Live Conflict UKRAINE AIR WAR THREE YEARS ON.

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UKRAINE AIR WAR THREE YEARS ON​

1. Aviation Features
2. Ukraine air war three years on

By Tim Ripley
21st January 2025
FEATURE

As we approach the three-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, the air war between the two has evolved dramatically with new weapons and tactics being employed by both sides. Tim Ripley reports

British engineers helped design the engineering modifications that allowed Ukrainian Su-24 strike jets to carry British and French-supplied Storm Shadow/Scalp long-range cruise missiles
Ukrainian Air Force
Three years ago, Russian troops were massing along Ukraine’s borders and Western leaders were issuing dire warnings to Moscow. In February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to strike against the Ukrainian capital to deliver a knockout blow against the President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government.
Under the leadership of their dynamic president, the Ukrainians fought off the Russian attack on Kyiv and drove back Putin’s troops in the south and east. Moscow then moved to set up a war economy and the conflict became a battle of attrition.
Air power has played an important role in all phases of the Ukraine war, but as 2024 turned into 2025, air operations were being executed in very different ways to the early days in February and March 2022.

Battlefield air power​

Both Ukraine and Russia opened the war in February 2022 with traditional air warfare equipment – fighter jets, strike jets, ground attack aircraft, battlefield helicopters and transport aircraft. They each had a couple of dozen unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, but only a handful of these were armed.
Russia’s opening air operations looked a lot like the US ‘shock and awe’ offensives against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Cruise missiles and strike jets, blasted airfields, command posts, air defences and ammunition depots. Russian jets and attack helicopters provided close air support for advancing tank columns. The Ukrainians used their air force to hit back at the Russians and they started to use their drones in unconventional ways to try to slow the advance of enemy columns.
As the ‘war of manoeuvre’ transitioned into a static battle between dug-in armies, air power had to be used differently with both sides starting to establish thick air defence networks along the 1,000km length of the battle front. This made the life expectancy of manned aircraft very low. New ways to influence the battlefield had to be found.
In the final months of 2024, the Russian army was on the offensive in key areas of the front. To support its offensive, the Russian Aerospace Force (RuAF/VKS) dramatically recast the way it carries out close air support and battlefield interdiction.
With air defences making it dangerous for manned aircraft to venture close to the front line, Russian air commanders opted for an innovative solution to put bombs on target. In 2022 and early 2023, the RuAF tied to use lofting attacks to deliver bombs and rockets on to Ukrainian positions without exposing their ground attack aircraft and helicopter gunships. These attacks proved hopelessly inaccurate.
So, a programme was launched in late 2022 by the Bazalt Design Bureau to develop a family of guided glide bombs that could penetrate Ukrainian air defences without putting Russian pilots’ lives at risk. The bombs, known as UMPK or ‘unified gliding and correction module’, shared a common satellite-based guidance device and wing kit, so they could be fitted to the FAB family of ‘dump’ bombs. There were eventually 250kg, 500kg and 1,500kg variants, as well a version with thermobaric warheads.
The concept was similar to that used in the American Joint Direct Attack Munition Extended Range (JDAM-ER), so it inevitably became known as the ‘JDAMski’ or ‘Russian JDAM’. This allowed RuAF strike jets, Sukhoi Su-24 Fencers and Su-34 Fullbacks, to hit targets more than 30km to 40km from the launch point. In 2024, a version fitted with a rocket motor, known as the UMPB or versatile intermediate gliding munition, appeared which extended the range of the weapon.
The essential simplicity of UMPK/UMPB kits meant they could be mass produced at very low cost, reportedly around $24,000 each. So, by the middle of 2024, hundreds were being delivered each day by RuAF strike jets. A system was set up to allow frontline Russian army units to call down air strikes on frontline Ukrainian positions during assault operations. As waves of these bombs rained down on the Ukrainian lines, they blasted open bunkers and deep trench lines. Ukrainian air defences proved unable to counter the glide bombs, which added to the feeling of helplessness among Kyiv’s troops.
The real success of the Russian approach to close air support and battlefield interdiction missions was their ability to do it at scale. Hundreds of bombs were delivered each day to frontline airfields, allowing a high tempo of operations to be conducted.

Missile and drone war​

Both the Russians and Ukrainians have found new ways to carry out strategic strikes against their opponent’s capital cities, industrial sites, electrical infra-structure, air bases and ammunition storage sites. Hitting these strategic ‘centres of gravity’ have long been identified by air power exponents as the key to victory. The first aim is to destroy physically targets to degrade the enemy’s military potential and also to undermine the will to fight among civilian populations. For the Russians, a key objective is to close down Ukraine’s power distribution network, so civilians have to live without electricity during freezing winter conditions. In response, the Ukrainians have launched their own drones and missiles strikes into Russia to bring home to the civilian population that they are at risk from Putin’s war. This is a return to World War Two concepts of strategic bombing as a psychological weapon, aimed at the enemy’s will to fight.
Just as with battlefield air support, strategic strike operations in the Ukraine war are now carried out by new and innovation weapons systems. The Russian military started the war with a huge advantage in this key domain, but as the Ukrainians received advanced air defence systems from the US and other NATO nations, the RuAF’s Long Range Aviation (LRA) branch had to drastically re-organise how it operated.
The opening strikes of the war were carried out by sea-launched 3M54-1 Kalibr (NATO: SS-N-27 Sizzler) cruise missiles of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, supported by Kh-101 (AS-23 Kodiak) air-launched cruise missiles carried by Long Range Aviation Tupolev Tu-95 (Bear) and Tu-160 (Blackjack) heavy bombers. Russian land forces missile brigades joined in these deep strikes with Iskander 9K720 (SS-26 Stone) tactical ballistic missiles. By the autumn of 2022, stocks of these weapons were running low and the Ukrainian air defences were knocking down an increasing number of them. Today, the Russians have completely revamped strategic strike weapons to better penetrate Ukrainian air defences. It is rare for strikes just to involve one type of weapon. Packages of a variety of weapons are fired to increase the chances of missiles and drones getting through. Kh-101 cruise missiles have been fitted with decoys and flares to defeat radar-detection and heat-seeking missiles. Training rounds of the missiles are also fired in salvos alongside weapons with live warheads to decoy away air defence missiles from Russian missiles with actual warheads. A handful of Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (AS24 Killjoy) hypersonic missiles are now regularly fired from Mikoyan MiG-31 (Foxhound) fighters to add to the complexity of challenge facing the Ukrainians. Ground launched 3M22 Zircon (SS-N-33) hypersonic missiles have also been used in action over Kyiv on several occasions since February 2024.
To give their strike packages mass, the Russians now routinely fire an equal number of missiles and armed HESA Shahed 136 drones. These are intended to swamp Ukrainian defences, even if few of the drones actually get through to their targets. The Russians have opened their own factories to mass produce the Iranian designed drones, including installing Russian-sourced GLONASS satellite navigation systems and secure communication links. These Russian-built variants are dubbed Geran-2, or Geranium-2, by the RuAF. Ukrainian intelligence estimates the Russians are making 900 Geran-series drones a month, so they have plenty to throw into the strategic air campaign against Ukraine.
In response, the Ukrainians have had to completely revamp their air defence network around Western supplied systems, rather than old Soviet-era surface-toair missiles (SAMs). They have created a layered network, with US, German and Dutch-supplied MIM-104 Patriot SAMs and French/Italian SAMP-T systems dealing with high level threats.

The delivery of Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Air Force was announced in May 2023 and the first missions were flown a few days later.
Ukrainian Air Force via @Osinttechnical

The Su-27, still used by Ukrainian Air Force for air-to-air missions, including hunting Russian drones and cruise missiles
Ukrainian Air Force

A small number of Su-25 ground attack jets are still operational with the Ukrainian Air Force
Ukrainian Air Force
Lower-level engagements are undertaken largely by Norwegian-designed NASAMS and German IRIS-T SAMs, supported by gun systems.
As Ukraine is a huge country with a land mass as big as Germany and Poland combined, so it has proved difficult for Kyiv to build an air defence network that covers all its territory. To try to fill in gaps between SAM batteries, the Ukrainians routinely launched manned fighters to try to intercept Russian drones and cruise missiles, with mixed success.
One of the most innovative elements of the Ukrainians’ air defence network is their early warning system, which is believed to incorporate real-time feeds from US missile launch detection satellites, signals intelligence against Russian air traffic control radio frequencies, social media monitoring and sound detection systems. Early warning is key to giving the Ukrainians time to orientate their air defences against in-bound Russian weapons.
The Ukrainians have also sought to strike back at Russian air bases and industrial/military infrastructure with their own drones and missiles. Their drones are particularly innovative, including converting light aircraft into remote controlled ‘flying bombs’. These have struck the Kremlin in the heart of Moscow and the main LRA base at Engels in the Saratov region, more than 700km from Ukrainian controlled territory.
To add to its long-range strike capability, the Ukrainians have integrated British and French supplied MBDA Storm Shadow/ Scalp air-launched cruise missiles on to their Su-24 jets. President Zelenskyy has sought for several months to get US President Joe Biden to allow Ukraine to use US-supplied ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles on Russian territory. On November 17, Biden gave the go-ahead for these attacks and the first attacks took place days later. Shortly after, Britain gave permission for its Storm Shadows to be used against Russian territory.
Ukrainian attacks on Russian air bases prompted the RuAF and LRA to mount an effort to beef up their air defences and to disperse their aircraft further away from Ukrainian controlled territory. LRA bombers now routinely operate from bases on the Kola Peninsula, near Murmansk, more than 2,000km from Kyiv when tasked to strike at targets in Ukraine.

New tech​

The Ukraine war has seen a dramatic acceleration in the development of air warfare technology. New drones, missiles and intelligence gathering have all been put to the test.

RuAF Su-34 strike jets are among the main platforms that deliver UMPK glide bombs
Zvezda/Russian Ministry of Defence via @Guy Ploposky

The artwork on this Russian bomb says: “Dear Ministry of Defence, I’m FAB with UMPK. Soon I will fly to destroy occupiers in Kursk Obl. I’m upset for my crew, they have not received bonus pay for counter-terrorist operation since August. Sort it out! P.S. You can make mistakes, but you can’t lie.”
@wartranslated

Ukrainian air defence kill claims for a massive Russian raid on November 17, 2024. This included the shooting down of: 1 out of 1, 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile 7 out of 8, Kh-47M Kinzhal ballistic missiles 85 out of 101, Kalibr/Kh-101 cruise missiles 0 out of 1, Iskander-M ballistic missile 4 out of 4, Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radar missiles 5 out of 5, Kh-59/69 cruise missiles 42 out of 90, Shahed drones and other types
Ukrainian Air Force
Three years into the conflict, the development and deployment cycles of these weapons is now at such a pace that some Western observers are amazed at the ability of both sides to render their opponents’ weapons obsolete in a matter of weeks. This is particularly important in the area of electronic warfare, where jamming technology can render very expensive weapons ineffective. The Russians have put great effort into neutralising the main Western satellite navigation system, the GPS. This is used in the guidance system of several weapons, including Storm Shadow missiles, Excalibur guided artillery rounds and the JDAM family of guided bombs. There are numerous reports from Ukraine that the Russians have significantly limited the effectiveness of these weapons by neutralising their GPS guidance.
Jamming is also regularly used by both sides to neutralise drones by jamming the radio signals used to control them or download video imagery. This is a critical weakness that can neutralise their ability to operate over enemy territory. As a result, both the Russians and Ukrainians have started fitting their tanks and other vehicles with their own jammers.

US-made Patriot missile batteries based at Kyiv’s Igor Sikorsky International Airport defend the city from Russian missile and drone attacks.
Google Earth
In a bid to counteract this jamming, Russian one-way (kamikaze) attack drones have now appeared, with fibre-optic control systems. This involves the missiles spinning out up to 10km of fibre-optic cables behind them as they head towards their target. This cable makes the drones invulnerable to Ukrainian jamming and potentially threatens to render their whole electronic warfare operation ineffective. The speed at which the Russians appear to be rolling out fibre-optic controlled drones is threatening to expose Ukrainian ground forces to unprecedented attacks.

The Trump effect?​

High-level diplomacy has been moving fast since the election of Donald Trump as US President on November 5. Trump and many of his key advisors are sceptical of the ability of the Ukrainians to win against the Russians.
This has led to speculation that Trump will force the Ukrainians to the negotiating table, under threat of cutting off US military aid. How this will impact the air war in Ukraine remains to be seen. The Russian army, backed by the RuAF tactical aviation using glide bombs, has now gained momentum on the battlefields of the strategic Donbas region. Another group of Russian troops, including a contingent of North Korean soldiers, are trying to push the Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk region of Russia. The more territory each side can hold is seen as vital in any future Trump-inspired peace talks. At the same time, the strategic missile and drone war between Kyiv and Moscow is showing no sign of letting up. The relentless war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine appears to be nearing a critical inflection point.

Topics​

Read more about

• Ukraine Russia Conflict
• Ukraine
• Russia
• Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF)
• Ukrainian Air Force
• AirForces Monthly February 2025

Source: Key.Aero​