks like an armed version of the Hürjet.

 

[Pokemonte13]

It has pylons attached under the wings. This looks like an armed version of the Hürjet.

I wonder whats the max payload is goin to be when Hürjet D already has 3.5 Tons probably between 4 and 4.5 tons right maybe more?

 

[boredaf]

I wonder whats the max payload is goin to be when Hürjet D already has 3.5 Tons probably between 4 and 4.5 tons right maybe more?

What? Unless they make a specific two engine version it is going to be less than that, not more. You simply cannot make navalize a plane without adding weight and that weight will come off from its payload or fuel hence its range.

 

[Pokemonte13]

What? Unless they make a specific two engine version it is going to be less than that, not more. You simply cannot make navalize a plane without adding weight and that weight will come off from its payload or fuel hence its range.

i mean regular LCA version as naval variant has 3.5 tons according to the info sheet from saha.

 

[boredaf]

i mean regular LCA version as naval variant has 3.5 tons according to the info sheet from saha.

They literally copy-pasted the current info on that, its weight and everything else was the same, weren't they? I wouldn't expect anything more than what it has now if I were you.

 

[Sanchez]

It has pylons attached under the wings. This looks like an armed version of the Hürjet.

It already had LAU-129s on the wingtips, so we can argue that it was already the "armed" version. I think a bigger surprise here are the cameras watching the wing pylons. We might see a drop test soon.

 

[Pokemonte13]

They literally copy-pasted the current info on that, its weight and everything else was the same, weren't they? I wouldn't expect anything more than what it has now if I were you.

That also could be it i was just saying that because FA 50 also has 4.5 tons of payload and the dimensions are similar.

 

[zio]

It already had LAU-129s on the wingtips, so we can argue that it was already the "armed" version. I think a bigger surprise here are the cameras watching the wing pylons. We might see a drop test soon.

View attachment 80575

We have to change antenna,to make a place for aselpod.

 

[Sanchez]

We have to change antenna,to make a place for aselpod.

Which one? I don't really see a engine pod side placement for Aselpod, like we have it on F-16s. Though it would be nice for the later fighter variant if that route is trodden. FA-50s for example carry their Snipers on the center pylon. Like the EF

 

[Pokemonte13]

Right under the inlet would be ideal right maybe a bit further behind.