Live Conflict Undestanding the battles of Irpin river, 2022

[ArmchairSergeant]

I've been looking into the Battles on Irpin river in Feb-Mar 2022, near Kyiv. It seems that the Russians were trying to establish a bridgehead with overwhelming force, and the Ukrainian defence there relied on Russians not being able to project full force on the critical points. In Moshchun particularly, Russia first crossed the intact bridge with very minor recon forces that were defeated and then the bridge destroyed. Russia then built three pontoon bridges, each resulting in only a small force crossing despite some sources saying the existed for several days before being destroyed but Ukrainian artillery. The battle descriptions talk about 2-3 BMPs/BMDs fighting each other on the southeast side.

What I haven't been able to understand is what was the limiting factor for Russia to be able to commit such small forces to the east side of the river. Russia famously had enough forces to form a column of dozens of kilometers approaching the area, so there must've been a lot of forces available. Can't you cross a pontoon bridge with dozens of vehicles per hour? Why were there only a few at any time, instead of forming a schwerpunkt that would have overwhelmed the defence and established a more permanent bridgehead?

 

[clonda]

Here is a quote from the British Army Review SPRING 2024 / ISSUE No. 187: "Between March 5 and March 8, the Russians made repeated attempts to establish new pontoon crossings. Each time, they had 30 to 60 minutes to get armored vehicles and soldiers across before Ukrainian special forces or drones detected the crossings and Ukrainian artillery destroyed them."

I watched a YouTube video where a Ukrainian soldier who fought there says they managed to destroy two pontoon bridges with artillery, but they couldn't hit the third one. But this third bridge turned out to be useless anyway, because the river level began to rise, and several infantry fighting vehicles got stuck in the mud.

In addition, the Russian command probably did not have reliable information about how many Ukrainian soldiers there were and where they were located. Therefore, they sent small mobile assault groups to strengthen the bridgehead and clear the way for the normal advance of the main column. It was too risky to send the entire column along a narrow, uncontrolled road without having a reliable escape route. And if things go badly, then there will be no normal way back either.

By about March 15-18, Russian troops had taken control of the village of Moshchun. But it was already too late and pointless. As we now know, the problems were at the level of fundamental planning. These kilometer-long columns did not plan to fight — they were heading somewhere for a parade in Kiev and could not turn around properly. And they thought they would just drive through the Moshchun. But the Ukrainian troops did not fight according to Russian rules. They blocked all the bridges and blew up the dam, which completely disrupted the Russians' plans for the western direction.

In Moshchun, Ukrainian artillery and reconnaissance troops simply prevented the Russians from 'turning on the tap,' turning their crossing attempts into a 'drip-feed' of forces that the Ukrainian defense managed to grind down.