Would you prefer MUGEM or 6 modern submarines?
Submarine or aircraft carrier? Both MUGEM and MILDEN are progressing very concretely in their respective fields, and by the mid-2030s these ships will be strategic elements of the navy. I think we passed this part of the debate years ago. Political will and Staff planning gave the answer as "both". My humble opinion is that the real gap, which is still not attracting attention, is happening elsewhere: the increasing need for enabling platforms. That is, intermediate platforms that strengthen operational linkage and mission continuity between the fleet's elements.
Look at where the surface fleet is heading. By the mid-2030s it centres on MUGEM and TCG Anadolu, screened by the TF-2000 destroyers and the İstif-class frigates (In addition, modernized Barbarossas and perhaps, a heavy frigate idea might come to fruition in 6-8 years) the Ada corvettes, the Hisar OPVs, and a submarine force past sixteen boats. Four Bayraktar LSTs carry the amphibious lift. And feeding all of this at sea are possibly two Derya-class ships. Derya is a genuinely capable platform, 26,000 tonnes, two-sided RAS, ADVENT, with a second hull probebly on the way. But its design logic is built around one task: keeping the Task ( strike or amphibious) group fuelled. Spread that across two or three task groups operating at once, add the new basing footprint in Libya and Somalia and beyond, and two replenishment ships start to feel like a thin margin, If the ultimate goal is a NATO independent naval power when necessary.
There is a second gap that bothers me more, because it is structural rather than just a numbers problem. The Bayraktar LSTs can put vehicles and troops ashore, but they cannot sustain themselves offshore for long without close support. Anadolu gives us air operations and amphibious command, but it cannot also be a Role-3 forward surgical hospital and a replenishment node at the same time. The layer between the capital ships and the assault force, the platform that holds the maritime support area and keeps everything alive, simply does not exist in our inventory. A ship that never puts its own ramp on the beach, but enables the force that does.
This is not a new idea, and it is worth looking at how others solved it. The Dutch Karel Doorman put logistics, a Role 3 hospital, and a large hangar into a single 28,000-tonne hull, and took criticism for trying to be everything at once. The Danish Absalon went the opposite way, a small 6,300-tonne hull with frigate-level weapons but very little cargo room. Neither is a clean template for us, but together they mark out the space. What we need sits between them, and closer to the logistics end than the combatant end.
In my head the platform looks like this: Somewhere around 200 metres and 18,000 to 20,000 tonnes, able to hold 16 to 18 knots so it can actually keep station with a frigate group rather than trailing behind it. Fuel capacity deliberately modest, because this ship is not a second Derya; it tops up escorts and LSTs at the margins while Derya does the heavy oiler work. Two-sided RAS so it can service two ships at once. A hangar for four helicopters and a deck that can take a Chinook for vertical replenishment. And the parts that actually justify a new hull rather than another oiler: a fixed Role 3 hospital, because Anadolu and the LSTs only reach Role 2 and we have no afloat Role 3 anywhere in the fleet; and a proper USV mothership capability, stern ramp or heavy davits plus a control centre that can run a dozen unmanned platforms at once. That last piece is where this concept earns its place in a navy that is leaning hard into unmanned systems.
On weapons I would keep the philosophy simple: this ship defends itself, it does not go looking for a fight. Two GÖKDENİZ on the hangar roof for the hard-kill close-in layer, ATOM airburst rounds being exactly what you want against both sea-skimmers and kamikaze USVs. One pedestal GÖKSUR forward to push the intercept envelope out to fifteen kilometres, a layer the guns alone cannot give you, and a system that has now actually intercepted a sea-skimming target rather than just sitting on a brochure. Two SMASH 30mm on the beam for fast boats and surface drones, four STAMP 12.7mm for close-in work, a torpedo countermeasures suite and a simple hull sonar for warning. No towed array, no VLS farm, nothing that turns it into a pseudo-frigate; so it is not a "jack of all trades" ship. Sensors and command on CENK 350-N and ADVENT, almost same combat system already working on Anadolu, which means if a flagship goes down this ship can pick up task group command without breaking the network.
Where it pays off is in the scenarios. In a contested deployment it sits behind the surface action group, feeding the escorts and running a forward USV screen that pushes the group's eyes and reach further out. It holds the support area while the LSTs work the beach, keeps their fuel and ammunition cycle going, and takes casualties into the Role 3. The same hull turns into a base for evacuation or disaster relief with surgical capacity and helicopter throughput nothing else in the fleet can offer that far from home.
I am not going to pretend it is cheap, in return for this strategic value. A hull this size with the propulsion to hold 18 knots, a Role 3 hospital, and a full sensor and weapon fit is going to land somewhere around 400 to 450 million dollars even with high local content, and the machinery to make the speed is a real cost, not a footnote. But weigh that against what it protects.
The TF-2000-Tepe Class programme alone runs into billions. A task group that has to break off early because the logistics ran out, or a casualty with nowhere to operate, costs far more in operational terms than the ship that would have prevented it. Sefine proved with Derya that our yards can build a complex auxiliary on time, and every major system this thing needs is already in production. The capability is there. The real question is whether a LPDish support ship can ever win an argument against the platforms that are simply more exciting to talk about.
