India Nuclear Weapons Program

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

There is no need for India to revise its policy of no first use policy insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned since the country’s deterrence redlines are fairly well established for any of the adversaries to take chances, two of India’s well-known analysts in this specialised field, Dr Manpreet Sethi of Centre for Air Power Studies and Dr Roshan Khanijo of United Services Institution feel. They are in conversation with StratNewsGlobal Editor-in-Chief Nitin A. Gokhale in the final episode of the limited edition series Strategic Insight jointly done with USI, India’s oldest military think-tank.
=========

Frankly its weird this channel still has only 54k subs given the quality content and level of guests+analysis given, but I would think they get to 100k subs soon.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

India’s Nuclear Arsenal Takes A Big Step Forward​

By Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen • December 23, 2021

On 18 December 2021, India tested its new Agni-P medium-range ballistic missile from its Integrated Test Range on Abdul Kalam Island. This was the second test of the missile, the first test having been conducted in June 2021.

Our friends at Planet Labs PBC managed to capture an image of the Agni-P launcher sitting on the launch pad the day before the test took place.


Following both launches of the Agni-P, the Indian Government referred to the missile as a “new generation” nuclear-capable ballistic missile. Back in 2016, when the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) first announced the development of the Agni-P (which was called the Agni-1P at the time), a senior DRDO official explained why this missile was so special:
“As our ballistic missiles grew in range, our technology grew in sophistication. Now the early, short-range missiles, which incorporate older technologies, will be replaced by missiles with more advanced technologies. Call it backward integration of technology.”

The Agni-P is India’s first shorter-range missile to incorporate technologies now found in the newer Agni-IV and -V ballistic missiles, including more advanced rocket motors, propellants, avionics, and navigation systems.

Most notably, the Agni-P also incorporates a new feature seen on India’s new Agni-V intermediate-range ballistic missiles that has the potential to impact strategic stability: canisterization. And the launcher used in the Agni-P launch appears to have increased mobility. There are also unconfirmed rumors that the Agni-P and Agni-V might have the capability to launch multiple warheads.


Canisterization

“Canisterizing” refers to storing missiles inside a sealed, climate-controlled tube to protect them from the outside elements during transportation. In this configuration, the warhead can be permanently mated with the missile instead of having to be installed prior to launch, which would significantly reduce the amount of time needed to launch nuclear weapons in a crisis. This is a new feature of India’s Strategic Forces Command’s increased emphasis on readiness. In recent years, former senior civilian and military officials have reportedly suggested in interviews that “some portion of India’s nuclear force, particularly those weapons and capabilities designed for use against Pakistan, are now kept at a high state of readiness, capable of being operationalized and released within seconds or minutes in a crisis—not hours, as had been assumed.”

If Indian warheads are increasingly mated to their delivery systems, then it would be harder for an adversary to detect when a crisis is about to rise to the nuclear threshold. With separated warheads and delivery systems, the signals involved with mating the two would be more visible in a crisis, and the process itself would take longer. But widespread canisterization with fully armed missiles would shorten warning time. This would likely cause Pakistan to increase the readiness of its missiles as well and shorten its launch procedures––steps that could increase crisis instability and potentially raise the likelihood of nuclear use in a regional crisis. As Vipin Narang and Christopher Clary noted in a 2019 article for International Security, this development “enables India to possibly release a full counterforce strike with few indications to Pakistan that it was coming (a necessary precondition for success). If Pakistan believed that India had a ‘comprehensive first strike’ strategy and with no indication of when a strike was coming, crisis instability would be amplified significantly.”

For years, it was evident that India’s new Agni-V intermediate-range missile (the Indian Ministry of Defense says Agni-V has a range of up to 5,000 kilometers; the US military says the range is over 5,000 kilometers but not ICBM range) would be canisterized; however, the introduction of the shorter-range, canisterized Agni-P suggests that India ultimately intends to incorporate canisterization technology across its suite of land-based nuclear delivery systems, encompassing both shorter- and longer-range missiles. While Agni-V is a new addition to India’s arsenal, Arni-P might be intended––once it becomes operational––to replace India’s older Agni-I and Agni-II systems.


MIRV technology

It appears that India is also developing technology to potentially deploy multiple warheads on each missile. There is still uncertainty about how advanced this technology is and whether it would enable independent targeting of each warhead (using multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs) or simply multiple payloads against the same target.

The Agni-P test in June 2021 was rumored to have used two maneuverable decoys to simulate a MIRVed payload, with unnamed Indian defense sources suggesting that a functional MIRV capability will take another two years to develop and flight-test. The Indian MOD press release did not mention payloads. It is unclear whether the December 2021 test utilized decoys in a similar manner.

In 2013, the director-general of DRDO noted in an interview that “Our design activity on the development and production of MIRV is at an advanced stage today. We are designing the MIRVs, we are integrating [them] with Agni IV and Agni V missiles.” In October 2021, the Indian Strategic Forces Command conducted its first user trial of the Agni-V in full operational configuration, which was rumored to have tested MIRV technology. The MOD press release did not mention MIRVs.

If India succeeds in developing an operational MIRV capability for its ballistic missiles, it would be able to strike more targets with fewer missiles, thus potentially exacerbating crisis instability with Pakistan. If either country believed that India could potentially conduct a decapitating or significant first strike against Pakistan, a serious crisis could potentially go nuclear with little advance warning. Indian missiles with MIRVs would become more important targets for an adversary to destroy before they could be launched to reduce the damage India could inflict. Additionally, India’s MIRVs might prompt Indian decision-makers to try and preemptively disarm Pakistan in a crisis.

India’s other nuclear adversary, China, has already developed MIRV capability for some of its long-range missiles and is significantly increasing its nuclear arsenal, which might be a factor in India’s pursuit of MIRV technology. A MIRV race between the two countries would have significant implications for nuclear force levels and regional stability. For India, MIRV capability would allow it to more rapidly increase its nuclear stockpile in the future, if it so decided––especially if its plutonium production capability can make use of the unsafeguarded breeder reactors that are currently under construction.


Implications for India’s nuclear policy

India has long adhered to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy and in 2020 India officially stated that there has been no change in its NFU policy. Moreover, the Agni-V test launch in October 2021 was accompanied by a reaffirmation of a “’credible minimum deterrence’ that underpins the commitment to ‘No First Use’.”

At the same time, however, the pledge to NFU has been caveated, watered-down, and called into question by government statements and recent scholarship. The increased readiness and pursuit of MIRV capability for India’s strategic forces could further complicate India’s adherence to its NFU policy and could potentially cause India’s nuclear adversaries to doubt its NFU policy altogether.

Given that Indian security forces have repeatedly clashed with both Pakistani and Chinese troops during recent border disputes, potentially destabilizing developments in India’s nuclear arsenal should concern all those who want to keep regional tensions below boiling point.


Background Information:
This article was made possible by generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Categories: ballistic missiles, Deterrence, Disarmament, India, Nuclear Weapons
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

In the final months of 2021, India conducted two major missile tests. The first was the Shaurya hypersonic weapon test, which was conducted in October. The second was the Agni-P missile test conducted on Christmas Eve. Both missile tests indicate that India is on course to fielding a more sophisticated nuclear arsenal with greater diversity of delivery systems. These developments have triggered a flurry of analyses ranging from satisfaction over improvements in the Indian arsenal’s level of readiness to dangerous prognostications about what these missile developments might mean for strategic stability, especially between India and Pakistan.

Let us begin with what Shaurya and Agni-P imply for the state of readiness of India’s arsenal. These two missiles highlight the importance of expanding the repertoire of our nuclear-capable missile forces. India also tested a hypersonic weapon that is estimated to travel at a speed of Mach 5 and designed to dodge missile defences. Hypersonic weapons such as Shaurya are likely to be highly effective in taking out enemy early radars, static military installations such as airbases and command and control (C&C) facilities, although Shaurya may require a few additional tests to establish the credibility of its operational capabilities.

The Agni-P missile is believed to be capable of delivering multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or multiple warheads against a single target. This creates an opportunity for India to strengthen nuclear deterrence through ambiguity. Several analysts have inferred that Agni-P and Shaurya together represent a shift in India’s no-first-use policy. However, officially there is no evidence to suggest a change; India’s declaratory doctrine has remained steadfastly committed to no-first-use even as the country’s operational posture in the form of higher readiness levels undergoes a shift. The latter part is increasingly manifesting itself in the form of the ‘canisterization’ of India’s missiles, not only for longer range missiles such as intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), but also for the Agni-P, which is a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).

Canistering missiles enables more rapid deployment, as warheads could already be mated with missiles and placed in climate-controlled tubes, preventing damage, for launch on short notice. Further, canisterized missile capabilities give India counter-force strike options, especially against Pakistan, according to some analysts who fear an intensification of strategic instability emerging from India’s missile progress.

Thus, because of India’s putative MIRV-based and canisterized ballistic missile forces, one school of thought holds that India could launch a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in the heat of a crisis. This view conveniently overlooks the fact that Pakistan has a larger nuclear arsenal than India’s and Rawalpindi’s refusal to adopt a no-first-use policy, despite past entreaties to do so. Pakistan also pursues an asymmetric escalation posture that involves the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, but most critically early use of atomic weapons in a conflict with India, leaving us exposed to stand-off missile attacks. Moreover, it is misleading to argue that India’s canisterized and MIRV capabilities sow “strategic instability" when it is more the result of Pakistan’s pursuit of an offensive posture that involves the tactical use of nuclear weapons against a potential Indian conventional attack.

Indeed, the Pakistani presumption that the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons can be kept separate is the primary source of instability. New Delhi has generally rejected the notion that decoupling the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons is possible or sustainable because there can be no real distinction between counter-value and counter-force strikes involving such weapons, at least against Pakistan. Also, India’s pursuit of higher readiness levels in the form of Agni-P and Shaurya is only par for the course in that it is a justifiable insurance against a risk-prone adversary such as Pakistan. Although India has a stated no-first-use policy, combining it with a higher degree of operational readiness of its nuclear tipped-missile forces is also about pursuing nuclear deterrence, though through ambiguity, as it sows uncertainty and induces caution in India’s two nuclear adversaries, China and Pakistan. If anything, it complicates the first strike options of Beijing and Rawalpindi.

Beyond Pakistan, the advances in India’s missile capabilities are geared to deterring the People’s Republic of China. The latter has significantly superior capabilities than India. Beijing has deployed its Dong-Feng (DF)-26 IRBMs in the Xinjiang region of Western China. India’s Shaurya hypersonic weapon is equally a response China’s DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) with a range of 1,800-2,500km, which Beijing is believed to have been fielding since at least 2019. Notwithstanding the caveat that New Delhi has generally rejected distinctions between counter-value and counter-force targets and tactical and strategic capabilities, Indian counter-force strike options are more plausible against China than Pakistan simply because a large number of the former’s land-based nuclear forces are more distant from population centres. Pakistan is acutely vulnerable to strategic interdiction due to its narrow geography as opposed to the geographic and strategic depth China enjoys. In any case, Beijing’s’s submarine-based nuclear capabilities give it a near invulnerable second-strike capacity, making India’s counter-force strikes against Chinese nuclear targets difficult. Thus, India’s hypersonic and canisterized Agni SRBM and IRBM capabilities are equally about preserving strategic deterrence and enhancing regional strategic stability.

Harsh V. Pant & Kartik Bommakanti are, respectively, professor of international relations, King’s College London and a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
 

Gessler

Contributor
Moderator
India Moderator
Messages
869
Reactions
39 1,947
Nation of residence
India
Nation of origin
India
Keeping in mind the fact that the S-5 class SSBN will probably have 12 missile tubes storing K-5 or K-6 intercontinental SLBMs (which will most definitely have Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles or MIRVs)....each S-5 boat, even if we assume a relatively modest MIRV capacity of 3 RVs per missile, would be carrying 36 nuclear warheads. Three such boats, if we assume each has it's own permanently assigned load of missiles, would require 108 warheads. If we're talking four boats (following the UK & France pattern of SSBN numbers) that goes to 144 warheads. That's close to the total stockpile that most experts assume India to have currently (~150 warheads).

If we assume 4 MIRVs per SLBM (like the slide I've shown below, shown by DRDO's then-chairman Dr. VK Saraswat at IIT-Bombay university) then it would be 48 warheads per sub, and 144 for Three boats and 192 for Four boats. With a quoted throwaway weight of 2 tons, likelihood is high for there to be indeed 4 x 500kg MIRVs per K-5/K-6.

Note that I'm discounting the Arihant/Arihant Stretch-class as I firmly believe they'll be retired as SSBNs as relegated to a less demanding role (like conventionally-armed SSGN) once a corresponding S-5 SSBN comes online.

photo-2021-03-14-02-28-29.jpg

K-5/K-6 Intercontinental-range SLBM

However - it must be remembered that India, with two nuclear-armed hostile neighbours who share land borders, certainly has no plans of giving up it's land-based rail & road-mobile nuclear deterrent like UK & France have done. This portion of the triad will continue to be armed in the form of Agni-4, Agni-5 and the in-development Agni-6 with MIRVs (plus whatever Agni-1P derived MRBM replaces Agni-1/2). The Agni-6 is reportedly designed to have a throw weight of 3 tons, so we're again looking at a significant MIRV payload (again, refer to the slide I've linked below, from same source at IIT-Bombay presentation).

Even with an extremely conservative number of only 24 Agni-6 missiles, we'll need 96 warheads for them alone (again a 4-MIRV bus). And that's just the China-focused deterrent. The Pakistani threat will be having its own land-based deterrence with NG-MRBM (Agni-1P descendent to replace existing Agni-1 & 2) and even if we assume only unitary warheads, that's another bare minimum of 12-24 right there, making up about 100-120 warheads for the Land leg of triad.

a5a6.jpg

Agni-5 and Agni-6 Intermediate-range BM

E5DAt1YX0AA77OF.jpg

Agni-1P technology-demonstration Medium-range BM platform

And we won't be giving up the Air-launched deterrent either (like UK has done), the presence of nuclear gravity bombs as well as the ongoing development of a nuclear-capable Liquid-Fuel Ramjet (LFRJ) ALCM intended for the Indian Rafales (very similar to the French ASMP-A missile) indicate that this leg of the triad is here to stay as well.

Make that another 12-24 nukes for the Air triad...and add a handful of reserves.


We're looking at a need of about:

144-192 -- for At-Sea deterrence
108-120 -- for land-based deterrence
12-24 -- for air-based deterrence
~10 -- strategic reserves

...a conservative, bare-minimum estimated requirement of between approx 274 to 346 warheads for the foreseeable future.

The delays of Plutonium deliveries to the PFBR prototype reactor also point at the possibility of the Pu going to fill other, more pressing & strategically important requirements, like perhaps building more bombs.

Thoughts?

@Nilgiri @Zapper @Paro @Cabatli_53 @T-123456 @Test7 @MisterLike @Bilal Khan(Quwa) @AlphaMike @Indos
 
Last edited:

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
Thoughts?

With reference to: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-force-structure-2015-pub-63988

Your final number comes out similar to Bharat Karnad's estimated need for 328 warheads by around 2030 (that he made back in 1998).

Of course at that point, the projection he made was far more air-delivery heavy since no MIRV was assumed.

Gurmeet Kanwal's projection (made around 2001) also shares some similar underlying contours to yours with regards to the land and air-delivered components. But again they give no MIRV to the sea-based one (ends up being ~ 48 for the SSBNs just like Karnad) and the total comes to just 200 warheads.

Effectively yours is quite similar to a Kanwal projection but with a commensurately larger sea-based deterrent (same number of boats, maybe even one less... but MIRV-enabled so a x4).

As I value the sea-based deterrent the highest (and MIRV basically concentrates more deterrence per expensive boat at a more economical approach w.r.t the missile dev), I prefer your approach the most.

MIRV also has better saturation potential against ABM systems which is an X-factor in achieving actual realised deterrence.

However let us see how it actually goes with the MIRV. There may or may not be other factors regarding its final dev that we are not privy to at this point. WMD material and warhead production (Plutonium production and availability) are also factors here....though I don't foresee that being an issue if decisions are made to ramp that up.

With MIRV approach established well and committed to, it will unlock the final tier of deterrence maximisation for India.
 

Rajendra Chola

Committed member
Messages
252
Reactions
87
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
PFBR is not operational yet. Being the first.of it's class, obviously it's actually already delayed by 7 years and definitely it's not lack of plutonium.

We don't have MIRV missiles yet to account for it yet as we don't have an active known MIRV system.

I quite honestly think India is due one last Nuclear test before going full fledged production for MIRV weapons. Either small tac nukes or thermo nuclear ones. Voices are already starting to get heard. But we may be 10-12 years away.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
PFBR is not operational yet. Being the first.of it's class, obviously it's actually already delayed by 7 years and definitely it's not lack of plutonium.

That's true. Pu feedstock (to either civil or weapons) is really not an issue IMO....

The issue with PFBR lies with its novel tier of technology that is proving a big challenge to implement.

We don't have MIRV missiles yet to account for it yet as we don't have an active known MIRV system.
It should come online within this decade I would think though, so we can make some projections as to optimal warhead need based on it.

I quite honestly think India is due one last Nuclear test before going full fledged production for MIRV weapons. Either small tac nukes or thermo nuclear ones. Voices are already starting to get heard. But we may be 10-12 years away.

Its complicated. It depends on the classified info regarding the thermonuclear tests results on what was actually designed for, achieved and measured (at hand) in the end....and the scaleability of this (by way of the relevant simulation from 50 ---> 200 or 300kt). i.e how much tritium (or proxy like LiD) was deployed (as the secondary) and achieved fusion.

There is nothing open source on this stuff (as one would expect)....so it is hard to say if test validation is needed or would be beneficial (given the geopolitical attention drawn to it). We simply dont have the info needed that the policy makers + scientists involved do.
 

Rajendra Chola

Committed member
Messages
252
Reactions
87
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
That's true. Pu feedstock (to either civil or weapons) is really not an issue IMO....

The issue with PFBR lies with its novel tier of technology that is proving a big challenge to implement.


It should come online within this decade I would think though, so we can make some projections as to optimal warhead need based on it.



Its complicated. It depends on the classified info regarding the thermonuclear tests results on what was actually designed for, achieved and measured (at hand) in the end....and the scaleability of this (by way of the relevant simulation from 50 ---> 200 or 300kt). i.e how much tritium (or proxy like LiD) was deployed (as the secondary) and achieved fusion.

There is nothing open source on this stuff (as one would expect)....so it is hard to say if test validation is needed or would be beneficial (given the geopolitical attention drawn to it). We simply dont have the info needed that the policy makers + scientists involved do.

We can do all simulation we want. Nothing is greater than actual testing. P5 had decades of multiple nuclear testing to formalize their technology. They have conducted open, air and sea nuclesr testing.

But it would be a bad time to do the testing this decade as our economy is just on it's feet. And we also have lots of our defence projects with Western inputs. All will be sanctioned. So either we can do it in secret (in Andamans) or openly declare, have sanctions for a few years and be done with it. Either way have to do it in a way our economy isn't affected.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
We can do all simulation we want. Nothing is greater than actual testing. P5 had decades of multiple nuclear testing to formalize their technology. They have conducted open, air and sea nuclesr testing.

But it would be a bad time to do the testing this decade as our economy is just on it's feet. And we also have lots of our defence projects with Western inputs. All will be sanctioned. So either we can do it in secret (in Andamans) or openly declare, have sanctions for a few years and be done with it. Either way have to do it in a way our economy isn't affected.

TIFWIW and IMO:

It just hinges on the tamper conversion....that stuff is classified.

If the conversion was bad or less than optimal, than certainly another test will have to be done.

But we (as laypeople) have no way of knowing the situation there.

There are totally new warhead components (untested and only simulated) that US (LANL and livermore iirc) and I think Russia too refurbish their deployed warheads with (given the testing agreements and conventions now).

There are probably a number of reasons why India didn't flat out just test the 200 kt max-variant for shakti-I. Maybe the LiD was just coming online at that time....and the political window for the test demanded it be done with whatever was ready at that point (and objective was to prove the tamper transfer knowing the assured scaleability of the secondary). One can look at what secondary designs involve...they are material availability dependent much more than RnD + testing dependent.

The 200kt number is after all not pulled out of thin air....it is based on the primary size and geometry.

The optimal play now could have been adjudged to build the 200 kt warheads (as LiD production now has established) with the computing available (that did not exist in the cold war).

Any doubt by others can simply be another deterrence X-factor.... you want to find out if its 50 or 200kt?

Do you (soundly) model on best or worst case scenario as the opponent?
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
Or do an underground test in secret.

It will be detected.....maybe an extremely deep sea test can be done secretly given the dampening on offer (I am not sure)....but there would be fallout that can be detected and raise a real maelstrom in that case too.

Underground is extremely detectable by seismographs.

If its another round of testing, it will have to be underground though IMO....as the only possible reason to do it is to declare an obvious 200kt and have the global seismo's leave little doubt on it....and just take the maelstrom on the chin and power through it (i.e at least you are open upfront about it)

A secret test would not achieve anything new.....unless of course there was tamper failure of some degree in the 98 tests and there is some correction/validation needed discreetly. But it would carry too much added political risk for little gain IMO.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India

Quote on page 256:

Instead, through a deliberate policy shift analogous to that of Bush’s nuclear agreement with India but at much lower political cost, it could encourage another U.S. ally—France—to offer India such collaboration with explicit American support.

The resulting agreement between India, France, and the United States (INFRUS) would not only go some distance in placating Paris for the shabby manner in which Washington helped to abort the previous Franco-Australian agreement for submarine construction, but it would also help India to avail of the superb French naval nuclear propulsion technology to build up its own sea-based deterrent (as well as its nuclear attack submarine force). What Washington would do most of all in such a hypothetical INFRUS compact is to endorse and midwife an Indo-French arrangement. Such an agreement, of course, could be concluded independently between Paris and New Delhi, but it is rather unlikely that France would pursue such a deal in the face of either U.S. reluctance or opposition. Consequently, the most sensible approach to aid India in building an effective naval nuclear reactor would be to develop a trilateral mechanism that first discusses the nature of Indian requirements and, thereafter, develops a plan of action that the United States could endorse even if it does not itself contribute any particular nuclear technology. The threats that will be posed by China’s growing nuclear capabilities to India’s strategic reserves are likely to be significant enough in the coming years to warrant the exploration of such ambitious solutions—if the common U.S., French, and Indian goal of preventing Beijing’s hegemony in Asia and globally is to be realized.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,680
Reactions
117 19,593
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
A very well researched video by Asianometry:

 

Follow us on social media

Top Bottom