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Basically the argument forwarded was capability acquisition w.r.t shipyard capacity.
Most of India's heavy shipyards (like MDL) are all full/commited to existing classes and future classes.
Thus because of UKR/RUS conflict that occured some years back that lead to their failling out, the krivak class (modern iteration of it) suffered in Russia's case as the propulsion was sourced from Ukraine (and was not delivered for 2 remaining hulls).
Thus Russia and India agreed India could source them relatively cheap and immediately...and India basically approach Ukraine independently for the propulsion package and does the integration and fitting out etc.
As part of this 2 more krivaks (talwars as known in IN) were added (to be built with ToT) so that this particular shipyard (GSL) can also concurrently have opportunity to transition to more medium/heavy category (given it simply did much lighter OPV's and similar tonnage thus far).
There is fine line here in balance (given you are right to bring up Shivalik and also Project 17A opportunity cost by simply investing into GSL to handle one of those two etc)...but IN went for it, deciding it needed some quick capability right away at seemingly good price...and transition GSL capability a bit more slower/steadier etc.
Indian shipyard expansion and capital investments are a longer awry subject of their own.
This is my rough understanding on it summarized off the top of my head, there could be a few errors.
@ANMDT @Dante80 @Joe Shearer @Paro @Gautam @Vergennes @Kartal1 @Chestnut @T-123456 @UkroTurk
That is if we take the wise, mature and balanced decision to build up all arms of our navy at roughly equal speed. To my unwise, immature, and hopelessly unbalanced point of view, we are making a huge mistake, giving aircraft carriers a bit, even if a small bit, of our mind-space long before we have achieved blanket coverage of our coastal, near-shore and offshore defences.
We should be building patrol boats, missile boats, Coast Guard cutters, sloops and corvettes, and the staffing to go with these, long before returning to our favourite frigates and destroyers. There is so much to be done:
Sorry to be such an embodiment of doom.
- Sea-facing police stations look INLAND, not out to sea; in most cases, they don't have even a row-boat at their disposal. Whatever was given to the Maharashtra Police after the attacks on Bombay are in disrepair, and most of the outboard motor-boats won't float any more.
- If ten terrorists were to slaughter the crew of an Indian fishing boat and make landfall, even within a port, nobody would have a clue about what to do for defence; Bombay at least had a sophisticated urban police force capable of thinking on its feet (after an initial period of shock and paralysis) and of grasping that in their case, life was following art. What would the rural police do in Baripada? Or even in Alibaug?
- If one hundred terrorists were to land, fully armed with Kalashnikovs, the Indian Army would be facing away from them, at right angles in cases, with all their attention on the Pakistan border, or the China border; it is doubtful that even a platoon of foot-soldiers could be summoned to defend the hapless constabulary (just forget about scout cars, armoured cars and armour, or any kind of air support);
- The Coast Guard is scattered along the sea-coasts approximately one micron thick, and are rapidly imitating their counterparts on the India-Bangladesh border in terms of cupidity and graft; there is a disaster waiting to happen, if either the Pakistanis or the Chinese decide to make an aggressive move (in the latter case, it is doubtful; the Chinese THESE DAYS are not known to fight, other than in a Run Run Shaw movie);
- There is nothing to defend our off-shore installations in the Arabian Sea, and less than nothing in the Godavari Basin; the scenario where a Pakistani submarine prowls around these installations is a nightmare waiting to happen;
- All this before any positive attention - any outward looking stance - to the Pakistan side, forget about the Straits of Malacca; Krivak/Talwars? <face palm>.
That is if we take the wise, mature and balanced decision to build up all arms of our navy at roughly equal speed. To my unwise, immature, and hopelessly unbalanced point of view, we are making a huge mistake, giving aircraft carriers a bit, even if a small bit, of our mind-space long before we have achieved blanket coverage of our coastal, near-shore and offshore defences.
We should be building patrol boats, missile boats, Coast Guard cutters, sloops and corvettes, and the staffing to go with these, long before returning to our favourite frigates and destroyers. There is so much to be done:
Sorry to be such an embodiment of doom.
- Sea-facing police stations look INLAND, not out to sea; in most cases, they don't have even a row-boat at their disposal. Whatever was given to the Maharashtra Police after the attacks on Bombay are in disrepair, and most of the outboard motor-boats won't float any more.
- If ten terrorists were to slaughter the crew of an Indian fishing boat and make landfall, even within a port, nobody would have a clue about what to do for defence; Bombay at least had a sophisticated urban police force capable of thinking on its feet (after an initial period of shock and paralysis) and of grasping that in their case, life was following art. What would the rural police do in Baripada? Or even in Alibaug?
- If one hundred terrorists were to land, fully armed with Kalashnikovs, the Indian Army would be facing away from them, at right angles in cases, with all their attention on the Pakistan border, or the China border; it is doubtful that even a platoon of foot-soldiers could be summoned to defend the hapless constabulary (just forget about scout cars, armoured cars and armour, or any kind of air support);
- The Coast Guard is scattered along the sea-coasts approximately one micron thick, and are rapidly imitating their counterparts on the India-Bangladesh border in terms of cupidity and graft; there is a disaster waiting to happen, if either the Pakistanis or the Chinese decide to make an aggressive move (in the latter case, it is doubtful; the Chinese THESE DAYS are not known to fight, other than in a Run Run Shaw movie);
- There is nothing to defend our off-shore installations in the Arabian Sea, and less than nothing in the Godavari Basin; the scenario where a Pakistani submarine prowls around these installations is a nightmare waiting to happen;
- All this before any positive attention - any outward looking stance - to the Pakistan side, forget about the Straits of Malacca; Krivak/Talwars? <face palm>.
Why don't they give the coastal security to the state governments like policing ?
@Nilgiri why does Indian Navy uses heavy torpedo instead of light 324mm one??
@Nilgiri why does Indian Navy uses heavy torpedo instead of light 324mm one??
And old habits die hard, sometimes you only need to wait for some aged admirals to retire, so new generation replaces them and intends to try something new they are acquainted themselves with - some might call this doctrine but i differ these by stubbornness.Past the heavy torpedo's larger warhead + envelope (and thus role this plays in what you feel are likeliest seek to target with ships you have and doctrine you develop that way w.r.t say heli or MPA ASW):
I believe this was also mostly due to change from British-lineage ships (324 mm whitehead legacy etc. with also original local Indian version) to Soviet ones (533 mm standard) that happened over course of cold war and post-cold war for IN.
Thus the munitions bought and stockpiled and bought are massively oriented to 533 mm...(along with usual heritage, logistics and doctrine experience developed) so it influences even the new designs of ships...esp given India now has varunastra heavy torpedo (533mm) locally made option now that IN has commenced to acquire and deploy.
324mm is making a comeback with Shyena (Indian navy already acquired some and has also sold some to Myanmar)....but let us see how and where it is deployed.
@ANMDT