“If Chinese aggressive warfare is as impossible as you claim, why is the command of the US armed forces so concerned?”
No, our allied defense posture is merely rotating from slow and expensive strategies into efficient new ones. Doing more with less is not ‘concern’. and current conflicts around the globe have taught you it’s a wise decision.
We’re witnessing is a defense spending reckoning plus regional political change. The political change is that we’re now in the post-Duterte era in the Philippines and Manila is now warmly welcoming the U.S. armed forces on their turf again. That doubles as a twin-flag deterrent that our ships lack.
The defense spending reckoning is that we can more rapidly develop and field alternatives to $2.5 billion combatant ships that take 4 years to build and $7 billion subs that take 6 years to build. Shore based forces can be proposed, formed, trained, equipped and deployed in less than a year. They can also be upgraded (even radically altered) in months while a naval vessel usually waits for a midlife overhaul. An Army or Marine unit can be rapidly reformed while a ship can’t.
So with sluggish shipyards and expensive ships, our Navy shrinks while cheaper, faster and unsinkable alternatives flourish and position forward. It’s not applicable everywhere – host nations are necessary – but definitely applicable in allied archipelagic regions and restricted waterways. It’s especially applicable where sowing chaos and uncertainty is enough to deter an adversary from seeking a new order. Thus Ukraine, Iran, and the Houthis (all without a steel navy) maintain the initiative in their regional waterways.