So in a certain sense, a lot of the actual fabric, the social historical fabric, is actually a containment
system. And I think that containment system had a failure mode in the Renaissance. Just to dip
back into the hyper-ideological space for a minute, what the extreme kind of what I call “paleoreactionaries”
get right is that they they totally see that. I share nothing of their mournful affection
for the medieval period, but I think they’re totally right to say that there was a catastrophic failure
that unleashed this explosive process, and that is what modernity is from the perspective of the
Ancien Régime. What any social system is for is to stop this nuclear pile going off. You look at
Chinese civilization and you say, well, what is it really doing? What’s it for? From a certain
perspective, it’s a capitalism containment structure that obviously worked better in this
traditionalist sense than the European one. The European one was too fractured, it was subject to a
whole bunch of wild, uncontrollable influences, and unprecedented feedback structures kicked off
that no one was in a position to master in Europe.
And so we get capitalism and modernity in Europe, and capitalism and modernity is brought to
China by Western gunboats. It’s not like they’re bringing a gift, what they’re bringing is … they’re
coming to pull the [laughs] graphite containment roads out, you know, from outside. That’s what
that process of Chinese modernization is. It’s a process of the indigenous Chinese process of
containment being dismantled from outside until it then — obviously in a way that is no less
spectacular than the one we’ve seen in the West — goes into this self-sustaining modernist
eruption basically in the early 1980s.