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Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time​

The use of a Chinese-made DF-15A missile in Yemen would mark a major development for Riyadh’s shy ballistic missile arsenal.

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.


It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.


As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.
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Among the later versions of the DF-15 family is the DF-15B. A more substantial redesign, its most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) warhead. Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP via Getty Images GREG BAKER

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

 

Fatman17

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Saudi Arabia's air defenses destroyed a Houthi drone south of Mecca before it entered prohibited airspace over the holy city, a spokesperson for the Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen said, as fighting spreads in the Middle East https://reut.rs/4iwVPea
 

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Yemen's Houthi forces claimed Wednesday that they had shot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet over Marib province using a locally made surface-to-air missile.


The pilot ejected and got captured, source said.
Saudi Arabia should just throw in the towel and be done with this.They got dragged into a war by the Americans now even their so called brothers or the Americans themselves dont want to help them.
 

Fatman17

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Saudi officials have yet to confirm the loss of an aircraft. Source: Houthi militant social media
The F-15SA is among the most advanced versions of the venerable twin-tailed jet.
 

Fatman17

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A short analysis of the downing of a Saudi F-15 fighter by the Houthis in Yemen, as of today, September 16, 2026. In the following analysis, I relied on examining the thermal-camera footage published by the Yemeni war media:

- First, the means of detecting the aircraft: In most cases, Ansar Allah previously relied on the Ultra-8500 thermal camera. More accurately, it is a multi-camera airborne surveillance sensor turret, rather than a single camera. It was commercially described as a quasi-military civilian system. Yemen received multiple such turrets in 2008, and the Houthis installed them on the ground to guide converted air-to-air missiles and to detect aerial targets in general.

The turret contains a spherical housing with a daylight camera and a thermal camera.

The detection range of the FLIR thermal camera is approximately 4–8 km for a human, 8–15 km for a vehicle, 15–25 km for a helicopter, and approximately 20–30 km for a fighter aircraft such as the F-15.

However, in today's video, the green tracking marker that locks onto the aircraft is clearly visible and appears to correspond to the Iranian Sadid system, which is intended for electro-optical/thermal imaging and also incorporates a laser rangefinder. This indicates that new systems may have reached the Houthis.

- The pilot initially performed a sharp maneuver, which indicates that the aircraft's warning systems detected some kind of threat. The F-15E Strike Eagle carries the AN/AAR-57 system manufactured by the British company BAE Systems, whose primary function is to detect approaching missiles using electro-optical/infrared sensors that detect the exhaust plume of an incoming missile and the infrared radiation it produces.

The F-15 also carries the AN/ALQ-239, an RWR system designed to provide warning of radar-guided threats by detecting hostile radar emissions and radar lock-on.

- The pilot then released chaff five consecutive times. These are specialized aluminum strips/fibers intended to deceive hostile radars. The F-15 carries the AN/ALE-47, which is capable of dispensing both chaff and thermal flares.

Each chaff cartridge disperses immediately after being released, rapidly forming a large cloud containing millions of very fine metallic fibers. This cloud is what deceives the radar.

It is reasonable that the aluminum strips and fibers would normally not appear on thermal imaging, but they may have temporarily acquired heat from the fighter's engines and therefore appeared for only a few seconds. If they had been flares, however, they would have appeared as an extremely intense thermal glow. I will include evidence from an incident in Yemen in 2018 showing what flares look like.

The second indication is that the missile struck the fighter in its forward section rather than tracking the heat of the engine.

- The pilot engaged the afterburner in an attempt to escape at maximum speed. This is dangerous if the incoming missile is an infrared-guided weapon.

- The Yemeni missile flew for 24 seconds before exploding, according to the video. The average speed of a surface-to-air missile during the terminal/intercept phase—that is, after passing the initial boost phase—is approximately 650–850 m/s. A simple calculation gives:

24 seconds × 700 m/s ≈ 17 km

This represents the missile's flight path, with an uncertainty of approximately ±3–4 km, depending on whether the fighter was flying laterally, approaching the missile, or moving away from it.

Based on the distance covered by the missile and the 24 seconds of flight time, I can rule out the following air-defense systems with 100% certainty:

Iranian Majid AD-08, Igla, Strela-1, Strela-2, and the R-60 and R-73 air-to-air missiles converted to surface-to-air use by the Yemenis (Thaqib-1). All of these are incapable of maintaining a 24-second flight time.
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