Indonesia Indonesian Navy, Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL)

[Lordimperator]

long range land attack capability

Whats your choice of LACM for TNi AL?

 

[Mandala]

A screenshot CGI poster of PT PAL LPH 244 Meter, Makassar Class LPD & OPV 90 at PT PAL Booth during RAPIM KEMHAN 2020. Credit to PT PAL.

 

[RockVett]

broken ..... is there something broken ?
View attachment 39136

well, if we could say our submarines aren't combat ready and terguncang when it nyelem, ya i could say those are broken )

 

[Umigami]

well, if we could say our submarines aren't combat ready and terguncang when it nyelem, ya i could say those are broken )

Tell us more please?

 

[Lordimperator]

terguncang when it nyelem

All 3 subs? Even the korean mainland made ones?

 

[HellFireIndo]

A Maritime Striker - Could Indonesia End Up Operating The Bayraktar TB3?​

Oryx Monday, January 31, 2022



By Stijn Mitzer

Indonesia's stated desire to acquire drones from Turkey could one day also see an interest in the Bayraktar TB3, which was designed as a heavier version of the TB2 that can also operate from aircraft carriers and landing helicopter docks (LHDs). The Indonesian Navy has already experimented with using fixed-wing UAVs from the helicopter deck of one of its Dutch-built Diponegoro-class corvettes. Although the UAV could only take-off from the vessel and had to land at an air base, the effort clearly indicates that Indonesia is interested in operating shipborne fixed-wing UAVs.

The Indonesian Navy currently operates a fleet of seven landing platform docks (LPDs), three of which are outfitted as hospital ships. Most of the LPDs were constructed by state-owned shipbuilder PT PAL Indonesia, which acquired the license to construct the Makassar class from Dae Sun Shipyard in South Korea. In June 2014 PT PAL signed a $92 million contract for the delivery of two LPDs to the Philippine Navy. Although delivered without many of the systems considered standard on contemporary ships in Western nations, the low unit price of some $45m means that these ships are now actually financially attainable for countries like Indonesia and the Philippines.

It is currently believed that the Indonesian Navy intends to procure several landing platform helicopter vessels (LPHs) in the coming decade. In 2018 PT PAL unveiled a 244-metres long LPH design that will likely form the basis of the design that will be offered to the Indonesian Navy. Similar to the Turkish TCG Anadolu LHD, the LPH design features a large aft elevator that can move helicopters and large U(C)AVs to the flight deck or hangar. Designed to be deployed from LHDs and LPHs from the onset, the Bayraktar TB3 could be deployed from Indonesia's LPHs without any design modifications required. Due to their small size and foldable wings, numerous TB3s could be deployed on the ships along with ASW helicopters and other drones to provide Indonesia with its first (unmanned-) aircraft carrier.

​

A rendering of Indonesia's 244-metres long LPH design.​

The TCG Anadolu LHD (and the follow-up vessel the TCG Trakya) are reportedly capable of carrying several dozen Bayraktar TB3s, a number that is only set to increase on Indonesia's larger LPH design. The TB3 can stay in the air for up to 24 hours while boasting a 280kg payload capacity. This could either consist of up to six MAM munitions, including the MAM-T with a 30+km range, a maritime surveillance radar or a combination of both. This enables the TB3 to engage enemy naval vessels, support amphibious landings and carry out maritime surveillance. The expected low unit price of Indonesia's LPHs (similar to its LPDs) in combination with the acquisition of TB3s could open up up entirely new possibilities for the Indonesian Navy.

The Carrier Candidate: Bayraktar TB3s For Indonesia?

www.oryxspioenkop.com

Just as predicted

As the article said, the cost of our future LPH is expected to be comparatively low to other country's ship of its class. So the future acquisition of it might be very likely to happen, with minimal cost of political will and economic investment, compared to say Japan's Izumo-class, French Mistral, or even Italy's Trieste class which are very expensive (and can raise talks about their use as Carrier in case of Izumo).

LPH will be very useful for an archipelagic nation like us, as it will increase the capability of both naval aviation AND marine landing operation. Its' cost will not be as high as a full-sized carrier, yet is just as effective to support our strategic interest across the archipelago. It will basically be a floating marine headquarters/ flagship that is capable of launching amphibious operations on its own, very effective if let's say something like the PRRI/ Permesta rebellion happens again. Of course, the main advantage is the capability of carrying VTOL and STOL aircraft and helicopters. Imagine an LPH with a squadron of armed drones and a battalion of marines, it will be capable to do drive-thru amphibious COIN operations, with drone air support capabilities to meet the requirement for all levels of insurgency warfare (and even conventional one if we push hard enough). I suppose that if we take the LPH/ LHD/ Light Carrier idea seriously, we might achieve amphibious warfare capability comparable to the WW2 Japanese Empire.

 

[Gary]

Operating flat decks are a big deal, not only the operating cost are very high, we must take into account on ways to effectively employ the flat decks which we have no experience btw. It will take years or even decade to effectively train a carrier aviation crew even under the most favorable circumstances. Just merely having the tools without the political will, constant funds or worst, the proficiency to operate one would cost a lot of taxpayers money. Just look at what happened to the Thai navy carrier.

If amphibious operation is our real need here, then LPD not LPH is the solution. consider our coast are very near from each other. For me the concept of carrier based naval aviation are still a remote yet distinct possibility this time.

We could shorten training time by actively engaging in high end naval exercise like RIMPAC or develop mechanism for other more PRO operator of naval aviation to train ours. China did this back in the 2010s by inviting the Brazilian navy to train their (then) nascent crew. I think due to our close relationship with the Aussies, this is possible especially Australia has operate flat decks for quite some time now.

and oh I don't think COIN should be handled by carriers, technically it can but that one hell of expensive ways to do COIN, the naval aviation wing OTOH could increase the fleet eyes and ears. Extending the situational awareness for hundreds of miles further. Or even guide the navy long range over the horizon missile with OTHT capability.

 

[HellFireIndo]

Operating flat decks are a big deal, not only the operating cost are very high, we must take into account on ways to effectively employ the flat decks which we have no experience btw. It will take years or even decade to effectively train a carrier aviation crew even under the most favorable circumstances. Just merely having the tools without the political will, constant funds or worst, the proficiency to operate one would cost a lot of taxpayers money. Just look at what happened to the Thai navy carrier.

If amphibious operation is our real need here, then LPD not LPH is the solution. consider our coast are very near from each other. For me the concept of carrier based naval aviation are still a remote yet distinct possibility this time.

We could shorten training time by actively engaging in high end naval exercise like RIMPAC or develop mechanism for other more PRO operator of naval aviation to train ours. China did this back in the 2010s by inviting the Brazilian navy to train their (then) nascent crew. I think due to our close relationship with the Aussies, this is possible especially Australia has operate flat decks for quite some time now.

and oh I don't think COIN should be handled by carriers, technically it can but that one hell of expensive ways to do COIN, the naval aviation wing OTOH could increase the fleet eyes and ears. Extending the situational awareness for hundreds of miles further. Or even guide the navy long range over the horizon missile with OTHT capability.

Let's do a discussion

Well, first of all, plans are supposed to be done in the future, in a projected future context. So of course by the time a concept is realized, which may take years and even decades, things could change by then, probably for the better economically because the current trend is stable. So that could also mean a bigger economy, meaning more funds, and realized reforms, meaning better military organization. So I think if we keep the current pace of development, I guess by then pulling out something like this is manageable, perfectly possible.

We cannot really compare ourselves to Thailand, they have a totally different national security challenge. They are a continental power, of course, so they will certainly focus on the Army and land warfare in general, while their Navy is somewhat of a sideshow. I think the case with Chakri Naruebet is obvious, it is a second-hand vessel, bought in a haste, and it doesn't really fit with their strategic interest, to begin with (as a land power). Their acquisition of the vessel was largely an impulsive decision (luck-based), similar to our decision to buy the 3 Bung Tomo class from Brunei, but in their case, they were in worse luck because the vessel is irrelevant strategically, even if they maintain it seriously. So from the very beginning, Thailand isn't supposed to operate that kind of ship, especially since it is not a well-thought-out decision and is in contradiction to their geostrategic interest. Of course, I would argue that we are inherently different from Thailand because we do have a reason: We are a maritime nation after all, with big seas.

Take note that I said that it is going to boost our "amphibious capability AND naval aviation capability". Let's assume that's the cost isn't that ridiculous to the point that ANYTHING is inoperable. If everything we do not own currently, is assumed can't be operated by us because of "operating costs", then we won't have anything of us in our inventory basically, and Bakamla is useless because they have problems with operating costs. That's a problem in assuming we will not be able to operate it, well using the same logic I can also assume we CAN operate it,

Tbh I think it isn't a really convincing argument that LPH is a bad idea "because our coasts are very near to each other". Like, first, they're not near each other, Aceh to Sorong is as far as Aceh to Shanghai. What the heck, who would have thought 4000 km is "very near". As far as I know, China and India own carriers, and apparently, they do not buy to that logic. The second is that I think geography does pose a challenge if someone is assuming all lands are equal, and geography is as smooth as a chessboard. It is not, and it is crucial to realize that people can't just put any battle-ready unit anywhere they want, at any time that easily. In war, such a thing might not be done, especially if said territory is in heat. We cannot transport troops or any equipment from island to island if we do not have adequate naval power projection capability, including naval aviation. Also, we cannot just move planes, drones, or anything to another island that easily, there are only a limited amount of serviceable airstrips on each islands and forget about transporting the crews there, that's impossible if there is no stable sea control over a long period of time. Without a capable naval aviation capability in the fleet, these aircraft are basically locked to their islands, and their airport's risk of being captured, or damaged, renders them unserviceable.

I think I also need to clarify that we might have different ideas of what COIN we imagine. As you can see, imagine Aceh or Timor scenario, Marines need to land, and there's a need for amphibious landing capability AND air cover for troops on the ground (also aerial recon). We have LPH 244 m class in the fleet, filled with helis and drones such as bayraktar. Heck not even need a Nimitz or even Liaoning class (they carry fighter jets vs smaller aircraft for LPH), so just stick to the purpose of LPH design above. What we have is something that fulfills all of the above requirements, you can land troops, as usual, you can carry air cavalry, and you can also provide them with air support from the drones. I am convinced that this arrangement will be useful in the event of something of a large-scale COIN operation (maybe somewhat of an invasion) like in Timor Timur especially, as a lesson learned from the problems we experienced during the landing at Dili.

 

[Gary]

Let's do a discussion

Well, first of all, plans are supposed to be done in the future, in a projected future context. So of course by the time a concept is realized, which may take years and even decades, things could change by then, probably for the better economically because the current trend is stable. So that could also mean a bigger economy, meaning more funds, and realized reforms, meaning better military organization. So I think if we keep the current pace of development, I guess by then pulling out something like this is manageable, perfectly possible.

First of all, politics precede the military. A military are expected to do what the political aim of a country is. Indonesia has grown economically for quite some time now, yet the biggest perceived threat by Jakarta is still internal by nature. I don't see this is going to change even if we put China-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Deck based aviation and power projection that comes with it are not the capability that inward looking government seems attracted to.

So while I would not entirely deny the possibility of the navy acquiring deck based naval aviation, it remains to me a very slim possibility

We cannot really compare ourselves to Thailand, they have a totally different national security challenge. They are a continental power, of course, so they will certainly focus on the Army and land warfare in general, while their Navy is somewhat of a sideshow.

Oh yes we can, certainly successive Indonesian government think the way a continental country think rather than what a maritime country think. In fact there's a lot of similarity between Indonesia and Thailand.

Take note that I said that it is going to boost our "amphibious capability AND naval aviation capability". Let's assume that's the cost isn't that ridiculous to the point that ANYTHING is inoperable. If everything we do not own currently, is assumed can't be operated by us because of "operating costs", then we won't have anything of us in our inventory basically, and Bakamla is useless because they have problems with operating costs. That's a problem in assuming we will not be able to operate it, well using the same logic I can also assume we CAN operate it, That's a problem in assuming we will not be able to operate it, well using the same logic I can also assume we CAN operate it,

Again politics precede the military. The foremost operator of the LHA are the US (and in a smaller scale the French and UK). Why do they need that LHA ? Because they are a GLOBAL power, they need their force ready at moments notice if contingency exist that require the US to land troops. Hence those LHA are part of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), the LHA provided the ARG with moving bases for the expeditionary forces (marines and helo).

Now look at Indonesia, what are we ? a global power with global interests ?? What justification does we have to spend money having both aviation and amphibious assets at the same time like the US navy ARG ?

Tbh I think it isn't a really convincing argument that LPH is a bad idea "because our coasts are very near to each other". Like, first, they're not near each other, Aceh to Sorong is as far as Aceh to Shanghai. What the heck, who would have thought 4000 km is "very near".

As I've posted above, mission requirements (usually backed by political aim) dictates why a ship are designed as such. the LHA are designed as such because the US need its expeditionary marines as well as its aviation to be packed into one moving objects capable to project power everywhere in the world. Why ? because they are a world power and Washington need to exercise those power.

Why would we need an LHA/LHD when our nearest airbase could support nearby military op ? Any attack on Indonesia will be in those 5 big islands and the local Kodam forces are expect to stave off any invader before ships bringing troops and material from Java came into the rescue. Java is quite close to the other big islands especially Kalimantan.

Without a capable naval aviation capability in the fleet, these aircraft are basically locked to their islands, and their airport's risk of being captured, or damaged, renders them unserviceable.

1. Umm no, while airbase are static, the aircrafts are MOBILE and I could assure you they're not fasten to the host island. It's up to the operator on how to employ them
2. The justification of having aircraft carriers as a way to have a more survivable airfield are out of our reach for maybe forever as the US would not sell us the -35s (B) and we'll need China level political commitment for such. Deck based aviation are very expensive and it will take decade(s) for us to train a capable crew operating it. So lets humble ourselves and seek what is realistic

I think I also need to clarify that we might have different ideas of what COIN we imagine. As you can see, imagine Aceh or Timor scenario, Marines need to land, and there's a need for amphibious landing capability AND air cover for troops on the ground (also aerial recon). We have LPH 244 m class in the fleet, filled with helis and drones such as bayraktar. Heck not even need a Nimitz or even Liaoning class (they carry fighter jets vs smaller aircraft for LPH), so just stick to the purpose of LPH design above. What we have is something that fulfills all of the above requirements, you can land troops, as usual, you can carry air cavalry, and you can also provide them with air support from the drones. I am convinced that this arrangement will be useful in the event of something of a large-scale COIN operation (maybe somewhat of an invasion) like in Timor Timur especially, as a lesson learned from the problems we experienced during the landing at Dili.

A COIN operation meant that we're 99.9999999% operating in a permissive environment and 99.999999% operating in Indonesia's territory where the local land based airfield could pretty much do the job done. No need for fancy deck based aviation. And if deck based aviation are needed that bad. LPD could do the job just OK.

Simply put when we're aspiring to have deck based aviation capability it would be in the form of :

1. Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
2. Amphib Ready Group (ARG)

None of which is compatible with our availability of $, foreign policy or anything. Maybe before we talk about LHA, we should talk about Jakarta perceived threat first, because unless the dudes in Jakarta change our perceived threat from internal to external, there's no point in having LHA.

Does that mean I'm against the navy developing naval aviation capability ?? well, NO. In fact I've make my points regarding the use and importance of naval aviation for the fleet many times in this forum. But LHA is just very remote possibillty at least for the time being.

 

[FPXAllen]

The fact that the design render of the LPH is still being displayed during Rapim Kemhan in 2020 (not sure about 2021, btw), at the very least should tell us that the idea of making and operating helicopter/drone carrier(s) for our navy is still alive and well. Also, if it's about crew trainings, I would argue that the level of crew training needed to be able to operate such type of vessels effectively will be considerably "easier" compared to conventional modern flattops such as Liaoning and Nimitz.

Let's put it this way: an Indonesian Navy's LPH, especially if it's designed and built domestically, does not necessarily has to follow similar design philosopy as Izumo or other navies' LPH. It will be enough if it's mainly projected to be deployed as a "tactical" helicopter/drone carrier to support amphibious landing and ground operation within 200-250 km radius from it (basically around the range that can be reached by helos like UH-60 and AH-64 as well as Bayraktar TB2/TB3 in one hour). This way, our air force can put more resources at its disposal for air defence and/or long range strike.

It will be great if each of our three naval fleets is equipped with two LPHs, four LPDs and one hospital ship as their "core". This will also include one multi-purpose amphibious plane squadron like the US-2 as well.

 

[Gary]

Also, if it's about crew trainings, I would argue that the level of crew training needed to be able to operate such type of vessels effectively will be considerably "easier" compared to conventional modern flattops such as Liaoning and Nimitz.

Easy here is relative, easier than operating supercarriers off course, but is the navy up to the job for that level of 'easy' ? You have to remember that the Indonesian military have not contributed anything in importance to the science of a modern military, let alone carrier deck operations (which is considered one of the most complex military op btw). Our experience in operating and managing deck based aircraft ? how about zero. So how are we going to develop the correct tactics to effectively employ deck based aircraft ?

Most of the modern warfare tactics and theory came from the west and the TNI compared to lets say the neighboring Thai's, Singapore and Malaysian armed forces are the less exposed to the western military institutions. So unless we could secure those western powers training our men to operate and employ them in effective manner this is a waste of money and time.

Securing western institutions help is one thing, the other thing is the men operating the assets, either the ships and/or the aircraft it carries must have proficient crew and it will need a lot of money, because they'll need to deploy as often as possible to increase their exercise logs. For a country who struggles to fuel its 5 strong navy ship in the Natuna this is a big questions that need answers and commitments.

And talking about commitments, the Chakri Naruebet ceased to be an effective fighting platform once the 1997 financial crisis swoop the country. The US navy carriers in contrast doesn't cease to exist as an effective fighting platform even when the US got hit by the 2008 meltdown.

I'm afraid our planned mini carrier could face the fate of the Thai navy Chakri Naruebet consider on how low the govt commitment on defense here. especially once economic crisis suddenly appears.

Let's put it this way: an Indonesian Navy's LPH, especially if it's designed and built domestically, does not necessarily has to follow similar design philosopy as Izumo or other navies' LPH.

Design or built by means of imports or built domestically doesn't solve the underlying problem. an LHA is a tool, and for a tool to work perfectly it need to find the right balance on how all the parts fit together. For an LHA that means the right balance on where to put the engine, ammo storage, the aviation garage, the well deck, lifts etc etc. In which Indonesia doesn't even have the industrial capacity, know how or even user feedback as the navy never operate one.

Most of the new LHA user uses an already proven design like the Juan Carlos I or Mistral, even navies with strong ties to modern western institutions like Turkey and Australia. Judging from our difficulties with the relatively simple KCR-60 I think we need to hold our breath on the LHA.

It will be enough if it's mainly projected to be deployed as a "tactical" helicopter/drone carrier to support amphibious landing and ground operation within 200-250 km radius from it

This kinda defeat, the purpose of an LHA, if 250km is the goal, our nearer land based airfield spread across the country could satisfy the requirements. This could be a potential for another white elephants projects like the Chakri Naruebet.

 

[Lordimperator]

It will be great if each of our three naval fleets is equipped with two LPHs, four LPDs and one hospital ship as their "core"

That would be great tho, we will need a lot of combatantsbas escort

 

[FPXAllen]

Our experience in operating and managing deck based aircraft ? how about zero. So how are we going to develop the correct tactics to effectively employ deck based aircraft ?

We're talking about operating (mostly) helicopters on deck here right? Yes, it's not exactly the same but at least in this regard our navy has been operating helicopters on and off the deck for quite some time. As for operating ship-based fixed wing unmanned combat drones, if we look from another perspective this is also the reason why we could build one LHD first for a pilot project so that the ship's crews can learn how to operate and manage them onboard.

For a country who struggles to fuel its 5 strong navy ship in the Natuna this is a big questions that need answers and commitments.

Indeed, this is true for now and for the foreseeable future. But what we're discussing here is not something that we urgently need to acquire in the next 5 years. However, given the potential that a LHD can provide to our navy to expand its presence in our own waters (as well as in our surrounding and immediate regions), it's just proper for us to also think of ways for our navy to utilize this platform so that it can suit its needs and purposes.

The US navy carriers in contrast doesn't cease to exist as an effective fighting platform even when the US got hit by the 2008 meltdown.

Isn't it a bit unfair to compare Indonesia with US in regards to military budget and priorities?

I'm afraid our planned mini carrier could face the fate of the Thai navy Chakri Naruebet consider on how low the govt commitment on defense here. especially once economic crisis suddenly appears.

Again, this is not something we must acquire in the next 5 years, or even in the next decade for that matters. I don't want to comment much on Thailand's trouble here, but at least compared to them, we have a much better case to have an aircraft carrier - geographically speaking. Of course, a conventional aircraft carrier even the smallest one like Chakri Naruebet is already overkill for our needs but that's not the case with LHAs/LHDs.

Most of the new LHA user uses an already proven design like the Juan Carlos I or Mistral, even navies with strong ties to modern western institutions like Turkey and Australia. Judging from our difficulties with the relatively simple KCR-60 I think we need to hold our breath on the LHA.

At the risk of getting this discussion sidetracked, those difficulties are not without remedies. However, it will take an unprecedented amount of reforms - one of which, that I strongly believe - is to give a lot more breathing room for our private companies to have their say rather than being placed as mere suppliers for our defense SoEs.

Yes, when compared to Western countries we're basically still in the sandbox phase, sometimes seemingly like we're just throwing things to the wall to see what sticks. But if that's what we have to go through to finally achive our self sufficiency in defense as much and as soon as possible, then why not?

This kinda defeat, the purpose of an LHA, if 250km is the goal, our nearer land based airfield spread across the country could satisfy the requirements. This could be a potential for another white elephants projects like the Chakri Naruebet.

And how long will it takes to equip nearer land-base airfield with a command, comunication and control center, sufficient weapons (when necessary), fuel and all other supporting equipments necessary for the operation? Of course, if it happens to be a medium-sized or large airfield, we can assume that it won't take long but what if it's not? In the case of natural disaster, there will always be a risk that even the nearest airfield not directly affected by the disaster can not be immediately prepared somehow.

Since we can't guarantee that this will always be achievable in the same amount of time it takes for a helicopter carrier to reach the shore nearest to the area of conflict or emergency (like in natural disaster, for example) this just proves my point even more.

It's because a LHA/LHD is basically a self-contained package of helicopters (plus UAV/UCAV in our case), equipments, weapons and crews ready to go at moment's notice.

 

[HellFireIndo]

Easy here is relative, easier than operating supercarriers off course, but is the navy up to the job for that level of 'easy' ? You have to remember that the Indonesian military have not contributed anything in importance to the science of a modern military, let alone carrier deck operations (which is considered one of the most complex military op btw). Our experience in operating and managing deck based aircraft ? how about zero. So how are we going to develop the correct tactics to effectively employ deck based aircraft ?

Most of the modern warfare tactics and theory came from the west and the TNI compared to lets say the neighboring Thai's, Singapore and Malaysian armed forces are the less exposed to the western military institutions. So unless we could secure those western powers training our men to operate and employ them in effective manner this is a waste of money and time.

Securing western institutions help is one thing, the other thing is the men operating the assets, either the ships and/or the aircraft it carries must have proficient crew and it will need a lot of money, because they'll need to deploy as often as possible to increase their exercise logs. For a country who struggles to fuel its 5 strong navy ship in the Natuna this is a big questions that need answers and commitments.

And talking about commitments, the Chakri Naruebet ceased to be an effective fighting platform once the 1997 financial crisis swoop the country. The US navy carriers in contrast doesn't cease to exist as an effective fighting platform even when the US got hit by the 2008 meltdown.

I'm afraid our planned mini carrier could face the fate of the Thai navy Chakri Naruebet consider on how low the govt commitment on defense here. especially once economic crisis suddenly appears.


Design or built by means of imports or built domestically doesn't solve the underlying problem. an LHA is a tool, and for a tool to work perfectly it need to find the right balance on how all the parts fit together. For an LHA that means the right balance on where to put the engine, ammo storage, the aviation garage, the well deck, lifts etc etc. In which Indonesia doesn't even have the industrial capacity, know how or even user feedback as the navy never operate one.

Most of the new LHA user uses an already proven design like the Juan Carlos I or Mistral, even navies with strong ties to modern western institutions like Turkey and Australia. Judging from our difficulties with the relatively simple KCR-60 I think we need to hold our breath on the LHA.


This kinda defeat, the purpose of an LHA, if 250km is the goal, our nearer land based airfield spread across the country could satisfy the requirements. This could be a potential for another white elephants projects like the Chakri Naruebet.

> So how are we going to have the experience if we don't start to operate them? This is a circular logic "we should not operate X because we don't have the experience, but we do not want to operate x so we won't ever acquire the experience". So what is the point? At some point in the past we never even operate any submarine, and submarines are a very difficult asset to handle. But then we acquire submarines, and start operating them anyway, what is the problem? The problem is by assuming we will not be able to learn, and assuming we should not try anything new because we don't have experience.

> I think is nonsense to say that we are not engaged with western institutions enough when the vast majority of our senior officers were trained and educated in western countries. This is very easy to disprove, because of just how many of our officers enrolled in the USCGC, USMC CSC, and NDU, and many more trained in service schools in the US.

First of all, politics precede the military. A military are expected to do what the political aim of a country is. Indonesia has grown economically for quite some time now, yet the biggest perceived threat by Jakarta is still internal by nature. I don't see this is going to change even if we put China-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Deck based aviation and power projection that comes with it are not the capability that inward looking government seems attracted to.

You are talking to a politics guy about politics. This is another case of framing assumption. Assuming one actor "the government", is always looking inward, with no possibility of changing orientation. Didn't Wowo already say that they are going away from the old paradigm? to not assume peer-to-peer conflict and that hot war wouldn't happen? Wowo is also part of the "government" and apparently, he currently didn't quite fit into your broad assumption. "Government" consists of many actors, not just one monolith of actors that somehow all agree towards inward-looking policy, and that means no flat deck vessels EVER. What the heck, just how many logic and heuristics we have skipped over thus far? Do all of the Government, that is the President, the DPR, the Kemhan, the TNI, ALL literally agree on an inward-looking military in the 21st century with no possibility of a strong navy? Let's use your logic, if we indeed are inward-looking THEN WHY THE HECK WE EVEN OWN A SUBMARINE? WHAT USE IS SUBMARINE AGAINST RAGTAG GUERILLA??

1. Umm no, while airbase are static, the aircrafts are MOBILE and I could assure you they're not fasten to the host island. It's up to the operator on how to employ them

In the event of a hot war, moving an entire squadron across the sea is not that easy, unless you have power projection capability. What the heck, it's not just the planes and the pilots that move, it includes all of the ground crew, the guards, the airport operators, how can you move that from island to island if the seas and airspace are challenged by the enemy navy? If you say "up to the operator on how to employ them", then employ them on flat deck vessels. As this guy said:

It's because a LHA/LHD is basically a self-contained package of helicopters (plus UAV/UCAV in our case), equipments, weapons and crews ready to go at moment's notice.

Besides, it is very obvious from the case of the Japanese invasion that these airbases become a point of interest for Japanese invaders during WW2. Their offensive operations here focus on literally capturing these airfields. How can you assume these airfields could serve us better when they were already proven to be vulnerable in the previous war? The Japanese invaders literally exploited the weakness of the airfield because they are locked to their respective islands, and that cross-island operation was not possible due to the incapability of power projection of the Navy. You say we can only rely on experience in deciding things, but when there is a literal war experience we have here you forget about it and suggest tactics that are already failed before.

A COIN operation meant that we're 99.9999999% operating in a permissive environment and 99.999999% operating in Indonesia's territory where the local land based airfield could pretty much do the job done. No need for fancy deck based aviation. And if deck based aviation are needed that bad. LPD could do the job just OK.

That doesn't happen during the Timor invasion. Land-based airfields were used relatively late into the war, while early on it wasn't used for such COIN operation, only to send off the Hercules. So who provided fire support for the landing force? Inaccurate naval cannon. Early in the war, we were not able to deploy the military in a proper combined arms operation, especially the air assets, because it takes time to set up the airfields and the aircraft, while at the same time we must deploy them "at a moment's notice". You see that it is not a "99.999% permissive environment", that doesn't happen before in Timor, doesn't happen in Permesta, so how can you even assume any number higher than 80%? I think we all should read history and theory to understand that all of our assumptions can be challenged, and history could easily disprove said strategic assumptions.

 

[Madokafc]

Contrary to most people here believe, Indonesian Navy and Air Force actually quite pioneering and very eager to acquire new novel capabilities, some of them quite advanced compared to what other countries in the region Fielded.

For examples, Indonesian Navy is one of the earliest to operated dedicated ASW aircraft in form of Fairy Gannet, one of the earliest to operated modern diesel Submarine system equipped with state of art combat management system in form of Cakra class, one of the earliest to employed AShM equipped vessels system in form of Komar class and Styx Missiles, one of the earliest to employed modern warships equipped with modern combat system (having air defense system, modern SEWACO, capable to do ASW roles, and having anti ship Missiles system etc) in the form of modernized Van Speijk class, Indonesian Navy too already equipped themselves with dedicated command and control ship like KRI Multatuli, and other stuff.

If in the near future Indonesian Navy is trying to gaining other new novel capabilities, like using LHD platform as launching platform for fleets of UCAV or refueling UAV to extend the reach of some helicopters or even manned fighter aircraft that's already given possibility with the quirk of our Navy tradition. Or for having typical destroyer/Frigates fleets equipped with modern combat system, hanggar for large Rotorcraft copter UAV, able to launch unmanned vessels to hunting Submarine (that's one of new capability being seeked from Mogami class though and under Fierce discussion between both parties), all of this is still within possibility to be happened in near future.

 

[Gary]

> So how are we going to have the experience if we don't start to operate them? This is a circular logic "we should not operate X because we don't have the experience, but we do not want to operate x so we won't ever acquire the experience". So what is the point? At some point in the past we never even operate any submarine, and submarines are a very difficult asset to handle. But then we acquire submarines, and start operating them anyway, what is the problem? The problem is by assuming we will not be able to learn, and assuming we should not try anything new because we don't have experience.

I'm assuming that you're confident enough that the navy will have the capability, money and time to develop tactics for deck based aviation from scratch on its own. Again I'm never that much against the navy acquiring LHA, but my question is will we maximalize the potential of the said LHA or it will end up a white elephant such as the fate of carrier 911 of the RTN.

and oh, when we first operate submarines its the Soviets who trained us the science and arts of undersea warfare. My question is as simple if we could persuade already established flat deck navies to pleeeaseeeee kindly teach us the arts of deck based aviation. Simple as that. See my post #6828.

> I think is nonsense to say that we are not engaged with western institutions enough when the vast majority of our senior officers were trained and educated in western countries. This is very easy to disprove, because of just how many of our officers enrolled in the USCGC, USMC CSC, and NDU, and many more trained in service schools in the US.

read again, I said compared to the neighboring countries we are the least engaged. Do you know that Hun Sen son, Hun Manet were also enrolled in the US military academy @ West Point ?
Does that make the Cambodian military exposed to Western military institution and ways they conduct warfare?

You are talking to a politics guy about politics. This is another case of framing assumption. Assuming one actor "the government", is always looking inward, with no possibility of changing orientation. Didn't Wowo already say that they are going away from the old paradigm? to not assume peer-to-peer conflict and that hot war wouldn't happen? Wowo is also part of the "government" and apparently, he currently didn't quite fit into your broad assumption. "Government" consists of many actors, not just one monolith of actors that somehow all agree towards inward-looking policy, and that means no flat deck vessels EVER. What the heck, just how many logic and heuristics we have skipped over thus far?

This is not framing, but military operations are based on politics first. The role of the military, defensive or offensive are dictated by the geopolitical need of a country and the weapons supplied to follow that particular political goal. It is very possible for Indonesia to acquire LHA . But what happens then ? No money to properly train the crew ? deploy only once a month because the navy got no money to buy fuel, because their budget share are smaller than the army ?

I say again, deck based aviation are big boys stuff and comes with big boys money and commitment. The 1997 Asian financial crisis killed the aspiration of the RTN on their carriers, on contrast multiple economic downturn never really annoy the navies of USA, UK , France etc to deploy them carriers as an effective military platform.

From the look of it, we are inclined to do the former if the economy crashed or even a change in government (which we do every 5 years).

Let's use your logic, if we indeed are inward-looking THEN WHY THE HECK WE EVEN OWN A SUBMARINE? WHAT USE IS SUBMARINE AGAINST RAGTAG GUERILLA??

A submarine is a defensive weapons, do not be fooled by the name "hunter killer"/ "attack", for most of the time a submarine is a an ambush predator which wait for an enemy fleet to come by and ambush. A submarine suits our geography and geopolitical goal just fine.

This is not the case for an LHA in regards to our geography and most important geopolitical goal. And one more thing, it's not me who brought the idea of using x weapons against the guerillas and try to justify the purchase.

In the event of a hot war, moving an entire squadron across the sea is not that easy, unless you have power projection capability. What the heck, it's not just the planes and the pilots that move, it includes all of the ground crew, the guards, the airport operators, how can you move that from island to island if the seas and airspace are challenged by the enemy navy? If you say "up to the operator on how to employ them", then employ them on flat deck vessels. As this guy said:

whatever LHA we will buy it will not came with a fixed naval air wing, US aint selling us F-35Bs what's the point ? At the end of the day, the navy will likely depend on the air cover the air force provided from its land based aircraft. As we always do.

So who provided fire support for the landing force? Inaccurate naval cannon.

The air force.

Early in the war, we were not able to deploy the military in a proper combined arms operation, especially the air assets, because it takes time to set up the airfields and the aircraft, while at the same time we must deploy them "at a moment's notice". You see that it is not a "99.999% permissive environment", that doesn't happen before in Timor, doesn't happen in Permesta, so how can you even assume any number higher than 80%? I think we all should read history and theory to understand that all of our assumptions can be challenged, and history could easily disprove said strategic assumptions.

let me give you an idea when I say 99.99999999% permissive environment, there are 3 levels on which an air force operate in an environment.

1. Air dominance : The air force force forced the foe into a subordinate posture
2. Air superiority : The air force control of the sky over the battlefield. An actor's air and ground forces can act “without prohibitive interference
3. Air supremacy : we own the entire skies, the enemy is 100% grounded, if he flies he dies. All he can do is cower and watch.

in a COIN op, we are operating in an air supremacy mode. No one will challenge our planes and if mishaps happens such as one or two getting luckily shot down by the enemy (maybe by manpads assuming Indonesian guerilla are tech savvy enough to have one) it will not even dent the ability of the military to conduct warfare.

One more thing, you have not explained on how carrier based aviation are >>>>>>than airfield based aviation in COIN. When Seroja op is launched our air cover come mainly from bases outside East Timor and they do just fine. Its just the Indonesian lack of combined arms experience that screw up the initial phase of the landings.

If we are talking about peer (potential) enemy like Malaysia, Vietnam or Thailand, we can only hope if the Air force could shift from air dominance to air superiority to air supremacy as soon as possible. Then our land based naval aviation could safely provide the fleet an extended eyes and ears for hundred of miles away.

There are however roles that the LHA could provide the navy with, such as ASW.

JDS Ise DDH-182 Hyuga class Helicopter Destroyer JMSDF

ddh-182 jds ise hyuga class destroyer japan maritime self defense force jmsdf

www.seaforces.org

And back to the earlier point on who can teach us on how to properly use an ASW carrier in a fleet. Does our defense cooperation with those navies deep enough already ?

 

[HellFireIndo]

read again, I said compared to the neighboring countries we are the least engaged. Do you know that Hun Sen son, Hun Manet were also enrolled in the US military academy @ West Point ?
Does that make the Cambodian military exposed to Western military institution and ways they conduct warfare?

You saying Indonesia is "least engaged with western institutions compared to other ASEAN countries" is an unfounded assumption, even contradicting a concrete reality. How the heck we are "least engaged"? Idk but you seem to not quite get the education and promotion system of TNI, hence assuming we are not "western enough". Idk but why are you always looking for weak examples such as Cambodia or Thailand, even when they have very different geopolitical situations than us. You said yourself it's Hun Sen's son, so he is a special case, not a general case. A General case is when a career soldier, rose up through the ranks via his assignment history, and education. That education is what determines what the military of said country values, you can see from the Panglima CV that we are engaged with the West more. I mean look at this:

Andika Perkasa
-Military College of Vermont, Norwich University, United States
- National War College, National Defense University, United States
- Harvard University, United States
- George Washington University, United States

And you are saying we are not as engaged as other countries in the region? BUT WHAT IS THE STANDARD HUH?

I can say that I can jump "very high", but "very high" for me is 20 cm. You see the flaw in your reasoning, you do not provide a clear comparison but just conclude like "we must be less engaged with the west, I don't know why, but it must be". And then provide an inconclusive example "Cambodia dictator son is western educated, but Cambodia is commie, so HFI opinion must be false", like so what? Kim Jong Un is also western educated, yet both of these examples didn't automatically mean Indonesia is the same as them! what the heck? Let's visualize your logic Mike

Mike: "Indonesia is LEAST engaged with the western institution" (so whether engaged or not )

HFI: "No, many of our military officers were educated in western countries" (confirming we are engaged)

Mike: Cambodia dictator son is from West Point -> Cambodia still not western leaning -> Indonesia must be the same (Answering a question I never asked ????)

HFI: But what the heck, that's irrelevant

The role of the military, defensive or offensive are dictated by the geopolitical need of a country and the weapons supplied to follow that particular political goal. It is very possible for Indonesia to acquire LHA . But what happens then ? No money to properly train the crew ? deploy only once a month because the navy got no money to buy fuel, because their budget share are smaller than the army ?

I say again, deck based aviation are big boys stuff and comes with big boys money and commitment.

But who said "no money no money"? who decided that? I mean that's your imagination only, assuming there WILL NOT BE ENOUGH MONEY FOR SOME REASON. "Somehow there will be no money, somehow, idk but as long as it makes HFI is incorrect, it must be true". You know, many people think in such a way that sees countries are stagnant, static, they are what they are since forever. So there is a permanent great power, there is a permanent small power, THERE IS NO SUCH THING. Who decided which one is the big boys and which ones are not? the countries themselves. Austria was a great power in 1914, now they are not. The US was only a middle power in the 1800s, now they are a superpower. So who cares about the current temporary situation that could easily change? money can increase and decrease, and commitment may become greater or smaller. The British used to hold very big commitments globally, but now not so much, so what? We are not allowed to pursue our interests because of the labels of big boys and small boys? Who cares! Besides, do you seriously think Italy is a big boy? Well, they own flat deck vessels, South Korea too? or even Egypt? Omg, the classification of "big boys" becomes confusing!

The air force.

As I said, they provide help late into the war, not early, because of the obvious reasons. Heck those helis and broncos were supposed to help early, not late, but they were late anyway. Why not take pride aside and admits that we should learn from past lessons? Instead, some become a hardheaded pessimists saying "we are not supposed to use big boys stuff", quit that a loser mentality, who cares about labels?

in a COIN op, we are operating in an air supremacy mode. No one will challenge our planes and if mishaps happens such as one or two getting luckily shot down by the enemy (maybe by manpads assuming Indonesian guerilla are tech savvy enough to have one) it will not even dent the ability of the military to conduct warfare.

One more thing, you have not explained on how carrier based aviation are >>>>>>than airfield based aviation in COIN. When Seroja op is launched our air cover come mainly from bases outside East Timor and they do just fine. Its just the Indonesian lack of combined arms experience that screw up the initial phase of the landings.

During Vietnam and Afghan wars, things didn't exactly go as planned, wasn't it. It's easy to overlook things, assuming the enemy will be far greater, or far inferior to ours, without considering other possibilities. For example, the Soviet invasion was bogged down simply because the Americans supplied Stinger missiles to Afghan mujahidin, and that fact alone completely messed up their calculations. During PRRI/ Permesta rebellion the US-backed rebels were supported by American planes, who would have predicted that? Probably somewhere out there, back then, a guy in US DoD probably predicted that Taliban armament wouldn't work against US forces and coalition victory is inevitable. But what the heck 20 years campaign didn't go well and the Taliban somehow won. So do not overlook things, and not assume there WILL be, or there WILL NOT be problems, just balanced look at it.

About the Seroja operation in Timor, you said yourself, the airfield used in the operation is not in Timor, but in another island, meaning far away, meaning the less efficient and higher margin of error. Look at Argentina's Malvinas/ Falklands War, Argentinian fighters operating from the mainland, have frequent problems with running out of fuel mid-air due to how far the distance was (despite seemingly close from the map perspective). The British force, on the other hand, didn't experience this problem because they operated from a Carrier, which enables them to maneuver their "airfield" at will around the warzone.

You can see a similar situation with Indonesia in Timor operation, the only long-range planes we have at that moment, that participate in the early stage of the war, was the Hercules transport planes. Where were the other fighter planes? Heck true COIN aircraft, the Broncos, weren't even operated until 1977, 2 years into the conflict. So let's say we are in the middle of conflict similar to Seroja, and we have something like flat deck LPH with both helicopter landing capability, and drones aboard with COIN capability. We may have better amphibious landing capability (via helis instead of walking), and CAS/ COIN capability outright from the same task force (because the LPH carries drones under their command). That will make simpler coordination if the Marine task force has their air support on the same leadership, of the same task force, on the same fleet, rather than from another branch that may cause delays. The landing troops may have air support outright from the start of the war and avoid unnecessary coordination blunders.

We should've remembered the incident with KRI Macan Tutul, poor coordination between Navy and Air Force, and lack of air capability of the Navy caused the death of Admiral Yos. But heck some people suggest we rather had that risk instead of properly building up the Navy to suit our maritime nation profile? Because apparently "it will be costly", then what are things that are not costly? Everything is costly, so what? we must adapt anyway.

Though remember Mike, this isn't personal, after all the forum is for discussion, and we may argue things as long as we exhibit proper behavior.

 

[Madokafc]

Just lol lah, for people who keep mentioned Alman helvas tweet in this forum although several member here have repeatitively Deny his claims or caught him change his Twitter message, suddenly to talk like an experience expert.

 

[Gary]

Though remember Mike, this isn't personal, after all the forum is for discussion, and we may argue things as long as we exhibit proper behavior.

I personally have no problem. This is after all a forum.......I have no grudge against difference in opinion. I'd rather discuss than spamming the forum with feel good pictures like some members do.

For me, forum= discussion, no need to worry.

You saying Indonesia is "least engaged with western institutions compared to other ASEAN countries"

Yes, I said that...while in your post #6829 you said:

I think is nonsense to say that we are not engaged with western institutions

see the difference ?

How the heck we are "least engaged"? Idk but you seem to not quite get the education and promotion system of TNI, hence assuming we are not "western enough". Idk but why are you always looking for weak examples such as Cambodia or Thailand, even when they have very different geopolitical situations than us. You said yourself it's Hun Sen's son, so he is a special case, not a general case. A General case is when a career soldier, rose up through the ranks via his assignment history, and education. That education is what determines what the military of said country values, you can see from the Panglima CV that we are engaged with the West more. I mean look at this:

Umm I don't know man, for example Singapore has led RIMPAC before, they're regularly present in US led live fire exercise , for example : Pacific Griffin and IIRC from defencetalk they have high level cooperation with RAN on undersea warfare. Not to mention that their air force personnel fly in the US with USAF pilot. Malaysia also is part of the FPDA and I was quite amazed to know that they hire elite former USN F-18 pilots to train their jockeys.

As I said, they provide help late into the war, not early, because of the obvious reasons. Heck those helis and broncos were supposed to help early, not late, but they were late anyway. Why not take pride aside and admits that we should learn from past lessons? Instead, some become a hardheaded pessimists saying "we are not supposed to use big boys stuff", quit that a loser mentality, who cares about labels?


During Vietnam and Afghan wars, things didn't exactly go as planned, wasn't it. It's easy to overlook things, assuming the enemy will be far greater, or far inferior to ours, without considering other possibilities. For example, the Soviet invasion was bogged down simply because the Americans supplied Stinger missiles to Afghan mujahidin, and that fact alone completely messed up their calculations. During PRRI/ Permesta rebellion the US-backed rebels were supported by American planes, who would have predicted that? Probably somewhere out there, back then, a guy in US DoD probably predicted that Taliban armament wouldn't work against US forces and coalition victory is inevitable. But what the heck 20 years campaign didn't go well and the Taliban somehow won. So do not overlook things, and not assume there WILL be, or there WILL NOT be problems, just balanced look at it.

yes, but our land based assets are adequate for low level insurgency we faced, imagine deploying an entire carrier and its guard just to hunt some rebels in hiding ? closer land based forward base hosing attack/utility helo could pretty much support the troops engaging nearby.

For me personally the idea to justify LHA purchase for COIN remain the most uncanny one.

 

[Madokafc]

Looking from this side look like an CN235 MPA