Bangladesh Historical 1971 Liberation War: Events, Battles, Stories, Interviews

[Isa Khan]

https://www.facebook.com/rusembdhaka/posts/355627086605414

 

[Isa Khan]

 

[Isa Khan]

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=377803747692315&id=100063880773399

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=380128564126500&id=100063880773399

 

[Isa Khan]

 

[Isa Khan]

William AS Ouderland, Bir Protik (the only foreigner given a gallantry award by the Bangladeshi government), with an officer from the 50 Independent Parachute Brigade, who had entered Dhaka following it's liberation from the Pakistani forces.

 

[Isa Khan]

Mukti Bahini guerillas moving out on a jeep on the streets, armed with Bren Light Machine guns after the town was liberated at the end of Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971.

Mukti Bahini forces pose during guarding a Locality near a road sign, somewhere in Sector-9 area of operations inside Bangladesh during the war.

 

[Isa Khan]

Exactly a week after former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa referred to the East Pakistan loss as a ‘political’ failure, foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari rejected the claim, insisting that the Dhaka debacle in 1971 was in fact a ‘military failure.’

Bilawal also insisted that the ‘military failure’ in erstwhile East Pakistan had brought a host of challenges for the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto-led Pakistan People’s Party, reported Dawn, Pakistan’s English-language daily, on December 1.

The Pakistani foreign minister expressed this opinion at a rally organised to mark the 55th anniversary of the founding of the PPP, according to DAWN.

He referred to the fall of Dhaka in 1971 when his grandfather took up the challenge to reunite the ‘disintegrated country’ and ‘regain the lost glory’.

‘When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over the government, the people were broken and had lost all hope,’ he said.

‘But he rebuilt the nation, restored the confidence of the people, and finally brought our 90,000 troops back home, who had been made prisoners of war due to “military failure”. Those 90,000 soldiers were reunited with their families.’

General Bajwa, in his final public speech as Pakistan’s army chief, said that Pakistan lost out the then East Pakistan in 1971 due to political failure, according to another DAWN report on November 24.

‘I want to correct some facts here. Firstly, former East Pakistan was

a political failure and not a military one,’ Bajwa had said.

Bajwa had said that the number of Pakistani soldiers fighting in Bangladesh was not 92,000 but 34,000 and the others were in different government departments.

He added that these 34,000 soldiers were confronted by an Indian army of 250,000 soldiers and 200,000 members of the Mukti Bahini.

Bajwa retired as the Pakistani army chief on November 29.

Pak FM, army trade blame over 1971 failure

Exactly a week after former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa referred to the East Pakistan loss as a ‘political’ failure, foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari rejected the claim, insisting that the Dhaka debacle in 1971 was in fact...

www.newagebd.net

 

[F-6 enthusiast]

Exactly a week after former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa referred to the East Pakistan loss as a ‘political’ failure

he is right

 

[Isa Khan]

he is right

Not exactly.

"Yet Gen Bajwa’s laying the blame for the separation of East Pakistan at the door of political forces must be examined more closely, for while West Pakistan’s politicians certainly had a role to play, it was the military leadership at the time that was in control, and whose actions ultimately resulted in the break-up of united Pakistan.

It should be recalled that in the run-up to the fall of Dhaka, Gen Yahya Khan was the president and chief martial law administrator of Pakistan.

Indeed, the West Pakistani elite — politicians, bureaucracy, military — all played a role in aggravating the crisis. There can be little argument that parties of the western wing, particularly Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP, were reluctant to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s victorious Awami League after the 1970 general elections. And the postponement of the National Assembly session, under Gen Yahya’s watch, was a major catalyst for unrest in the eastern wing.

But arguably, the point of no return came when the military launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971. This move resulted in a political and constitutional crisis metastasising into a bloody civil war, with atrocities committed by both sides.

By December, India would enter the fray, leading up to Gen ‘Tiger’ Niazi signing the instrument of surrender, and resulting in the permanent rupture of Jinnah’s Pakistan.

Even before December 1971, the sense of disillusionment felt by the eastern wing’s population was greatly exacerbated during Gen Ayub Khan’s long military rule. This included the denial of cultural and economic rights to the people of East Pakistan.

So for the outgoing chief to say that the fall of Dhaka was a political failure is highly debatable, especially when military strongmen had such a key role to play in the development of this crisis.

Unfortunately, we as a nation have yet to come to terms with the bitter truths of 1971. For example, although the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report — a redacted version of which was officially released in 2000 — had recommended the court martial of some senior military officials, action was never taken. For there to be full closure, we need to make peace with the truth."

1971 in retrospect

The point of no return came when the military launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971.

www.dawn.com

 

[F-6 enthusiast]

Not exactly.

"Yet Gen Bajwa’s laying the blame for the separation of East Pakistan at the door of political forces must be examined more closely, for while West Pakistan’s politicians certainly had a role to play, it was the military leadership at the time that was in control, and whose actions ultimately resulted in the break-up of united Pakistan.

It should be recalled that in the run-up to the fall of Dhaka, Gen Yahya Khan was the president and chief martial law administrator of Pakistan.

Indeed, the West Pakistani elite — politicians, bureaucracy, military — all played a role in aggravating the crisis. There can be little argument that parties of the western wing, particularly Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s PPP, were reluctant to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s victorious Awami League after the 1970 general elections. And the postponement of the National Assembly session, under Gen Yahya’s watch, was a major catalyst for unrest in the eastern wing.

But arguably, the point of no return came when the military launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971. This move resulted in a political and constitutional crisis metastasising into a bloody civil war, with atrocities committed by both sides.

By December, India would enter the fray, leading up to Gen ‘Tiger’ Niazi signing the instrument of surrender, and resulting in the permanent rupture of Jinnah’s Pakistan.

Even before December 1971, the sense of disillusionment felt by the eastern wing’s population was greatly exacerbated during Gen Ayub Khan’s long military rule. This included the denial of cultural and economic rights to the people of East Pakistan.

So for the outgoing chief to say that the fall of Dhaka was a political failure is highly debatable, especially when military strongmen had such a key role to play in the development of this crisis.

Unfortunately, we as a nation have yet to come to terms with the bitter truths of 1971. For example, although the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report — a redacted version of which was officially released in 2000 — had recommended the court martial of some senior military officials, action was never taken. For there to be full closure, we need to make peace with the truth."

1971 in retrospect

The point of no return came when the military launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971.

www.dawn.com

denying Mujib his rightful govt , Op. Searchlight , intentional economic neglect and alienation were all political decisions made by the politicians and the military men who ruled Pakistan.

He added that these 34,000 soldiers were confronted by an Indian army of 250,000 soldiers and 200,000 members of the Mukti Bahini.

If the PA knew that if a war broke out , their position would be untenable they could have avoided this by handing over the reigns to AL. This was a political decision by the military . A political failure by the military and the elites. That is my reasoning.

 

[Isa Khan]

DHAKA, Dec 11, 2022 (BSS) - Muktijoddha Maitri Awardee Pakistani origin Swedish judge Syed Asif Shahkar has wished to be interred in Bangladesh, a country for which he was imprisoned and tortured by Pakistani rulers during its Liberation War in 1971.

"I am now 72 years old. I don't know how long I will be alive. But as a well-wisher of Bangladesh, I want to be buried in its soil," said Shahkar.

Taking to BSS over phone in the month of victory (December), he said he had already written a letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in December of 2015, expressing his final desire.

In the letter, the retired judge sought Bangladesh citizenship but he is yet to know whether Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina received his letter.

He was born in Panjab and in 1971, he was 22 years old.

Young Shahkar protested, held rallies, wrote poems and distributed leaflets in support of Bangladesh Liberation War, he said, adding, as a result, he was hated by his family, society and the people of Pakistan.

He also said he was general secretary of Punjab Students' Union and a section of people of West Pakistan protested the ruthless and brutal genocide of the Pakistani regime called 'Operation Search Light' on the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) on the dark night of March 25, 1971.

"I was imprisoned as a 'traitor'. During the nine months of Liberation War, I endured mental and physical tortures in Pakistan prison. But I did not go against Bangladesh. I was released from captivity after December 16, 1971 with the victory of Bangladesh," he recalled.

Shahkar said, "If Bangladesh hadn't achieved independence, I could not have been released from the prison. I would have been sentenced to death or life in prison in Pakistan".

Later, he worked as a producer in Pakistan Television for some days in Lahore but he could not stay in Pakistan for long with recognition as 'Kulangar' (black sheep) in his own country.

In 1977, he went to Sweden for political asylum. He started his new struggle for living. Later he was appointed and started working as a judge of the High Court Division of Sweden.

After 41 years of independence, Justice Shahkar came to Bangladesh to receive the Liberation War Friendship Award in 2012 at an invitation of the Bangladesh government. Late President Md. Zillur Rahman and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina presented the award to him on December 15, 2012.

Shahkar said, "I might not express my love to Bangladesh during my life time. I was so touched and emotional to get overwhelming love, respect and goodwill what I received during my stay in Bangladesh. When I left for Sweden I guessed that leaving Bangladesh will be my lifeless departure and my soul will remain behind".

"I like to think of myself as a Bangladesh citizen, not Pakistan. I applied for Bangladesh citizenship so that after my death I could be buried in the soil of Bangladesh," he added.

In a long letter of 770 words to the prime minister, Shahkar expressed his love for Bangladesh, the people of Bangladesh, as well as heartfelt desire to be buried in the soil of this country.

In the letter, Shahkar quoted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as saying, "A foreigner who supported the War of Liberation is also a freedom fighter" and said her words have guided him to proceed and directly knock at her door.

"We were honored to have received the Friends of Bangladesh Award. When a freedom fighter of Bangladesh can be a citizen of Bangladesh, live here, own a home, then being a foreigner who supported the war of liberation why cannot I be buried here like other deceased freedom fighters of Bangladesh? Why cannot I be a citizen of Bangladesh? Why cannot I have my own home in Dhaka like a Bangladeshi freedom fighter," he said in his letter to Sheikh Hasina.

Mentioning himself as a foreign freedom fighter of Bangladesh, Shahkar applied for Bangladesh citizenship and the privilege of a citizen, including the facility to be buried in Bangladesh. He also expressed his desire to work for Bangladesh.

Drawing the attention of the premier, he wrote, "I not only believe but I am sure that you will consider my humble request in earnest."

The retired justice is still working for Bangladesh despite living in Stockholm. He is also vocal in demanding justice for the brutal genocide that the then Pakistani rulers committed in Bangladesh in the 1971 Liberation War.

After the World War II, no other country in the world had such a large-scale genocide and despite that, the United Nations has not yet recognized the genocide in Bangladesh that occurred in 1971, he said.

On October 3, 2022, a discussion meeting was held at the headquarters of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to demand recognition for Pakistan's genocide in Bangladesh by the United Nations.

Shahkar was present as a discussant in the meeting jointly organized by Bangladesh Support Group, an expatriate organization based in the Netherlands, Aamra Ekattor and Projonmo 71' with the support of the European Bangladesh Forum.

In the meeting, he strongly appealed to the United Nations to recognize the genocide on Bangladesh and prosecute the killers.

Foreign FF wishes to be buried in Bangladesh, seeks citizenship | News

By Mahfuza Jasmine DHAKA, Dec 11, 2022 (BSS) - Muktijoddha Maitri Awardee Pakistani origin Swedish judge Syed Asif Shahkar has wished

www.bssnews.net

 

[Isa Khan]

What is new is a lengthy discussion of the 1971 crisis in what were then the separated parts of East and West Pakistan. This once forgotten episode, in which the U.S.-backed armed forces of West Pakistan massacred an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 East Pakistanis and drove some ten million refugees into India, became more widely known after the Princeton political scientist Gary Bass published The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide in 2013.

The crisis arose when voters in East Pakistan chose a leader who called for the region’s autonomy from Pakistan, and that country’s military dictator, General Yahya Khan, ordered his military to crush the newly elected regional government. The United States did not object publicly or privately, and Nixon and Kissinger continued to secretly supply Pakistan with weapons, including F-104 fighter jets, ammunition, and spare parts, despite warnings from State Department and Pentagon lawyers and White House staff that the transfers were illegal.

Eventually, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided that the only way to stop the flood of refugees was to end the killing. India invaded East Pakistan and crushed the Pakistani army, eventually leading to the founding of an independent Bangladesh. But despite its nonaligned status, India had recently concluded a friendship and military assistance pact with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger claims that the pact transformed the conflict “from a regional and humanitarian challenge into a crisis of global strategic dimensions.” Indeed, during the invasion, Nixon dispatched ships from the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal and urged China to threaten India by moving troops to the two countries’ shared border.

Kissinger attributes the passionate opposition to Nixon’s policy by U.S. diplomats in East Pakistan and others in Washington to “human-rights advocates” arguing for “largely symbolic gestures.” Pakistan, he asserts, was “already amply armed,” and U.S. disapproval would do nothing except “diminish American leverage.” But he also admits, in so many words, that what actually determined the U.S. stance was that Yahya Khan was serving as the key intermediary in the administration’s efforts to open relations with Mao Zedong’s China.

Unfortunately, Kissinger writes, “the tragedy unfolding in East Pakistan coincided with and complicated our communications over the date and agenda of my impending secret trip to Beijing.” The administration would not take any action that held even the remotest chance of jeopardizing that process. (Kissinger does not make clear that that first crucial trip took place in July 1971, a timing that might account for the White House’s policy before that but that is less satisfactory in explaining its continued silence in the months that followed.)

A vicious, bigoted anti-Indian sentiment was also at work. Drawing on the once secret Nixon tapes, Bass shows that Nixon and Kissinger inflamed each other. The president said that what India really needed was a “mass famine” and that he couldn’t understand “why the hell anybody would reproduce in that damn country.” In these conversations, Indira Gandhi was “the witch” or “the old bitch.”

The United States, Kissinger says at another point, cannot allow “Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours.” Obviously, attitude affected policy, notwithstanding Kissinger’s insistence that the administration’s approach to the crisis had nothing to do with what he calls “insensitivity.” (He further belittles that term by adding that some conversations “did not reflect moral elevation.”)

What is most striking are the conclusions that Kissinger now draws from the tragic affair. This previously unremarked episode now becomes “a turning point in the Cold War” because of China’s potential involvement and, even more far-fetched, “the first crisis over the shape of the first genuinely global order in world history.” Raising the bar still higher, Kissinger even posits that a “global war over Bangladesh” was “possible.”

Few would dispute that Nixon and Kissinger were juggling critical U.S. relations with both China and the Soviet Union or that the opening of relations with China held far greater strategic value in 1971 than did autonomy for East Pakistan. But serious questions remain. Did pursuing that opening require the stance Washington took? When policy in a democracy requires secrecy because of widespread opposition, how often does it produce a beneficial result in the long run?

Do illegal acts—in this case arms transfers—by the government lower the threshold for bad behavior, leading others, in and out of government, to break the law? Is there a better balance to be found than obtained here between a realist concern for the national interest and a decent respect for human life, including brown, non-Christian life? Answers are not to be found here.

Profiles in Power

The world according to Kissinger.

www.foreignaffairs.com

 

[Nilgiri]

200,000 views so far in just 1 day time (and many comments pouring in):

The longer interview with the author:

 

[Zapper]

Razia Begum, who was attacked and raped by soldiers in 1971 and left for dead in a ditch. Photograph: Noor Alam/The Guardian
Rights and freedomGlobal development

‘We lay like corpses. Then the raping began’: 52 years on, Bangladesh’s rape c​

In 1971, the Pakistan army began a brutal crackdown against Bengalis in which hundreds of thousands of women were detained and repeatedly brutalised. Only now are their stories beginning to be told
Warning: graphic information in this report may upset some readers



It was the summer of 1971, and the distant murmurs of a war that began months earlier had made their way to Rajshahi in Bangladesh, across the north bank of the Padma River, to Noor Jahan’s door. The 14-year-old was playing in the courtyard with her little sister when a loud military truck came to a halt outside the family’s farmhouse.
Armed soldiers threw the two girls into the back of the truck, where they discovered several women sitting back to back with their hands tied. “They told us to look down and to remain silent,” recalls Jahan, now 65. The truck continued through the small town, making several stops; each time loading more women and girls into the back as if they were cattle. All the women were sobbing silently, Jahan describes, too afraid to make a sound.

“We had no idea where they were taking us. I watched from the corner of my eye as the marigold fields surrounding our home disappeared from sight,” says Jahan. “I remember clutching my sister’s hand tightly and being terrified the entire time. We had all heard about the Butcher of Bengal and his men.”

Noor Jahan: ‘The only time we saw daylight was when the door creaked open and the soldiers marched in. Then the raping would begin.’ Photograph: Noor Alam/The Guardian
The Butcher of Bengal was the nickname given to Pakistan’s military commander, Gen Tikka Khan, notorious for overseeing Operation Searchlight, a murderous crackdown on Bengali separatists in what was then East Pakistan, which led to a genocidal crusade during the liberation war that followed.

But Jahan was about to become a victim of another brutal tactic of the Pakistani army. Alongside the killings, soldiers carried out a violent campaign of mass rape against Bengali women and girls, in what many historians believe amounted to a direct policy under Khan’s command to impregnate as many women as possible with “blood from the west”.

When the truck finally came to a stop, the girls found themselves in military barracks. The next few months were a blur for Jahan, who regularly passed out during her confinement. “We lay there like corpses, side by side. There were 20, maybe 30, of us confined to one room,” she recalls tearfully. “The only time we saw daylight was when the door creaked open and the soldiers marched in. Then the raping would begin.”

During the conflict that led to the birth of Bangladesh, military-style rape camps such as the one in which Jahan was held were set up across the country. Official estimates put the number of Bengali women raped at between 200,000 and 400,000, though even those numbers are considered conservative by some.
Though ethnic rape was feature of Partition years earlier, what Bengali women experienced was one of the first recorded examples of rape being used as a “consciously applied weapon of war” in the 20th century. But despite its shocking scale, little remains known about it outside the region.

Ostracised​

Within Bangladesh, widespread stigma led to the women being ostracised by their communities, and their horrifying accounts were often suppressed by shame. Today, a plaque on the wall of the Liberation War Museum in Dhaka says it all: “There are not many records of this hidden suffering.” Yet in every corner of Bangladesh, there are survivors with terrifying testimonies.

In August 1971, Razia Begum had gone looking for her husband, Abu Sarkar, who had been missing for several days. She wandered anxiously through the abandoned streets of Tejturi Bazar in Dhaka, where Sarkar was a fruit seller, but he was nowhere to be found. Begum turned a corner, when she found herself face to face with a group of soldiers. She tried to run but was struck on the head with a rifle; a scar she still bears.

Begum was dragged to a nearby forest where she was raped repeatedly over a period of weeks. The soldiers were stationed close by and returned at different times of the day. “They tied me to a tree and took turns raping me during their breaks,” says Begum, now 78. After they were done with her, the soldiers threw Begum into a shallow ditch.

Razia Begum: ‘I don’t like to think about what happened. But after all these years, it has been difficult for me to forget.’ Photograph: Noor Alam/The Guardian
A passerby eventually found her and took her to a shelter, which Begum describes as a lost-and-found for women who were abducted during the war. Such makeshift shelters had been set up in districts across the region for the many women who had been abducted and abandoned miles from their home.

“Women didn’t often leave the house during that time, so many of us didn’t even know our proper addresses,” says Begum. Begum’s husband tried four different shelters before he found her and took her home. “I don’t like to think about what happened,” says Begum. “But after all these years, it has been difficult for me to forget. I still have nightmares.”

On 16 December 1971, the war came to an abrupt end. Although independence had been won, thousands of Bengali women, such as Jahan and Begum, would be rescued from shelters and rape camps across the country.

Rescue mission​

Maleka Khan, then secretary of the Bangladesh Girl Guides Association, was tasked with mobilising female volunteers to help with war recovery efforts. But after learning about the discovery of women who had been raped and held captive in underground bunkers near Jahangir Gate in Dhaka, Khan decided to lead the rescue mission herself.
When Khan arrived, she was shocked by what she saw. “There were women who were completely naked,” Khan, now 80, says. “They were abandoned in bunkers, where they had been kept and tortured during the war.” Khan bought the women clothes and, after helping them out, she describes carefully wrapping them in saris and blankets.

“They were in a state of shock and couldn’t speak,” says Khan. “Some had their hair chopped off, while others were heavily pregnant. There was an air of disbelief about the whole thing. It was all so horrific.”
The women were taken to safe houses provided by the government of the newly independent Bangladesh. In an effort to integrate rape survivors back into society, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the nation, granted them the honorific of Birangona (war heroine) and established a rehabilitation programme for the women, of which Khan became executive director.

Maleka Khan: ‘There was an air of disbelief about the whole thing. It was all so horrific.’ Photograph: Courtesy of Khalid Hussain Ayon
“The rehabilitation programme provided shelter, counselling and training for survivors, while entrusting medical practitioners with the task of dealing with unwanted pregnancies,” Khan says. Two things then happened: temporary legislation to allow later abortions and an international adoption campaign for babies that had been abandoned.

Geoffrey Davis, an Australian doctor who specialised in late-term abortions, was brought in by the World Health Organization to oversee the high-risk procedures. He described how the Pakistani army would conduct their attacks on towns and villages during the war.

“They’d keep the infantry back and put artillery ahead and they would shell the hospitals and schools. And that caused absolute chaos in the town. And then the infantry would go in and begin to segregate the women,” Davis told Bina D’Costa, a professor at the Australian National University, in his last interview before he died in 2008.

“Apart from little children, all those who were sexually matured would be segregated,” he said. “And then the women would be put in the compound under guard and made available to the troops.
“Some of the stories they told were appalling – the women had it really rough. They didn’t get enough to eat. When they got sick, they received no treatment. Lots of them died in those camps.

“They all had nightmares. You never get over it. A lot of them had tremendous anxiety because we were foreign and they didn’t trust anybody who was foreign,” he said. “They didn’t know what we were going to do to them … It was very difficult.”
The doctor also reflected on his conversations with soldiers who had taken part in the rapes but could not seem to understand what all the fuss was about.

We still haven’t received an apology from Pakistan for the horrendous war crimes it committed against the Bengali people

Saida Muna Tasneem
“They were in a prison in Comilla and in pretty miserable circumstances and they were saying: ‘What are they going on about? What were we supposed to have done? It was a war!’” said Davis. “The really disgraceful thing is that all these officers were trained in Sandhurst [Royal Military Academy] in England – and that was just not acceptable.”

Today, women in Bangladesh are finding ways to write Birangona women back into a history from which they had been largely erased. Rising Silence, an award-winning documentary by the British-Bangladeshi playwright Leesa Gazi, preserves the testimony of some of those still alive.

Convictions​

Uncovering the women’s stories left Gazi asking herself: “How can a woman’s body instigate so much hatred and violence? If we need to shame a family, we go after their daughters. If we need to shame a country, we go after their daughters. It’s the same mindset.”

Birangona women featured in the award-winning documentary Rising Silence. Photograph: Handout

Rape continues to be deployed in war as a tool of fear, a military strategy to terrorise communities and destroy their dignity. A recent report by the UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict listed 18 countries where women were being raped in war, and named 12 armies and police forces and 39 non-state actors.


‘Like an open prison’: a million Rohingya refugees still in Bangladesh camps five years after crisis
Read more
“The repeated failure of the international community to bring perpetrators to account means these horrendous acts continue with impunity,” says Shireen Huq, co-founder of Naripokkho, an activist group leading the fight for women’s rights in Bangladesh. Naripokkho was instrumental in supporting Rohingya rape victims in 2017, when Bangladesh once again found itself on the frontline of a rape epidemic, as more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims crossed its borders to escape genocide in neighbouring Myanmar.

Among them were thousands of women and children who had suffered horrifying sexual violence at the hands of Burmese soldiers. Harrowing details emerged of women being tied to trees and subjected to rape for days, tortured by bamboo sticks and set on fire. Once again, in an echo of past events, many of the women would also find themselves battling with the stigma of unwanted pregnancies.

The hands of Razia Begum. Photograph: Noor Alam/The Guardian
“It has been 52 years and we still haven’t received an apology from Pakistan for the horrendous war crimes it committed against the Bengali people,” says Saida Muna Tasneem, Bangladesh’s high commissioner to the UK.

Bangladesh has already succeeded in getting genocide recognition from the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention and Genocide Watch, and US Congress recently introduced a historic resolution recognising that a genocide occurred in 1971. The government is now lobbying for the UN and international community to recognise that a genocide was committed during the liberation war.

“Lack of recognition remains an open wound for the millions who were directly impacted by the atrocities that took place, many of whom are still alive today,” says Tasneem. “This dark chapter of history has been kept in the shadows for too long.”


https://www.theguardian.com/global-...a-women-mass-rape-surviviors?CMP=share_btn_tw

 

[Isa Khan]

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=1009189370070603

 

[what]

Let me ask a somewhat related question in here:

How was India's involvement / invasion perceived by Bangladesh and its citizens during the independence war?
Welcome, or were people irritated because they didn't know if they were coming to stay? @Isa Khan @Afif


What is Pakistan's stance on the mass killings of civilians back then, today?

 

[Afif]

Let me ask a somewhat related question in here:

How was India's involvement / invasion perceived by Bangladesh and its citizens during the independence war?
Welcome, or were people irritated because they didn't know if they were coming to stay? @Isa Khan @Afif


What is Pakistan's stance on the mass killings of civilians back then, today?

Thank you for the question.
I am no expert on the topic, so my answer would be in the general sense.

On the first point, India's involement was seens largely in a positive way. (They were helping us from the beginning)

And India genuinely didn't have any plan to 'stay'.
And I think East Pakistani/Bangladeshi leadership was pretty much certain of it.

Because, considering the regional and international geopolitical consequences realpolitik tells us, annexing Bangaldesh would have way too much for India to swallow/handle at that time.

Let me unpack that little more,

Firstly, Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi campaigned those months (before direct military involvement) all over the world to raise the general awareness about what was going on in East Pakistan and build up support and sympathy of the International community for the East Pakistani/Bangladeshi people.

And that whole thing definitely would've backfired if India just suddenly annexed East Pakistan after the war.

But more importantly, there would have been a desicive reaction from Western alliance.

So, creation and independence of East Pakistan/Bangladesh was somewhat off ramp for the Americans and the brits.

Otherwise, if a soviet ally defeated and captured half territory of a strategic western ally, I don't think USA and the brits could afford to back down.

Definitely there would have been heavy western sanctions. (And at that time India was very poor) But also, i would suspect, in such scenario Western alliances may considered climbing up the escalation ladder (despite the presence of Soviet fleet) and bomb the Indian army out of East Pakistan.


Officially, US carrier strike groups objective was to help evacuate the West Pakistani force after the supposed cease-fire.

However, unofficially they did have plan for more.

"US wanted to avoid a second Indo-Pak war, but had to support Pakistan as an ally. However, the mass killing in East Pakistan created massive international response, limiting the power of the US to help Pakistan legally. In the United Nations, US had to announce that they would not deliver arms to India or Pakistan, but Nixon, needing Yahiya as the errand boy to deal with China, delivered arms to Pakistan directly or through third countries, keeping UN or US congress in dark. But when liberation of Bangladesh was imminent by the first week of December, Nixon signaled to move U.S.S Enterprise carrier group toward Bay of Bengal.
However, it was not totally unplanned, Nixon and his henchman, Kissinger planned this long ago. In November 13th General Haig, Kissinger's right hand man, in a special memo on “Pakistan India situation”, instructed admiral Welendar to consider the use of carrier task force in the Indian Ocean and form a task group to arrange deployment within 24 hours notice.
On December 9, after CIA director warned that 'East Pakistan was crumbling', Nixon decided to send “carrier task force” to Bay of Bengal, to threaten India. As US Ambassador to UN, Bush, on a meeting on 10th December with Henry Kissinger, Admiral Haig, and Chinese emissary noted that “Kissinger talked about the fact that US would be moving some ships in the area( bay of Bengal) , about military supplies being sent ( to Pakistan) from Jordan , Turkey and Iran.”

December 10, 10:51 am, in a meeting Nixon said to Kissinger, “Our desire is to save West Pakistan, Keep those carriers moving now.” Kissinger replied, “The carriers—everything is moving, we're going to keep moving until there's a settlement.” On the same day, Indian intelligence intercepted an American message, indicating that the US “7th” Fleet, led by the USS Enterprise, reached Sri Lanka from Vietnam. In a note General Tiwari recalls that in a briefing of the defense services bavy chief Admiral Nanda informed army chief General Manekshaw and Ms. Gandhi about the US “8th” fleet “sailing into the Bay of Bengal.'
The US “fleet” consisted of the USS Enterprise, at 75,000 ton, the world's largest nuclear powered aircraft carrier with more than 70 fighters and bombers , guided missile cruiser USS King, guided missile destroyers USS Decatur, Parsons and Tartar Sam, and amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli.

Synchronizing with the US, UK navy also started to move, seemingly to support US and hence, Pakistan. Soviet intelligence reported that a British naval group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle with commando carrier HMS Albion, several destroyers and other ships was approaching India's territorial waters from west.
The British and the Americans planned a coordinated pincer attack to intimidate allied forces: the British ships in the Arabian Sea will target India's western coast, while the Americans would make a dash into the Bay of Bengal from the east to Bangladesh."

US Fleet in Bay of Bengal: A game of deception

It is known that US 7th fleet, led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, entered Bay of Bengal on December, 1971. Officially to secure American citizens in Bangladesh, unofficially to threaten allied forces and prevent the liberation of Bangladesh. But few know the masterminds behind this...

www.thedailystar.net

Obviously, Soviet fleet wasn't exact match for British and American carrier strike groups.

Also, I think India directly annexing East Pakistan/Bangladesh would've been more than what Soviet signed up for when they signed the treaty and sent their fleet.

So in a nutshell, cost of annexing East Pakistan/Bangladesh for India would've outweighed the benefits by a large margin.



And about Pakistan's stance on the matter, I am not sure if you are asking about state or the people or both.

So, Pakistan as a STATE obviously never officially apologized for the atrocities committed the Pak army.

When it comes to Pakistani people, they has mixed views on the topic.

Some ultra-nationalist think amry is the guardian angel of the country and most of it were Indian/Bangladeshi propaganda against Pakistani army or were justified anyway.


Majority probably think, there was good people on both side and both parties did some horrible things.
Not that, its not true. Some Bangladeshi independent fighters did do some horrible things, however, that wasn't any close to the scale and numbers of what Pak army did.

Also, if you start the massacre unprovoked you should take majority of the blame for what happens next.

Some younger generation who are better educated and not fed up with the state's propaganda has a more realistic picture of what happened.

Edit-We have to remember, technically it was a civil war in Pakistan

 

[Isa Khan]

People are protesting against the Pakistani rulers on the Dhaka's street. Dhaka, Bangladesh (05/03/1971)

Explore the role of racism in the separation of East Pakistan as we delve into Mr. Pervez Hoodbhoy's perspective. Discover the historical context and complexities surrounding West Pakistanis' treatment of Bengalis. Gain insights into the impact of racism on the Fall of Dhaka and its far-reaching consequences.
Pervez Hoodbhoy (Video in Urdu)

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=6235343336512740

 

[Jackdaws]

Let me ask a somewhat related question in here:

How was India's involvement / invasion perceived by Bangladesh and its citizens during the independence war?
Welcome, or were people irritated because they didn't know if they were coming to stay? @Isa Khan @Afif


What is Pakistan's stance on the mass killings of civilians back then, today?

A bit like Brits and Americans entering occupied France.

 

[Isa Khan]