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"This is an article by the author only for forum discussion and not to be posted on any other media"
CSC Frigate vs Hunter class Development Comparisons:
Earlier this month, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published a Special Report (see link below) dealing with Australia’s equivalent of Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). This Report by Dr. Marcus Hellyer, ASPI’s experienced Senior Analyst, touched upon many aspects of Australia’s two major naval procurement programs, but its findings should resonate here in Canada. Hellyer’s central argument is that Australia’s two major naval procurement programs, the Hunter-class frigate and the nuclear-powered submarine, are progressing far too slowly. The first frigate is scheduled for delivery in 2033, and at best, the initial nuclear submarine will not be delivered before the late 2030s. This, coupled with evidence that the Hunter-class frigates will be built with a very minimal 32 vertical launch systems (VLS), have only a bare minimum of land-attack missiles, will be overly heavy and underpowered, and will possess only the tiniest margins for future growth, will leave the Australian Navy with a serious capability gap over the next 20 years. These twin shortcomings require immediate hedging measures to forestall a dangerous situation developing.
Hellyer’s analysis bears striking similarities with the current situation in Canada. Ottawa does not expect a construction contract for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), to be concluded before late 2023-24, with the first warship being delivered no earlier than 2031 or perhaps later. Furthermore, an Access to Information briefing note urging the Department of National Defence (DND) to “kick off without delay” a replacement plan for Canada’s 4 Victoria-class submarines or else face a defence gap in the arctic. To state that planning for Canada’s CSC Type 26 Frigate lacks urgency is to grossly understate the obvious. Early plans first began in 2008, and the intent was to deliver the first frigate in 2020. Almost at once this overly optimistic target was slipped to 2025, and the estimate now is for the first of this class to be delivered in the early 2030s. As Hellyer notes of the Hunter-class, “wishful thinking has reigned” in the Australian fast frigate program, its schedule “lacks vitality” and costs have increased to the point that the total number to be built is in question. The Australian government has decided “to choose the least mature design and then to perform fundamental modifications to it.” The result has been “instability in the ship’s design” and a weight growth from about 8,800 tonnes to over 10,000 tonnes. He notes that there will be challenges to integrate the various systems, and all this will add to prospect of further schedule delays and the injection of “additional risk into the program.” Sounds familiar? The Hunter-class, when it finally materializes, will be slower, possess an inadequate number of VLS at 32, carry only 8 maritime-strike missiles, and will have only a 2.5 percent future growth margin.
Of course, it is difficult to compare the Australian Hunter-class to Canada’s CSC, because in the latter case, we will have no firm contract information for several years. But similarities to the Australian case abound. Canada, too, picked the least mature frigate design and has evidently modified the original BAE Type 26 ship design extensively. There will certainly be challenges in integrating several new sensor, communications, and weapons systems from the UK, the US, and from Canada. The original design has increased from around 5,500 tonnes to approximately 9,400 tonnes. We do not know what design margin will be available for future growth, but the Hunter-class data provide a cautionary tale. Unless the basic principles of hydrodynamics have magically changed, the power required to propel a 9,400 tonne ship at a given speed will be much more than that required for a 5,500 tonne ship, yet the proposed UK power plant remains the same. While the current power is adequate for a 7,800 tonne CSC, if the full displacement weight is actually 9,400 tonnes, “that would be a totally different game.”
The minimum number of 32 MK 41 VLS Canisters is now in jeopardy. With the latest CSC “Frigate” graphics from LM, we only see 24 VLS Canisters forward, so even the “fitted for but not with” scenario seems to be in doubt. Of course we don’t know because of the “secrecy” from the government…..again. The only way now to maximize speeds of 30+knts for the CSC Frigate would seem to be fit 2 x RR MT 30 gas turbines but even this design phase may not be feasible at this stage of the game. Finally, and indisputably, Canada’s CSC is certain to eclipse Hellyer’s claim about the Hunter-class: “Overall, of all contemporary warships, it seems to be the most expensive for getting missiles to sea.” It remains clear that without a vigorous sea change in approach to both Canada’s CSC and submarine procurement programs, Canada will be left to face 21st century threats with increasingly obsolescent technology.
Building at least 3 more Hobart 11 AAW Destroyers as the ASPI article suggests, at first brush seems to make a lot of sense giving that the ADF is in the same “pickle” with the Hunter class as Canada is with the CSC Type 26 Frigate program. Perhaps something Canada should have thought out before we lost our AAW capability with the de-commissioning of the Iroquois class destroyers. Perhaps a re-think here in Canada seems to be appropriate as well. Could Canada acquire 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 destroyers to be built here in Canada before the CSC Type 26 Frigate build starts and perhaps build just 11 of the 9,400 tonne “Monsters”? The ABs would have at least 3 times the MK 41 VLS capability with dedicated Tomahawk, SM3/SM6 missiles as well and be in service with the RCN well before the first CSC Type 26 comes off the assembly line. They would each cost much less than the CSC Frigate as well. Something to think about!
Canadian Arleigh Burkes:
Canada could build 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 AAW Destroyers for $5B CAD for all (at 2021/2022 prices) take away. Of course this would not include the price to build here in Canada, Canadianize the ABs and the final operational price list which would include armament, missiles, bullets, stores and personnel, so say $10B CAD in service for the RCN for all 4 “Destroyers”. But still, a bargain compared to $4.3-5B CAD for only one CSC Frigate bringing the CSC build requirements down to just 11 CSC “Frigate’ units at between $47.3-55B CAD (at 2021/2022 prices-using the PBOs reported price tag of $77.3B CAD). The sticking point would be acquiring the design “blue-prints” from the US and building them here in Canada if, the US would allow that, but one could always ask. These “Destroyers” should be built in Canada to politically pass the “sniff test” and we should eventually have an official third Yard (possibly Davie Shipyard) in the NSS to pick-up the slack. In order to ensure maximum commonality with the CSC and to fit our unique needs, it would need a few modifications. Of course the main propulsion plant should not change. The AB uses two LM2500 GTs per shaft for a total power of 78 MW but operate 99 percent of the time with a single GT per shaft for speeds up to at least 26 kts. The AB class can run on two 3.8 MW electric motors (one per gearbox) for speeds up to 13 kts without the GTs. With a good engineering team it would be feasible to modify the AB design in less than a year while the basics parts of the ship were being built. The first change would be to replace the MK45 Gun with the Vulcano 127/64. The 25 mm MK38 gun could be replaced by the CSC’s BAE 30 mm gun. We would need to fit our new multirole boats (MRBs) to the boat decks (port/stb’d). The main effort would happen aft in order to fit a single CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and our SKELDAR V-200 helicopter drones along with support facilities and our own VDS and Towed Array sonar systems. The flight deck could be easily extended further aft with C-RAST fitted. The new single hangar would need to be moved toward the center but the configuration of the Gas Turbine generator situated there may be a problem although there is ample space to move things around once you go down from two to one helicopter. Moving from two to one hangar would allow for the torpedo launchers to be installed in a fashion close to the Halifax class and using the same launchers as the CSC with the tube situated inside the ship, un order to help those changes and to more easily fit within budget. Decreasing the number of MK41 VDS launchers aft from 64 down to 32 plus increase the six ExLS CIAD Quad launchers to 12 along-side the MK 41 launchers removing more weight up forward and maybe allowing for the installation of at least eight NSM launchers. In that configuration the weapon fit would closely match the CSC “Frigate” but with more missile capabilities. The Ship would carry 64 MK41 VLS cells (32 fore and 32 aft) for any combination of ESSM, SM2 and Tomahawk cruise missiles with the possibility of other types (SM3/6). It would also be able to carry 48 Sea Ceptor in the ExLS launchers. We could probably lower the number of crew needed to operate the ship but it would still require more sailors than the CSC. Operating on two LM2500 GTs most of the time would use more fuel than the CSCs. We would definitely need to commission another “Asterix” if that was to happen.
The AB Flt 111s should be configured as closely to the CSC Type 26 as much as possible. These AB’S would also be excellent Command ships. Crewing size may be an issue though although with Command Staff on board, perhaps not as much. The things that need to change would be: Replace the current AB mast with a slightly larger CSC Frigate mast. The SPY 6 V1 radar would be replaced with a “beefed-up LM SPY 7 (V) (more RMA’s). This radar has already proven that it can out-perform the SPY 6 radar with longer ranges along with whatever MDA’s X Band Illumination radar will be. Keep the CMS 330 Combat system which already has the Aegis Baseline for CEC commonality (and BMD capability) with the CSC Frigate. The good news is that when (and if) this were to happen, most if not all of the integration for the CSC Frigate will already have been done by LM during the Design Phase so integration of all of the CSC Frigate software for the AB’s “Flt IVs” would happen more quickly. The CSC Frigates guns should also be used on the AB’s. The NSM might be increased from 8 to 16 as the Constellation class has and the CIWS could be replaced by the Dragon Fly DEW laser system port/stbd as the BAE Type 26 British version will have. As stated before, the main “sticking point” would be a built-in-Canada design (possibly Davies Shipyard) which the US would have to agree on. Other than that, this Arleigh Burke “Flt IV” Canadian design could work well, would be an awesome ship for Canada and could be built for the same price as 2 CSC frigates currently cost.
Is the CSC Type 26 A Frigate or Destroyer?:
Describing Canada’s proposed CSC as a “Frigate”, when that is no longer a term used much any more by officials in Ottawa and even in the RCN. The CSC will have a total number of VLS that is at the low-to-mid range of warships of comparable size and tonnage when it finally comes into operational service. And, by most standards, the CSC will be closer to what we think of as a “destroyer” than a current frigate. Warship tonnages are bandied about quite loosely these days, but based on the weight of the CSC on a statement by Mr. Kevin McCoy, who, until the spring of 2021, was the President of Irving Shipbuilding. Hence he was well acquainted with the proposed design for the CSC at that time. McCoy stated: “This is a big ship, lots of capability” and indicated that full displacement for the new frigate will likely be about 9,400 tonnes; almost double the 4,700 tonnes of the current Halifax-class frigates. The CSC will likely be roughly the same size and tonnage as an Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers. The latter is equipped with 96 VLS, and is also less costly than the CSC is likely to be. By redefining more carefully what we are talking about in terms of warships of comparable size and full load displacement, we thereby eliminate many of the “frigates” which lie in the 4,000-5,000 tonnes full load range. Even some of today’s “Destroyers”, which fall in the 7,200-8,000 tonne full load range, possess more VLS capability today, than the CSC will likely have when it enters service in the mid-2030s. For example, China’s PLAN Type 052D destroyer is 7,500 tons full load and has 64 VLS plus a 24-cell SAM launcher. Japan’s Maya-class destroyer is 10,250 tons full load and has 96 VLS and 8 anti-ship missiles in quad canisters and India’s Visakhapatnam-class destroyer is 7.400 tons and features 4×8-cell SAM VLS plus 2×8-cell VLS for anti-ship missiles
We can all agree that it is very difficult to talk comparables when in fact it will still be at least several years before a production contract is signed and steel is cut on Canada’s CSC. However, it was instructive that Marcus Hellyer would raise these concerns about the Australian Hunter-class – the rough equivalent of Canada’s CSC – which is currently under construction. And, for the record, Hellyer does mention Canada’s CSC in his analysis. We also need to remember that the last of the CSCs will begin construction in the 2040s and may very well sail into the 2060s. In terms of technological development, a lot may (will) happen so it is imperative to leave room for growth in the design in terms of power and weight. It’s possible that if weight isn’t the main restriction, then the decision to drop from 32 to 24 MK 41 VLS cells may be in part to leave room for a future VLS systems should it be required based on the future threat levels. The immediate concern is the power plant being used on the CSC “Frigate” relative to the tonnage of the ship, and the fact that it may not be adequate to support future integrations of sensors and energy weapons. Then again, we don’t know the power consumption of the current design.
Conclusion:
It is with “some authority” that some or all of the CSC Type 26 Frigates will only have 24 Lockheed Martin (LM) MK 41 VLS Canister silos forward vice the 32 LM Quad Pac MK 41 VLS as has most often been reported. Some or perhaps all will be extended length to accommodate Tomahawk Cruise missiles and/or future missile capabilities. I suspect this was done to save weight for more speed and $$. This “authority” however was not willing to share his sources. The latest CSC computer graphic seems to bear that out. The CAMM Sea Ceptor ExLS CIAD missile silos just behind the funnel are in fact from a European Company MBDA-UK’s CAMM CIAD VLS canisters and Launch Management System (LMS) and not LM MK 41 VLS launchers. The reason (rightly or wrongly) why Canada went with the Sea Ceptor system was to get away from having 2 x CIWS/Sea RAM (port/stb’d-midships) systems for CIAD, in favour of 6 X Quad Pac CIAD CAMM launchers for a total of 24 CIAD missiles again to save weight and $$. To say that the CSC Frigate will have 32 MK 41 VLS canisters forward then seems not to be accurate. Even if you called the 6 Quad Pac CIAD silos- MK 41 VLS canisters, that would only add up to 30 launchers and not 38 using the concept of 24 MK 41 VLS Quad Pac canisters forward. Still, a big improvement over what we have now and better than most NATO and allied countries have or will have in the future. In my own opinion (IMOO) I believe the first batch of Frigates will indeed have 32 cells forward with the remaining CSC Frigate batches having 24 cells. It would however, be great to see Canada keep the 32 LM MK 41 VLS canisters for all 15 CSC Frigates, but to develop a “true” Canadian Naval capability with a combination of Arleigh Burkes (Flt IV) and CSC Type 26 Frigates would be “game changing”.
https://www.bing.com/search?q=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/delivering-stronger-navy-faster&form=PRCAEN&httpsmsn=1&msnews=1&refig=49a7a348184b4ef9b9bc1d0501790735
CSC Frigate vs Hunter class Development Comparisons:
Earlier this month, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published a Special Report (see link below) dealing with Australia’s equivalent of Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). This Report by Dr. Marcus Hellyer, ASPI’s experienced Senior Analyst, touched upon many aspects of Australia’s two major naval procurement programs, but its findings should resonate here in Canada. Hellyer’s central argument is that Australia’s two major naval procurement programs, the Hunter-class frigate and the nuclear-powered submarine, are progressing far too slowly. The first frigate is scheduled for delivery in 2033, and at best, the initial nuclear submarine will not be delivered before the late 2030s. This, coupled with evidence that the Hunter-class frigates will be built with a very minimal 32 vertical launch systems (VLS), have only a bare minimum of land-attack missiles, will be overly heavy and underpowered, and will possess only the tiniest margins for future growth, will leave the Australian Navy with a serious capability gap over the next 20 years. These twin shortcomings require immediate hedging measures to forestall a dangerous situation developing.
Hellyer’s analysis bears striking similarities with the current situation in Canada. Ottawa does not expect a construction contract for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), to be concluded before late 2023-24, with the first warship being delivered no earlier than 2031 or perhaps later. Furthermore, an Access to Information briefing note urging the Department of National Defence (DND) to “kick off without delay” a replacement plan for Canada’s 4 Victoria-class submarines or else face a defence gap in the arctic. To state that planning for Canada’s CSC Type 26 Frigate lacks urgency is to grossly understate the obvious. Early plans first began in 2008, and the intent was to deliver the first frigate in 2020. Almost at once this overly optimistic target was slipped to 2025, and the estimate now is for the first of this class to be delivered in the early 2030s. As Hellyer notes of the Hunter-class, “wishful thinking has reigned” in the Australian fast frigate program, its schedule “lacks vitality” and costs have increased to the point that the total number to be built is in question. The Australian government has decided “to choose the least mature design and then to perform fundamental modifications to it.” The result has been “instability in the ship’s design” and a weight growth from about 8,800 tonnes to over 10,000 tonnes. He notes that there will be challenges to integrate the various systems, and all this will add to prospect of further schedule delays and the injection of “additional risk into the program.” Sounds familiar? The Hunter-class, when it finally materializes, will be slower, possess an inadequate number of VLS at 32, carry only 8 maritime-strike missiles, and will have only a 2.5 percent future growth margin.
Of course, it is difficult to compare the Australian Hunter-class to Canada’s CSC, because in the latter case, we will have no firm contract information for several years. But similarities to the Australian case abound. Canada, too, picked the least mature frigate design and has evidently modified the original BAE Type 26 ship design extensively. There will certainly be challenges in integrating several new sensor, communications, and weapons systems from the UK, the US, and from Canada. The original design has increased from around 5,500 tonnes to approximately 9,400 tonnes. We do not know what design margin will be available for future growth, but the Hunter-class data provide a cautionary tale. Unless the basic principles of hydrodynamics have magically changed, the power required to propel a 9,400 tonne ship at a given speed will be much more than that required for a 5,500 tonne ship, yet the proposed UK power plant remains the same. While the current power is adequate for a 7,800 tonne CSC, if the full displacement weight is actually 9,400 tonnes, “that would be a totally different game.”
The minimum number of 32 MK 41 VLS Canisters is now in jeopardy. With the latest CSC “Frigate” graphics from LM, we only see 24 VLS Canisters forward, so even the “fitted for but not with” scenario seems to be in doubt. Of course we don’t know because of the “secrecy” from the government…..again. The only way now to maximize speeds of 30+knts for the CSC Frigate would seem to be fit 2 x RR MT 30 gas turbines but even this design phase may not be feasible at this stage of the game. Finally, and indisputably, Canada’s CSC is certain to eclipse Hellyer’s claim about the Hunter-class: “Overall, of all contemporary warships, it seems to be the most expensive for getting missiles to sea.” It remains clear that without a vigorous sea change in approach to both Canada’s CSC and submarine procurement programs, Canada will be left to face 21st century threats with increasingly obsolescent technology.
Building at least 3 more Hobart 11 AAW Destroyers as the ASPI article suggests, at first brush seems to make a lot of sense giving that the ADF is in the same “pickle” with the Hunter class as Canada is with the CSC Type 26 Frigate program. Perhaps something Canada should have thought out before we lost our AAW capability with the de-commissioning of the Iroquois class destroyers. Perhaps a re-think here in Canada seems to be appropriate as well. Could Canada acquire 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 destroyers to be built here in Canada before the CSC Type 26 Frigate build starts and perhaps build just 11 of the 9,400 tonne “Monsters”? The ABs would have at least 3 times the MK 41 VLS capability with dedicated Tomahawk, SM3/SM6 missiles as well and be in service with the RCN well before the first CSC Type 26 comes off the assembly line. They would each cost much less than the CSC Frigate as well. Something to think about!
Canadian Arleigh Burkes:
Canada could build 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 AAW Destroyers for $5B CAD for all (at 2021/2022 prices) take away. Of course this would not include the price to build here in Canada, Canadianize the ABs and the final operational price list which would include armament, missiles, bullets, stores and personnel, so say $10B CAD in service for the RCN for all 4 “Destroyers”. But still, a bargain compared to $4.3-5B CAD for only one CSC Frigate bringing the CSC build requirements down to just 11 CSC “Frigate’ units at between $47.3-55B CAD (at 2021/2022 prices-using the PBOs reported price tag of $77.3B CAD). The sticking point would be acquiring the design “blue-prints” from the US and building them here in Canada if, the US would allow that, but one could always ask. These “Destroyers” should be built in Canada to politically pass the “sniff test” and we should eventually have an official third Yard (possibly Davie Shipyard) in the NSS to pick-up the slack. In order to ensure maximum commonality with the CSC and to fit our unique needs, it would need a few modifications. Of course the main propulsion plant should not change. The AB uses two LM2500 GTs per shaft for a total power of 78 MW but operate 99 percent of the time with a single GT per shaft for speeds up to at least 26 kts. The AB class can run on two 3.8 MW electric motors (one per gearbox) for speeds up to 13 kts without the GTs. With a good engineering team it would be feasible to modify the AB design in less than a year while the basics parts of the ship were being built. The first change would be to replace the MK45 Gun with the Vulcano 127/64. The 25 mm MK38 gun could be replaced by the CSC’s BAE 30 mm gun. We would need to fit our new multirole boats (MRBs) to the boat decks (port/stb’d). The main effort would happen aft in order to fit a single CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and our SKELDAR V-200 helicopter drones along with support facilities and our own VDS and Towed Array sonar systems. The flight deck could be easily extended further aft with C-RAST fitted. The new single hangar would need to be moved toward the center but the configuration of the Gas Turbine generator situated there may be a problem although there is ample space to move things around once you go down from two to one helicopter. Moving from two to one hangar would allow for the torpedo launchers to be installed in a fashion close to the Halifax class and using the same launchers as the CSC with the tube situated inside the ship, un order to help those changes and to more easily fit within budget. Decreasing the number of MK41 VDS launchers aft from 64 down to 32 plus increase the six ExLS CIAD Quad launchers to 12 along-side the MK 41 launchers removing more weight up forward and maybe allowing for the installation of at least eight NSM launchers. In that configuration the weapon fit would closely match the CSC “Frigate” but with more missile capabilities. The Ship would carry 64 MK41 VLS cells (32 fore and 32 aft) for any combination of ESSM, SM2 and Tomahawk cruise missiles with the possibility of other types (SM3/6). It would also be able to carry 48 Sea Ceptor in the ExLS launchers. We could probably lower the number of crew needed to operate the ship but it would still require more sailors than the CSC. Operating on two LM2500 GTs most of the time would use more fuel than the CSCs. We would definitely need to commission another “Asterix” if that was to happen.
The AB Flt 111s should be configured as closely to the CSC Type 26 as much as possible. These AB’S would also be excellent Command ships. Crewing size may be an issue though although with Command Staff on board, perhaps not as much. The things that need to change would be: Replace the current AB mast with a slightly larger CSC Frigate mast. The SPY 6 V1 radar would be replaced with a “beefed-up LM SPY 7 (V) (more RMA’s). This radar has already proven that it can out-perform the SPY 6 radar with longer ranges along with whatever MDA’s X Band Illumination radar will be. Keep the CMS 330 Combat system which already has the Aegis Baseline for CEC commonality (and BMD capability) with the CSC Frigate. The good news is that when (and if) this were to happen, most if not all of the integration for the CSC Frigate will already have been done by LM during the Design Phase so integration of all of the CSC Frigate software for the AB’s “Flt IVs” would happen more quickly. The CSC Frigates guns should also be used on the AB’s. The NSM might be increased from 8 to 16 as the Constellation class has and the CIWS could be replaced by the Dragon Fly DEW laser system port/stbd as the BAE Type 26 British version will have. As stated before, the main “sticking point” would be a built-in-Canada design (possibly Davies Shipyard) which the US would have to agree on. Other than that, this Arleigh Burke “Flt IV” Canadian design could work well, would be an awesome ship for Canada and could be built for the same price as 2 CSC frigates currently cost.
Is the CSC Type 26 A Frigate or Destroyer?:
Describing Canada’s proposed CSC as a “Frigate”, when that is no longer a term used much any more by officials in Ottawa and even in the RCN. The CSC will have a total number of VLS that is at the low-to-mid range of warships of comparable size and tonnage when it finally comes into operational service. And, by most standards, the CSC will be closer to what we think of as a “destroyer” than a current frigate. Warship tonnages are bandied about quite loosely these days, but based on the weight of the CSC on a statement by Mr. Kevin McCoy, who, until the spring of 2021, was the President of Irving Shipbuilding. Hence he was well acquainted with the proposed design for the CSC at that time. McCoy stated: “This is a big ship, lots of capability” and indicated that full displacement for the new frigate will likely be about 9,400 tonnes; almost double the 4,700 tonnes of the current Halifax-class frigates. The CSC will likely be roughly the same size and tonnage as an Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyers. The latter is equipped with 96 VLS, and is also less costly than the CSC is likely to be. By redefining more carefully what we are talking about in terms of warships of comparable size and full load displacement, we thereby eliminate many of the “frigates” which lie in the 4,000-5,000 tonnes full load range. Even some of today’s “Destroyers”, which fall in the 7,200-8,000 tonne full load range, possess more VLS capability today, than the CSC will likely have when it enters service in the mid-2030s. For example, China’s PLAN Type 052D destroyer is 7,500 tons full load and has 64 VLS plus a 24-cell SAM launcher. Japan’s Maya-class destroyer is 10,250 tons full load and has 96 VLS and 8 anti-ship missiles in quad canisters and India’s Visakhapatnam-class destroyer is 7.400 tons and features 4×8-cell SAM VLS plus 2×8-cell VLS for anti-ship missiles
We can all agree that it is very difficult to talk comparables when in fact it will still be at least several years before a production contract is signed and steel is cut on Canada’s CSC. However, it was instructive that Marcus Hellyer would raise these concerns about the Australian Hunter-class – the rough equivalent of Canada’s CSC – which is currently under construction. And, for the record, Hellyer does mention Canada’s CSC in his analysis. We also need to remember that the last of the CSCs will begin construction in the 2040s and may very well sail into the 2060s. In terms of technological development, a lot may (will) happen so it is imperative to leave room for growth in the design in terms of power and weight. It’s possible that if weight isn’t the main restriction, then the decision to drop from 32 to 24 MK 41 VLS cells may be in part to leave room for a future VLS systems should it be required based on the future threat levels. The immediate concern is the power plant being used on the CSC “Frigate” relative to the tonnage of the ship, and the fact that it may not be adequate to support future integrations of sensors and energy weapons. Then again, we don’t know the power consumption of the current design.
Conclusion:
It is with “some authority” that some or all of the CSC Type 26 Frigates will only have 24 Lockheed Martin (LM) MK 41 VLS Canister silos forward vice the 32 LM Quad Pac MK 41 VLS as has most often been reported. Some or perhaps all will be extended length to accommodate Tomahawk Cruise missiles and/or future missile capabilities. I suspect this was done to save weight for more speed and $$. This “authority” however was not willing to share his sources. The latest CSC computer graphic seems to bear that out. The CAMM Sea Ceptor ExLS CIAD missile silos just behind the funnel are in fact from a European Company MBDA-UK’s CAMM CIAD VLS canisters and Launch Management System (LMS) and not LM MK 41 VLS launchers. The reason (rightly or wrongly) why Canada went with the Sea Ceptor system was to get away from having 2 x CIWS/Sea RAM (port/stb’d-midships) systems for CIAD, in favour of 6 X Quad Pac CIAD CAMM launchers for a total of 24 CIAD missiles again to save weight and $$. To say that the CSC Frigate will have 32 MK 41 VLS canisters forward then seems not to be accurate. Even if you called the 6 Quad Pac CIAD silos- MK 41 VLS canisters, that would only add up to 30 launchers and not 38 using the concept of 24 MK 41 VLS Quad Pac canisters forward. Still, a big improvement over what we have now and better than most NATO and allied countries have or will have in the future. In my own opinion (IMOO) I believe the first batch of Frigates will indeed have 32 cells forward with the remaining CSC Frigate batches having 24 cells. It would however, be great to see Canada keep the 32 LM MK 41 VLS canisters for all 15 CSC Frigates, but to develop a “true” Canadian Naval capability with a combination of Arleigh Burkes (Flt IV) and CSC Type 26 Frigates would be “game changing”.
https://www.bing.com/search?q=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/delivering-stronger-navy-faster&form=PRCAEN&httpsmsn=1&msnews=1&refig=49a7a348184b4ef9b9bc1d0501790735
