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CEP – KAS: Sahel Monitoring September 2023
This tenth monthly report monitoring activities of al-Qaeda and Islamic State branches throughout the Sahel will focus on the propaganda output of these groups in September 2023.
An initial observation is that the number of claimed attacks remains at the same level when compared to August. Fifty-seven separate incidents have been registered. But perhaps the most remarkable fact is that ISGS was last mentioned in an-Naba’ 405 and did not claim a single attack even though it is very clear that they continue to be highly active in the Jihadist insurgency in Mali and Niger. This results in the somewhat strange observation that Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) is now more active than both branches of the ISIS throughout the region. Similar to previous months, most attacks reported by the Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP) are of relatively low impact, with a lower number of casualties per attack. The deadliest attack was reported on September 8 in an-Naba’ issue 407, with a death toll of 15 killed and wounded. Although it is clear that the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) is by far more lethal and impactful in its attacks, their propaganda outlets did not report any terrorist operations at all this month and therefore there is no output that can be analyzed for this report. The strategic silence of ISGS is deafening. It remains to be seen whether or not the group is preparing a larger scale operation or campaign, which would explain its current silence.
Attacks in the Sahel: General Trend
Given the fact that not a single claim was published by ISGS, the steady trend of a rising number of attacks throughout the months has come to a halt. Only 57 incidents were reported by az-Zallaqa Media and an-Naba’. As mentioned, most incidents were claimed by JNIM, totalling 35. The overall majority of these attacks was claimed in Mali, with a total of 20 attacks. Burkina Faso was struck by at least 14 different attacks by JNIM, one resulting in the claimed killing of over 50 Burkinabe soldiers on September 4. For the first time since systematic monitoring started at the end of 2022, Benin was hit by JNIM.Although ISGS did not claim a single attack in its propaganda outlets, there are strong indications from other sources that the group was involved in several highly impactful attacks throughout Mali and Niger in September.
Mali is rapidly descending into further general chaos. On September 4, JNIM even communicated via az-Zallaqa Media that the group is besieging the entire city of Timbuktu, the largest city in the north of Mali.
On September 7, 64 civilians were killed by JNIM on a ferry in the area of Mopti. Interestingly, JNIM’s propaganda outlets subsequently denied the group’s involvement.
Another worrying event that became clear in late August already is the alleged ceasefire between ISGS and JNIM. In the past few months, ISGS had repeatedely attacked JNIM fighters in an apparent conflict over territory and influence. However, currently, it seems that both groups have reached some kind of agreement and seem to focus on their common enemies: the Malian Army and the Wagner Group. Therefore, a mutual weakening of these two terrorist groups can currently not be expected.
This agreement seems to be a strategic ceasefire, as both JNIM and ISGS are dividing Mali into separate areas of control.
The crash referred to by Pawel in his last tweet above refers to a significant accident in which an overloaded Iliouchine76 TZ98 airplane overestimated the runway and fatally crashed and exploded, killing at least 16 Wagner mercenaries and three Malian soldiers, including an air force Colonel.
Given the developments and incidents outlined above, it is clear that overall the trend of an ever increasing intencity of terrorist operations in the region is continuing, despite the fact that the propaganda outlets of the terrorist groups are not claiming more attacks this month when compared to August. It will be important to see whether or not ISGS continues its strategic silence beyond September. Undeniably, the group continues to play a central role in the deteriorating security situation in Mali and Niger.
Here is the full analysis: https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/cep-kas-sahel-monitoring-september-2023
